# LALA RAM v. HARi RAM

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 898
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-10-17
- **Case number:** Cdminal Appeal No. 191 of 1967
- **Bench:** S. M. S1Kri, G. K. Mitter, P. Jaganmohan Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lala-ram-v-hari-ram-4960
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, s. 417(4)-/f prescribes a period
of Limitation.
Words and Phrases-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, s. 417(4)-
"Entertain", meaning of.
An application for leave to' appeal to the High Cou'rt under s. 417(3)
Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal by a Magistrate
dated August 31, 1965 was filed on November l, 1965. , It was claimed
that two days were necessary for obtaining the certified copy of the order
of the Magistrate. The application would be in time if these two days
were deducted.
The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the
appellant.
In appeal to this C'ourt against his _conviction the appellant
contended that the period of 60 days mentioned in s. 417(4) was not a
p<riod of limitation within die meaning of s. 12 of the Limitation Act and
that the sub.-section barred the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with
the application if a period of 60 days had expired from the date of the
order of acquitial.
HELD: The application under s. 417(3) to
the High Court was
within time,
Section 417(4) itself prescribes a petiod of limitation; it was open to
the legislature to prescribe a period of limitation in the code itself. In the
conte<I of s. 417 ( 4) the word "entertain" means "file or receive by the
court and it has no reference to the actual hearing of the application for
leave to appeal; otherwise the result would be that in many cases applications for leave to appeal would be barred because the applications have not
been put up for hearing before the High Court within sixty days of the
order of acquittal. [901 D-F]
J(ausha(va Rani v. Gopal Singh, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 982, 987, Anja11abai v.
Yeshwantrao Daplatrao Dudhe, I.LR.
(1961)
Born.
135,
137 and
Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works v.
Asstt. Commissioner Sales Tax.
[1968] 1 S.C.R. 505, referred to.

## Text

898
LALA RAM
v.
HARi RAM
October 17, 1969
[S. M. S1KRI, G. K. MITTER AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, s. 417(4)-/f prescribes a period
of Limitation.
Words and Phrases-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, s. 417(4)-
"Entertain", meaning of.
An application for leave to' appeal to the High Cou'rt under s. 417(3)
Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal by a Magistrate
dated August 31, 1965 was filed on November l, 1965. , It was claimed
that two days were necessary for obtaining the certified copy of the order
of the Magistrate. The application would be in time if these two days
were deducted.
The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the
appellant.
In appeal to this C'ourt against his _conviction the appellant
contended that the period of 60 days mentioned in s. 417(4) was not a
p<riod of limitation within die meaning of s. 12 of the Limitation Act and
that the sub.-section barred the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with
the application if a period of 60 days had expired from the date of the
order of acquitial.
HELD: The application under s. 417(3) to
the High Court was
within time,
Section 417(4) itself prescribes a petiod of limitation; it was open to
the legislature to prescribe a period of limitation in the code itself. In the
conte<I of s. 417 ( 4) the word "entertain" means "file or receive by the
court and it has no reference to the actual hearing of the application for
leave to appeal; otherwise the result would be that in many cases applications for leave to appeal would be barred because the applications have not
been put up for hearing before the High Court within sixty days of the
order of acquittal. [901 D-F]
J(ausha(va Rani v. Gopal Singh, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 982, 987, Anja11abai v.
Yeshwantrao Daplatrao Dudhe, I.LR.
(1961)
Born.
135,
137 and
Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works v.
Asstt. Commissioner Sales Tax.
[1968] 1 S.C.R. 505, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Cdminal Appeal No.
191 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
March 14, I967 of the Rajasthan High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 720 of 1965.
B. D. Sharma, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J.
Hari Ram, respondent, filed a complaint against
Lala Ram, appellant, alleging that Lala Ram had attacked him
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LALA RAM v. HARi RAM (Sikri. J.)
899
with a Kassi on June 10, 1964, at about 6 p.m. Poonaram, who
was stinding there prevented the blow from falling on Hari Ram
by receiving it on his hand.
The respondent, however, made ~
second attack and inflicted an injury on the left shoulder of Han
Ram. Hari Ram and Poonaram got themselves examined by the
Civil Assistant Surgeon of the city and the injury report was submitled alongwith the complaint.
The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused. Hari Ram filed
an application under s. 417 ( 3) of the Crjminal P.rocedure Code
for leave to appeal against the order of /the Magistrate.
Leave
was granted by the High Court, and thereupon Harl Ram filed the
appeal.
The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the
appellant, Lala Ram, under s. 324, I.P.C., and sentenced him to
four months' rigorous imprisonment.
The attention of the High Court was not drawn to the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, during the hearing of the appeal but
subsequent to the delivery of the judgment an application was
filed under s. 561-A, Cr. P.C., read with ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the
Probation of Offenders Act It was alleged in the application
that the appellant was 20 years old and the High Court should
have given him the benefit of the Probation of the Offenders Act.
The High Court did not accede to this application.
The appellant
having obtained special leave from this Court, the appeal is now
. before us.
The main contention of law which arises before us is whether
the appeal to the High Court was filed within limitation.
The
application for leave to appeal to the High Court under s. 417 (3)
against the order of acquittal of the Magistrate, dated August 31,
I 965, was filed on November 1, 1965.
It was claimed by the
applicant that two days were necessary for obtaining the certified
copy of the order of the Magistrate and the applicant was entitled
to deduct these two, days take;n for obtaining the certified copy of
the order of the Magistrate.
There is no doubt that the application would be in time, if these two days are deducted.
But the
learned counsel for the appellant contends that s. 12(2) of the
Indian Limitation Act is not attracted to applications under
G·
s. 417(3), Cr. P.C. Section 417(3) and (4) read as follows:
H
"417. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the
Public Prosecutor to prLlent an appeal to the High
Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal
passed by any Court other than a High Court.
.
( 3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any
case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on
1L5SupCI/70-12
900
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 S.C.R.
an application made to it by the complainant in this
behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of
acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to
the High Court.
( 4) No application under sub-section (3) for the
grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
acquittal shall be entertained by the' High Court after
the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of
acquittal . ... "
It is contended that the period of 60 days mentioned in
s.417(4) is not a period of limitation within the meaning of
s.12(2) of the Limitation Act.
Section 12(2) of the Limitation
Act reads as follows :
"12(2) In computing the period of limitation for an
appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the
judgment complained of was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or
order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed
shall be excluded."
The learned counsel says that what s.417 ( 4) provides is a
prohibition and it bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal
with the application if a period of 60 days has expired from the
date of the order of acquittal.
Jn our opinion there is no force in these contentions.
In
Kausha/ya Rani v. Gopal Singh(') this Court, while dealing with
the question whether s.5 of the Limitation Act applies to applications under s.417(3) described this period of 60 days mentioned
in s.417(3) as follows:
"Jn that sense, this rule of 60 days bar is a special
law, that is to say, a rule of limitation which is specially
provided for in the Code itself, which does not ordinarily provide for a period of limitation for appeals or
applications."
This Court further observed :
"Once it is held that the spP.cial rule of limitation
hid down in sub-s. ( 4) of s. 417 of the Code is a
'special law' of limitation, governing appeals by private
prosecutors, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that s.5 of the Limitation Act is wholly out of the
way, in view of s.29 (2 )(b) of the Limitation Act."
(l)'."[19641 4 S.C.R. 982; 987.
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LALA RAM V. HAR! RAM (Sikri, J.)
901
This Court approved the judgment of the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court in Anjanabai v. Yashwantrao Dau/acrao
Dudhe('). The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court "had
observed in Anjanabai's case :
"Sub-se.;tion ( 4) prescribes a period of limitation for
such an application. It states that no such application
shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry
of sixty days from the date of the order cf acquittal.
This period of limitation is prescribed not for all appeals
under the Criminal Procedure Code, or even for all
appeals froin the orders of acquittal.
It is prescribed
only for applications for special leave to appeal from
orders of acquittal.
It is therefore a special' provision
for a special subject and is consequen•ly a special law
within the meaning of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act."
It is quite clear that the Full Bench of the Bombay High
Court and this Court proceeded on the assumption th.at s.417 ( 4)
of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes a period of limitation.
The learned counsel, however, contends that there was no discussion of this aspect.
Be that as it may, it seems to us that s.417 ( 4)
itself prescribes a period of limitation for an application to be
made under s.41? ( 3). It was not necessary f<'r the legislature to
have amended the Limitation Act and to have inserted an article
dealing with applications under s.417 ( 3), Cr. P .C.; it was open
to it to prescribe a period .of limitation in the Code itself.
The learned counsel also suggests that the word "entertain"
which occurs in s.417 ( 4) Means "to deal with or hear" and in this
connection he relies on the judgment of this Court in Lakshmi
Rattan Engineering Works v. Asstt. Commissioner Sales Tax(').
It seems to us that in this context "entertain" means "file or received by the Court" and it has no reference w the actual hearing of
the application for leave to appeal; otherwise the result would be
that in niany cases applicatio,ns for leave to appeal would be barred. because the applications have not been put up for hearing
before the High Court within 60 days of the order of acquittal.
In the result we hold that the application under s.417 (3) to
the High Court was within time.
The learned counsel then contends that the High Court should
not have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the
Magistrate. He has taken us through the evidence of Poonaram
who was injured and the statement of P.W. 3, Ananda, who was
present and who seems to be an independent witness. We agree
(I) l.L.R. [1961[ Bom.135,'.!37.
(2) [1968] I. S.C.R 505.
902
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 2 S.C.R.
with the High Court that the Magistrate was not entitled to reject
the evidence of the eye-witnessess.
No reason has been shown to
us why we should interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by
the High Court.
The learned counsel further contends that no offence was comnlitted because the accused had a right of private defence of property.
Assuming that he had a right of private defence of property he had ample opportunity of· having recourse to the authorities and there was no need for the appellant to have taken the
law into his own hands.
The only question that remains now is the question whether
the benefit of s.6 of the Probation ot_Offenders Act should be extended to the appellant.
In spite of opportunity being given no
good proof has been furnished to establish that the appellant was
at the relevant time under the age of 21 years.
For the aforesaid reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed.
R.K.P:s.
Appeal dismissed:
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