# LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

- **Citation:** [2015] 14 S.C.R. 403
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-12-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 13940 of 2015
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lalaram-v-jaipur-development-authority-30612
- **Pages:** 102

## Headnote

[2015] 14 S.C.R. 403
LALARAM & OTHERS
v ..
JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY &ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 13940 of 2015)
DECEMBER 01, 2015
[V. GOPALA G.OWDAAND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] .
A
B
Land Acquisition - Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act,
1953 - Land of appellants had been compulsorily acquired,
in the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain by C
invoking an expropriatory legislation -
CompuJsory
acquisition of their lands for the Indian Army for. its "Field
Firing Range" - State Government was to purportedly allot
developed land to the land oustees in lieu of compensation
- However, plots offered to the appellants till now not D
developed - Procrastinated legal tussle spanning over three
decades - Issue pertaining to adequate reparation to the
appellants - Held: The facts demonstrate that the State
Government had taken a pre-meditated decision to allot
developed land to the land oustees in lieu of compensation E
- As per the successive circulars including the one dated
13; 12.2001, it was incumbent on the State Government to
allot developed land with all the essential attributes thereof -
The land had been acquired in the year 1981 and more than
three decades have elapsed-The delay cannot.be attributed F
to the appellants - It would be indefensible and too farfetched .
for the respondents to contend that the circular dated
13.12.2001 cannot be construed to be a policy reflecting the
executive decision as contemplated u!Art. 166 and is not
enforceable, as the subject matter thereof had not been laid G
before the Chief Minister u/r.31 of the Rajasthan Rules of
Business u/Art.166 of the Constitution - The plea of the
respondents, at this belated stage, to take refuge of
· unenforceabi/ity of the circular dated 13, 12. 2001 in isolation, ·
403
H
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14S.C.R.
A as not being a binding policy, cannot receive judicial
imprimatur -
The predominant facts herein, justifiably
demand a fitting relief modelled by law, equity and good
conscience -
The value of the acquired land of the
appellants, as on today, cannot' be taken to be an
B unmistakable index to identify the developed land to be
allotted to them - In the singular facts and circumstances of
the case and for the sake of complete justice, the appellants
are entitled to be allotted their quota of 15% developed land
in the terms of policy/circular dated 13. 12.2001 in one or more
c available plots as enumerated by them in their affidavit dated
17.8.2015 - Respondents directed to accommodate them
accordingly - Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 166 - Rajasthan Rules of
Business u!Art.166 of the Constitution-r.31.
D
Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts.142, 14 and 21 -
Powers under Art. 142 - Nature and extent of the power -
Held: The plenary powers of Supreme Court enshrined in
Art. 142 of the Constitution for achieving complete justice is
only an insignia of empowerment so that the constitutional
E guarantees are not reduced to mere ritualistic incantations -
Supreme Court extra-ordinarily does exercise its power
. under Article 142 as warranted in a given fact situation, for
making order (s) as is felt necessary for doing complete
justice in a case a matter pending before it- There can be
F no straight jacket formula, for its exercise nor there can be
any fetter thereto, it being plenary in nature - The invocation
of this power is to reach injustice and redress the same, if it
is not feasible otherwise to achieve this avowed objective -
In doing so, this Court acts in its equity jurisdiction to balance
G the conflicting interests of the parties and advance the cause
of administration of even handed justice - The purport and
purpose of this power being justice oriented and guided by
equitable principles, it chiefly aims at the enforcement of a
public duty, if not forthcoming on legitimate justification
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
405
ensuing in oppressive injustice, militating against the A
constitutional or

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[2015] 14 S.C.R. 403
LALARAM & OTHERS
v ..
JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY &ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 13940 of 2015)
DECEMBER 01, 2015
[V. GOPALA G.OWDAAND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.] .
A
B
Land Acquisition - Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act,
1953 - Land of appellants had been compulsorily acquired,
in the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain by C
invoking an expropriatory legislation -
CompuJsory
acquisition of their lands for the Indian Army for. its "Field
Firing Range" - State Government was to purportedly allot
developed land to the land oustees in lieu of compensation
- However, plots offered to the appellants till now not D
developed - Procrastinated legal tussle spanning over three
decades - Issue pertaining to adequate reparation to the
appellants - Held: The facts demonstrate that the State
Government had taken a pre-meditated decision to allot
developed land to the land oustees in lieu of compensation E
- As per the successive circulars including the one dated
13; 12.2001, it was incumbent on the State Government to
allot developed land with all the essential attributes thereof -
The land had been acquired in the year 1981 and more than
three decades have elapsed-The delay cannot.be attributed F
to the appellants - It would be indefensible and too farfetched .
for the respondents to contend that the circular dated
13.12.2001 cannot be construed to be a policy reflecting the
executive decision as contemplated u!Art. 166 and is not
enforceable, as the subject matter thereof had not been laid G
before the Chief Minister u/r.31 of the Rajasthan Rules of
Business u/Art.166 of the Constitution - The plea of the
respondents, at this belated stage, to take refuge of
· unenforceabi/ity of the circular dated 13, 12. 2001 in isolation, ·
403
H
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14S.C.R.
A as not being a binding policy, cannot receive judicial
imprimatur -
The predominant facts herein, justifiably
demand a fitting relief modelled by law, equity and good
conscience -
The value of the acquired land of the
appellants, as on today, cannot' be taken to be an
B unmistakable index to identify the developed land to be
allotted to them - In the singular facts and circumstances of
the case and for the sake of complete justice, the appellants
are entitled to be allotted their quota of 15% developed land
in the terms of policy/circular dated 13. 12.2001 in one or more
c available plots as enumerated by them in their affidavit dated
17.8.2015 - Respondents directed to accommodate them
accordingly - Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 166 - Rajasthan Rules of
Business u!Art.166 of the Constitution-r.31.
D
Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts.142, 14 and 21 -
Powers under Art. 142 - Nature and extent of the power -
Held: The plenary powers of Supreme Court enshrined in
Art. 142 of the Constitution for achieving complete justice is
only an insignia of empowerment so that the constitutional
E guarantees are not reduced to mere ritualistic incantations -
Supreme Court extra-ordinarily does exercise its power
. under Article 142 as warranted in a given fact situation, for
making order (s) as is felt necessary for doing complete
justice in a case a matter pending before it- There can be
F no straight jacket formula, for its exercise nor there can be
any fetter thereto, it being plenary in nature - The invocation
of this power is to reach injustice and redress the same, if it
is not feasible otherwise to achieve this avowed objective -
In doing so, this Court acts in its equity jurisdiction to balance
G the conflicting interests of the parties and advance the cause
of administration of even handed justice - The purport and
purpose of this power being justice oriented and guided by
equitable principles, it chiefly aims at the enforcement of a
public duty, if not forthcoming on legitimate justification
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
405
ensuing in oppressive injustice, militating against the A
constitutional ordainment of equality before law and equal
protection of laws enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution and
entrenched as are, among others, in the invaluable right to
. life envisioned in Art. 21 of the Constitution.
Constitution oflndia, 1950-Art. 166- Executive power 8
of the State - Scheme of executive functioning- Conduct of
business of the Government of a State - Valid executive
decision in terms of the Rules of Business - Held: The
essentials of Art. 166 are a valid executive decision in terms
of the Rules of Business framed under clause (3), expressed C
in the name of Governor and authentication of the resultant
orders and instruments in the manner specified in the rules
to be made by the Governor- Clause (1) stipulates the mode
of expression of an executive action taken in conformity
therewith and clause (2) ordains the manner of authentication D
of the consequential orders and instruments -
The
enjoinment of clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 166, is not mandatory
so much so, that any non compliance therewith, ipso facto
would renderthe executive action/decision, if otherwise validly
taken in terms of the Rules of Business framed u!Art. 166(3),
E
invalid - Any decision however, to be construed as an
executive decision as contemplated u/Art.166, would
essentially has to be in accordance with the Rules of Business
- The Rules depending upon the scheme thereof, may or
may not, accord an inbuilt.flexibility in its provisions in the
F
matter of compliance -
Contingent on the varying
imperatives, some provisions may warrant compulsory
exaction of compliance therewith- The mandatory nature of
any provision of any Rule of Business would be conditioned
by the construction and the purpose thereof to be adjudged G
in the context of the scheme as a whole - The interpretation
of the Rules, necessarily, would be guided by the framework
thereof and the contents and purport of its provisions, and
the status and tenability of an order/instrument, represented
H
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14S.C.R.
A
as an executive decision would have to be judged in the
conspectus of the attendant facts and circumstances - No
straight jacket formula can, thus be ordained, divorced from
the Rules applicable and the factual setting accompanying
the order/decision under scrutiny.
B
Constitution of India, 1950 - Writ jurisdiction - Writ of
mandamus - Features of- Held: The writ of mandamus is
an extraordinary remedy and is intended to supply
deficiencies in law and is thus discretionary in nature -The
issuance of writ of mandamus pre-supposes a clear right of ·
C the applicant and unjustifiable failure of a duty imposed on
an authority otherwise obliged in law to imperatively
discharge the same.
Administrative Law-Administrative discretion - Held:
0 Administrative discretion can never be unregulated,
omnipotent and fanciful-A public authority vested with power
has to essentially exerdse its discretion, if
conferred,
conditioned by the dictates of duty as envisaged, to effectuate
the exercise of the prerogative to achieve the objective
E therefor- The central and cardinal canon of administrative
governance, enjoins a framework of controlled use of
discretion coupled with duty.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Having regard to the progression of
F events pertaining to the decision of allotment of.
developed land and the conscious initiatives taken by
the State Government in furtherance thereof, it is
impossible as well as impermissible to conclude, that it
had remained unaware thereof. The facts demonstrate
G · that the State Government had taken a pre-meditated
decision to allot developed land to the land oustees in
lieu of compensation. As per the successive circulars
including the one dated 13.12.2001, it was incumbent on
the State Government to allot developed land with all the
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
407 ..
essential attributes thereof. As is apparent from the order A
d11ted 7.5.2015 of this Court, the plots offered to the
appellants till now are not developed. The land had been
acquired in the year 1981 and more than three decades
have elapsed. The delay cannot be attributed to the
appellants for the obvious failure of the State B
Government to allot developed land in lieu of
compensation as represented. [Para 111][483-E-H; 484A-B]
2. It is amply clear that all State functionaries
including the Chief Minister of the State were aware of C
the process undertaken in terms of the circular/policy
dated 13.12.2001 and had affirmatively associated
themselves therewith. It would be indefensible and too
farfetched for the respondents to contend that the
circular dated 13.12.2001 cannot be construed to be a D
policy reflecting the executive decision as contemplated
under Article 166 and is not enforceable, as the subject
matter thereof had not been laid before the Chief Minister
under Rule 31 of the Rajasthan Rules of Business. The
non-acceptability of the land at Lalchandpura and E
Anantpura by the appellants, being undeveloped, does
not detract from these conclusions. [Para 113][484-G-H;
485-A-B]
3. It is the burden of the State Government, in view F
of the belated attempt on its part to wriggle out of its
commitment und.er the circular/policy dated 13.12.2001
to demonstrate on the basis of contemporaneous
records that it was never intended to be acknowledged
. as its policy. As the file pertaining to the circular/policy G
dated 13.12.2001 is not traceable, the State Government
has failed to discharge its burden in this regard. The
appellants understandably have no access either to the
official records of the Government or control over the
manner of discharge of the role of the functionaries H
·~.
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A under the Rules. In this view of the matter, in the face of
the predominant facts testifying the reflective and
consistent decision of the State Government in the
matter of allotment of developed land in lieu of
compensation, spanning over a decade from the year
B 1992 to 2005, the endeavour on its part to disown the
policy/circular dated 13.12.2001, betrays its truant
disposition, cavalier indifference and impervious display
of superior bargaining power which is constitutionally
impermissible. [Para 114)(485-C·F)
c
4. On a concatenation of the stream of events,
traced from the acquisition of the land involved, it is clear
that the circular dated 13.12.2001 is indeed a policy
decision of the State Government regarding the
allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation to
D the persons referred to therein and is thus enforceable
against it. [Para 115](485·G·H]
5. Even otherwise, having regard to the
consistency in approach of the State Government in the
E matter of allotment of developed land in lieu of
compensation as is evident from the series of circulars
commencing from 22.4.1992 to 27.10.2005 in continuum,
motivated by the objective of early culmination of the
process of acquisition of land on the spirit of mutual
F settlement, the same irrefutably present an inviolable
scheme of proclaimed State action for compliance,
thereby making it invocable against the respondents,
more particularly as the same had been acted upon over
the years. The plea of the respohdents, at this belated
G stage, to take refuge of unenforceability of the circular
dated 13.12.2001 in isolation, as not being a binding
policy, cannot receive judicial imprimatur. [Para 116)(486·
A·D]
6. The process leading to the allotment of land at
H Lalchandpura and Anantpura villages, as the records
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
409
produced discloses, did originate from the circular dated A
13.12.2001, and received the approval of the Chief
Minister at an appropriate stage.· It would thus be
conspicuously patent, that all concerned State
functionaries were not only aware of the relevance and
the obligatory bearing of the said circular, but also had B
participated in the exercise, contemplated by it for
allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation. The
respondents, in the totality of the existent facts and
circumstances are thus estopped from questioning the
status and efficacy of the said circular in vesting a right c
in the appellants to claim their due in law there under.
[Para 117][486-D-F]
7. As by the time, the allotment was contemplated,
the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 had been
brought into force, the concept of developed land was D
clearly traceable to one informed with the concept of
"development" and "amenities" defined thereunder. Any
land to be allotted in lieu of compensation, thus, was
required to mandatorily comply with the requisites of
'development' and 'amenities' as envisaged .under the E
Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982. As only a certain
percentage of land acquired was offered by way of
allotment and understandably as the same was in lieu
of compensation i.e. the market value along with the
incidentals, it was expectedly assessed to be F
proportionate thereto in value/worth. 15% developed
land was, thus construed to be equivalent to the amount
of compensation then payable for the land acquired.
However, for the purpose of identification of developed
land as on today, equivalence of the value thereof with G
that of the land acquired as on date after three decades
would not be a correct measure. The appellants were
entitled to 15% developed land in the year 2001, the point
• time when the value thereof was comparable to the
H
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14S.C.R.
A compensation then payable for the acquisition of their
land. Had the developed land, as conceived of, been
allotted to them, then the value thereof over the years,
as on date, would have been much higher than their land
so acquired. Though the development of a plot of land
B depends upon various factors e.g. location, potential,
facilities, use etc., it is a matter of common experience
that the pace of enhancement of the value of an already
developed land would be increasingly higher in
comparison to the one not developed. The value of the
c acquired land of the appellants, thus, as on today, cannot
be taken to be an unmistakable index to identify the
developed land to be allotted to them. [Para
119][487-0-H; 488-A·B]
8. Be that as it may, the land offered to the.appellants
D at Lalchandpura and Anantpura as well as at Boytawala
and Mansarampura have been held by this Court, as
recently on 7.5.2015, to be not fully developed and more
importantly conceded to be so by the JOA as recorded
in the said order. According to the JOA, it would require
E further two years to develop the land thereat. The land
of the appellants, as acquired, was situated at Boytawala
which, thus has not yet been fully developed as on date.
Thus, in any view of the matter, the market value of the
land at Boytawala cannot be an acceptable yardstick to
F identify the developed land to which they are entitled.
This is more so, as for the last thirty years and above,
the respondents have failed to allot 15% developed land
as envisaged by the policy to the appellants. Admittedly,
two of the land oustees had been allotted developed land
G at Vidyadhar Nagar and as the letter dated 16.10.2007
referred to hereinabove would reveal, till then, land at
the same site was available. As a matter of fact, allotment
of land at Lalchandpura, Anantpura, Boytawala and
Mansarampura, which admittedly had not been fatly
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
411
developed, was in breach of the promise engrafted in A
the policy dated 13.12.2001. The approach of the
respondents, when viewed in the backdrop of
compuls·ory acquisition of land in the exercise of the
State's power of eminent domain and its persistent
failure to act on this policy, only demonstrates a highly B
insensitive and evasive orientation at the cost of its
citizenry by a show of dominant bargaining· power. The
policy, though was to allot developed land in lieu of
compensation to. ensure quick and unhindered
completion of the process of acquisition, the C
respondents have remained apathetically inert, having
obtained the land, without living up to their commitments.
To gloss over this inexplicable default, would signify
effacement of decades of indifference and mute inaction
of the respondents, more particularly the State, inspite D
of a binding policy decision, to the suffering detriment
and prejudic;e to the appellants without their fault. In this
overwhelming conspectus of facts, the respondents
cannot be permitted to dictate terms to the appellants in
the matter of allotment of land inter alia on the E _
consideration of equivalence of the value of their land
as acquired with the one offered to them as developed
Jand as on date. [Para 120)[488-C-H; 489·A·C]
9. The right to property having been elevated to
the status of human rights, it is inherent in every F
individual, and thus has to be venerably acknowledged
and can, by no means, be belittled or trivialized by
adopting an unconcerned and nonchalant disposition
by anyone, far less the State, after compulsorily
acquiring his land by invoking an expropriatory G
legislative mechanism.' The judicial mandate of human
rights dimension, thus, makes it incumbent on the State
to solemnly respond to its constitutional obligation to ·
guarantee that a land looser is adequately compensated.
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A The proposition does not admit of any compromise or
laxity. Added to this, is the promissory estoppel
perspective, the State being the promisor. A parallel
doctrine founded on the doctrine of fairness and natural
justice baptised as "legitimate expectation" has grown
B as well in the firmament of administrative law to ensure
the predication of fairness in State action. (Paras 127,
128 and 133](491-A-C; 493-E-F]
10. It appears that the sites at Boytawala,
Lalchandpura, Anantpura and Mansarampura are
C located within a range of 14.70 K.M. to 39 K.M, from the
central point Jaipur, the nearest being at Boytawala. All
these lands have been recorded by this Court, as.
admitted by the JOA, to be not fully developed. The plots
offered by the respondents at Rohini Phase I, Anupam
D Vihar, Pitambara Scheme including Rajbhawan Yojana ,
Rohini Phase II, Abhinav Vihar Vis tar and Harit Vihar are
situated within a distance of25.40 K.M. to 36.80 K.M. from
the central point, Jaipur. The appellants, in categorical
terms, have asserted that the plots at these places are
E not developed inasmuch as they are bereft of the
essential facilities like water, electricity, communication/
connectivity, sewerage, drainage etc. and have sought
to substantiate their plea on the basis of recent
photographs along with sworn pleadings. On the other
F hand, they have suggested plots at Vidyadhar Nagar,
Gokul Nagar, Truck Terminal and Vaishali Nagar, located
within a distance of5 K.M. to 15.6 K.M. from the central
point Jaipur for allotment. That these plots of land are
developed has been unreservedly admitted by the
G respondents, their plea being that, the appellants are not
entitled thereto, judged by the factor of equivalence of
the value of the acquired land. At this distant point of
time, this Court is disinclined to sustain this demur of
the respondents. As the facts have unfolded, the
H appellants cannot be held accountable for the delay in
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
413
between, the respondents having failed to offer A
developed land as contemplated in the policy. This
stands fortified,, amongst others, by the order dated
7 .5.2015 vis-a-vis the land at Boytawala, Lal Chandpura,
Anantpura and Man sarampura. The other plots offered
by the respondents, also having regard to the attributes B
of developed land as envisioned by the Rajasthan Act
do not accord with the letter and spirit of the policy.
[Paras 136,137and138][495-D-H; 496-A·D]
11. In the overall perspectives, the respondents
have utterly failed to abide by a public policy upon which, C
the appellant had altered their position and had suffered
immense prejudice. The persistent denial to the
appellants of their right to the developed land in lieu of·
compensation and that too without any legally
acceptable justification, has ensued in manifest injustice D
to the appellants over the years. Neither have they been
paid just compensation for the land acquired nor have
they been provided with the developed land in place
thereof, as assured. They are thus predominantly entitled
for the remedial intervention of this court to ensure fair, E
just, efficacious, tangible and consummate relief in
realistic terms. If fairness is an indispensable and innate
constituent of natural justice, this imperative indubitably
has to inform as well the judicial remedy comprehended.
In the overwhelming factual scenario, as obtains in the F
instant case, refusal to grant the relief to which they are
entitled, would amount to perpetuation of gross illegality,
unjustness and unfairness meted out to them. The textual
facts demand an appropriate respon"se of the judicial
process to effectuate the guarantee of justice, engrafted G
in the preamble of the Constitution reinforced by the
canons of equity. The remedy indeed has to be
commensurate to the cause and the prejudice suffered.
The invocable judicial tools, predominantly in the form
of a writ of mandamus, and the plentitude of the powers H
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A of constitutional courts, and more particularly, this c::ourt
under Article 142 of the Constitution are assuredly the
potential redressal aids in fact situatiol')s akin to the one
in hand. [Paras 141, 142][499-A·F]
12. The predominant facts herei·n, justifiably
B demand a fitting relief modelled by law, equity and good
conscienc~. In the overall view of the matter, in the
singular facts and circumstances of the case and for the
sake of complete justice, the appellants are entitled to
be allotted their quota of 15% developed land in the terms
C of policy/circular dated 13.12.2001 in one or more
available plots at Vidyadhar Nagar, Gokul Nagar, Truck
Terminal and Vaishali Nagar as enumerated by them in
their affidavit dated 17.8.2015. The respondents are
hereby directed to accommodate them accordingly. The
D respondents would allot the developed land as per
policy decision dated 13.12.2001 to the appellants atthe .
places indicated hereinabove without fail and within a
period of six weeks herefrom. To secure a permanent
resolution to the lingering lis, the respondents would
E ensure that a transparent and fair process is undertaken,
if necessary, to be overseen by an appropriate authority
to obviate any disparity in treatment in t~e matter of
allotment as ordered. [Paras 152, 153 and 154][503-H;
F
G
H
504-A·E]
Jaipur Development Authority and Others v. Vijay
Kumar Data & Another (2011) 12 SCC 94 : 2011
(7) SCR 242; State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar
(1987) 3 SCC 34 : 1987 (3) SCR 1; Dattatreya
Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay &
Ors. 1952 SCR 612;. R. Chitralekha v. State of
Mysore & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1823: 1964 SCR
368; Hari Ram and Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.
(2010) 3 SCC 621 : 2010 (2) SCR 756; Census
Commissioner and others v. R. Krishnamurthy
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(2015) 2 sec 796 : 2014 (11) SCR 463; Goa
Glass Fibre ·Ltd. v. State of Goa & Anr. (2010) 6.
sec 499 : 2010 (5) SCR 970; MRF Ltd. v.
Manohar Parikar & Ors. (2010) 11 SCC 374 :
201 O (5) SCR 1081; Rajasthan Housing Board
v. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Limited
and Anr. (2015) 7 sec 601 : 2015 (5) SCR 365;
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure
Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and others
(2007) 8 sec 105 : 2001 (6) SCR 799; steel
Authority of India Limited v. Sutni Sangam and
others (2009) 16 SCC 1 : 2009 (12) SCR 929; .
Dev Sharan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and others (2014) 4 SCC 769 : 2014 (3) SCR 84;
State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar and others
(2011) 10 sec 404: 2011 (14) SCR 211; Union
of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies (1968) 2 SCR
366; Motila/ Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v.
State of U.P. (1979) 2 sec ~09: 1979 (2) SCR
641; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Limited and
another (2004) 6 SCC 465 : 2004 (2) Suppl.
SCR 135; Monnet /spat and Energy Limited v.
Union of/ndia and others (2012) 11 SCC 1 : 2012
(7) SCR 644; S. V.A. Steel Re-Rolling Mills
Limited and Others v. State of Kera/a and.others
(2014) 4 sec 186 : 2014 (2) SCR 336; Food
Corporation of India v. Mis. Kamdhenu Cattle
Feed lndustries(1993) 1SCC71 : 1992 (2) Suppl. ·
SCR 322; State of Bombay v. PuNshottam Jog
Naik 1952 SCR 67 4; Ghaio Mall and Sons v. State
of Deihi 1959 SCR 1424; Goa Glass Fibre Limited
v. State of Goa and another (201 O) 6 sec 499 :
2010 (5) SCR 970; Haridwar Singh v. Bagun
Sumbrui & others (1973) 3 SCC 889; Jaipur
Development Authority v. Radhey Sh yam (1994)
4 sec 370 : 1994 (2) SCR 1; Jaipur
415
A
B.
c
D
E
F
G
H
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain (1997)
1 sec 35 : 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 584; Delhi
International Airport Ltd. v. International Lease
Finance Corporation and others 2015 (8) SCC
446 : 2015 (2) SCR 1040; Central London
B
Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd (1947)
1 KB 130; Naida Entrepreneurs Association v.
Naida and others (2011) 6 SCC 508 : 2011 (8)
SCR 25; C. Chenga Reddy and Others v. State
ofA.P. (1996) 10sec193: 1996 (3) Suppl. SCR
c
479; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary
and Others (2014) 2 SCC 532 - referred to.
Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11•h Edition,
D
Page 369; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn.
Reissue, Vol. 44(1) at para 1238; Halsbury"s
Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 1(1)
151; Administrative Law, 1o•h Edition by H.W.R.
Wade and C.F. Forsyth at Page 286 - referred
to.
E
Case Law Reference
2011 (7) SCR ~42
referred to
Para 18
1987 (3) SCR 1
referred to
Para18
F 1952 SCR 612
referred to
Para 39
1964 SCR368
referred to
Para 39
2010 (2) SCR 756
referred to
Para 39
2014 (11) SCR 463
referred to
Para 41
G 2010 (5) SCR 970
referred to
Para 41
2010 (5) SCR 1081
referred to
Para 41
2015 (5) SCR 365
referred to
Para 41
2007 (6) SCR 799
referred to
Para 42
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
417
2009 (12) SCR 929
referred to
Para 42
A
2014 (3) SCR 84
referred to
Para 42
2011 (14) SCR 211
referred to
Para42
(1968) 2 SCR 366
referred to
Para 42
1979 (2) SCR 641
referred to
Para 42
B
2004 (2) Suppl. SCR 135 referred to
Para 42
2012 (7) SCR 644
referred to
Para 42
2014 (2) SCR 336
referred to
Para 42
c
1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 322 referred to
Para 42
1952 SCR 674
referred to
Para 72
1959 SCR 1424
referred to
Para 72
.
2010 (5) SCR 970
referred to
Para 73
D
(1973) 3 sec 889
referred to
Para 76
1994 (2) SCR 1
referred to
Para 87
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 584 referred to
Para 87
E
2015 (2) SCR 1040
referred to
Para 91
(1947) 1 KB 130
referred to
Para 128
2011 (8) SCR 25
referred to
Para 140
1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 479 referred to
Para 150
F
(2014) 2 sec 532
referred to
Para 151
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
13940 of 2015.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2011 of the G
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, .
in D. B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 276 of 2010 .
•
WITH
C. A. Nos. 13941, 13942, 13943 and 13944 of 2015.
H
418
A
B
c
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
Rajiv Dhavan, Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Advs., Shobha,
Ms. Akanksha Kaushik, Bhoomik Choudhary, Kabir Ghosh,
Ms. Bina Madhavan, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Akanksha
Mehra, (For M/s. Lawyer S Knit & Co.), Pravir Choudhary,
P. D. Sharma, Advs. fortheAppellants.
S. S. Shamshery, AAG, C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Rohini Musa, Zafar I., Ajay Choudhary, Adarsh Upadhyay,
Amit Sharma, lshu Prayash, S.S. Reddy, Ms. Ruchi Kohli,Advs·.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AMITAVA ROY, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. A procrastinated legal tussle spanning over three
decades has spiralled up the judicial tiers to this Court seeking
0 a quietus to the issue of adequate reparation of the appellants,
consequent upon the compulsory acquisition of their lands for
the Indian Army for its "Field Firing Range" in the year 1981.
3. The debate centres around the grant of 15% developed
residential land in lieu of compensation which, as perceived
E
by the oustees, had been promised by the Urban Development
Department of the State Government by its proclaimed policy
dated 13.12.2001. The State of Rajasthan (for short,
hereinafter to be referred to as "the State/State Government")
and the Jaipur Development Authority (for short, hereinafter to
F
be referred to as "JOA") have taken turf together to successfully
laciniate the appellants' identification of such land, thus
impelling them to impeach the impugned judgment and order
dated 12.8.2011 rendered by the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan upholding the refutation. Since the verdict assailed
G is common in all the appeals, the instant adjudication would
suffice for the analogous disposal thereof.
H
4. We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhawan and Mr. Dhruv
Mehta, learned senior counsel for the appellants in Civil
Appeals arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 28415 of 2011 and
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
419
[AMITAVAROY, J.]
29515 of 201.1, Ms. Bina. Madhavan, learned counsel forthe A
appellants in Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 36111
and 36179 of 2011, Mr. Sakal Bhushan, learned counsel for
the appellants in Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.
36175 of 2012, Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel ·
for the. respondent No. 1 and Mr. S.S. Shamshery, learned
B
counsel for the respondent No. 2.
5. Filtering out the unnecessary details, the
. indispensable facts are that the lands df the appellants situated
at Village Boytawala, District Jaipur was acquired by the State
. under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short,
C
hereinafter to be referred to as "Rajasthan Act") and the
Notification under Section 4 thereof to this effect was issued
on 8.5.1981. To reiterate, the land was acquired for the
purpose bf the Army for its "Field Filing Range". The award
under the Rajasthan Act was passed by the Land Acquisition D
Officer on 26.3.1983 and the possession of the land was taken
over on 26.3.1983. Though the compensation was awarded
by the Land Acquisition Officer@ Rs. 1500 per bigha, on
reference being made under the aforementioned statute, the
Reference Court enhanced the same to Rs. 15000/- per bigha E
by its decision dated 11.4.1994. The determination of market
value of the lands made by the Reference. Court was
unsuccessfully challenged by the Authority and its appeals were
dismissed by the High Court on 30.8.2000. The compensation
awarded at Rs. 15000/- per bigha, thus attained finality.
F
Compensation, the above notwithstanding, was deposited in
the court concerned @Rs. 1500 per bigha on 11.10.2001.
Thus, the amount of compensation deposited was not at the
enhanced rate fixed by the Reference Court and affirmed by
the High Court.
G
6. Meanwhile, by circular No. F.6(19)UDH/3/89, Jaipur
dated 21.9.1999 issued by the Government of Rajasthan,
Urban Development and Housing Department, it was notified
by the State Government that it had taken a decision with
.
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420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
reference to the earlier circulars, as mentioned therein, that
developed land equivalent to 15% of the area required, may
be given to the khatedars/land owners in lieu of the land being
acquired/held under acquisition/surrendered, as the case may
be, in land acquisition cases for commercial purposes. A
B
meeting, thereafter of a High Powered Body under the
chairmanship of the Minister of the Department of Urban
Development, Rajasthan was held on 18.10.2001 in which it
was discussed that in several cases of land acquisition, though
award had been passed, the compensation had not been paid
C to the land owners. It was decided that, in cases where
compensation amount awarded had not been paid, though
award had been passed, one more opportunity to the
khatedars to opt for developed land ought to be afforded and
on the basis of the merit of such claims, 15% developed land
D
be allotted to them. The option was made valid till 31.3.2001
and it was resolved that the allotment of land would be made
through the allotment committee of the concerned organization.
As the minutes of the said meeting would reveal, it was
resolved as well that the developed land in lieu of the acquired
E
land would be usually allotted only in the scheme area and at
the place where the land acquired was situated and if it was
not possible to develop the scheme within the fixed period of
five months or if it was not possible to give the land in the
same area, only then the land would be allotted in some other
F
area. It was however underlined, that the concerned committee
would as far as possible make an endeavour to allot such land
to the land losers near the scheme area.
7. The circular No. F6(19)/UDD/89, Jaipur dated
13.12.2001 occupying the centre stage of the debate was
G thereafter issued by the Under Secretary to the Department of
Urban Development with reference to the circular/notification
No. F.6(9)/UDH/89 dated 21.9.1999, adverted to hereinabove.
The said circular took note of the pendency of land acquisition
matters in which, though award had been passed but
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
421
[AMITAVAROY, J.]
compensation could not be paid to the land owners. It noted A
as well, that said land owners in the past could not submit their
options within the time prescribed due to lack of information
about the provision of allotment of developed land in lieu of
cash compensation. The circular recorded the decision of
the State, to the effect that in old cases in which award had
B
been passed but compensation could not be made to the
khatedars, one more opportunity ought to be granted to them.
As a corollary, thereby the khatedars/land owners were left at
liberty to exercise their option till 28.2.2002 to be allotted 15%
developed land in the scheme area by the allotment committee C
of the concerned organization, afterthe approval from the State.
The composition of the Committee in the eventualities as
mentioned therein was also delineated. The conditions for
allotment required, inter alia, thatthe land to be allotted was to
be developed residential land located "normally in the same o
scheme area and at the very place from where the land had
been acquired" and not a commercial land.
8. Admittedly, the appellants exercised their options and
submitted their applications within the time allowed for being
allotted 15% developed· land in lieu of the compensation
E
payable to them. They did so in writing on 15.1.2002 whereby
in the applications addressed to the concerned authority, they
recorded their request for 15% developed land in Vidyadhar
Nagar Scheme.
9. While the matter rested at that, the JDA on 17.5.2003 F
issued an auction notice for sale of Group Housing plots in
Vidyadhar Nagar Scheme. This was challenged before the
Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Development Authority Jaipur (for
short, hereinafter to be referred to as "the Tribunal") under
Section 83(8)(a) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 G
(hereinafter, in short to be referred to as "JDAAct"), inter alia,
alleging discrimination on the ground that persons similarly
situated like the appellants, had been allotted developed lands
in Vidyadhar Nagar Scheme, while they were sought to be
H
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A deprived by the assailed initiative to auction the land within
the said scheme. The Tribunal, by its ruling dated 18.8.2003,
annulled the auction notice and held that the JDA would not
sell or auction the plots mentioned therein, till the appellants
were allotted 15% developed land in the Vidyadhar Nagar
B Scheme. The Writ Petition filed by the JDA before the High
Court impugning the above decision of the Tribunal was
dismissed on 4.1.2005.
10. Subsequent. thereto, on 1.7.2005, the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Nagariye Vibhag,
C addressed a letter to the Commissioner, JDA, Jaipur offering
allotment of land in terms of the Circular dated 13.12.2001 to
the concerned khatedars/beneficiaries, at Villages
Lalchandpura and Anantpura to be allotted through lottery.
Being aggrieved by the said decision and also the follow up
D process in connection therewith, the appellants approached
the Tribunal afresh. By the judgment and order dated
18.10.2005, the Tribunal returned a finding that appellants were
entitled to be allotted 15% developed land in Vidyadhar Nagar
Scheme, as plots were available thereat. Thereby the
E respondent J.D.A was directed that the appellants be allotted
developed land at Vidyadhar Nagar in lieu of their acquired
land and also restrained it from allotting or selling such land to
others. In arriving at this conclusion, as the narration in the
.decision would reveal, the Tribunal.took cognizance of the fact
F that the land of the appellants situated in Village Boytawala
was acquired for Field Firing Range, in exchange whereof,
the Ministry of Defence had handed over to the JDA, land at
Vidyadhar Nagar. It also recorded the fact that the JDA had
admitted in its reply that the price of the offered land in
G Lalchandpura and Anantpura Villages was negligible in
comparison to that of Vidyadhar Nagar. It, thus held the view,
that the proposal for allotment of land at Lalchandpura and
Anantpura Villages to the appellants, by distinguishing them
from others to whom 15% developed land in lieu of
H
LALARAM v. JAIPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
423
[AMIT AVA ROY, J.]
compensation had been allotted in Vidyadhar Nagar, was A
inappropriate.
11. Time rolled by without making any endeavour on the
part of the JOA, to comply with the determination of the Tribunal.
It was, at this juncture, that the JOA, after two years addressed
a letter dated 16.10.2007 to the Deputy Secretary (P), Chief B
Minister Office, Rajasthan Government reciting summarily the
above facts. While admitting that out of the khatedars, alike
the appellants, whose land at Boytawala village had been
acquired, two namely; S/Sh. Sedu and Nathu had been allotted
15% developed land in the Vidyadhar Nagar Scheme, it C
disclosed that at that point of time as well, larid measuring
1, 10,500 sq. meters was available in the Vidyadhar Nagar
Scheme .
. 12. Situated thus and appalled by the inaction on the part 0
of JOA, the appellants approached the High Court with S.B.
Civil Writ Petition 9908 of 2008, complaining of noncoi;npliance of the operative directions contained in the
judgment and order dated 18.10.2005 of the T ribuna[ By order
dated 23.10.2008, the learned Single Judge required the JOA E
to comply with the aforesaid directions. within a period of two
months. It was recorded that the JOA had not questioned the
verdict dated 18.10.2005 of the Tribunal. Being aggrieved,
the JOA filed D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1879 of 2008
which also came to be dismissed on 17.11.2008. The JOA,
F
undaunted by the reverses, approached this Court with Special
leave Petition (C) No. 2901 of 2009 which was disposed on
20. 7 .2009, as in the interregnum, the judgment and order dated
18.10.2005 of the Tribunal came to be assailed by the JOA in
S. B. (Civil) W.P. No. 539 of 2009 before the High Court. By
the order dated 20.7.2009, this Court, however, did observe, G
without expressing any opinion on the merits of the dispute,
that the judgment and order dated 17 .11.2008 of Division
Bench of the High Court in challenge before it, would be subject
to any order, that would be passed in the writ petition.
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424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 14 S.C.R.
A
13. The Writ Petition No. 539 of 2009 was dismissed by
B
the High Court on 11.1.2010 where after the JOA preferred
D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 276 of2010 against the same.
The decision impugned in the present batch of appeals arises
from the said verdict.
14.