# LALJI HARIDAS v. STAIB OF MAHARASIITRA AND ANOTHER - **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 700 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962-01-30 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayya"1Gar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lalji-haridas-v-staib-of-maharasiitra-and-another-3215 - **Pages:** 27 ## Headnote Income Tax-False evidence in the proceedings before Income·ttu OU•ccr-For the purpose of s. !95(!)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceedings if proceedings in a court-whether Complaint .has to be made by the Income-tax Officer-Indian Incom~ tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 37-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1)(b)-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), SS, 193, 228. The appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by giving false evidence in certain proceedings before the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objectioh that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b) of the Coue of Criminal Procedure. 1898, and since no complaint in writing bad been made by the court of the Income-tax Officer the provision of s. 195(I)(b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint. On the rejection of this preliminary objection respondent No. 2 preferred a criminal revision application before the Bombay High Court impleading the State of Maharashtra as respondent No. I. The High Court allowed the revision application. Thereupon the appellant appealed to this Court on a certificate issued under Art. 134(1 )( c) of the Constitution. The short question before this court was whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Income-tax Act can be said.to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure. Held (per P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo and N. Raja· gopala Ayyangar JJ.) (i) While the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), tbe proceedings held by him are judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code and the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193, Indian Penal Code. (ii) It is not necessary to decide the general question whether the 1n,'.omc-tax Officer is a Court or not for s. 37( 4) of the Income-tax 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 701 Act makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, judicial pr<>- ceedings for the purposes of s. 193 Indian Penal Code and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purpose of s. 195 (l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court was right in allowing the revision application on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with as no complaint has been filed by the Income-tax Officer. Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850 and Puran Chand Maneklal, in re: l.L.R. 38 Bom. 642, distinguished. Per Sarkar and Das Gupta JI. (dissenting) (i) From the nature of functions under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act it ii clear that the Income-tax Officer is a part and parcel of the executin organ of the State. The fact that for carrying out some of th.- executive functions he will have the powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure wi11 not make him a limb of the judicial organ. Neither does the fact that he is a quasi-judicial authority make him a. court. (ii) In Jaswant Sugar Mills v., Lakshmi Chand. [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 242 this court has held that the Income-tax Officer is not 'a ', I I ' ' Tribunal and therefore it is obvious t~at he cannot be a coul1j. (iii) To say that the legislature in providing in s. 37(4)' of the Indian Income-tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 Indian Penal Code intended also to say that such authori ## Text _Characters 0–39,703 of 62,969. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39703 for what follows._ 19M Fcbniary 7. '700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64] LALJI HARIDAS v. STAIB OF MAHARASIITRA AND ANOTHER (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYA"1GAR, JJ.) Income Tax-False evidence in the proceedings before Income·ttu OU•ccr-For the purpose of s. !95(!)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceedings if proceedings in a court-whether Complaint .has to be made by the Income-tax Officer-Indian Incom~ tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 37-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1)(b)-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), SS, 193, 228. The appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by giving false evidence in certain proceedings before the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objectioh that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b) of the Coue of Criminal Procedure. 1898, and since no complaint in writing bad been made by the court of the Income-tax Officer the provision of s. 195(I)(b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint. On the rejection of this preliminary objection respondent No. 2 preferred a criminal revision application before the Bombay High Court impleading the State of Maharashtra as respondent No. I. The High Court allowed the revision application. Thereupon the appellant appealed to this Court on a certificate issued under Art. 134(1 )( c) of the Constitution. The short question before this court was whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Income-tax Act can be said.to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure. Held (per P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo and N. Raja· gopala Ayyangar JJ.) (i) While the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), tbe proceedings held by him are judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code and the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193, Indian Penal Code. (ii) It is not necessary to decide the general question whether the 1n,'.omc-tax Officer is a Court or not for s. 37( 4) of the Income-tax 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 701 Act makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, judicial pr<>- ceedings for the purposes of s. 193 Indian Penal Code and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purpose of s. 195 (l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court was right in allowing the revision application on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with as no complaint has been filed by the Income-tax Officer. Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850 and Puran Chand Maneklal, in re: l.L.R. 38 Bom. 642, distinguished. Per Sarkar and Das Gupta JI. (dissenting) (i) From the nature of functions under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act it ii clear that the Income-tax Officer is a part and parcel of the executin organ of the State. The fact that for carrying out some of th.- executive functions he will have the powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure wi11 not make him a limb of the judicial organ. Neither does the fact that he is a quasi-judicial authority make him a. court. (ii) In Jaswant Sugar Mills v., Lakshmi Chand. [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 242 this court has held that the Income-tax Officer is not 'a ', I I ' ' Tribunal and therefore it is obvious t~at he cannot be a coul1j. (iii) To say that the legislature in providing in s. 37(4)' of the Indian Income-tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 Indian Penal Code intended also to say that such authority shall be deemed to be a court within the meaninv of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure would be to impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself had no knowledge. (iv) The words used in s. 37(4) of the Income-tax Act fumishe&·- no reason--to--altei'the legal position that is inescapable on a consideration of the functions of the Income-tax Officer that he is not a court withia the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure. Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 8l0, Punamchand Manaklal, re: l.L.R. 38 Born. 642, State v. Nemchand Pe.svir, S? Born. L.R. 1056, Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. "· The Additional Collector of Customs, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 394, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTJON: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1962, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1142 of 1960. S. V. Gupte, Additiooa/ Solicitor-Genera/, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. 1964 Lalji Haridlll ... Stal• of MoJte. · riuhtro 1964 Lalji IJ.arida.r v. State of Mahata.Jhtra Ga/endragadkar C, I. 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS S. K. Kapur and R. H. Dhebar, for r~ndent No. 1. S. T. Desai, J. L. Jain and V. J. Merchant, for respondent No. 2. February 7, 1964. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar C.J., Wanchoo and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ. was delivered by Gajendragadkar C.J. The dissenting opinion of Sarkar and Das Gupta JJ. was delivered by Das Gupta J. GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The short question· of law which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (No. XI of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act) can be said to be a proceeding in any co.urt within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This question arises in this way. The appellant Lalji Haridas and respondent No. 2 Mui.ii Manila! Kamdar are businessmen and they carry <>n their business in Jamnagar and Bombay respectively. They have known each other for several years past in the course of their ordinary business activities. In the income-tax assessment proceedings of the appellant for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51, respondent No. 2 gave evidence on oath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar on the 4th December, 1958. In his evidence he denied that he had a son named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business in the name of MI s. Nihal Chand & Co. at Jamnagar. According to the appellant, the said statements were false to the knowledge of respondent No. 2 and were made by him to mislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of income-tax on himself. As a result of the said false statements, the appellant was heavily taxed. On the 24th November, 1959, the appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (No. 452/S of 1959) in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. At the hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b) Cr. P.C., and since no complaint in writing had been made by the Court of the Income-tax Officer before which the said proceedings were conducted, the provisions of s. 195 ( 1) (b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., and so, he rejected the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2. Against the said decision of the Presidency Magistrate, respondent No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision Application (No. 1142 of 1960) before the Bombay High Court. The State of Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said Revision Application. .A Division Bench of the ila·id High Court reversed the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and held that the. Income:tax Officer ~as a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., and so, it upheld the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2. In the result, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered to be dismissed. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the Bombay High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that he has brought the present appeal before us. That is hoj\'_.the narrow question which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer are proceedings in any Court under s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C. The question thus raised is undoubtedly a short one, but its ·decision is not easy, because the arguments urged in support of the two respective constructi9ns are fairly balanced and the task of preferring one construction to the other presents some difficulty. The proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during which, according to the appellant, respondent No. 2 made a false statement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Act. Section 37 ( 1) deals with the powers of Income-tax authorities and provides, inter alia, that the Income-tax Officer shall, for the purposes of th~ Act. have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (No. Vof 1908), when trying a suit in 1964 Lalji llaridu v. State of Mah• rashtra Gajendragadl«u c. J. 1964 La/ji Haridm v. State of Maha· rashtra Gajendragadkar c. 1. SUPREME COURT REPORTS respect of the matters specified by clauses (a) to (d/. Section 37(2) confers upon the Income-tax Officer certain additional powers which can be exercised subject to any rules made in that behalf, provided the said Officer is specially authorised by the Commissioner iri that behalf, and in exercising these powers, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relating to searches apply. Section 37(3) deals with the question of impounding and retaining any books of account or other documents. That takes us to s. 37(4) which is relevant for our purpose; this section provides that any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. It is thus clear that while the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3) the proceedings held by him arc judicial proceedings for the purposes of the three sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in sub-section (4). There· fore, the question as to whether the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made by him at any stage of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 I.P.C., must be answered in the affirmative. That is the plain effect of s. 37(4) of the Act. Section 193 of the Indian Penal Cod~ \l!ith which we are directly concerned in the present appeal provides for punishment for intentionally giving false evidence. It consists of two parts; the first part deals, inter a/ia, with false evidence intentionally given in any stage of a judicial proceeding, and prescribes that the person found guilty of having given such false evidence in a judicial proceeding shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable :o fine; the second part deals with cases where false evidence has been intentionally given in any other case, and it prescribes the maximum sentence of three years as well as fine. In other words, if the false evidence has been intentionally given in any judicial proceeding, the sentence awardable is higher than that where false evidence is intentionally given in proceedings which are not judicial. There are three explanations to s. 193. Expln. I provides that a trial before a Court-martial is a judicial proceerling; expln. 2 lays down that an inv~ti- 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS gation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though · that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice; this explanation takes in, for instance, committal proceedings. Under expln. 3, an investigation directed by a Court of Justice according to law, and conducted under the authority of a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice. This explanation covers enquiries before officers deputed by Courts of Justice to ascertain, for instance, on the spot the boundaries of land. It would thus be seen that having provided for a higher sentence in regard to the offence of giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, the three explanations of~. 193 include within the expression "judicial proceeding" certain proceedings which on a strict construction of the said expression may not have been included under it. For the purpose of the present appeal, however, the only point to notice at this stage is that s. 37(4) of the Act makes a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer, held under the said section, a judicial proceeding for the purposes of s. 193, I.P.C. and that means that if an offence of giving false evidence is proved to have been committed by a person in a proeeeding before the Income-tax Officer, he would be liable for the higher sentence awardable under th~ first part of section 193. That takes us to section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well-known that s. 195 provides for an exception to the ordinary rule · that any person · can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence triable under the Cr. P. C. Section 4(h) of this Code defines a "complaint" as meaning the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, thut some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does n'ot include the report of a police officer. This definition shows that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence. Section 190 requires that the Magistrate to whom a complaint has been made should take cognizance of the said complaint, subject to the provisions of the said section. Thus, the general rule is that any person can make a complaint, and s. 195 provides for an exception. Section 195(1) 134-159 S.C.-45 1964 Lal/I H11rid- t08htra Gajendragadkar C. J. 1964 Lal/i Harida• v. State of Maha· ra1htra Gafendragadkar c. J. SUPREME COURT REPORTS omission to refer to the relevant provision of the Cr. P.C. in s. 37 ( 4) is not accidental, but deliberate, and so, though the proceeding before the Income-ta~ Officer may be nnd has to be regarded as 11 judicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C.,)t cannot be said to be a proc~eding before a Court, because the Income-tax Officer is not a Court. In support of his argument, the Additional Solicitor· General has referred us to several statutes where the legis· lative intention to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr. P.C., to specific proceedings has been carried out by making an express provision in that behalf. Section 23 of the Work· men's Compensation Act, 1923 (No. 8 of 1923) provides that the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Cou.rt for μie purposes therein indicated, and by an amend· inent .inade in 1929, it further lays down that the Commis· sioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the pur· pqses of s. 195 and Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument is that where the legislature want· eel to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr. P.C. to the proceed· ings before the Commissioner held under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it thought it necessary to make a specific and express provision in that behalf. A similar provision is contained in s. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936). In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947), the position is similar to that in the case of the Work· men's Compensation Act; section 11 (4) confers on the autho· ritie~ therein specified powers as are vested in a Civil Court in respect of the matter mentioned therein. In 1950, sub· section (8) was added to section 11 by which it was provided that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be Civil Court for the purposes of sec· tions 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This scheme also shows, says the Additional Solicitor-General, that where the legislature wants to make any Tribunal or authority a Court, it uses express and appropriate language in that behalf. Section 45 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (No. 31 of 1950) likewise confers powers of a Civil Court on the Custodian and expressly adds that the proceedings before him shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of t.he Indian Penal Code, and the Custodian shall be deemed 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS to be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same provision is made by s. 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act. 1951 (Act 64 of 1951), as well as by section 26 of the Dis- . placed Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. 1954 (No. 44 of 1954). On the other hand, s. 51 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913 (No. 3 of 1913) provides that whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes a false statement on oath knowingly, he shall be deemed to have intentionaJly given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding. The argument is that in this case, the legislature wanted to equate the proceedings under this Act with judicial proceedings under s. 193, I.P.C., and did not intend to make section 195, Cr. P.C., applicable to them, because it does not make the authority under this Act a Court, or does not, in terms, extend the provisions of the said section to the proceedings held before such an authority. The same comment has been made on the provisions of s. l 71A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No. 8 of 1878). Thus presented, the argument is no doubt attractive and cannot be rejected as without any substance. The expression "judicial proceeding" is not defined in the Indian Penal Cude, but we have the definition of the said expression under s. 4(m) of the Cr. Procedure Code. Section 4(m) provides that "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. The expression "Court" is not defined either by the Cr. P.C. or the I.P.C .. though 'Court of Justice' is defined by s. 20 of the latter Code as denoting a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judi· cially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines a "Court" as including all Judges and Magistrates and aJI persons except the Arbitrators legaJiy authorised to take evidence. Prima facie, there is some force in the contention that it would not be reasonable to predicate about every judicial proceeding that it is a proceeding before a Court, and so, it is open to the appellant to urge that though the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer may be a judicial 1964 Ltdii Harldu •• St•I• of Mahartuhtr• Gajendragadkar c. J. 1964 Lalji Haridas v. SUttt of Maha· ruhtra Ga;endr"gadkar C.J. 710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C., it would not follow that the said judicial proceeding is a proceeding in a Court as re· quired by s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P.C. It is somewhat remarkable that though section 193, I.P.C., refers to a judicial proceeding, section 195, Cr. P.C. refers to a proceeding in any Court; it does not say a judi· ciai proceeding in any Court. Mr. Desai contends that reading section 193 l.P.C. ands. 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C., together. it would not be unreasonable to hold that proceedings which are judicial under the former, should be taken to be proceed· ings in any Court under the latter. The whole basis of pro· viding for a higher sentence in regard to offences committed at any stage of a judicial proceeding appears to be that the legislature took the view that the said offences were more serious in character, and so, it distinguished the said offences from similar offences committed at any stage of other pro· ceedings. The argument is that while providing for a higher sentence in respect of this more serious class of offences com· mitted at any stage of judicial proceedings, the legislature intended that there should be a safeguard in respect of com· plaint as regards the said offences and that safeguard is provided by s. 195(l)(b), Cr.P.C. In other words, an offence which is treated as more serious by the first paragraph of · s. 193, l.P.C. because it is an offence committed during the course of a judicial proceeding should be held to be an offence committed in any proceeding in any Court for the purpose of s. 195(l)(b) Cr.P.C. On this argument, it is not necessary to consider whether the Income-tax Officer is a Court or not, for, in substance, the contention is that as soon as s. 37(4) of the Act was enacted, the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer became judicial proceedings for the purpose of s. 193, l.P.C. and since they are classed under the first paragraph of the said section, they attract the pro· tection of s. 195(l)(b), Cr.P.C. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument, and, on the whole, we are inclined to prefer the construction suggested by Mr. Desai to that pressed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General. It is true, the Additional Solicitor-General has mainly relied upon the relevant provisions of several statutes in support of his construction and in so far as it appears that. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT I (b) Cr. P.C. had not been complied with as no complaint had been filed by the Income-tax Officer. It appears that In re: Punam Chand Maneklal(') the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had taken the view that an Income-tax Collector is a Revenue Court within the meaning of that term as used in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 195, Cr. PC., 1898. Scott, C. J. who spoke for the Full Bench, observed that it could not be contended that the Income-tax Collector was a Civil or Criminal Court, and so, he addressed himself (I) I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS to the narrow question as to whether he was a Revenue Court. Dealing with the question on that footing, he examin- . ed the functions of the Income-tax Collector under Act II of 1886, and held that he was a Revenue Court. He rejected the contention that he could be treated as a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act, and so, he found no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that he was a Revenue Court. The Bombay High Court in the present case has substantially based itself on this decision in reversing the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and directing that the complaint filed by the appellant should be dismissed. It is unnecessary to consider whether the view taken by the Full Bench in in re: P•mam Chand Maneklal(') is right, because the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act have been subsequently modified in 1922 and different considerations have now assumed importance. It is no longer possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court, and, indeed, that has not been the contention raised before us by Mr. Desai. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. DAS GUPTA, J.-Is an Income-tax Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, a court within the meaning of cl. (b) in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? That is the short but difficult question that arises in this appeal against a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. On November 24, 1949, the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent Mulji Manila! Kamdar was examined on commission by the Income-tax Officer, Jamnagar Circle, Jamnagar, he gave answers which were false to his knowledge. He prayed for the issue of process against the said Mulji Manila! Kamdar, so that he might be dealt with according to law. An objection was raised by the accused that in the absence of a complaint by the Income-tax Officer before whom the false statement was alleged to h~ve been made the Magistrate was debarred from taking cognizance of the case. This contention was based on a submission that the Income-tax Officer was a court within the meaning of s. 195 (1 )(bl. This objection was rejected by the Presidency Magistrate. (!) I.LR. 38 Born. 642. 1964 Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra Gajendragadkar c. J. Du Gupta J, 196/ Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra Das Gupta J. SUPREME COURT REPORTS The High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order. But considering itself bound by a Full Bench decision of the Court in in re: Pwzamclzand Manekla/(1) and the later decision in State v. Nemchand Peshvir(') the High Court held that an Income-tax Officer when holding proceedings under s. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is a Revenue Court within the meaning of cl. (b) in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The correctness of the High Court's view is challenged before us by the complainant on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under Avt. 134 ( 1 ) ( c) of the Constitution. Section 195 ( l) (b) is one of the group of sections in the Code of Criminal Procedure which have laid down exceptions to the general rule of criminal· law that criminal proceedings can be instituted in a court by any person. To this rules. 195 along with ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A, 198, l 98A, and 199 provide exceptions. Section 195 mentions in its first sub-section a number of offences of which no coupt shall take cognizance except on the complaint in writing of the persons as indicated. Three classes of offences are dealt with in three els. (a), (b) and ( c) of this subsection. Section 195(1) (a) deals with offences punishable under ss. 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code and provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any of these except <>n the complaint in writing "of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate." Section 195 (1 )(b) deals with offences punishable under SS. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228 .:md provides that when any such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, no court shall take cognizance of it except on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other court to which such court is subordinate. Section 195 (1 )( c) deals with offences punishable under ss. 463, 471, 475 and 476 and provides that when any such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of any document produced ---·--- ---- (I) l.L.R. 38 Born. 642. {2) 57 Born. L.R. 1056. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 715 <>r given in evidence in such proceeding, no court shall take cognizance of the same except on the complaint in writing of such court, or some other court to which such court is subordinate. The second sub-section of s. 195 runs thus :- "'In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term "court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar, or SubRegistrar, under the Indian Registration Act, 1877." In this appeal we are concerned directly with cl. (b) of. s. 195 (1). The appellant's com;>laint before the Magistrate alleged the commission of an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code in the course of the examination on oath by the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar . Circle, J amnagar. The examination itself took place in relation to assessment proceedings against the complainant for the years 1949-50, and 1950-51. If the Income-tax Officer is a Court it necessarily follows that the Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance of this offence except on the complaint of the Income-tax Officer. That is how the question whether the Income-taic Officer is a Court or not falls to be considered. Section 5 of the Income-taic Act, 1922, mentions six classes of Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act. The primary function of an Income-tax Officer is the assessment of income that is chargeable to taic under s. 3 of the Act and the determination of the tax payable on it. He has to rperform other functions under the Act that are subsidiary and ancillary to this main function. Under s. 5(7) the Income-tax Officers are subordinate to the Director of Inspection, the Cmi:tmissioner of Income-tax and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax within whose jurisdiction they perform their functions. Under s. 5 ( 8) they have to observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the Central Board of Revenue. Chapter III of the Act in its several sections state what heads of income-profits and gains shall be chargeable to incometaic and indicates the duties which the Income-tax Officer 1961 Lalji Harida1 v. State of Mahorashtra Das Gupta I. 1964 Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra Das G u:;ta J. SUPREME COURT REPORTS has to perform for the purpose of his main function of assessing the chargeable income. For instance, deductions under s. 7 ( 2 )( iia) in respect of conveyance owned by the assessee or used by him for the purpose of his em;iloyment "shall be such sum as the Income-tax Officer may estimate . ..... ". The allowances permissible under s. 10(2) (i) "shall be such sum as the Income-tax Officer may determine"; the allowances under s. 10(2) (ix) also shall be such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary course of business as the Income-tax Officer may estimate to be irrecoverable. Again, the allowances mentioned in cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s.