# LALLA RAM v. MANAGEMENT OF D.C.M. CHEMICAL WORKS LTD. & ANR

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 82
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-02-16
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 351 of 1971
- **Bench:** \(". R. Krishna Iyer, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lalla-ram-v-management-of-d-c-m-chemical-works-ltd-anr-7444
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Industrial Dispurcs Act 1947 s. 33(2)(b)-Scope and 1;at1<re of enquiry by
the Tribunals on an application u/s 33(2) (b).
The appellant, a worker under Respondent No. 1 was occupying one of the
jhuggies on the plot adjacent to the mill of Respondent No. 1.
On receipt of a
report fron1 ,the seritry, Dharam Singh, that one Sheo Ram had started making
an unauthorised construction on the said plot, Shyau.1 Singh, Assistant Security
Officer of Respondent No. 1 who \Vas in-charge of prevention of encroachment
and further unauthorised construction, proceeded to the spot accompanied by
two members of bis s:taff to investigate into the matter. . On Ending Sheo Singh
constructing a new jhuggi in front of his existing jhuggi Shyam Singh pleaded
\vith the forn1er and asked hin1 to desist from cons1,ructing th.;: new jhuggi. While
he was so engaged the appellant made his appearance along \vith 8 to 10 jhu$gi
dwellers, manhandled Shyam Singh, hurled highly provbcativc invectives at him
and his con1panions, and bade them to quit on pain of dire con:'lequences. Later,
the managen1ent of respondent 1 det<liled two of its officers to enquire into the
aforesaid n1isbehaviour towards and attempt to assault Shyam Singh who was
discharging his. official duties.
The inquiry officers found that the acts comn1itted by the appellant \Vere subversive of indiscipline and constituted misconduct, as
conten1plated by the Standing Order 27 ( 1) as applicable
to
the
appellant.
Agreeing wi,;h the findings, the General Manager of Respondent No. 1 passed
an order on Atay 2, 1968, disn1issing the appellant from service.
Since, however,
an industrial dispute was pending, the General A-tanager directed the appellant
to take his final dues together with one month's pay in lieu of notice and n1ade
an application on the same day to the Industrial Tribllnal, Delhi, seeking its
approval of the order of the appellant's dismissal, as required by s. 33(2)(b)
of the Act.
The Additional Indu.strial Tribunal, Delhi, refused by its order dt. April 23,
1969 to accord its approval to the appellant's dismissal on the grounds viz.,
that the disciplina1y c:ction taken against the appellant \Vas mbconceived; that
since there was no rational connection bet\veen the employ1nent ot the appellant
and Shyam Singh in regard to the affairs of the D.C.tvl.
Chen1ical
\Vorks,
Standing Order 27(1) was not 'attracted and that it was really a case of civil
dispute between the Company and jhuggi d\vellers who \Vere long being pres-
:-urised to surrender possession of the area to the Company and the machinery
of security staff of D.C.J\..1. \vas pressed into service for that purpose.
Against
the sriid orders, Respondent No. 1 moved the High Court under Art. 226 of
the Constitution. The High, Court a1lowed ·the petition holding that since there
was a clear finding of the Inquiry Officers about the existence of rational connection hetwccn the aforesaid incident and the duties of the appellant. and Shyam
Singh nnd
then:~ wns nothing in 1he order of the Tribtmal to shO\V that the
Inquiry Officers had arrived at that finding without any evidence, it was not
open to the. Tribunal to come to a different conclusion on the facts or to hold
that the present was a case of victimisation and then to refuse its approval. The
IIigh Court quashed the order and directed the Additional Tribunal to consider
the aforesaid application of Respondent No. 1 in the light of its judgment.
Dismissing the app~::il by special leave, the. Court
HELD:
l. Though it is true that a private quarrel bet\\'een an employee and a
stranger with which the employer is not conce1ned falls outside the categories
of trnisconduct, acts which are subversive of discipline an1ongst employees or
)
'
.;
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•
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LALLA RAM V. D.C.M. CHEMICALS
83
misconduct or misbehaviour by an employee which is directed against another
A
employee of the concern may in certain circumstances constitu~e misconduct so
as to form the ba5is of an order of dismissal or dis

## Text

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LALLA RAM
V.
MANAGEMENT OF D.C.M. CHEMICAL WORKS LTD. & ANR.
February 16, 1978
[\(". R. KRISHNA IYER AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.J
Industrial Dispurcs Act 1947 s. 33(2)(b)-Scope and 1;at1<re of enquiry by
the Tribunals on an application u/s 33(2) (b).
The appellant, a worker under Respondent No. 1 was occupying one of the
jhuggies on the plot adjacent to the mill of Respondent No. 1.
On receipt of a
report fron1 ,the seritry, Dharam Singh, that one Sheo Ram had started making
an unauthorised construction on the said plot, Shyau.1 Singh, Assistant Security
Officer of Respondent No. 1 who \Vas in-charge of prevention of encroachment
and further unauthorised construction, proceeded to the spot accompanied by
two members of bis s:taff to investigate into the matter. . On Ending Sheo Singh
constructing a new jhuggi in front of his existing jhuggi Shyam Singh pleaded
\vith the forn1er and asked hin1 to desist from cons1,ructing th.;: new jhuggi. While
he was so engaged the appellant made his appearance along \vith 8 to 10 jhu$gi
dwellers, manhandled Shyam Singh, hurled highly provbcativc invectives at him
and his con1panions, and bade them to quit on pain of dire con:'lequences. Later,
the managen1ent of respondent 1 det<liled two of its officers to enquire into the
aforesaid n1isbehaviour towards and attempt to assault Shyam Singh who was
discharging his. official duties.
The inquiry officers found that the acts comn1itted by the appellant \Vere subversive of indiscipline and constituted misconduct, as
conten1plated by the Standing Order 27 ( 1) as applicable
to
the
appellant.
Agreeing wi,;h the findings, the General Manager of Respondent No. 1 passed
an order on Atay 2, 1968, disn1issing the appellant from service.
Since, however,
an industrial dispute was pending, the General A-tanager directed the appellant
to take his final dues together with one month's pay in lieu of notice and n1ade
an application on the same day to the Industrial Tribllnal, Delhi, seeking its
approval of the order of the appellant's dismissal, as required by s. 33(2)(b)
of the Act.
The Additional Indu.strial Tribunal, Delhi, refused by its order dt. April 23,
1969 to accord its approval to the appellant's dismissal on the grounds viz.,
that the disciplina1y c:ction taken against the appellant \Vas mbconceived; that
since there was no rational connection bet\veen the employ1nent ot the appellant
and Shyam Singh in regard to the affairs of the D.C.tvl.
Chen1ical
\Vorks,
Standing Order 27(1) was not 'attracted and that it was really a case of civil
dispute between the Company and jhuggi d\vellers who \Vere long being pres-
:-urised to surrender possession of the area to the Company and the machinery
of security staff of D.C.J\..1. \vas pressed into service for that purpose.
Against
the sriid orders, Respondent No. 1 moved the High Court under Art. 226 of
the Constitution. The High, Court a1lowed ·the petition holding that since there
was a clear finding of the Inquiry Officers about the existence of rational connection hetwccn the aforesaid incident and the duties of the appellant. and Shyam
Singh nnd
then:~ wns nothing in 1he order of the Tribtmal to shO\V that the
Inquiry Officers had arrived at that finding without any evidence, it was not
open to the. Tribunal to come to a different conclusion on the facts or to hold
that the present was a case of victimisation and then to refuse its approval. The
IIigh Court quashed the order and directed the Additional Tribunal to consider
the aforesaid application of Respondent No. 1 in the light of its judgment.
Dismissing the app~::il by special leave, the. Court
HELD:
l. Though it is true that a private quarrel bet\\'een an employee and a
stranger with which the employer is not conce1ned falls outside the categories
of trnisconduct, acts which are subversive of discipline an1ongst employees or
)
'
.;
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LALLA RAM V. D.C.M. CHEMICALS
83
misconduct or misbehaviour by an employee which is directed against another
A
employee of the concern may in certain circumstances constitu~e misconduct so
as to form the ba5is of an order of dismissal or discharge.
[880-E]
Tata Oil Co. Ltd. v. Its Worknien [19641 7 SCR 555 and Ag1u111i (~V.fvf.) v.
Badri Das & Ors. [1963] 1 LLJ 684 referred to.
2. The extent of jurisdiction exercisnble by an appropriate authority under
s. 33(2J(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is very limited.
In proceedings under
s. 33 ( 2) (b) the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is conf~ned to the inquiry
as lo: (1) whether a prop;!r domestic enquiry in accordance will1 th~ relevant
rules/Standing Ordi:rs and principles of natural justice has been hcid; (2) whether
3 μrhnr. facie case for disn1issa I based on legal evidence adduced
before
the
don1estic tribunal is mad-. out; (3) whether the employer had come to a bona
fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dis1nisstil' <lid not amount
to unfair labour practice and \Vas not intended tn victi1nisc the employee regard
l:c ing had to the positicn settl~d by the decision of ''.his Cour1 th<H though generaHy speaking the a\vard of punish1nent for misconduct under
the
Standing
Orders is a matter for the n1anagement to decide and the Tribunal is not required
to consider rhe propric~y or adequacy of the punishn1ent or v.:hcther it is exces-
~ivc or too severe: yet an inference of n1ala tides rnay i11 certain cases be dra\vn
from the in1position of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable
or
shockingly
disproportionJ.te punishn1ent; ( 4) \Vhether the employer has paid or offered to
pay \i'ages for one month to the employee and (5) V1/hether the employer has
simullaneously or within such reasonably short time as to forn1
part of the
san1e tn1Psaction applied to the authority before which
the main industrial
dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by hin1.
If these conditions
are satisfitd the Industrial Tribllnal would grant the
approval
which
would
relate back to the date from which the cn1ployer had ordered the di<;missal.
Jf.
however. 1he don1estic enquiry suffers from any defect or inlir111~ty, the labour
authority n·ill have to find out on its own assessn1ent of the evidence adducrd
before it
1.1,;hether there was justifh:ation for dismissal nnd if it so finds it will
grant appro\'~ll of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the
d,Hc \Vhen the order \\'as passed prO\'ided the employer had paid or offered to
pay w;i.ges for one month to the employee and the employer had within the
time indicuted above applied to 1he authority before which the main industrial
<lls~\1te is pending for approval of the action taken by hi1n.
rssE, 90B-G]
Lord l•ri ... h11a Textile 1\1ills v.
Its U'ork111e11 [1961] 3 SCll 204, Kalyarii
(P.H.) ''· 4ir France, Calcutta f1963] 1 LLJ 679, Central Bank of India Ltd.,
New Drlfii v. Shri Praka'lh Cha11d Jain [1969] 1 SCH. 735. Benf!al Bhatdee Coal
Co. v. Rc11n l'toh!!sh Sin1d1 l1964] 1 SCR 709; AlR 1964 SC 486. Ti1ui:h11r Pap<'r ..
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Rtun 1\iareslz K111nar [1961] LU 511 (SC), Hind Construction
& E11ginceti11u Co. Ltd. v. Their Workn1e11[1965]2 SCR 83: ATR 1965 SC 917,
lVork111c11 of Af('s.\T.\' Firestone Tyre & Rubber Con1pa11y of I11dia (P) T.Ad. v.
Manaru:111e111 (.\!Ors. [1973] 3 SCR 587: ATR 1973 SC 1227 and Eastern Electric
and Trading Co. v. Baldev Lal [1975], Lab JC 1435 (SC) applied.
In the instant case; (a) The requisite nexus was there and the lndustrial
Tribunal unauthorisedly assumed the role of an appellate authority and exceeded
the \veil defined limits of its jurisdiction in refusing to accord its approval of the
action tuki:n :1gainst the appellant by holding, not on the basis of any legal
evidence but purely on the basis of conjectures and surmises that the
present
was a case of victimisation; and (b) No cjuestion of victimisation or management having a bias against the appellant can arise on the facts and circumstances of the case. once it is held that the findings of misconduct alleged agz,inst
the \Vorkn1en were properly arrived at and the domestic enquiry
or
in
any
other way vitiated.
[91 E-F]
3. Both the victim and the delinquent workn1an need not
necessarily
be·
eng<iged in the perforn1:ince of their official duties when the act which
is
the
subject-matter of n1isconduct is said to have been committed.
Tt is sufficient if
the victim and the delinquent workman are both employees of the samy concern and the misconduct is directed against the former, while he is acting in
the discha.ige of the duties imposed on him by virtue of his office.
[91H, 92-A]
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
A
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal being a limited one and all the
essential requisites of the proviso to s. 33(2)(b) of the Act being present in
the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal was not justified in withholding its
approval.
[92A-BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeal No. 351
of
1971.
B
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order the 19th
November, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.
No. 373
of
1969).
S. C. Agarwala for the appellant.
Dr. Anand Prakash and M. K. D. Namboodri for
Respondent
C
No. 1.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JAsWANT SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed
against the judgment and order dated November 19, 1970 of the
High Court of Delhi rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 373 of 1969
setting aside the order dated April 23, 1909
of
the
AdditiO'lla!
Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, rejecting respondent No. l's application
under section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') seeking approval of its order of the
appellant's dismissal from service passed during the pendency
of
an industrial dispute.
The facts and circumstances giving rise
to
this
appeal are :
Behind the premises situate on Najafgarh Road, Delhi of responden~
No. 1 which is a unit of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company
Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Company') there is a plot of
land admeasuring 181 acres ownership whereof was
transferred in
favour of the Company by the erstwhile Delhi Improvement Trust
(now constituted as Delhi Development Authority) vide sale deed
dated May 20, 1964. The plot being adjacent to the premises of respondent No. 1, the same was being fo'oli:ed after by the managemen~ of
the respondent which also constructed some quarters thereon for the
use of its employees.
There are also some jhuggies
(fiutments)
standing on the land in which live 172 families out of whjch 70 are
of the employees of respondent No. 1 and the rest are df some outsiders.
After taking over the watch and ward
of
the
plot,
the
management of respondent No. 1 posted some sentries to prevent
encroachment and nnanthorised construction thereon.
On the Company's taking up construction of a boundary wall on the aforesaid
plot in April or May, 1967, the appellant, who was
the President
(Pradhan) of the Jhuggi Jhoupari Sudhar Sabha and a few
other
jhuggi dwellers brought a suit, being suit No. 418 of 1967 in the
court of the Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi for injunction restraining
the Company and respondent No. 1 from constructing the boundary
wall and from evicting them from the jhuggies.
On the basis of the
voluntary statement made on behalf of the Company to the effect
that it would not evict the appellant and his co-plaintiffs except by a
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LALLA RAM v. D.C.M. CHEMICALS (Jaswant Singh, !.)
85
due process of Jaw, the Sub-Jucjge issued a temporary iuju_nc_tion res·
A
trainiug the Company and respondent
No. 1 from
ev1ctmg
the
appellant and his co-plaintiffs except by a due process of Jaw
but
refused their prayer for injunction restraining the Company and respondent No. 1 from building the boundary wall.
The Sub-Judge,
however directed the Company and respondent No. 1 to leave 10 feet
wide gate for the passage of the appellant and his
co-plaintiffs.
Aggrieved by the rejection of their prayer with regard to
issue
of B
injunction regarding constructian of the boundary wall, the appellant
and his co-plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the Senior Sub-Judge,
Delhi, who dismissed the same by his order dated February 28, 1968
observing :
"The dispute between the parties is
only regarding the
C
construction of the boundary wall
along the Naja!garh
Drain.
TI1is bouncfary wall is admittedly sought to
be
constructed by the defendant-respondents in their own land
and the plaintiffs appellants did not claim any right of
ownership in the site on which the Jhuggis
existed or on
which the wall in question is sought to be constructed. The
applicants had not claimed any right of easement or irrevoD
cable licence against the construction of this wall lmd
so,
they do not appear to have any right to compel the defendants-respondents not to construct this wall.
The learned
counsel for the appellant has contended before me that their
passage from the jhuggis towards the Najafgarh Drain would
be obstructed by the construction of this wall.
The !Carried
trial court, it appears, ordered the defendant to leave a gate
E
of about 10' width for the passage of the jhuggi dwellers,
while constructing the boundary wall in question.
The
learned trial court exercised the discretion keeping in view
the right of the defendants to construct the boundary wall in
their own land as also the convenience of plaintiffs-appellants. There is hardly any justification to interfere with the
discretion exercised by the learned trial court."
F
On the evening of March 2, 1968, Shyam Singh, Assistant Security Officer of respondent No. 1 received a
report fwm sentry
Dharam Singh alleging that one Shea Ram had started making
an
u~antho'.ised c?nstrnction oi: the aforesaid plot.
In the discharge of
his official dnues of preventing encroachment and unauthorised construction :m the immovable property belongi':'g
to
he
Company,
G
Shyam Smgh proceeded to the spot accompamed by two members of
his ?laff to investigate info the matter.
On reaching the spot and
~dm~ Shea Ra!" constructmg .a new jhuggi in front of his
existing
Jhnggi, Shyam Smgh pleaded with the former and asked him td desist
from constructing the new jhuggi.
While he was so , engaged,
the
appellant who was also an employee of respondent No. 1 made his
appearance .a!on~ith ei.gh!_ to ten jhuggi
dwellers and adopting a
H
v_ery aggressive a!htude mtel'Ven~d on behalf of Shea Ram and questioned the authonty of Shyam Smgh, who was senior to him, to make
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 S.C.R.
inquiries in regard to the constructio11 during the pendency of the
aforesaid litigation.
He also manhandled
Shyam
Singh,
hurled
highly provocative invectives at him and his companions and bade
them to quit on pain of dire consequences.
Unnerved by the threats
held out by the appellant, Shyam Singh left the place alongwith his
security personnel and hastened to make a repo,rt of
the
incident
to his immediate superior which Jed to flie suspension of the i:'PPellant
and issue to him of a notice by General Manager of respondent No. 1
calling upon him to show cause as t-0' why he should not be dismissed
for his aforesaid misbehaviour towards and attempt to assault Shyam
Singh who was discharging his official duties which were acts ~ubver
sive of discipline within the meaning of Standing Order 27(i) applicable
to
him.
The appellant sub_mitted his explanation denying the
charges levelled against him and questioning the
authority ot tlie
respondent to ehargesheet him in respect .of an incident which was
purely private. Not satisfied with the explanation
tendered by the
appellant, the management of respondent No. 1 detailed two of its
otlicers to inquire into the aforesaid charges against the appellant.
On completion of the inquiry in accordance with the Standing Orders,
the Enquiry Officers submitted a unanimous report observing therein
that it was not the appellant's case that either Sheo Ram or any
other person was being evicted from any of the jhuggics standing on
the area which was admittedlv known as 'D.C.M. Chemical Works
Jhuggi Area'., that it was clear that Dharam Singh, a member of the
watch and ward staff placed on duty to protect the property of the
Company had noticed Shea Ram constructing new walls in front of
his jhuggi; that on reaching the spot on the evening of March 2, 1968,
Shyam Singh saw the freshly constructed walls of the height of :1.bout
5' and some building material lying in front of Shea Ram's jhuggi
and was accordingly justified in investigafing into the matter; that
when Shyam Singh was telling Shea Ram that he should not construct
a new jhuggi or extend the jhuggi, the appellant questioned the authority of
Shyam Singh, and abused and manhandled him and in so
doing was guilty of misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order
27 ( 1). It would be profitable to refer to the concluding portion of
the report which reads thus :
"Shri Shyam Singh is a member of the Security Staff and
a responsible officer of the Company.
Shri
Shyam Singh
is an otlicer of the Company and is senior to Shri Lalla Ram.
In the discharge of official duties of protecting the property
of the Company and preventing its misuse, if Shri Shya.llt
Singh wanted to investigate into the matter reported to him
by Shri Dharam Singh he was perfectly within his rights.
The acti.o'n of Shri Lalla Ram is certainly not justified in so
far as he intervened and obstructed Shri Shyam and other
security staff; and in the process Shri Lalla Ram questioned
the authority of a superior officer/security staff, called him
and his sepoys "GONDAS" caught hold of him by his hand
and pushed him and threatened him. . ... Shri Lalla Ram
also said that they were not afraid of the uniform i.e.
security staff, who are meant for safeguarding the property
)
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LALLA RAM v. D.C.M. CHEMICALS (Jaswant Singh, J.)
87
of the company and enforcing the
discipline.
Under the
circumstances, we conclude that Shri Lalla Ram committed
the acts alleged against him, namely, obstructing the assistant
security officer
in
the
discharge · of official duties, and
threatening him and catching hold of him by hand and
thereby committed acts subversive of discipline, a misconduct
under the Standing Order No. 27(i).
We find Shri Lalla
Ram guilty of the charge. n
Agreeing with the finding~ of the Enquiry Officers that the aforesaid acts committed by the appellant were subversive of discipline and
c,onstituted misconduct as contemplated by
Standing
Order 27 (i),
the General Manager of respondent No. 1 passed an order o~ l\1ay 2,
1968, dismissing the appellant from service.
Since,
however,
an
industrial dispute was pending, the General
Manager directed the
appellant to take his final dues together with one month's pay in lieu
of notice and made an application on the sam.e day to the Industr!al
Tribunal, Delhi seeking its approval of the order of the appellant's
dismissal as required by section 33(2) (b)' of the Act.
While holding that the Enquiry Officers were not biased
against
the appellant; that there was no violation of the principles of natural
justice and that it could not be said that the findings of the Enquiry
Officers were not based upon any evidence or that the same were
perverse, the Additional Industrial Tribunal;
Delhi
refused by its
<>'rdcr dated April 23, 1969 to accord its approval to the appellant's
dismissal on the grounds that the disciplinary action taken
against
the appellant was misconceived; that since there was
no
r~\ional
connection between the employment of the appellant
and
Shyam
Singh in regard to the affairs of the D.C.M. Chemical Works, _Standing Order 27(i) was no\ attracted in the present case
which
was
really a case of civil dispute between the Company and jhuggi dwellers
who were long being pressurised to surrender pqssession of the area
to the Company and the machinery of security
staff of
D.C.M.
Chemical Works was pressed into service for that purpose.
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Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the
Additional
Industrial
Tribunal, respondent No. 1 movea the High Court of Delhi
under
Article 226 of the Cons1itution.
The High
Court
allowed
the
petition holding that since there was a clear finding by the Enquiry
Officers about the
existence of rational
connection between
lhe
aforesaid incident and tnc duties of the appellant herein and Shyam
G
Singh and there was nothing in the order of the Tribunal to
show
that the Enquiry Officers had arrived at that finding
without
any
evidence, it was not open to the Tribunal to come to a different conclusion on the facts or to hold that the present was a case of victimisation and then to refuse its approval.
In this view of the matter,
the High Court quashed the order of ~he Additional Industrial Tribunal and directed it to consider the aforesaid application of respondent
No. 1 in the light of its judgment.
Not satisfied with this order, the
appellant has come up in apeal to this court under Article
136 of
the Constitution.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. S. C. Aggarwal has urged that
since the quarrel between the appellant and Shyam Singh was purely
private and the misconduct attributed to the appellant had no rational
connection with his employment and that. of Shyam Singh, the dismissal of the appellant under Standing Order 27(i) was not valid
and legal; that the Additional Tribunal was well within its authority
to refuse to accord its approval to the action taken by the management of respondent No. 1 in dismissing the appellant and that the
order under appeal which is erroneous cannot be sustained.
He has,
in support of his contention referred us to two decisions of this Court
in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen(') and Agnani (W.M.) v.
Badri Das & Ors.( 2 )
In Agnani's case (supra), this Court held as under :-
"It is true tha_t if a domestic enquiry is properly held and
the employer terminates the services of his employee, the
industrial tribunal dealing with industrial disputes arising
out of such dismissal is not authorized to fa in appeal over
the findings of the enquiry committee, or to examine the
propriety of the ultimate order of dismissal passed by the
employer."
Though it is true that private quarrel between an employee and
a stranger with which the employer is not concerned as in Agnani's
case (supra) falls outside the categories of misconduct, it cannot
be reasonably disputed that acts which are subversive of discipline
amongst employees or mis.conduct or misbehaviour by an employee
which is directed against another employee of the concern may in
certain circumstances constitute misconduct so as to form the basis
of an order of dismisal or discharge. It cannot also be disputed that
the extent of jurisdiction exercisable by an approving authority under
section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is very limited as has been clearly and
succinctly pointed out by this Court in a number of decisions.
In
Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen(') this Court after referring to its earlier decisions and explaining the distinction between
'permission' and 'approval' observed as follows :-
"Therefore, putting it negatively the
jurisdiction of
the
appropriate industrial authority in holdi;ig an enquiry under
s. 33(2)(b) cannot be wider and is, if at all, more limited,
than that permitted under s. 33 (1), and in exercising its
powers under s. 33 (2) the appropriate authority must bear
in mind the departure deliberately made by the Legislature
in separating the two classes of ca§es falling under the t\VO
sub-sections, and in providing for express permission in one
case and only approval in the other. It is true that it would
be competent to the authority in a proper case to refuse
to give
approval,
for
section
33(5)
expressly empowers
the
authority to pass
such
order in
rehtion to the application made before it under the proviso to
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 555.
(2) [1963] 1 L.L.J. 684.
(3) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 204.
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LALLA RAM v. D.C.M. CHEMICALS (Jaswant Singh, J.)
s. 33(2)(b) as it may deem fit; it may either approve or
. refuse to approve; it can, however, impose no conditions
and pass no condition;tl order.
x x x
In view of the
limited nature and extent of the enquiry permissible under
s. 33(2)(b) all that the au~ority can do in dealing with an
employer's application is to consider whether a prima facie
case for according approval is made out by him or not. If
before dismissing an .employee the employer
has held a
proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass the impugned order as a result of the said enquiry, all that the
.authority can do is to enquire whether the conditions prescribed by s. 33(2) (b) and the proviso are satisfied or not.
Do the standing orders justify the order of dismissal ? Has
an enquiry been held as provided by the Standing Orders ?
Have the wages for the month been paid as required by 1he
proviso ?; and, has an application been made as prescribed
. by the proviso ?"
89
In another case between Kalyani (P.H.) and Air France, Calcutta('), Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) speaking for a bench of five
judges of this Court said :
A
B
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"If the enquiry is not defective, the labour court .has only
D
to see whether there was a prima facie case for dismissal,
and whether the employer had come to the bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty of misconduct. Thereafter,
on coming to the conclusion that the employer
had bona fide come to the conclusion that the employee
was guilty, i.e. there was nd unfair labour practice and no
victimization, the labour court would grant the approval
E
which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the
dismissal. If the enquiry is
defective for any reason, the 1abour court would also have
to consider for itself on the evidence adduced before it
whether the dismissal was justified.
However, on coming
to the conclusion on its own appraisal of evidence ad<luced
before it that the dismissal was justified, its approval of the
F
order of dismissal made by the employer in a defective
enquiry would still relate back to' the date when the order
was made."
In Central Bank of India Ltd-, New Delhi v: Shri Prakash Chand
lain(2), this Court laid aown :
"These decisions of this Court make it cleaf that when an
G
industrial tribunal is asked to give its approval to an
order of dismissal.nuder s. 33(2)(b) of the Act, it can disregard the findings given by the Enquiry Officer only if the
findings
are
perverse.
The test
of
perversity
that
is
indicated in these cases is that the findings may not
be supported by any legal evidence at all ...... A finding
by a domestic tribunal like an Enquiry Officer can be held
H
(l) [1963] I L.LJ. 679.
(2) [1969] l S.C.R. 735.
7-211SCI/78
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SUPREME COURT REP OR TS
[J 978] 3 S.C.11
to be perverse in those cases als.o where the finding arrived
at by the domestic tribunal is one at which no reasonable
person could have arrived on the material before it."
The position that emerges from the above quoted decisions ot
this Court may be stated thus: In proceedings under section 33(2)(b)
of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to
the enquiry as to (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance
with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles
of
natural
justice has been held; (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal
· based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic
tribunal is
made out; (iii) whether the employer had come to
a
bona fide
conclusion that the employee was guilty anq the dismissal did not
amount to unfair labour pq1ctice and was not intended to victimise
the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decisions
of this Court in Bengal Bhatdee Coal CO, v. Ram Probesh Singh('),
Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ram Naresh
Kumar(•),
Hind
Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd.
v. Management & Ors( 4 )., and Eastern Electric and Trading Co. v.
Baldev Lal(') that though generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders is a matter f9f the
ma_nagement to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider
the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is ex~es
sive or too severe yet an inference of ma/a fides may in certain case;;
be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable
or shockingly disproportionate punishment;
(iv) whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages ror one month to th6
employee and (v) whether the
employer has
simultaneously or
within such reasonably short time as to form part of the same
transaction applied to the authority before which the main indnsrial
dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these
conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would
grant the
approval which would relate back to the
date from
which the
employer had ordered the dismissal. If however,
the domestic
enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will
have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced
before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so
finds it will grant apprmal of the order of dismissal which would
also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the
employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the
employee and the employer had within the time indicated
above
applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is
pending for approval of the action taken by him.
(1) [1964} l S.C.R. 709.
(2) [1961] L.L.J. 511.
(3) [19651 2 S.C.R. 83.
(4) [1973] 3 S.C.R. 587.
(5) [1975J Lab. I.C. 1435 (S.C.).
·----
I
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LALLA RAM v. D.C.M· CHEMICALS (Jaswant Singh, !.)
91
Let us now see whether the aforesaid requirements are satisfied
in the present case or not.
As stated earlier, the Enquiry Officers
had, after a regular enquiry properly made according to the requirements of the Standing Orders and principles of natural justice, come
to a categoric and bona fide conclusion that the appellant obstructed
Sh yam Singh in the execution
of his legitimate
ofiicial duties (of
protecting the immovable property of the Company and preventing
its improper and unauthorised nse)
by abusing,
threatening and
roughly handling him and thereby committed misconduct as contemplated by Standing Order 27 (i). The Industrial Tribunal had itself
also clearly found that the Enquiry Officers were not biased against
the appellant; that the
domestic
enquiry held
against
the
appellant was not violative of the principles of natural justice
and that it could not be said that the findings of Enquiry Officers
were not based upon evidence or were perverse.
The material on
record also disclosed that the employer paid one month's wages
to
the appellant and simultaneously made an application to the specified
authority before which the main industrial dispute was pending for
grant of approval of the dismissal of
the appellant.
Further the
misconduct for which the disc'iplinary action was taken against the
appellant was undoubtedly directed against Shyam Singh to prevent
him from investigating into a matter relating to immovable property
belonging to the Company which he was bound to protect in discharge
of the duties which devolved upon him as a security officer.
In
face of all the aforesaid factors which make out a strong prima facie
case against the appellant, it is difficult to
understand
how
the
Additional Industrial Tribunal could legitimately ignore the bona (ule
findings of the Enquiry Officers wfiich it had itself
endorsed
by
holding that there was no rational nexus between the appellant's misconduct and his employment and that of Shyam Singh and withhold
its approval of the action taken by the management of rcspoi1dent
No. Y
On a careful consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are therefore clearly of the view that the
requisite nexus was there and the Industrial Tribunal unauthorisedly
assumed the role of an appellate authority ·and exceede-d the well
defined limits of its jurisdiction in refusing to accord its approval of
the action taken against the appellant by holding not on the basis
of any legal evidence but purely on the basis of conjectures' and
surmises that the present was a case of vietimisation.
We
would
like to call attention at this stage to the decisions of this Court in
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Prasad (S.C.) &
Anr.(') and Hmndard Dawakhana Wakf v. Its Workmen & Ors.(2)
and reiterate and re-emphasize that no question of victimisation or
management having a bias against the appellant can arise once it is
held that the findings of misconduct alleged against the
workman
were properly arrived at and the domestic enquiry was in no way
vitiated.
We woul_d also like to emphasize that it is not necessary
as stressed by the learned OOllnsel for the appellant that both the
victim and the delinquent workman should he engaged in the performance of their official duties when the act which is
the
subject
(!) [1969] 2 L.L.J. 799.
(2) [1962] 2 L.L.J. 772.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( ]_978] 3 S.C.R.
A
matter of misconduct is said to have been committed. It is sufficient
if the victim and the delinquent w6ikman are both employees of the
same concern and the misconduct is directed against
the
former
while he is acting in the discharge of the duties imposed en him by
virtue of his office.
Thus the jurisdiction of the Industrial Trib1mal
being a limited one, as stated above and all the essential requisites of
the ptoviso to section 33(2)(b) of the Act being present in the
instant case, the Industrial Tribunal was not, in our opinion, justified
B
in withhdlding its approval and the High Court was perfectly right in
passing the impugned judgment and order.
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For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal which
is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
We have disallowed costs to express our thought that notwithstanding the gravity of the misconduct ffie management could .be a
little magnanimous while awarding punishment. The broad guideline
which persuaded us not to interfere was the reluctance of this Court
to demolish a finding by the High Court unless there was something
seriously wrong with it and our further view that unless there is a
serious error or infirmity, as we have indicated earlier,
with
the
enquiry or the·ord~r by the disciplinary authority, the Tribunal should
n0t interf_ere.
We indicated to the management, through its counsel,
that this was pre-eminently a case for desirability of the dismissal
being tempered with SO!lle s<J!atium to the workman so as to soften
the blow. But there are employers and employers and some have
their own reasons and difficulties and so nothing came out of the
suggestion.
We have left it at that and have indicated, by denial of
costs, what our attitude about the refusal of the management is.
S.R.
Appeal dismissed.
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