# LALLU YESHW ANT SINGH v. RAO JAGDISH SINGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1968] 2 S.C.R. 203
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 145 of 1965
- **Bench:** J. c. SHAH, s. M. SJKRI
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lallu-yeshw-ant-singh-v-rao-jagdish-singh-ors-4308
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Gwa/it>f Reve1111e Laws-Ryotwari Land-GG/rdakhilk<ir lenarlls de·
faulling in paymenl ·of rent-Landlord whether can eject !heni forcibly
witi1Qu1 process of law--QanoO'll Mal s. 326 and Qanoon Ryotwari ss.
82. 137, 163-Effect of.
..
.
Certain tenants of ryotwari land in Gwalior district filed a suit under
s. 326 of the Qanoon Mal alleging dispossession by the landlords and
praying for restoration of possession.
On behalf of the defendants· it
was urged that by not paying land revenue the plaintiffs' rights had been
extinguished under s. 82 of the Qanoon Ryotwari. The Revenue authori·
ties decreed the suit on the view that even when Jand revenue was not
paid the landlord could not take possession v.ithout recourse to a suit
undor s. 137 Qanoon Ryotwari. · The High Court_ however allowed the
landlords' petition under Art. 217 of the Constitution holding that it
was not obligatory on the landlord to resort to Court in order to eject
a defaulting lessee, and that in a proceeding under s. 163 of Qanoon
R_yotwari it was not snfficie·nt to determine the question of
de facto
posses.sion alone but it was also necessary to enquire as to \\'hethe-r this
possession was or was not wrong.
The appellant, V.'ho was one of the
tenants came to this Court.
Held : (i) Under s. 82(3) Qanoon Ryotwari, the right of a Khatedar
is extinguished if the khatedar keeps in arrears the land revenue of his
khata but there is no automatic extinguishment of his right because the
proviso to s. 137 of the Qanoon Ryo1wari enables the Collector to accept
arrears if the khatedar is a good payer (khush-dehanda) and there are
special reasons beyond his control for not paying land revenue.
The
proviso would become a dead Jetter if in
every case when
there are
arrears of land revenue the landlord could take possession forcibly with·
out trying to recover the land revenue under s. 137. [207 E-Gl
Further s. 163 of Qanoon Ryot/wari clearly provides for suits of the
nature described in s. 326 of Qanoon /\fa!.
Section 326 is ''ei'Y similar
to s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, and the words 'disturbed unlaw·
fully· in s. 326 mean "disturbed not in due course of law".
Otherwjse.
there is no reason why a shorter period of limitation and sun1mary procedure is provide.d in s. 326 \vhile s. 325 provides a longer period of three
ve.ars 'for a suit for possession. ·The word ·trespass' in s .. 326 would include
i·orcible entry and dispossession by the landlord. [207 G-208A]
(ii) Under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act the question of title i., irrcle-
\'ant in a suit under that section. Section 326 Of Qanoon Jl.,fa/ read with
s. 163 of Qanoon Ryotwarl being similar to that section must l>o similarly
interpreted. [208B]
Mid11{1.pur .Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 51
I.A. 293, K. K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani. I.L.R. [1954}
Born.
950, Yar Mo/Janunad v. Lakshmi Das, I.L.R. [1958) 2 All. 394, Wa/i
20 ·I
SUPB.lME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S.C. R.
Ahmud Khan '· Ayodlaa K111rd11, (1891) l.L.R. 13 All. 537, State
of
A
West Bcngu/ v. /Jirendrr. Nath Bas1111ia, A.1.R. 11955) Cal. 601.
Hi//aya
Suhhaya Hegde v. Naraycmappl' Timmayc. ( 1911) 13 B.L.R. 1200, I. :lu
hin Raghushet \', A n11aji ParaJ!irom,
[ 1881)
I.L.R. 5 Born. 387.
Ba11du
v. Naba, [ 1890] I.LR. 15 Born. 238 aad Dadabhai Narsidas v. The S11bCol/ector of Broach, 7 Born. H. C. Rep. 82 ACJ, referred to.

## Text

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LALLU YESHW ANT SINGH
v.
RAO JAGDISH SINGH & ORS.
Nowmber 29, 1967
[J. c. SHAH AND s. M. SJKRI, JJ.]
Gwa/it>f Reve1111e Laws-Ryotwari Land-GG/rdakhilk<ir lenarlls de·
faulling in paymenl ·of rent-Landlord whether can eject !heni forcibly
witi1Qu1 process of law--QanoO'll Mal s. 326 and Qanoon Ryotwari ss.
82. 137, 163-Effect of.
..
.
Certain tenants of ryotwari land in Gwalior district filed a suit under
s. 326 of the Qanoon Mal alleging dispossession by the landlords and
praying for restoration of possession.
On behalf of the defendants· it
was urged that by not paying land revenue the plaintiffs' rights had been
extinguished under s. 82 of the Qanoon Ryotwari. The Revenue authori·
ties decreed the suit on the view that even when Jand revenue was not
paid the landlord could not take possession v.ithout recourse to a suit
undor s. 137 Qanoon Ryotwari. · The High Court_ however allowed the
landlords' petition under Art. 217 of the Constitution holding that it
was not obligatory on the landlord to resort to Court in order to eject
a defaulting lessee, and that in a proceeding under s. 163 of Qanoon
R_yotwari it was not snfficie·nt to determine the question of
de facto
posses.sion alone but it was also necessary to enquire as to \\'hethe-r this
possession was or was not wrong.
The appellant, V.'ho was one of the
tenants came to this Court.
Held : (i) Under s. 82(3) Qanoon Ryotwari, the right of a Khatedar
is extinguished if the khatedar keeps in arrears the land revenue of his
khata but there is no automatic extinguishment of his right because the
proviso to s. 137 of the Qanoon Ryo1wari enables the Collector to accept
arrears if the khatedar is a good payer (khush-dehanda) and there are
special reasons beyond his control for not paying land revenue.
The
proviso would become a dead Jetter if in
every case when
there are
arrears of land revenue the landlord could take possession forcibly with·
out trying to recover the land revenue under s. 137. [207 E-Gl
Further s. 163 of Qanoon Ryot/wari clearly provides for suits of the
nature described in s. 326 of Qanoon /\fa!.
Section 326 is ''ei'Y similar
to s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, and the words 'disturbed unlaw·
fully· in s. 326 mean "disturbed not in due course of law".
Otherwjse.
there is no reason why a shorter period of limitation and sun1mary procedure is provide.d in s. 326 \vhile s. 325 provides a longer period of three
ve.ars 'for a suit for possession. ·The word ·trespass' in s .. 326 would include
i·orcible entry and dispossession by the landlord. [207 G-208A]
(ii) Under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act the question of title i., irrcle-
\'ant in a suit under that section. Section 326 Of Qanoon Jl.,fa/ read with
s. 163 of Qanoon Ryotwarl being similar to that section must l>o similarly
interpreted. [208B]
Mid11{1.pur .Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 51
I.A. 293, K. K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani. I.L.R. [1954}
Born.
950, Yar Mo/Janunad v. Lakshmi Das, I.L.R. [1958) 2 All. 394, Wa/i
20 ·I
SUPB.lME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S.C. R.
Ahmud Khan '· Ayodlaa K111rd11, (1891) l.L.R. 13 All. 537, State
of
A
West Bcngu/ v. /Jirendrr. Nath Bas1111ia, A.1.R. 11955) Cal. 601.
Hi//aya
Suhhaya Hegde v. Naraycmappl' Timmayc. ( 1911) 13 B.L.R. 1200, I. :lu
hin Raghushet \', A n11aji ParaJ!irom,
[ 1881)
I.L.R. 5 Born. 387.
Ba11du
v. Naba, [ 1890] I.LR. 15 Born. 238 aad Dadabhai Narsidas v. The S11bCol/ector of Broach, 7 Born. H. C. Rep. 82 ACJ, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
Civil Appeal No. 145 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
September 24, 1956 of Madhya Pradesh (Now Madhya Pradesh)
High Court at Gwalior in Civil Misc.
Application No. 91
of
1955.
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N. S. !Jindra, P. W. Sahasrabudde and A. G. Ratnaryarkht, for
C
the appellant
Ramesh11·ar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos.
Nos. I to 3.
The Ju'1gn1cnt of the Court ''as delivered by
Sikri, J,
This appc:il by special leave is dir~ctcd against the
1udgment of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 91 of 1955. read with Civil Miscellaneous AJ?plication No. 92 of 1955. filed under Art. 227 of tile
Constitutton by Rao Jagdish Singh and others. By this ju'..!gmcnt
the High Court accepted the applicatiom and qu:ishcd the decision of the Board of Revenue and dismissed the claim of Lallu
Y eshwant Singh, son of Nahar Singh, now deceased, represented
by Babu Singh, appellant before us.
The
relevant
facts
for
appreciating the points arising in the appeal arc as follows.
Yeshwant Singh and other sons of Lallu Nahar Singh, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs, filed a suit against Rao Jagdish
Singh and 4 others (Revenue Cas.e No. 24 of 2000 S. Y.) in the
Court of Tehsildar, Pargana Pichhore, District Gwalior, for the
possession of some agricultural land under s. 326 of Qanoon Mal.
The plaintiffs' case. in brief. was that they were gairdakhi/kar cultivators and that Rao Jagdish Singh, defendant No. 1, had forcibly prevented the plaintiff> from doing cultivation and got the
disputed land cultivated by defendants Nos. 2 and 3, by interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs prayed
that a deer.cc for possession may be passed in their favour against
~II the defendants. The defendants' case, in brief, was that the
village in which the land in dispute is situated is Ryotwari village
und no suit could be instituted against Jagirdars under s.
326.
The defendants further alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to
pay revenue and their rights had been extinguished under s. 82
of Qa11'1nn Ryot\l'ari.
The Tehsildar decreed the suit.
The
Collector on appeal upheld th,· order.
The Commissioner on
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(
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2ns
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YESHWANT V. JAGDISH SINGH Sikri, .
further appeal also upheld the order. On revision, the Board of
Revenue agreed with the Commissioner and dismissed the revision.
On behalf of the appellant it is contended ( 1) that .in a sutt
under s. 326 Qanoon Mal, read with s. 163, Qanoon Ryotwari,
a plaintiff is entitled to recover possession if he is dispossessed from
P.rior juridical possession, within six months of the suit, and the
question of title is irrelevant in such a suit; and (2) that a landlord cannot forcibly enter and drive out the tenant whose tenancy
is alleged to have been extinguished.
The relevant statutory provisions are as follows :
"Qanoon Ryotwari
S. 82. The right of the pukhta Maurusi,
Sakitul
Milkiyat and Mamuli Maurusi will
be extinguished
under the following circumstances;
( 3) When the Khatedar keeps in arrears the land
revenue of his khata excepting the case where the collection of land revenue is ordered to be postponed; ...
S. 137. In case the land revenue for the whole year
is not paid before one week of the date fixed for the
last instalment the khatedar will
be dealt with
as
follows:-
1 . By issue of process;
2. By arrest of the defaulter;
3. By attachment and sale of movable property;
4. By attachment and sale of immovable property;
5. By confiscation (Jupti) of the khata and ejectment
of the defaulter;
6. By auctioning the khata;
Provided if the arrears are due against such khatedar who has been a good payer ( khush-dehanda) and
for some special reason for .some years not by his own
mischief but for reason beyond his control, the Suba
(Ccllector) will be entitled to accept his instalments
upto three years.
S. l 63. Suits of trespass and obstruction between
khatedars and between khatedars and other persons
will be entertained in that Sega (Dept.) court and limitation which h described in Section 326 of Qanoon
Mal Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1983 and Sections 326,
!?OG
SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS
(1968) 2 S.CR.
327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334 and 335 so far as
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they arc applicable or appendices of the Qanoon Mal
>hall apply as may be applicable to the suits
under
'cction 326 of the said Act.
Qanoon Mal
S. 325. If any person claiming to be in rosscssion
nl any agricultuml land desires his name to be entered
tn Revenue papers and papers of Patwari.
'.hen
the
Patwari, if in case of actual physical possession enter hb
name in accordance with procedure in
Khasra
and
other papers and inform the Malguzar; in case of not
being in possession, the cultivator not in .possession shall
have the right to file within three years of th.~ date of
dispossession a suit regular in Court of Tehsil on stamp
paper, which may become payable on annual income
of "Lagan" according to Scale in Schedule No. 4 prescribed.
·
S. 326. ( 1) Cases in respect of the return of poscssion which has been disturbed unlawfully (Beja Tor
Par) or for prevention of obstruction about agricultural lan<ls, thrashing grounds, (Khaliyan) road. forest.
grass-pastures, gardens, trees, wells, irrigation and tank'
between Maluuzars and cultivators or between cultivators will be entertained in the summary jurisdiction
of the Pargana revenue Court or in the Tappa courts
within six ( 6) months and in case of proof of trespass
or obstruction,
possession
and
damages
will
be
awarded against the defendant and if the court thinks
lit it may also take bonds, quantum whereof will
be
decided in view of the nature of the trespass or obstruc-
~ion.
( 3) Suits beyond this duration will be entertained
;is per section 325 of the Qanoon Mal in the regular
jurisdiction."
The Board of Revenue was of the view that in case land revenue remains in arrears, the right of a tenant
get~ extinguished
under s. 82 of the Qmwon Ryotwari, but nevertheless the possession of the tenant whose right has been so extinguished i~ not
put to an end automatically, and the tenant must be legally dispossessed.
The Board observed :
"Th is is a general principle of law that no act can
be done by the strength of one's own hands but help
of the law should be takel" and the procedure which is
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YESHWANT v. JAGDISH SINGH (Sikri, J.)
207
pre~cribed for that act must be acted upon. In this case
the petitioner has not obeyed any .Jaw regarding the dispossession of the opponent after the plaintiff lost his
right and he himself went there and took possession."
"tbe Board was further of the view that action for dispossession
should have been taken according to s. 13 7 of Qanoon Ryotwari,
extracted above.
·
The High· Court, however, came to the conclusion that it was
not obligatory on the defe'ldant to have filed a suit under s. 137
of Qanoon Ryotwari.
The High Court felt that the proviso to
s. 137, which enabled the Collector to accept arrears for three
years, did not militate against such a construction. The High
Court was also of the view that under the general Jaw applicable
to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made
it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order
for possession before he could eject the lessee. Th.e High Court
in~reted s. 163 of Qanoo11 Ryotwari to mean that in a proceeding under that section it is not sufficient to det.ermine the
question of de-facto possession alone but it is also necessary to
· enquire as to whether this possession is or is not wrongful.
It seems to us that on a true interpretation of the statutory
provisions, extracted above, the Board of Revenue came to the
correct conclusion.
Under s. 82(3) Qanoon Ryo1wari, the right
of a Khatedar is extinguished if the khatedar keeps in arrears the
land revenue of· his khata but there is no automatic extinguishment pf his right because s. 137 of Qanoon Ryotwari enables the
Collector to accept arrears if the khatedar is a good payer ( khushdehanda) and there are special reasons beyond his control. for
not paying the land revenue.
The existence of the proviso instead of assisting the landlord's contentions assists the tenant's
case because if the reasoning of the High Court is accepted to be
correct, the proviso would become a dead-letter for in every case
where there are arrears of land revenue, the landlord would take
possession forcibly without trying to recover land revenue under
s. 137. Further, s. 163 of Qanoon Ryotwari _clearly provides for
suits of the nature described in s. 326 of Qanoon Mal.. Woon we
tum to s. 326. it is very similar to s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act,
1877 and it seems to us that the words "distlij'bed unlawfully"
in s. 326 mean "disturbed not in due course of Jaw." Otherwise,
there is no reason why a shorter period of limitation and summary procedure is provided in s. 326 whIJe s. 325 provides a
longer period of three yea" for a suit for possessiol).
Some stress was laid on the· words "in case of proof of trespass" in s. 326 by the leameJ counsel for
the respondent.
According to him, a landlord does not commit trespass when he
forcibly enit'rs on land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy
208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1968] 2 S.C.ll
has expired.
In our view. in the contel\t, the word
··1rcspa%"
here would include forcible entry and dispossession hy the landlord.
Reference was made to a number of English authorities in this
behalf but 11 is not neces' 3ry to deal with them because the Jaw
in India on this subject is difforent.
Under s. 9 of the Specific
Relief Act it is well-settled that question of title is irrelevant in a
suit under that section.
As the structure of s. 326 of Qanoon
Mal, read with s. 163 of Qa110011 R,votwari, is similar to s. 9 of
lhe Specific Relief Act, there is no reason why s. 326 should be
interpreted differently.
In Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Nareslz Narayan Roy ( 1 ), the Privy Council observed :
"Jn India persons are not permitted to take forcible
possession; they must obtain such possession as
they
are entitled to through a Coun."
lo K. K. Verma v. Narai11das C. Malkani('). Chagla. C.J.,
stated that the law in India was essentially different from the law
in England.
He observed :
"Under the Indian Jaw the possession of a tenant
who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law.
Althougl. he may not have a right to continue in pos~
sion after the termination of the tenancy his possession
is juridical and that possession is protected by statute.
Under s. <; of the Specific Relief Act a tenant who has
ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against
his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession
otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser
who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to
Court und.~r s: 9 and claim possess;'Jn against the true
owner."
In Yar Molu:mmad v. Lakshmi Das('), the Full Bench of
the Allahabad High Court observed :
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"No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the
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defendant can be raised or gone into in that case (under
s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act). The plaintiff will be
entitled to succec:l without proving any title on which
he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish
the best of all titles.
The restoration of possession in
such a suit is, however, always subject to
a
regular
H
(I) SI lA.293 nt 299.
(2) I.LR. (1954] Born. 9S0at!IS7.
(3) I.LR. )1958) 2 All. 394 nl 4C4.
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_ YESHWANT v. JAGDISH SINGH (Sikri, J.)
209
title suit and the person who has cne real title or even
the better tilh\ cannot, ·therefore, be prejudiced in any
way by a decree. in such a suit. It will always oe open
to him to establish his title in a regular suit and to
recover back possdsion."
·
The High Court further observed :
"Law respects possession even if there is no title to
support it. It will not permit any person to take the
law in his own hands and to dispossess a persori in
actual possession without having recourse to a court.
No person can be allowed to become a judge in his
own cause. As-observed by Edge, C.J., in Wali Ahfed
Khan v. Avodhya Kundu(') :
"The object of the section was to drive the person
who wanted to eject a person into the proper court
and to prevent them from going with a high hand and
ejecting such persons."
D
Our attention was invited to the decision of the
Calcutta
High Court in State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath Basunia(2 ).
In that case the High Court refused to issue an order under Art.
226 of the Constitution prohibiting the Government froni. forcibly
taking possession of lands which had been validly resumed by
Government.
We are not concerned with that question
here.
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But we do not agree with the conclusion of the High Court that
a lessor is entitled in India to use force to throw out his lessee.
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In Hillaya Subbaya Hegde v. Narayanappa Timmaya( 8 )
it
was observed :
"No doubt, the true owner of property is entitled to
retain possession, even though he has obtained it from
a trespasser by force or other unlawful means : Lillu
bin Raghushet v. Annaji Parashram(') and Bandu v.
Naba(')."
We are unable to' appreciate how this decision assists the respondent. It was not a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. In
Lillu bin Raghushet v. Annaji Parashram(•), it was recognised
that "if there is a breach of the peace in attempting 'to take possession, that 31fords a ground for criminal prosecution, and, i r
the attempt is successful, for a sumrn<:ry _suit also for a restoration
to possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act I of 1877
-Dadabral N(lrsida5 v. The Sub-Collector of Broach."(")
In
Bandu v. Naba( 0) it was observed by Sargent, C.J., as follows :
"(I) [t891] l.L.R. 13 AU. 537-556.
t3~ (19ll) 13 B.L.R. 1200.
(5) [1890] l.L.R. 15,Bom. 238.
(Zl A.IR. 1955 Cal. 601.
(4) [1881] I.LR. 5 Born. 387-391.
(6) 7 Bom. H.C. Rep. 82 A.C.J.
:.:10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
(1968] 2 S.C.R. ·:
. "The Indian Legislature has, however, ~rovided .for
the summary removal of any one
who
dispossesses
another, whether peaceably or otherwise than by due
course of law; but subject to such provision there is. no
reason for holding that the rightful owner so dispossessing the other is a trespasser, and may not rely for
the support of his possession on the title vested in him,
as he clearly may do by English law .. This would also
appear to be the view taken by West, J., in Lillu v.
Annaji(') .". · ·
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n
. In our opinion, the law on this point has been correctly stated .
by the Privy Council, by Chagla, C.J;;· and by the Full Bench of.·
llf '.he Allahabad High Court, !11 the cases cited above.
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· !'.or the aforesaid reasons i.ve hold that the High Court erred
·.·in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue. The appeal is
accordingly allowed with costs, judgment of the High Court set
aside ·and the ·order of. the Board of Revenue restored.__
_
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G.C .
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Appeal allowed. ·
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(I) [1881J l.L.R. 5 Bom. 387-391.
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