# LAX:l-.'1AN PURSHOTT A.M PIMPUTKAR /Jtctm6tr, 13 v. STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 200 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Bench:** S.J. Imam, K. SuBBA RAo, N. R.AJAGOPA.L.A Avv.1NOAR, ]. R. MuDHOLK.AR - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lax-l-1an-purshott-a-m-pimputkar-jtctm6tr-13-v-state-of-bombay-and-others-2888 - **Pages:** 20 ## Headnote Jratan J..andl-Rt.1umption-Government's ordtr directi111 rw1mption-lf can be reviewr.d by Govemmrnt-Bombay Heredi· tary OffitM Act, 1874 (Born. 3 of 1874) 8$. 12, 74, 79. In 1944, the plaintiff moved the Government for rccum• ption of Watan Lands which were in the posscs•ion of dcfen· dants 2 to 4 and for making them over to him. The Govern· ment, after causing some e11quiry to be made, resumed those lands by its order dated October 9, 1946, and directed their restoration to the plaintiff'. Thereafter, the defendants moved the Govern men! for re-consideration of that order, and the Government modified its previou• order by directing that the defendants who were in possession of the lands, should continue to retain them but they should pay such rent as may be fixed by the Government from time tYtrli for JJ. C. 3lism, for the appellant. N. S. Hirulm, S. IJ • .Jatlv;r and J'. D. Menon for H. II. Dliebrir, for respondent Xo. I. Jl. F . .Joshi and G11npat Hai, for respondents Nos. ~-4. lfJ62. Dec em her I :l. The J udgmrnt of the Court was dcl i vcr<"d by Ivh; 111101.KAI:, .J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgmmt of the High Court of Bombay affirming the decree of the District J uclge, Than a, setting aside the decree in favour of the Plaintiffappellant. The r.:levant facts which arc no longer in dispute arc these : The plaintiff's family arc grantees of the Patilki Watan of some villages in Umbergaon taluka of the Thana District of Maharashtra, including the villages of Solsumbha, Maroli and Vavji. Defendams 2 to .( also belong lo the family of the plaintiff. The plaintiff represents the seniormost branch of the family while the defendants :! to 4 rep· resent other branches. The dispute with which we are concerned in this appeal relates to the Patilki of Solsumbha. Under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1814 (Ill of 181-l) the person who actually performs the duty of a hereditary Office for the time being is called an Officiator. It is common ground •• t I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 203 that the Officiator had been selected from the branch of the plaintiff from the year 1870 in which year the propositus Krishna Rao Pimputkar died. After his death he was succeeded by his eldest son Vasudev, upon whose death in 1893 his eldest son Sadashiv was the Officiator. Sadashiv died in 1901 and was succeeded by Purshottam, who was Officiator till the year 1921 when, because of the disqualification incurred by him, a deputy was appointed in his place. After the death of Purshottam in 1940 his son the plaintiff-appellant Laxman became the Officiator. In the year 1914 the descendents of Krishnarao, who were till then Joint, effected a partition of the family property which consisted of inam and Watan lands in various villages including the villages of Solsumbha, Maroli and Vavji. The document embodying the partition is Ex. 49. Under that partition lands which had so far been assigned for remuneration of the Patilki of Solsumbha were allotted to the branch of the defendants while some other lands were given to the branch of the plaintiff. It would appear that Purshottam had not subscribed to the partition deed in the beginning but later on he appears to have acquiesced in it and apparently for this reason it has been held by the Courts below that he was a party to the partition. It may be mentioned that after Purshottam had incurred a disqualification, the deputies who acted for him were not allowed to take possession of the lands of Solsumbha which are now in dispute inspite of the objections raised by these persons. They were instead allowed a remuneration of Rs. 240/-per annum which was to be paid by the members of the family in possession of the Watan lands. This position continued till 1946. · It may be mentioned that after the death of J'l!fShottam the plaintiff W!IS init'.ally appointed Patil 1962 Laxmari PJ1r1/wltam 1'imputlw •• Stott of Bom!H.7 Mudholkar, J. 1962 Uixm'nn Pu1 'hottam Pimputkllr v. Slalt of Bembay Mudhol!ar, J, 204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. for five years. llut eventually he was appointed officiator for life. In the ) car lfl·M the plaintiff moved the Government, vio.R.ts 20/i when the defendants preferred an appeal before the District Judge they confined their attack to the decree to one ground only and that was about the competance of Government to reconsider the order of _1946. The plaintiff's contention Lhat the order made by Government on October 9, 1946, was a judicial order passed by the Government in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 79 of the Watan Act and that it was not competent to the Government to revise or review that order in the absence of a provision in the Act empowering the Government to do so. It is not disputed that alienation of Watan lands without the sanction of the Government is prohibited by s. 5 of the Watan Act. Similarly the alienation of Watan lands assigned as remuneration without the sanction of the Government is prohibited by s. 7 of the Act. Section 11 empowers the Collector, after recording his reasons in writing, to declare certain types of alienations to be null and void. Section 12 provides that it shall be lawful for the Collector whenever it m..iy be necessary in carrying out the provisions of certain sections, including s. 11 (a) to summarily evict any person wrongfully in possession of any land or (b) to levy any rent due by any person in the manner that may be prescribed in any law for the time being in force for the levy of a revenue demand. According to the defendants the discretion conferred upon the Collector by s. 12 either to evict a person in wrongful possession of any land or to require him to pay rent with respect to it is of an administrative nature and, therefore, the order of the Collector made under s. 12 can be varied from time to time by the Collector or can be challenged by the party aggrieved only in the manner provided by the Act, that is, by preferring an appeal or an application in revision and in no other manner. Undoubtedly, if the order is of an administrative nature it would be beyond the purview of the juris1!162 Lumttn Purshallam Pim;utka v. St•t1 •f •1,,,j9 Mutiholkar, J, 1962 ·-·- Laxm.att PUTshottam Pimputfcar ... ·stal1 of Bomha, MrdMlkar, J. . . . -,,....._.-...,i ·,..--~- ·_.., ·, \ · 206 stJi>!lE:ivl::E cot.ill T REPORTS [1964] VOL. _diction of the civil court.-·. The first question to b'e considered is whether · tlie order of a Collector _under s. 12 is administrative in ·character. It has to be borne in mind that before action is taken under s. 12, the collector has to make a declaration under s. 11. This declaration· has ·to be supported by reasons in · writing and, therefore, it follows that it can be made only after holding an enquiry which means that the Collector has to hear both the parties ·and consider such ·evidence; oral and. documentary, .as may be adduced by them before him. So far, therefore, the procedure must be considered as quasi-judicial in character. This. Court has held in Gullapalli · Nageswara Rao v. 'Andhra Pradesh Road Transport . Corporation (1), as well ·as recently in Board of lligh Sclwol and Intermediate Edncation U.P. v. Ghanshyam -Das Gupta('), that an order.will be deemed to be of quasi-judicial character not only when there is. a contest betweeii one individual and another but also when the contest is between an authority purporting to do an act and a person opposing it provided the statute imposes a duty on the authority to act judici· ally. Section 12 undoubtedly confers discretion on the Collector to make an order of. one of two kinds, after he declares that an alienation is null and void. The . order of the Collector in exercise of his discretion . affects the rights of parties to property· and is further . open to challenge before the Commissioner. and the State Government under sections .77 and 79 of the Watan Act respectively .. ·It is therefore difficult. to . appreciate how the order can tie regarded as admini1- . trative. · Mr .. Bindra. who appears for the State, _ however, contends that though the enquiry contemp· lated by s. 11 may be regarded as a quasi-judicial ·proceeding the ultimate decision of the. Collector either to restore the property to the \Vatandar or to confirm the possession of the person in actual posses· sion thereof and make him liable· to pay rent is not · the exercise of a quasi-judicial function but is purely~ an administrative function; He·_ contends that the (I) [1959] Supp. 18.C.R. 319... (2) (1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R, 35. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 207 Collector has to exercise his discretion one way or the other in the light of the policy of the Government and refers in this connection to the provisions of s. 74 of the Watan Act. That section provides that the proceedings of the Collector shall be under the general control of the Commissioner and of the State Government. It may be borne in mind, however, that the collector has been given various kinds of powers and is required to perform numerous duties under the Act, some of which are administrative in character. Since the decision taken by the Collector cannot properly be reached by exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner and of the State Government, as the case may be, it was necessary 'to incorporate a general provision of this kind. The right of appeal conferred by s. 77 extends only to decisions of the Collector or other authorities inferior to the Collector only in respect of decisions rendered by them after investigation recorded in writing and not against each and every decision rendered by them. Section 73 of the Act requires investigation to be recorded in writing in respect of orders made under certain parts of the Act. But apart from that provision there are other provisions likes. 11 which provide for recording of reasom in writing which by implication also require investigation by the Collector. These provisions do not represent the totality of the Collector's power under the Act. Section 74 is thus clearly a provision which relates to orders made by the Collector without making any investigation in writing. This provision, therefore, does not assist the defendants. Relying upon the decision in Robinson v . . ilfinistei- of Towii and Country Planning (1), and other decisions in that category Mr. Bindra con tended that the Collector's quasi-judicial function ended with the declaration that the alienation was null and void and the decision pursuant to it which he took under s. 12 thereof was purely administrative. Apart from the (I) [1947] I All, E.R, 851. 1962 ·· L·1xman Purshotuim Pimputkin v. Stat1 of Bom6ay Mudlwlkar, J. 1962 T.amon P1111/to1t""' Pimf""luzr •• 5141' ef Bomb•J 208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)VOL. fact that the decision in Robinson's case('), and other decisions taking similar view have been criticised in En~land (.~ce Griffith and Street, Principles of Admi· uistrativc Law, p. l!i8 aud Rolison, Justice and Administrative Law, p. 533) we may point out that the scheme of the statute which was considered in those decisions is different from that of Part II of the Watan Act which contains ss. 11 and 12. The Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, with which Robinson's case('), deals confers a discretion on the Minister to accept wholly or with modification or reject a scheme prepared by a local authority. For a certain purpose that Act requires that the Minister has to cause an enquiry to be made by the Inspector or to make an enquiry himself and it has been held that such an enquiry is quasi-judicial in nature. After the enquiry is made it is for the Minister to exercise his authority under the Act and to accept wholly or in a modified form or reject the scheme. The Courts in England have held that proceedings under the Act are administrative in nature except to the limited extent that the enquiry is to be made in consonance with the principles of natural justice. Whether the view taken by the Courts in England is right or wrong it is sufficient to say that the nature of proceedings as well as what is required to be done under the English Act is something quite different from the nature of proceedings or what is required to IJe done under the relevant provisions of the Watan Act. Here, as Mr. Bindra himself concedes, the whole of the enquiry is not administrative in character. Jn fact its foundation is a lis between two parties: a Watandar out of possession and an alienee in possession of \\Iatan property. When the final order is made by the Collector under s. 12 this lis comes to an end and, therefore, there is no scope for the contention that any part of the proceeding is administrative in character. Even ih an ordinary suit there are matters which are in the discretion of the court, as for instance, awarding costs or (I) (lgf7] l AU. E.R. 851, .. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 209 fixing the rate of interest or of granting one relief instead of another. But merely because discretion is conferred 011 it in dealing with a particular matter, it cannot be contended that while exercising that discretion the Court acts otherwise than in the exercise of its judicial function. The proceedings before the Collector are of course not judicial but they are certainly quasi-judicial and where the Collecter has to exercise a discretion for giving effect to his decision that a certain alienation is null and void it would not be permissible to say that all of a sudden his act ceases to be a quasi-judicial act and becomes an administrative one. The declaration made by him under s. l I that an alienation is null and void is by itsdf' of little: help to the Watandar and can be effectuated only after an order is made by the Collector under s. I :2. The p1ovisions of these two sections are thus interlinked and it is difficult to conceive that as the proceedings progress their quasi-judicial nature degenerates into an achninistrative one. W.e may recapitulate that the Collector's order under s. 12 is appealable but not so the order of the Minister. This, in our opinion, is an important distinction between the class of cases of which Robin8on's case (1) is representative, and the present case. We may refer to the decision in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao's case ('); where this Court has considered the decision in Rob·inson's case (1), as also that in Franlclin v. 111inister of Town and Country Planninr; (3). While dealing with the argument advanced before it that the Qovernment, in considering a scheme provided for road transport service under s. 68 ( c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, was discharging an administrative function, one of us (Subba Rao, J.) speaking for the majority of the Court has observed a11 follows :- "A comparison of the procedural steps uPder both the Acts brings out in bold relief the (I) [1947) l All E.R. 851, (2) [1959] Supp. 1 5.C.R, 319. (3) [IU/'8] A.C, 87. 1962 Laxman Pursholtsm Pimputkar v. Slate of Boml a~v A!ud/1,olkar ,J." 1912 ,.,__ ,.,,,.,,_ Pimp.rl;ar •• ,\,.,,. ef &rd•.1 Mur/Mlkor, J, • l!IO SUPREME COURt REPORTS [1964) VOL. nature of the enquiries contemplated under the two statutes. There, there is no lis, no personal hearing and even the public enquiry contemplated by a third party is presumably confined to the question of statutory requirements, or at any rate was for eliciting further information for the Minister. Here, there is a clear dispute between the two parties. The dispute comprehends not only objections raised on public grounds, but also in vindication of private rights and it is required to be decided by the State Government after giving a personal hearing and following the rules of judicial procedure. Though there may be some justification for holding, Oil the facts of' the case before the House of Lords that that Act did not contemplate a judicial act-on that question we do not propose to express our opinion-there is absolutely none for holding in the present case that the Government is not performing a judicial act. Robson in 'Justice and Administrative Law', commenting upon the aforesaid decision, makes the following observation at p. 533: 'lt should have been obvious from a cursory glance at the New Towns Act that the rules of natural justice could not apply to the Minister's action in making an order, for the simple reason that the intiative lies wholly with him. His role is not to consider whether an order made by a local authority should be confirmed, nor docs he has to c!etermine a controversy between a public authority and private interests. The responsibility of seeing that the intention of Parliament is carried out is placed on him'." The aforesaid observations explain the principles underlying that dccisirm aml that μrinciplc ca1111ot have any application to the facts of this case. In 'Principles of Administrative law' by Griffith and 1 s.a.n.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 2li Street, the following comment is found on the aforesaid decision: After considering the provision of s. 1 of the New Towns Act, Hl46, the authors say- 'Like the town-planning legislation, this differs from the Housing Acts in that the Minister is a party throughout. Further, the Minister is not statutorily required to consider the objec- ' tions. It is obvious, as the statute itself states, that the creation of new towns i~ of national interest.' (pp. 34!J-50 ). After concluding the above passage he observed : "It is therefore clear that Franklin's case is based upon the interpretation of the provisions of that Act and particularly on the ground that the object of the enquiry is to further inform the mind of the Minister and not to consider any issue between the Minister and the objectors. The decision in that case is not of any help to decide the present case which turns upon the construction of the provisious of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the State Governmenfs order under s. H8-D is a judicial Act." As we have already said the scheme of certain sections of Part II of the Watan Act, including ss. 11 and 12 also discloses that a judicial or quasi-judicial duty is imposed on the Collector to decide what is in effect a lis ur quasi-lis between the \Vatandar and the alienee of the Watan land. We must, therefore, hold that the whole process, including the order made undc1· s. 3 of tl1c Act, is a quasi-judicial one and not administraliVl' as contcuded fur Ly the