# Laxnii Devi Sugar Mills v. N and K ishore Singh BhagwatiJ - **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 756 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1956 - **Case number:** Civil Judge, Sitapur in Regular Civil Suit No. 14 of 1944 - **Bench:** Jagannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha, S. K. Das - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/laxnii-devi-sugar-mills-v-n-and-k-ishore-singh-bhagwatij-1265 - **Pages:** 16 ## Headnote Hindu Law-Religious end<>Wment-Temple-Public or private -Question of mixed fact and law-Gift to idol-Whether worshippers are the beneficiaries-: Dedication to public-Construction of will -Ceremonies relating to installation of idol-fher of temple. The issue whether a. religious endowment is a. public or e. pri· va.te one is a. mixed question of law and fact the decision of whi°6b must depend on the application of legal concepts of • public and • private endowment to the facts found and is open to consideration by the Supreme Court. Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal ([1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271), referred to. The di•tinction between a private and a public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries a.re specific individua.ls, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 757 Though under Hindu law an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the temple vest in it, it can have no beneficial interest in the endowment, and the true beneficiaries are the worshippers, as the real purpose of a gift of properties to an idol is not to confer a.ny benefit on God, but the acquisition of spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. Prosunno Kitmari Debya v. Golab Ohand Baboo ([1875] L.R. 2 I.A. 145), Maharaja J agadindra Nath Roy Btthadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi ([1904] L.R. 31 I.A. 203), Pramatha Nath Mullik v. Pradhyumna Kumar Mitllik ([1924] L.R. 52 I.A. 245) and Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra ([1910] I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128), referred to. A pious Hindu who was childless constructed a temple and was in management of it till his death. He executed a will whereby he bequeathed all his lands to the temple and made provision for its proper management. The question was whether the provisions of the will disclosed an intention on the part of the testator to dedicate the temple to the public or merely to the members of the family. Held, that the recital in the will that the testator had no sons coupled with provisions for the management of the trust by strangers was an indication that the dedication was to the public. Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal (I.L.R. [1942] 1 Cal. 211), referred to. Heldfitrther, that the performance of ceremonies at the con· secration of the temple (Prathista), the user of the temple and other evidence in the case showed that the dedication was for worship by the general public. ## Text 1956 Laxnii Devi Sugar Mills v. N and K ishore Singh BhagwatiJ. 1956 October 4 • 756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956] lant to the respondent formed the basis of the enquiry which was held by the General Manager and the appellant could not be allowed to justify its action on any other grounds than those contained in the chargesheet. The respondent not having been charged with the acts of insubordination which would have really justified the appellant in dismissing him from its employ, the appellant could not take advantage of the same even though these acts could be brought home to him. We have, therefore, com!'l to the conclusion that the order made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal was correct even though we have· done so on grounds other than those whi.ih commended themselves to it. We accordingly dismiss this appeal but having regard to the conduct of the respondent which we have characterised above as reprehensible we feel that the ends of justice will be met if we ordered that each party do bear and pay its own costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed. DEOKI NANDAN v. MURLIDHAR . [JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAS JJ.] Hindu Law-Religious end<>Wment-Temple-Public or private -Question of mixed fact and law-Gift to idol-Whether worshippers are the beneficiaries-: Dedication to public-Construction of will -Ceremonies relating to installation of idol-fher of temple. The issue whether a. religious endowment is a. public or e. pri· va.te one is a. mixed question of law and fact the decision of whi°6b must depend on the application of legal concepts of • public and • private endowment to the facts found and is open to consideration by the Supreme Court. Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal ([1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271), referred to. The di•tinction between a private and a public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries a.re specific individua.ls, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 757 Though under Hindu law an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the temple vest in it, it can have no beneficial interest in the endowment, and the true beneficiaries are the worshippers, as the real purpose of a gift of properties to an idol is not to confer a.ny benefit on God, but the acquisition of spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. Prosunno Kitmari Debya v. Golab Ohand Baboo ([1875] L.R. 2 I.A. 145), Maharaja J agadindra Nath Roy Btthadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi ([1904] L.R. 31 I.A. 203), Pramatha Nath Mullik v. Pradhyumna Kumar Mitllik ([1924] L.R. 52 I.A. 245) and Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra ([1910] I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128), referred to. A pious Hindu who was childless constructed a temple and was in management of it till his death. He executed a will whereby he bequeathed all his lands to the temple and made provision for its proper management. The question was whether the provisions of the will disclosed an intention on the part of the testator to dedicate the temple to the public or merely to the members of the family. Held, that the recital in the will that the testator had no sons coupled with provisions for the management of the trust by strangers was an indication that the dedication was to the public. Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal (I.L.R. [1942] 1 Cal. 211), referred to. Heldfitrther, that the performance of ceremonies at the con· secration of the temple (Prathista), the user of the temple and other evidence in the case showed that the dedication was for worship by the general public. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil AppealNo. 250ofl953. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 14, 1948 of the Obief Court of Audh, Lucknow in Second Appeal No. 365 of 1945 arising out of the de- ..,_ cree dated May 30, 1945 of the Court of District Judge, Sitapur in Appeal No. 4 of 1945 against the decree dated November 25, 1944 of the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Sitapur in Regular Civil Suit No. 14 of 1944. A. D. Mathur, for the appellant. Jagdisk Okandra, for respondent No. 1. 1956 Deoki N and an v. Murlidhar 1956 Deokl N andan v. Murlidhar 758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956] 1956. October 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The point for decision in this appeal is whether a Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji in the village of Bhadesia in the District of Sitapur is a private temple or a public one in which all the Hindus are entitled to worship. One Sheo Ghulam, a pious Hindu and a resident of the said village, had the Thakurdwara constructed d1,1ring ·the years 1914-1916, .and the idol of Shri Radhakrishnaji ceremoniously installed therein. He was himself in management of the temple and its affairs till 1928 when he died without any issue. On March 6, 1919, he had executed a will whereby he bequeathed all his lands to the Thakur. The provisions of the will, in so far as they are material, will presently be referred to. The testator had two wives one of whom Ram Kuar, had predeceased him and the surviving widow, Raj Kuar, succeeded him as Mutawalli in terms of the will and was in management till her death in 1933. Then the first defendant, who is the nephew of Sheo Ghulam, got into possession of the properties as manager of the endowment in accordance with the provisions of the will. The appellant is a distant agnate of Sheo Ghulam, and on the allegation that the first defendant had been mismanaging the temple and denying the rights of the public therein, he moved the District Court of Sitapur for relief under the Religious and Charitable Endowments Act XIV of 1920, but the court declined to interfere on the ground that the endowment was private. An application to the Advocate-General for sanction to institute a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also refused for the same reason. The appellant then filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration that the Thakurdwara is a public temple in which all the Hindus have a right to ·worship. The first defendant contested the suit, and claimed that "the Thakurdwara and the idols were private'', and that "the general public had no right to make any interference". - ,. - - - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 759 The Additional Civil Judge, Sitapur, who tried the suit was of the opinion that the Thakurdwara had been built by Sheo Ghulam "for worship by his family", and that it was a private temple. He accordingly dismissed the suit. This judgment was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge, Sitapur, whose decision again was affirmed by the Chief Court of Oudh in second appeal. The learned Judges, however, granted a certificate under s. 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure that the question involved was one of great importance, and that is how the appeal comes before us. The question that arises for decision in this appeal whether the Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji at Bhadesia is a public endowment or a private one is one of mixed law and fact. In Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal(1), in which the question was whether certain lands had been dedicated as cremation ground, it was observed by the Privy Council that it was "essentially a mixed question of law and fact", and that while the findings of fact of the lower appellate court must he accepted as binding, its "actual conclusion that there has been a dedication or lost grant is more properly regarded as a proposition of law derived from those facts than as a finding of fact itself". In the present case, it was admitted that there was a formal dedication; and the controversy is only as· to the scope of the dedication, and that is also a mixed question of law and fact, the decision of which must depend on the application of legal concepts of a public and a private endowment to the faqts found, and that is open to consideration in this appeal. It will be oonvenient first to consider the principles of law applicable to a determination of the question whether an endowment is public or privatP, anC then to examine, in the light of those principles, the facts found or established. The distinction between a private and a public trust is that.whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof, While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are (1) [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271. 1956 Dcoki N and an v. Murlidhar Venkatarama AyyarJ 1956 Deoki N andan v. Murlidliar Venkatarama Ayyar J. 760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956] ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment. The position is thus stated in Lewin on Trusts, Fifteenth Edition, pp. 15-16: "By public must be understood such as are constituted for the benefit either of the public at large or of some considerable portion of it answering a particular description. ·To this class belong all trusts for charitable purposes, and indeed public trusts and charitable trusts may be considllred in general as synonymous expressions. In private trusts the beneficial interest is vested absolutely in one or more individuals who are, or within a certain time may be, definitely ascertained .... ". Vide also the observations of Mitter J. in Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal('). Applying this principle, a religious endowme.nt must be. held to be private or public, according as the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof. Then the question is, who are the beneficiaries when a temple is built, idol installed thereip and properties endowed therefor? Under the Hindu law, an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and . the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. But does it follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment? Though. such a notion had a vogue at one time, and there is an echo of it in these proceedings (vide para 15 of the. plaint), it is now established beyond all controversy that this is·not the true position. It has been repeatedly held that it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties. Vide Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo("); Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi(') and Pramatha Nath Mullik v. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullik('). It cannot itself make use of them; it cannot enjoy them or dispose of them, or even protect them. In short, the idol can have no beneficial interest in the endowment. This was clearly (1) T.L.R. (1942) l Cal. 211, 227, 228. (2) (1876) L.R. 2 I.A. U5, 162. (31 [1904) L.R. 31 I.A, 203. (4) (1924) L.R. 52 I.A. ~46. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 761 laid down in the Sanskrit Texts. Thus, in his Bhashya on the Purva Mimamsa, Adhyaya 9, Pada 1, Sahara Swami has the following: e:"l'!frir\ ~~irra, ~q:q1«11'44:_t ~ ~m1ra f.ffirfi- .... Jlira, a~~ ~I ;r 'q' mil ~~ Cl'T ~mfllSlrir ~~~ ~q~R=lf ~q~ I "Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means whatever is abandoned for Gods, for purposes of sacrifice and the like, because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the relationship between the owner and the property owned, is impossible of application to Gods. For the Gods do not make use of the property according to their desire nor are they seen to act for protecting the same". Thus, according to the texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the properties, and they can be described as their owners only in a figurative sense (Gaunartha), and the true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing oppor· tunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. 1956 Deoki N andan v. Murlidhar Venkatarama AyyarJ. 1956 Deoki N andan v. 1rlurlidhar V.:ullatara11ta Ayyar J. 762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956) In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra(1), it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules. applicable to a transfer to a 'sentient being', and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his dominion over them for the pnrpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins 0. J. at p. 138 that "the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected" and that "the dedication to a deity" may be "a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the dedication is designed". Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155. In Hindu Religious Endownlents Board v. Veeraraghavachariar('), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra (supra)· and observed: "As explained in that case, the purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust". When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose 'of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, (!) [1910) I.L.R. 37 C•l. 128. (2) A.LR. 1037 :\fad. 750. - ... S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 763 and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers. In the light of these principles, we must examine the facts of this case. The materials bearing on the question whether the Thakurdwara is a public temple or a private one may be considered under four heads: (1) the will of Sheo Ghulam, Exhibit A-1, (2) user of the temple by the public, (3) ceremonies relating to the dedication of the Thakurdwara and the installation of the idol with special reference to Sankalpa and Uthsarga, and (4) other facts relating to the character of the temple. (1) The will, Exhibit A-1, is the most important evidence on record as to the intention of the testator and the scope of the dedication. Its pro,visions, so far as they are material, may now be noticed. The will begins with the recital that the testator has two wives and no male issue, that he has constructed a Thakurdwara and installed th~ idol of Sri Radhakrishnaji therein, and that he is making a disposition of the properties with a view to avoid disputes. Clause 1 of Exhibit A-1 provides that after the death of the testa·- tor "in the absence of male issue, the entire immovable property given below existing at present or which may come into being hereafter shall stand endowed in the name of Sri Radhakrishnaji, and mutation of names shall be effected in favour of Sri Radhakrishnaji in the Government papers and my wives l\Ist. Raj Kuer and Mst. Ram Kuer shall be the Mutawallis of the waqf". Half the income from the properties is to be taken by the two wives for their maintenance during their lifetime, and the remaining half was to "continue to be spent for the expenses of the Thakurdwara". It is implicit in this provision that after the lifetime of the wives, the whole of the income is to be utilised for the purpose of the Thakurdwara. Clause 4 provides that if a son is born to the testator, then the properties are to be divided between the son and the Thakurdwara in a specified 99 1956 Deoki N andan v. Murlidltar Venkataranra Ayyar j. 1956 Dcoki N andan v. Murlidhar Venkatarama Ayyar J, 764 SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS [1956] proportion; but as no son was born, this clause never came into operation. Clause 5 provides that the Mutawallis are to have no power to sell or mortgage the property, that they are to maintain accounts, that the surplus money after meeting the expenses should be deposited in a safe bank and when funds permit, property should be purchased in the name of Sri Radhakrishnaji. Clause 2 appoints a committee 0f four persons to look after the management of the temple and its properties, and of these, two are not relations of the testator and belong to a different caste. It is further.provided in that clause that after the death of the two wives the committee "may appoint my nephew Murlidhar as Mutawalli by their unanimous opinion". This Murlidhar is a. divided nephew of the testator and he is the first defendant in this action. Clause 3 provides for filling up of vacancies in the committe!l. Then finally there is cl. 6, which r'uns as follows: "If any person alleging himself to be my near or remote h!lir files a claim in respect of whole or part of the waqf property his suit shall be improper on the face of this deed". The question is whether the provisions of the will disclose an intention on the part of the testator that the Thakurdwara should ·be a private endowment, or that it should be pub\ic. The learned Judges of the Chief Court in affirming the decisions of the courts below that the temple was built for the benefit of the members of the family, observed that there was nothing in the will pointing "to a conclusion that the trust was a public one", and that its provisions were not "inconsistent with the property being a private endowment". We are unable to endorse this.opinion. We think that the will read as a whole indubitably reveals an intention on the part of the testator to dedicate the Thakurdwara to the public and not merely to the members of hi~ family. The testator begins by stating that he had no male issue. In Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal (supra), the question was whether a wakf created by a deed of the year 1806 was a public or a private • - • I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 765 endowment. Referring to a recital in the deed that the settlor had no children, Khundkar J. observed at p. 217: "The deed recites that the founder has neither children nor grandchildren, a circumstance which in itself suggests that the imambara was not to remain a private or family institution". Vide also the observations of Mitter J. at p. 228. The reasoning on which the above view is based is, obviously, that the word 'family' in its popular sense means children, and when the settlor recites that he has no children, that is an indication that the dedication is not for the benefit of the family but for the public. Then we have clause 2, under which the testator constitutes a committee of management consisting of four persons, two of whom were wholly unrelated to him. Clause 3 confers on the committee power· to fill up vacancies; but there is no restriction there.in on the persons who could be appointed under that clause, and conceivably, even all the four member~ might be strangers to the family. It is difficult to believe that if Sheo Ghulam intended to restrict the right of worship in the temple to his relations, he would have entrusted the management thereof to a body consisting of strangers. Lastly, there is clause 6, which shows that the relationship between Sheo Ghulam and his kinsmen was not particularly cordial, and it is noteworthy that under clause 2, even the appointment of the first defendant as manager of the epdowment is left to the option of the committee. It is inconceivable that with such scant solicitude for his relations, Sheo Ghulam would have endowed a temple for their benefit. And if he did not intend them to be beneficiaries under the endowment, who are the members of the family who could take the benefit thereunder after the lifetime of his two wives? If we are to hold that the endowment was in favour of the members of the family, then the result will be that on the death of the two wives, it must fail for want of objects. But it is clear from the p.rovisions of the wiU that the testator contemplated the continuance 1956 Deoki N andau v. Murli4haf" Venkatarama Ayyar). 1956 Deoki l'>[ and an v. Murlidhar Vi:nkatarafna AyyarJ. 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956 of the endowment beyond the lifetime of his wives. He directed that the properties should be endowed in the name of the deity, and that lands are to be purchased in future in the name of the deity. He also provides for the management of the trust after the lifetime of his wives. And to effectuate this intention, it is necessary to hold that the Thakurdwara was dedicated for worship by members of the public, and not merely of his family. In deciding that the endowment was a private one, the learned Judges of the Chief Court failed to advert to these aspects, and we are unable to accept their decision as correct. 2. In the absence of a deed of endowment constituting the Thakurdwara, the plaintiff sought to establish the true scope of the dedication from the user of the temple by the public. The witnesses examined on his behalf deposed t.hat the villagers were worshipping in the temple freely and without any interference, and indeed, it was even stated that the Thakurdwara was built by Slieo Ghulam at the instance of the villagers, as there was no tern pie in the village. The trial Judge did not discard this evidence as unworthy of credence, but he held that the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence of P. W. 2 was that the public were admitted into the temple not as a matter of right but as a matter of grace. P;W. 2 was a pujari in the temple, and he deposed that while Sheo Ghulam's wife was doing puja within the temple, he stopped outsiders in whose presence she used to observe purdah, from going inside. We are of opinion that this fact does not afford sufficient ground for the conclusion that the villagers did not worship at the temple as a matter of right. It is nothing unusual even in well-known p~blic temples for the puja hall being cleared of the public when a high dignitary comes for worship, and the act of the pujari in stopping the public is expression of the regard which.the entire villagers must have had for the wife of the founder, who was a pardanashin lady, when she came in for worship, and cannot be construed as a denial of their rights. The learned Judges of the Chief Court also relied on the decision • S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 767 of the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroon(1) as an authority for the position that "the mere fact that the public is allowed to visit a temple or thakurdwara cannot necessarily indicate that the trust is public as opposed to private". In that case, certain properties were granted not in favour of an idol or temple but in favour of one Daryao Gir, who was maintaining a temple and to his heirs in perpetuity. The contention of the public was that subsequent to the grant, the family of Daryao Gir must be held to have dedicated the temple to the public for purpose of worship, and the circumstance that members of the public were allowed to worship at the temple and make offerings was relied on in proof of such dedication. In repelling this contention, the Privy Council observed that as the grant was initially to an individual, a plea that it was subsequently dedicated by the family to the public required to be clearly made out, and it was not made out merely by showing that the public was allowed to worship at the temple "since it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned away". But, in the present ca.se, the endowment was in favour of the idol itself, and the point for decision is whether it was a private or public endowment. And in such circumstances, proof of user by the public without interference would be cogent evidence that the dedication was in favour of the public. In Mundancheri Koman v. Achuthan(2), which was referred to and followed in Babu Bhagwan Din v Gir Har Saroon(1), the distinction between user in respect of an institution which is initially proved to have been private and one which is not, is thus expressed: "Had thne been any sufficient reason for holding that these temples and their endowment were originally dedicated for the tarwad, and so \Vere privat_e trusts, their Lordships would have been slow to hold that the admission of the public in later times possibly owing to altered conditions, would affect the private character of the trusts. As it is, they are of (1) (1939] L.R. 67 I.A. 1. (2J [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 405. 1956 Deoki N andati v. Mr