# •> (li S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS JYOTI BHUSHAN GUPTA v. THE BANARAS BANK LTD - **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 73 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. !98 of 1936 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao, J. c. SHAH, J.R. MuDHOLKAR - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/li-s-c-r-supreme-cour-l-reports-jyoti-bhushan-gupta-v-the-banaras-bank-ltd-2570 - **Pages:** 9 ## Headnote 73 Limitation-Order of Higk Uourt directing contributories lo pay money to liquidator-Order if passed in exercise of urdi'nary original Civil jurisdict-ion-Executi9n a:i:pl-ication filed b£yond three years-If barred-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 190~), Art. 183-Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), ss. 187 and l J.?9-Lettcrs Palent of the Allahabad High Court. The Banaras Bank Ltd. was ordr.red by the Allahabad High Court to be compulsorily wound up. The High Court passed an order under s. 187 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, directing the appellants, whose namos had been placed on the list of contributories, to pay a certain sum of money to the Official Liquidator. The Official Liquidator applied for execution of the order more than three years after the making thereof. The appellants contended that the execution ap· plication, not having been preferred \\ ithin three years as prescribed by Art. 182 of the Limitation Act was barred. The Official Liquidator contended that the order was made in the. exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction by the High Court and the application was governed by Art. 183 which prescribed a period of limitation of twelve years. Held, that Art. 183 was applicable to the case and the application for execution was within time .. The order was made by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction as contempla!ed in Art. 183. Though the Letters Patent did not invest the High Court with any original jurisdiction it could be conferred by legislation. The Indian Companies Act, 1913, invested the High Court with the jurisdiction to order payment of amounts due by debtors of companies ordered to be wound up. The jurisdiction was ordinary, it did not depend on and extraordinary action on the part of the High Court. It was original as a petition for the exercise of it was entertained by the High Court as a court of: first instance and not as an appellate court, and since the High Court adjudicated upon the liability of the debtor to pay debts due by him to the company the jurisdiction was civil. In the matter of Candas Narondas, Navivahu and C. A; Turner, I. L. R. (1889) 13 Born. 520 and P. T. Munia Oervai 1'61 Oclobtr 12. 1!161 J_ro .. .. (li S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS JYOTI BHUSHAN GUPTA v. THE BANARAS BANK LTD. (B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, .J. c. SHAH and J.R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.) 73 Limitation-Order of Higk Uourt directing contributories lo pay money to liquidator-Order if passed in exercise of urdi'nary original Civil jurisdict-ion-Executi9n a:i:pl-ication filed b£yond three years-If barred-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 190~), Art. 183-Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), ss. 187 and l J.?9-Lettcrs Palent of the Allahabad High Court. The Banaras Bank Ltd. was ordr.red by the Allahabad High Court to be compulsorily wound up. The High Court passed an order under s. 187 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, directing the appellants, whose namos had been placed on the list of contributories, to pay a certain sum of money to the Official Liquidator. The Official Liquidator applied for execution of the order more than three years after the making thereof. The appellants contended that the execution ap· plication, not having been preferred \\ ithin three years as prescribed by Art. 182 of the Limitation Act was barred. The Official Liquidator contended that the order was made in the. exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction by the High Court and the application was governed by Art. 183 which prescribed a period of limitation of twelve years. Held, that Art. 183 was applicable to the case and the application for execution was within time .. The order was made by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction as contempla!ed in Art. 183. Though the Letters Patent did not invest the High Court with any original jurisdiction it could be conferred by legislation. The Indian Companies Act, 1913, invested the High Court with the jurisdiction to order payment of amounts due by debtors of companies ordered to be wound up. The jurisdiction was ordinary, it did not depend on and extraordinary action on the part of the High Court. It was original as a petition for the exercise of it was entertained by the High Court as a court of: first instance and not as an appellate court, and since the High Court adjudicated upon the liability of the debtor to pay debts due by him to the company the jurisdiction was civil. In the matter of Candas Narondas, Navivahu and C. A; Turner, I. L. R. (1889) 13 Born. 520 and P. T. Munia Oervai 1'61 Oclobtr 12. 1!161 J_roiatrict Judge .. ... ' (l) s.c.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 75 to the Civil Judge, Allahabad. The appellants contended inter alia that as the application for execution was not preferred within 3 years of the order for payment as prescribed by Art. 182 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act it was barred by the law of limitation. The Official Liquidator contended that the applicat.ion was governed by Art. 183 of the Act and that, in any ev~nt, cer· tain part payments having been made towards the claim by the appellants, the period of limitation was extended thereby. At the hearing, the alter· native plea of part payment was abandoned by the Official Liquidator. The Civil Judge held that the application for execution was barred by limitation as it• was not preferred within 3 years from the order of the High Court. In appeal to the High Court of. Allahabad, the order passed by the Civil Judge was reversed and the proceedings were remitted to the Civil Judge with a direction to restore the execution application to its original number and to proceed with it according to law. Against that order with certificate of fitness granted by the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution, this appeal is preferred. Counsel for the Company contended that the order passed by the High Court not being a final order the appeal on certi.tlcate granted by the High Court is not maintainable. We have not thought it necessary, having regard to the impmta.ncti of the question raised by the appellants and the fact that this Court may in a proper case regularise the proceeding in this Court by granting special leave, even if certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution could not be issued by the High Court, to hear the parties on the question as to the maintainability of the appeal on the certificate and have heard the appeal on the merits. We are of the view that the appeal must fail on the merits. 1911 JJQli Bhusiw1 Gup,. v. 1 lie Banoros Bonk Ltd. Shoh J. 1961 J;·oJi Blw.r.han Gupta v. The Banmas Bank Ltd. SlwhJ. ·. 76 SUPRfillE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Art. 182 of the . Indian Limitation Act provides a period of 3 years for an application for execution of a decree or an order uf any Civil Court not providerl by Art; 183 or s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). By Art. 183 a period of 12 years for enforcing a judgment, decree - or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction is prescribed arid the period commences to run from the- date on which a present right · to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of releasing the right. The _order sought to be executed was not passed by the High Court in the trial of a suit: it was passed in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court bys. 187 of the Indian CompanLs Act, 1913. Section 3 of the Indian Companies Act by sub-s.( 1) enacts that the Comt having jurisdiction under this Act shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate. By the proviso, the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette empower any District Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court. But it is co=on ground that no notification conferring jurisdiction and empowering the District ·Court at B:maras - where tht' registered office of the company is situate-to pass orders under s. 187 has been issued. The High Court was therefore the only Court competent to direct under s. 187 of the Indian Companies Act payment of the amount due from the appellants.'- Counsel for the appellants. contends that the authority exercised by the High Court in directing payment under s. 187 of the Indian Companies Act, l!H3, is neither ordinary, nor original civil. He submits th~t bys. 187 a special power is vested in the High Court by the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which is exercisable in its extraordinary jurisdiction. _To appreciate this argument it is necessary to refer to the statute authorising the estalJ!ish- (1) S.C.R. SUPREl\ffi COURT REPORTS 77 ment of the High Court, and the Letters Patent constituting the same. The High Court for the North Western Province, of which the Allahabad High Court is the successor, was constituted by the Letters Patent issued on March 17, 1866, in exercise of the powers eonferred by cl. 16 of the Charter Act of 1861 (24.25 Viet. C. 104). By that clM:ise, Her Majesty the Que€n was authorised to establish a High Court and to invest the High Court with such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the Charter Act may by cl. 9 be conferred upon the High Court to be established in any of the presic\1mcies, i.e., Calcutt&, Bombay and Madras. The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, which were popularly known as the Presidency High Courts were by cl. 12 of their respective Letters Patent invested with ordinary original civil jurisdiction to entertain and try suits of every description subject to the restriction as to territorial limitations contained in cl. 11 thereof. But by its Letters Patent, the High Court for the North Western Province was not invested with jurisdiction to entertain civil ·suits in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Counsel for the appellants submits that Art.183 applies only to dem:ees and orders passed by the High Courts established by the Royal Charter, which by their constitution are authorised to entertain, hear and try civil suits in exercise of their ordinary civil jurisdiction, and as no such power was conferred upon the Allahabad High Court, the order sought to be executed was not passed in exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction. It is true that when the Letters Patent were issued the High Court had no jurisdiction under a law relating to companies of the nature exercised by the High Court, the character whereof falls to be determined in this appeal. But by cl. 16 of the Charter Act and cl. 35 of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court jurisdiction 1961 Jyoti Bhusha11 Gupta v. The Banaras Bank L·d. Shah J. 1961 ]yoli B!whan Gupta v. 'IN lJanaras Banlr Ltd. Shah J. 78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1982] SUPP. which was not initially conferred upon the High Court could he conferred by legislation within tho competence of the Gm•ernor.Gencral in Council and the Governor in Council. By the Companies Act of 1913, the High Court was invcst-Od with jurisdiction to order payment of the amounts due by debtorR of companies ordered to be wound up. This jurisdiction may be. invoked aR of right against all persons whose natnes are placed on the list of contributories. The jurisdiction is ordinary: it does not depenci on any extraordinary action on the part of the High Court. The jurisdiction is also original in character because the petition for 1•xerci"e of the jurisdiction is entertainablc by the High Court as a court of first instance and not in excr cise of its appellate jurisdiction. Again by s. 18 7 no sp<'cial jurisdiction is confcrrC'd. The High Court adjudiC11.tcs upon the liability of the debtor to pay debts due by him to the Company: the jul'i8dicti0n is therefore civil. Normally, a creditor has to file a suit to enforce liability for payment of a debt due to him from his debtor. The Legislature bas by s. 187 of the Companies AC't empowered the High Court in a summary proceeding to determine the liability and to pass an order for payment, but on that account the real character of the ju1 iediction . exercised hy the High Court. is not altered. !'\or is there any substance in the contention that the authority to order payment of a debt under s. 187 is merely a power of the High Court anrl no' its jurisdiction. Bys. 3 read with s. I 87 of the Companirs Act tlie High Court has jurisdiction to direct payment of the amount clue by a contributory : and an order paBSed for payment manifestly is an order passe,l in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court by s. 3 read with s. 187 of the Companies Act. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was called upon In the matter of Caruia·a N aroruias Nauivahu and C. A. '.furn.er(') to determine the true (I). I. L. R. (18891 JS. Eom. '20. 1 • • ,. (I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 79 na.ture of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of judicature at Bombay in respect of insolvent debtors. The Privy Counc:il held that articlt> 180 9f Schedule II of the Indian Limitation Act XV of 1877 (which was similar to article 183 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908) applies to a judgment of a Court for the relief of insolvent ebtors entered up in the High Court, in accordance with section 86 of the Statute II and 12 Vic., c. 21. It w·a.s held in that case that although a Court exercising insolvency jurisdiction determines the substance of the question relating to an insolvent's estate, the proceedings in execution and the judgment are the High Court's. The judgment is entered up in the ordinary course of the duty cast upon the High Court by the law, not by way of special or extraordinary action, but in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Lord Hobhouse dt>livering the judgment of the judicial committee observed: "But it was strongly contended at the bar that this jurisdiction though civil and original, was not ordinary : and Mr. Rigby argued that the passages of the Charter which have just been epitomised divide the jurisdiction into four .classes-ordinary original, extraordinary original, appellate, an1 those special matters which are tho subject of special and separate provisions. But their Lordships are of the opinion that the expression "ordinary jurisdiction" embraces all such as is exflrcised in the ordinary course of law and without any special step being necessary to assume it and that it is opposed to extraordinary jurisdiction, which the Court may assume at. its discretion upon special occasions and by special orders. They are confirmed in this view by observing that, in the next group of clauses which indicated the law to be applied by the Court to the various clauses of Mses, there is not a four-fold divisiQn of jurisdiction, but a three-fold one, into ordinary, extraordinary, 1961 Jy1ti Bhushan G1,;_IJ1a v. The Ba11ar1:.s Ba11k LJ. IHI Jyoti Bhuslum GufJt• v. Tlt1 Bonaros Ba1tli: LtJ. SAaliJ. 80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP. a.nd appellate. The judgment of 1868 was entered up by the Hi!!h Court, not by way of spocial or discretionary action, but in the ordinary course of the duty ca.st upon it by law, according to which every other case of the same kind would be tiealt with. It was, t.herefore, entered up in exercise of the ordinary original civil juri~diction of the High Court." Counsel for the appellants contended that by cl. 18 of tho Letters Patent the High Court of Bombay was invested with insolvency jurisdiction whereas the High Court of Allahabad is not invested by tho Lettel'll Patent with any jurisdiction in the matter of companies and thorefore the principle of "In reCt>ndas Naronda~" doos not apply. But under cl. 18 of the Letters Patent a Judge or Judges of the High Court are to sit as a Court for relief of insolvent debtors and powers and authorities with respect to original and appellate jurisdiction a.re to be determined by reforence to the law relating to insolvent debtors. The jurisdiction to deal with the claims of companies ordered 11o be wound up is conferred by the Indian Companies Act and to that extent thfJ Letters Patent are modified. There is, however, no difference in tho character of tho original ci vii jurisdiction which is conferred upon the High Court by Letters Pa.tent and the jurisdiction conferred by special Acts. When in exercise of its authority conferred by & Rpecia.l statute the High Court in an application preStlnted to it as a court of first instance declares liability to pay a debt, the jurisdiction exercised is original and civil and if the exercite of that jurisdiction does not depend upon any preliminary step invoking exercise of discretion of the High Court, the jurisdiction is ordinary. In P. T. Mun.ia Servai v. The Hanuman Bari.Tc Ltd., Tanjure ('), a Division BMlllh of the Madras (I) I. L. R. (1951) Mad. 685. 1 • t (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 81 High Court by the Banking Companies Act, 1949 ( X of 1949) is pa.rt of its ordinary civil jurisdiction within the meaning of Art. 183 of the Limitation Act, and an order passed in exercise of its ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction is governed by Art. 183 and not by Art. 182 of the Limitation Act. In that case on an application preferred by the Official Liquidator of the Hanuman Bank Ltd., a direction for payment by the High Conrt of certain sums of money by the appellant Munia on or before a certain date was made. To an application for enforcement of that liability Art. 183 of the Limitation Act was held applicable. In our view, the High Court was right in holding that the application for execution filed by the Official Liquidator was within limitation. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismi&sed. RADHAKRISHNA SIVADUTTA RAI AND ORS. v. TAYEBALLI DAWOODBHAI (B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJJ\]NDRAGADKAR and RAGHUJIAR DAYAt, JJ.) Bread/, of coritract-Buit for damages-Broker•' bought and sold notea, if and when constitute terms of the comract-Commercial U8(l{le-Conlract on behalf af discloBPJl partner-Maintainability of •uit-lndian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), s. 230. · The appellant sued the respondent for damages for breach of contract. The respondent pleaded .that the app• ellant had contra~ted as agent for its disclosed principal and had no right to sue. The bought and sold notes issued by the brokers 1howed that the appellant had entered into ihe contract on account of the disclosed principal; but in the confirmation slips and subsequent letters exchanged between the parties no reference was made to the principal nor did the appcllan!J describe themselves as acting or signing on his behalf. H eU, that it is well established in commercial usage 1h~t the bought and sold notes issued by the brows, where 1961 J.yqti Bhushan Gupl4 v. Tiu Banartu Bonk Ltd. Shah J. 1901 0&10/ur 13.