# Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr v. Amazon Technologies INC

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1190
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-10-07
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, K.V. Viswanathan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/lifestyle-equities-c-v-anr-v-amazon-technologies-inc-38037
- **Pages:** 68

## Headnote

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court committed any error in
passing the impugned judgment and order by which the application
filed by the respondent herein (judgment debtor-original defendant)
under Order XLI Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(3), Civil Procedure Code,
1908, respectively came to be allowed and thereby the Court
granted stay of the execution of the money decree suffered by the
respondent without insisting for the deposit of the decretal amount.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5 - Stay by Appellate
Court - Interpretation:
Held: Although, Or.XLI r. 5 uses the word "shall", yet a combined
reading of the sum and substance of rr.1(3) and 5(5) would reveal,
that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the
appellate court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in
dispute - Appellate court, for the grant of stay of execution, has a
discretion to impose a condition of deposit of the amount depending
on the facts and circumstances of each case - A deposit is not a
condition precedent for an order of stay of execution of the decree
by the appellate court - The only guiding factor and statutory
mandate, for the grant of such stay of execution as indicated in
r.5, is the existence of "sufficient cause" in favour of the appellant,
on the availability of which the appellate court would be inclined to
pass an order of stay - For the grant of benefit of an unconditional
stay of execution of a decree, an exceptional case has to be made
out before the appellate court - This discretion of the appellate
court to grant an unconditional stay of execution of decree must
not be exercised arbitrarily - It must be exercised sparingly and
only if an exceptional case is made out for such stay in view of
* Author
464
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the peculiar facts and attending circumstances of the case before
it - In the present case, the High Court looked into various relevant
aspects for the purpose of granting benefit of unconditional stay
of execution of money decree viz., that the suit had proceeded in
the absence of the respondent herein; there were no pleadings
of infringement against the respondent herein; no pleadings for
the purpose of claiming Rs. 3,36,02,87,000/- towards damages;
Single Judge had recorded no findings as regards the role of the
respondent herein in the alleged infringement - No error committed
by Division Bench in passing the impugned judgment, upheld.
[Paras 134 VI-VIII, 125-129]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5 - "exceptional case"
for granting benefit of unconditional stay of the execution of
money decree:
Held: A case within the purview of "exceptional case" for the
purpose of granting benefit of unconditional stay of the execution
of money decree by the appellate court would be, if the money
decree in question- (i) is egregiously perverse; (ii) is riddled with
patent illegalities; (iii) is facially untenable; and/or (iv) such other
exceptional causes similar in nature. [Paras 134, 82-87]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI - Grant of benefit of
stay of execution of a decree by an appellate court - Law
w.r.t, summarized. [Para 134]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5:
Held: For the purpose of the grant or refusal of stay of execution of
the decree under r.5 of Or.XLI, it is immaterial whether the decree
is a money decree or any other decree - Or.XLI, r.5 makes no
distinction between a money decree and other decrees, and the
said provision applies with full rigour in both instances - Yet as a
rule of prudence and established practice evolved over a period of
time, no stay of execution of a money decree should be granted,
except on the condition that the decretal amount be deposited in
the court - However, such condition for deposit is not mandatory
and non-prescription thereof does not operate as a bar to staying
the execution of a money decree - Further, there is no provision
u/Or.XLI, r.5 imposing a mandate to deposit cash security

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[2025] 10 S.C.R. 463 : 2025 INSC 1190
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr.
v.
Amazon Technologies INC.
(Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 19767 of 2025)
07 October 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the Division Bench of the High Court committed any error in
passing the impugned judgment and order by which the application
filed by the respondent herein (judgment debtor-original defendant)
under Order XLI Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(3), Civil Procedure Code,
1908, respectively came to be allowed and thereby the Court
granted stay of the execution of the money decree suffered by the
respondent without insisting for the deposit of the decretal amount.
Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5 - Stay by Appellate
Court - Interpretation:
Held: Although, Or.XLI r. 5 uses the word "shall", yet a combined
reading of the sum and substance of rr.1(3) and 5(5) would reveal,
that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the
appellate court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in
dispute - Appellate court, for the grant of stay of execution, has a
discretion to impose a condition of deposit of the amount depending
on the facts and circumstances of each case - A deposit is not a
condition precedent for an order of stay of execution of the decree
by the appellate court - The only guiding factor and statutory
mandate, for the grant of such stay of execution as indicated in
r.5, is the existence of "sufficient cause" in favour of the appellant,
on the availability of which the appellate court would be inclined to
pass an order of stay - For the grant of benefit of an unconditional
stay of execution of a decree, an exceptional case has to be made
out before the appellate court - This discretion of the appellate
court to grant an unconditional stay of execution of decree must
not be exercised arbitrarily - It must be exercised sparingly and
only if an exceptional case is made out for such stay in view of
* Author
464
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the peculiar facts and attending circumstances of the case before
it - In the present case, the High Court looked into various relevant
aspects for the purpose of granting benefit of unconditional stay
of execution of money decree viz., that the suit had proceeded in
the absence of the respondent herein; there were no pleadings
of infringement against the respondent herein; no pleadings for
the purpose of claiming Rs. 3,36,02,87,000/- towards damages;
Single Judge had recorded no findings as regards the role of the
respondent herein in the alleged infringement - No error committed
by Division Bench in passing the impugned judgment, upheld.
[Paras 134 VI-VIII, 125-129]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5 - "exceptional case"
for granting benefit of unconditional stay of the execution of
money decree:
Held: A case within the purview of "exceptional case" for the
purpose of granting benefit of unconditional stay of the execution
of money decree by the appellate court would be, if the money
decree in question- (i) is egregiously perverse; (ii) is riddled with
patent illegalities; (iii) is facially untenable; and/or (iv) such other
exceptional causes similar in nature. [Paras 134, 82-87]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI - Grant of benefit of
stay of execution of a decree by an appellate court - Law
w.r.t, summarized. [Para 134]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5:
Held: For the purpose of the grant or refusal of stay of execution of
the decree under r.5 of Or.XLI, it is immaterial whether the decree
is a money decree or any other decree - Or.XLI, r.5 makes no
distinction between a money decree and other decrees, and the
said provision applies with full rigour in both instances - Yet as a
rule of prudence and established practice evolved over a period of
time, no stay of execution of a money decree should be granted,
except on the condition that the decretal amount be deposited in
the court - However, such condition for deposit is not mandatory
and non-prescription thereof does not operate as a bar to staying
the execution of a money decree - Further, there is no provision
u/Or.XLI, r.5 imposing a mandate to deposit cash security as the
only mode of security for execution of the decree - Security, for
the purpose of the said provision, can be in the shape of property,
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
465
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
bond and or in the form of an appropriate undertaking from the
appellant to abide by the decree, seeking stay of execution.
[Para 134 X, XI]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI r.1(3) - Obligation
under - Nature - Mandatory or directory:
Held: Though Or.XLI r.1(3) is couched with the expression "shall"
but, obligation under Or.XLI r.1(3) is not mandatory but directory in
nature - Failure to comply with the same shall not result in rejection
of the appeal, but would disentitle the appellant the benefit of stay
of execution of the money decree. [Paras 62, 63]
Interpretation of Statute - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Or.XLI, rr.5(1), (3) - Interpretation of a provision of a statute -
Principles to be followed, enumerated. [Paras 55-70]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Second Proviso to Or.IX
r.13 - Service of Summons and Irregularity in the Service of
Summons - Plea of the petitioners that in view of the second
Proviso to Or.IX r.13, the defendant could be said to have had
the requisite "knowledge" of the date of hearing and sufficient
time to appear and the delivery of suit papers and the order
granting ex parte injunction dated 12.10.2020 could be said
to be valid service of summons:
Held: No merit in the said submission - Second Proviso to Or.IX r.13
would come into play only when there is "irregularity" in the service
of summons (for instance, the publication in wrong newspaper,
no acknowledgment on duplicate summons being received etc) -
In the present case, prima facie there was nothing on record to
establish valid service of "summons" - If that be so, the second
Proviso would not come into play. [Paras 89, 90]
Words and Phrases - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI,
r.5 - "sufficient cause" - Meaning and import of, explained.
[Paras 78, 80-70]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.36(3) - Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Or.XLI, r.5 - Plea of the plaintiffs that courts
cannot grant the benefit of unconditional stay of an award
in cases other than those covered by the second Proviso
to s.36(3) and when it comes to staying a money decree
unconditionally, the judgment-debtor needs to make out more
466
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
than a prima facie case of fraud or corruption, or something
analogous to the same, and it is just not sufficient to point
out serious infirmities in the judgment granting money decree:
Held: It is difficult to accept the submission that even for the
purpose of grant of benefit of unconditional stay of money decree
under Or.XLI r.5, the judgment-debtor has to make out more
than a prima facie case of fraud or corruption and not solely
on the basis of an extreme or egregious view on the merits of
the adjudication - The analogy of s.36, Arbitration Act sought to
be applied is inappropriate - The decision of this Court in Pam
Developments should also be understood and confined only to
matters relating to arbitration, more particularly, s.36, Arbitration
Act - If fraud or corruption or something analogous to the same is
only to be seen for the purpose of granting benefit of unconditional
stay of execution of money decree then in such circumstances,
the decree holder may argue that although there may not be a
valid service of summons to the defendant/judgment-debtor yet,
the same by itself would not be sufficient to grant the benefit of
unconditional stay of execution of money decree. [Paras 122-124]
Case Law Cited
Sunil Poddar and Others v. Union Bank of India [2008] 1 SCR
261 : (2008) 2 SCC 326 - distinguished.
Malwa Strips Pvt. Limited v. Jyoti Limited [2008] 17 SCR 1297 :
(2009) 2 SCC 426; Kayamuddin Shamsuddin Khan v. State Bank
of India (1998) 8 SCC 676 - relied on.
Sihor Nagar Palika Bureau v. Bhabhlubhai Virabhai & Co. (2005)
4 SCC 1; Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India [2003] 2 SCR 377 :
(2003) 3 SCC 309; Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu
[2002] 2 SCR 383 : (2002) 3 SCC 533; Union of India v. Deoki
Nandan Agarwal [1991] 3 SCR 873 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 323;
Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. [2004]
Supp. 6 SCR 843 : (2005) 1 SCC 705; Central Bank of India v.
State of Gujarat [1988] 1 SCR 106 : (1987) 4 SCC 407; Basant
Singh v. Roman Catholic Mission [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 70 : (2002)
7 SCC 531; Sushil Kumar Sabharwal v. Gurpreet Singh & Ors.
[2002] 3 SCR 352 : (2002) 5 SCC 377; Sepco Electric Power
Construction v. Power Mech Projects Limited [2022] 7 SCR 343 :
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1243; Pam Developments Private Limited v.
State of West Bengal [2019] 9 SCR 252 : (2019) 8 SCC 112;
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
467
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
Hindustan Construction Company & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
[2019] 17 SCR 331 : (2020) 17 SCC 324; BCCI v. Kochi Cricket
Pvt. Ltd. [2018] 2 SCR 829 : (2018) 6 SCC 287 - referred to.
A.A. Khan v. Ameer Khan, 1949 SCC OnLine Kar 11; Borough
Municipality v. Firm Ramji Vashram, AIR 1955 Guj 113; Dhunjibhoy
Cowasji Umrigar v. Lisboa, ILR 1889 13 Bom 252; Movie
Enterprises v. M.S. Periasamy Mudaliar, 1952 SCC OnLine Kar 14;
Bansidhar v. Pribhu Dayal, 1952 SCC OnLine Raj; LT Foods Ltd. v.
Saraswati Trading Company, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3694; ITD
Cementation India Ltd. v. Urmi Trenchless Technology Pvt. Ltd.,
2020 SCC OnLine Bom 10611 - referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; Limitation Act, 1963; Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Bill, 1974; Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976; Code
of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978; Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958; Civil Procedure Code, 1882; Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act 2015; Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)
Act, 2019; Arbitration Act, 1996; Arbitration and Conciliation
Amendment Act, 2021.
List of Keywords
Order XLI Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Stay by Appellate
Court; Order XLI Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(3), Civil Procedure Code,
1908; Money decree; Order XLI Rule 1(3), Civil Procedure Code,
1908; Stay of the execution of money decree; Without deposit of
decretal amount; Condition for deposit of amount in dispute; Decretal
amount; Deposit; Security; "exceptional case"; "sufficient cause";
Unconditional stay of execution of money decree; "irregularity" in
the service of summons; No valid service of "summons"; Trademark;
Infringement; Beverly Hills Polo Club; Lifestyle Equities; Amazon
Seller Services.
Case Arising From
EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 19767 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.07.2025 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CMAPPL No. 26455 of 2025.
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Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
Mukul Rohatgi, Gaurav Pachnanda, Sr.Advs., Sidhant Goel, Mohit
Goel, Ms. Garima Bajaj, Dipankar Mishra, Ms. Karmanya Dev
Sharma, Udbhav Gady.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Saikrishna Rajagopal, Sidharth Chopra, Ms. Sneha Jain, Devvrat
Joshi, Angad Makkar, Ms. Swikriti Singhania.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala J.,
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*
A.
FACTUAL MATRIX .............................................................
3
B.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS ......... 11
C.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT ....... 13
D.
REJOINDER TO THE SUBMISSIONS CANVASSED ON
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS ...................................... 15
E.
ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 16
i.
History of the Legislation in Question ......................... 18
ii.
Principles required to be followed while Interpreting
a Provision of a Statute .............................................. 22
iii.
Decisions of various High Courts on the Subject ....... 33
iv.
Meaning and Import of "sufficient cause" under Order
XLI Rule 5 of the CPC ................................................ 38
v.
Service of Summons and Irregularity in the Service
of Summons ................................................................ 39
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
469
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
vi.
Reading of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act and Order
XLI Rule 3 and Rule 5 respectively of the CPC ......... 41
vi.
Relevant aspects which the High Court looked into
for the purpose of granting unconditional stay ........... 53
F.
CONCLUSION .................................................................... 69
1.
Our Order dated 24.09.2025 passed in the instant petition reads thus:
"1. Exemption Application is allowed.
2. Heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Gaurav Pachnanda,
the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and
Mr. Arvind Nigam, the learned Senior counsel appearing
for the respondent.
3. We are of the view that there is no good reason for
us to interfere with the impugned Judgment and Order
passed by the High Court.
4. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
5. In view of the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition,
no orders are required to be passed on the application for
intervention/impleadment and the same stands disposed of.
6. However, reasons to follow by a separate Order."
2.
This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Delhi, dated 01.07.2052 in the CM Application No. 26455
of 2025 filed in the RFA(O.S.)(COMM) No.11 of 2025 by which the
application filed by the respondent herein (judgment debtor-original
defendant) under Order XLI Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(3) of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, (for short, "the CPC") respectively came
to be allowed, and thereby the Court stayed the operation of the
judgment and money decree dated 25.02.2025 passed by a learned
Single Judge in the suit instituted by the petitioner herein. In short,
the Division Bench of the High Court granted stay of the execution
of the money decree suffered by the respondent herein without
insisting for the deposit of the decretal amount.
470
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3.
For the sake of convenience, the petitioners herein shall be referred
to as the original plaintiffs and the respondent herein shall be referred
to as the original defendant.
A.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4.
The plaintiffs along with its subsidiaries and licensees claim to be
engaged in the business of manufacturing, distribution and sale of
a wide range of products including garments, apparels, footwear
for men, women and children, furniture, textiles, watches and other
lifestyle/personal care products under the trademark Beverly Hills
Polo Club (hereinafter referred to as, "BHPC").
5.
The plaintiff No. 1 is an Amsterdam based company and is the
proprietor of the BHPC trademark and claims to hold exclusive rights
for its use and commercialisation. The BHPC trademark consists of a
distinctive look featuring a charging Polo pony with a mounted rider
wielding a raised polo stick (mallet) symbolising the sport of Polo.
6.
The plaintiff no. 2 is the licensee of the said trademark pursuant to the
Master License and Licensing Service Agreement dated 20.05.2008.
7.
The plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit (COMM) No. 443 of 2020 in the Delhi
High Court, inter alia, seeking permanent injunction and damages
against the defendant for the alleged infringement of their registered
trademark BHPC.
8.
It is the case of the plaintiffs that they are the rightful proprietors of
the BHPC Mark which enjoys extensive goodwill and recognition in
the domestic and international markets. The plaintiffs instituted the
suit contending that the defendant has been unlawfully using a mark
identically or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' trademark, thereby
violating their statutory and common law rights.
9.
In such circumstances referred to above, the plaintiffs prayed for
the following reliefs:
"a. Decree for permanent injunction restraining die
Defendants, its partners, directors, shareholders or
proprietor as the case may be, its assigns in business,
franchisees affiliates, subsidiaries, licensees, and agents
from selling, offering for sale, advertising, directly or
indirectly dealing in any products or reproducing or using
in any manner whatsoever, the Infringing Logo Mark or
any other trade mark or logo/device, which is identical
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
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Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
to and/or deceptively similar to, or is a deceptive variant
of, and/or includes the Plaintiffs' well known Logo Mark
amounting to infringement of the Plaintiffs' registered trade
marks as disclosed in the Plaint.
b. Decree for permanent injunction restraining the
Defendants, its partners, directors, shareholders or proprietor
as the case may be, its assigns in business, franchisees,
affiliates, subsidiaries, licensees and agents from selling,
offering for sale, advertising, directly or indirectly dealing
in any products or reproducing or using in any manner
whatsoever, the infringing Logo Mark or any other trade
mark or logo/device, which is identical to and/or deceptively
similar to or imitation of, or is a deceptive variant of, and/
or includes the Plaintiffs' artistic Logo Mark amounting to
infringement of the Plaintiffs' copyright in the said logo.
c. Decree for permanent injunction restraining the
Defendants, its partners, directors, shareholders or
proprietor as the case may be, its assigns in business,
franchisees, affiliates, subsidiaries, licensees and agents
from selling, offering for sale, advertising, directly or
indirectly dealing in any products or using in any manner
whatever, the infringing Logo Mark or any other mark or
logo/device, which is identical to, or is a deceptive variant
of and/or deceptively similar to and/or includes the Plaintiff's
well known Logo Mark amounting to passing off of the
goods/services and/or business of the Defendants for those
of the Plaintiffs, dilution of goodwill and unfair competition.
d. A decree for delivery up of all products and material
including stationery, visiting cards, hill boards, brochures,
promotional material, letter-heads, cash memos, sign
boards, sign posts, leaflets, cartons, or any other items of
whatsoever, bearing the infringing Logo Mark and/or any
other mark, logo or device which may be identical and/
or deceptively similar, or is a deceptive variant of and/or
includes the Plaintiff's well-known Logo Mark.
e. A decree for damages amounting to Rs. 2,00,05,000/-
(Rupees Two Crores and Five Thousand only) or any such
amount as found due in favour of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs
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submit that the valuation of damages is an approximate
figure only, and the Plaintiffs undertake to pay further
Court fees as may be determined by this Hon'ble Court
upon the damages that the Plaintiffs are able to prove in
the course of trial.
f. An order for rendition of accounts of profits in favour of
the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants to ascertain the
profits made by Defendants through sale of its apparel
products or any other products which bear the infringing
Logo Mark. The Court fees as and when the accounts
of profit are determined precisely and accurately in the
course of trial, and upon disclosure of profits made by
the Defendants.
g. An order awarding costs of this suit to the Plaintiffs;
h. Any other and further relief(s) as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper to meet the ends of justice."
10. It appears from the materials on record that in the suit filed by the
plaintiffs there were three defendants including the respondent herein
as the original defendant No. 1. The plaint computed the damages
claimed from all the defendants to the tune of Rs. 2,00,05,000/-
(Rupees Two Crore and Five Thousand Only), or such other amount
as the court would find it to be payable.
11. It further appears that the defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex parte
vide Order dated 20.04.2022. Of the remaining two defendants, the
suit was decreed against the defendant No. 2 for Rs. 4,78,484/-
vide the Order dated 02.03.2023. The very same order deleted the
defendant No. 3 from the array of parties.
12. In such circumstances, the respondent before us is the only defendant
now contesting the litigation.
13. It appears that upon institution of the suit by the plaintiffs the following
Order dated 12.10.2020 came to be passed:
"1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. Original documents, if any, be filed within two weeks
of the resumption of the normal functioning of the Court.
3. Application is disposed of.
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
473
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
I.A. 9256/2020 (under Order XI Rule 1 (4) Commercial
Courts Act)
1. Additional documents, if any, be filed within 30 days.
2. Application is disposed of.
Signing Date:13.10.2020 07:06:56 This file is digitally
signed by PS to HMJ Mukta Gupta CS(COMM) 443/2020
I.A. 9254/2020 (under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC)
1. Plaint be registered as a suit.
2. Issue summons in the suit and notice in the application
to the defendants.
3. Learned counsel for the defendant No.2 and defendant
No.3 accept summons in the suit and notice in the
application.
4. Summons in the suit and notice in the application be
now issued to defendant No.1 on the plaintiff taking steps
through email and whatsapp, returnable before this Court
on 2nd February, 2021.
5. Written statement and reply affidavit along with affidavit
of admission/denial be filed within 30 days of the receipt
of summons in the suit and notice in the application.
6. Replication and rejoinder affidavit, along with affidavit
of admission/denial, be filed within three weeks thereafter.
7. Case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff is a brand-owner
of "BEVERLY HILLS POLO CLUB" which was established
by its predecessors in the year 1981. The first registration
for the trademark "BEVERLY HILLS POLO CLUB" was
applied on 3rd December, 1992 and thereafter the plaintiff
has number of registrations for the said mark. The mark of
the plaintiff is a device mark, that is, and the plaintiff is the
owner of the registered trademark and the copyright thereof.
8. Grievance in the present suit of the plaintiff is limited to
defendant No.1 which is a group company of defendant
No.3 but not working as an intermediary but is selling its
own brand, copying the logo of the plaintiff as..... It is
thus claimed that by infringing the plaintiff's device mark
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as also the copyright in the logo, the defendant No.1 is
selling its goods representing them to be as the plaintiff's
brand. Learned counsel further states that defendant No.2
is selling the products of the defendant No.1 under the
impugned logo mark by listing the same on the platform
of defendant No.3.
9. None appears on behalf of defendant No.1 despite
advance notice however, learned counsel for defendant
No.3, that is, Amazon Seller Service Pvt. Ltd. enters
appearance and states that in an earlier suit filed by the
plaintiff being CS(COMM) 1015/2018 Lifestyle Equities C.V.
and Ors. vs. Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd., vide order
dated 16th July, 2018, this Court had already directed the
defendant No.3 to take down the URLs wherein the brand/
logo/device mark of the plaintiff is copied including those
mentioned in the plaint and as and when the plaintiff gives
any further information in this regard. Learned counsel for
the defendant No.3 states that since the defendant No.3
is covered by the said order of this Court dated 16th July,
2018, no fresh suit is maintainable and the plaintiff was
only required to intimate the same to the defendant No.3
and hence the present suit is mala fide.
10. Learned counsel for the defendant No.2 states that
the defendant No.2 has already taken down the listing
and will further investigate into the matter and take down
any further listing which is either on the defendant No.3's
platform or any other platform.
11. Case of the plaintiff is that in the earlier suit, that is,
CS (COMM) No.1015/2018, the plaintiff had impleaded
parties who were selling their products on the defendant
No.3's listing by infringing the plaintiff's device mark and
the copyright and in the earlier suit the defendant No.1
was not a party and in the present suit, not only does
the plaintiff seek delisting of the brand of the defendant
No.1 from the defendant No.3's platform but also seeks
the relief of injunction against the defendant No.1 which
is infringing and diluting the plaintiff's mark by selling its
products on a much cheaper rates representing to be that
of the plaintiff.
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Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
12. Considering that the defendant No.1 is a separate
entity, this Court is prima facie of the view that the
present suit would be maintainable. From the averments
in the plaint as also the documents filed therewith,
this Court finds that the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case in its favour and in case no ex-parte adinterim injunction is granted, the plaintiff would suffer
an irreparable loss. Balance of convenience also lies
in favour of the plaintiff. Consequently, till the next date
of hearing, defendant No.1 and defendant No.2, their
Partners, Directors, Proprietors, Shareholders, Affiliates,
Licensees, Agents etc. are restrained from selling,
offering for sell, advertising, directly or indirectly dealing
in any products or reproducing or using in any manner
whatsoever the infringing logo mark which is identically/
deceptively similar to the plaintiff's logo mark "BEVERLY
HILLS POLO CLUB". In the meantime, defendant No.3
is directed to take down the products of the defendant
No.1 with the infringing logo within 72 hours of the URLs
being provided by the plaintiff.
13. Compliance under Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC be made
within one week."
14. Thus, the Court while registering the plaint as a suit noted that the
defendant No. 1, i.e., the respondent before us despite an advance
notice failed to enter appearance, and accordingly granted an ex
parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants, their partners,
directors, proprietors, shareholders, etc., from selling, offering for
sale, advertising, directly or indirectly dealing in any products which
is identically/deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' logo mark "BHPC".
15. The suit ultimately came to be adjudicated ex parte, and came to be
decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant No. 1,
i.e., the respondent before us in the following terms:
"121. The suit is accordingly decreed as under in favour
of Plaintiffs and against Defendant No. 1 in the following
terms:
(i) A decree of permanent injunction is granted in terms
of paragraphs 64(a), (b) and (c) of the plaint,
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(ii) A decree of damages to the tune of $38.78 million as
on date Rs. 336,02,87,000.00/- is granted in favour of the
Plaintiffs against Defendant No. 1. If the said amount is
paid within three months, no interest would be liable to be
paid. However, if the same is not paid by the Defendant
No.1, interest @ 5% per annum would he payable from
the date of this judgment until the full realization of the
said amount.
(iii) A decree of costs to the tune of Rs. 3,23,10,966.60/-
along with the Court Fee.
122. The details of the relief granted are summarized below:
S.NO.
DECREE DETAILS
AMOUNT/TERMS
1
Compensatory
Damages
1A
Lost Royalties
USD 33.78 million
(Rs.292,70,37,000,00/)
1B
Increased Advertising &
Promotional Expenses
USD 5 million
(Rs.43,32,50,000.00/-)
1C
Total Compensatory
Damages
USD 38.78 million
(Rs.336,02,87,000.00/)
2
Costs
Rs.3,23,10,966.60/-
along with the Court Fee.
3
Grand Total (Damages
+ Costs)
Rs.339,25,97,966.60/- +
Court Fee
123. Decree sheet be drawn up in the above terms.
124. The suit along with all pending applications, if any
are disposed of."
16. The defendant being dissatisfied with the judgment and money decree
passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court challenged
the same by filing RFA (O.S.) (COMM) No. 11 of 2025.
17. In the appeal filed by the defendant, an application was filed under
Order XLI Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(3) of the CPC respectively, seeking
stay of the operation of judgment and money decree passed by the
learned Single Judge referred to above.
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
477
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
18. The Division Bench of the High Court after hearing the decreeholders and the judgment-debtor allowed the stay application in the
following terms:
"181. We, therefore, dispose of the present application
by staying the operation of the impugned judgment dated
25 February 2025, passed by the learned Single Judge,
insofar as it awards damages of Rs. 336,02,87,000/-, and
costs of Rs. 3,23,10,966.60/-.
182. This shall, however, be subject to an undertaking
being furnished by the appellant Amazon Tech to comply
with the impugned judgment, in the event of its failing in
the present appeal, to be furnished with the Registry of this
Court within a period of two weeks from pronouncement
of the present judgment.
183. CM Appl 26455/2025 stands flowed to the aforesaid
extent.
184. Observations and findings contained in the present
judgment, we clarify, are only intended to be prima facie
and for the purposes of disposing of the present application.
They shall not be binding on Court while deciding the
present appeal."
19. In such circumstance referred to above, the original plaintiffs/decreeholders are here before us with the present petition.
B.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS
20. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Gaurav Pachnanda, the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that the Division
Bench of the High Court committed an egregious error in granting
the benefit of unconditional stay of the execution of money decree.
It was vehemently submitted that the impugned judgment and order
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is in gross violation
and flagrant disregard of the mandatory provisions of Order XLI
Rule 5(1) and Rule 5(3) of the CPC respectively.
21. Mr. Rohatgi vehemently submitted that impugned judgment and
order is erroneous on all counts. According to the learned Senior
Counsel, the High Court is not correct in saying that there was no
valid service of summons to the defendant.
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22. The learned Senior Counsel vehemently submitted that Order XLI
Rule 1(3) of the CPC makes it abundantly clear that in an appeal
against a decree for payment of amount, the appellant is obliged
in law, within the time permitted by the Appellate Court, to deposit
the amount awarded or furnish such security in respect thereof as
the Court may think fit. He laid much stress on the fact that under
Order XLI Rule 5(5) of the CPC a deposit or security, is a condition
precedent for an order by the Appellate Court staying the execution
of the decree.
23. In other words, according to the learned Senior Counsel the provision
is mandatory in character. With a view to fortify the submissions noted
aforesaid, the learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance on the
decision of this Court in the case of Sihor Nagar Palika Bureau v.
Bhabhlubhai Virabhai & Co., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 1.
24. It was vehemently argued that, if according to the defendant it is a
case of an ex parte decree, i.e., decree passed without service of
valid summons, then why the defendant did not prefer any application
under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC? Why defendant thought fit to
prefer an appeal against such so called ex parte decree?
25. The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the second
Proviso to Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. Relying on the same, it was
argued that the defendant had the requisite knowledge of the date of
hearing and had sufficient time to appear, file its written statement,
and to contest the suit. It was argued that the delivery of the suit
papers and the order passed by the High Court dated 12.10.2020
granting ex parte injunction subject to compliance of Order XXXIX
Rule 3 of the CPC would amount to adequate service of summons in
accordance with law. To fortify this submission reliance was placed on
the decision of this Court in the case of Sunil Poddar and Others v.
Union Bank of India, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 326, and the decision
of the Delhi High Court in the case of LT Foods Ltd. v. Saraswati
Trading Company, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3694.
26. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel that the Division Bench
of the High Court committed an egregious error in staying the money
decree on mere asking the defendant to furnish an undertaking on
oath, that in the event, if the appeal is dismissed the defendant shall
deposit the decretal amount. This according to the learned Senior
Counsel cannot be termed as adequate security.
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
479
Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
27. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel
prayed that there being merit in his petition the same may be allowed
and the impugned judgment and order be set aside, and further
the defendant may be directed to deposit the decretal amount with
interest in the court below.
C.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT
28. On the other hand, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Neeraj Kishan
Kaul and Mr. Arvind Nigam, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the defendant, while vehemently opposing this petition submitted
that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have
been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment
and order.
29. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that all the relevant aspects
of the matter could be said to have been looked into by the Division
Bench painstakingly, and upon being fully convinced on all aspects,
the Division Bench in its discretion thought fit to grant the benefit of
stay of the execution of the money decree without insisting for the
deposit of the decretal amount with interest or any other tangible
security.
30. It was argued that the decision of this Court in Sihor Nagar Palika
(supra) upon which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the
petitioner is of no avail in view of the decision of this Court in Malwa
Strips Pvt. Limited v. Jyoti Limited, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 426.
31. It was pointed that in Malwa Strips (supra), this Court considered
Sihor Nagar Palika (supra) and took the view that the word "shall" in
Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC is not mandatory, and if an exceptional
case is made out then it is always open for the Appellate Court to
grant the benefit of stay of the execution of a money decree without
insisting for deposit of the entire decretal amount with interest.
32. It was argued that the Division Bench of the High Court was fully
convinced that not only any valid summons was not served upon
the defendants and the suit proceeded ex parte, but even on other
counts, the judgment and decree passed by the Court, prima facie,
suffers from various legal infirmities.
33. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court in its impugned judgment and order has recorded
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few shocking facts like the plaintiffs enhancing the claim of damages
consequently from Rs. 2 crore in the plaint to Rs. 3,780 crore at
the stage of written submissions post-trial, and that too without any
amendment and without putting the defendant to notice of such
enhanced claim without any basis in the pleadings. It was argued that
having regard to the gross perversities and illegalities writ large in the
decree and conduct of the suit proceedings, asking the defendant to
furnish security or deposit of any particular amount as a pre-condition
for stay would be wholly disproportionate and excessive.
34. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Senior Counsel
prayed that there being no merit in the present petition the same
may be dismissed.
D.
REJOINDER TO THE SUBMISSIONS CANVASSED ON
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS
35. Mr. Gaurav Pachnanda, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the plaintiffs in rejoinder put forward an important submission, which
we must take record and deal with the same.
36. The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to Section 36(3) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, "the Arbitration
Act"). He would submit that the second Proviso attached to Section
36(3) of the Arbitration Act is an indication that ordinarily by applying
the principles of Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, as mentioned in Section
36(3) of the Arbitration Act, the Court would not be empowered to
unconditionally stay an arbitration award or a judgment.
37. In the alternative, the learned Senior Counsel sought to argue that,
even if it was to be understood that the second Proviso attached to
Section 36(3) of the Arbitration Act provides that instead of exercising
discretion, the Court must grant unconditional stay in cases of fraud
and corruption, the same would lead to a logical inference that the
discretion to grant an unconditional stay under Order XLI Rule 5 of
the CPC would be restricted to only cases of fraud or corruption,
or grounds that take colour from those two grounds and not cases
of an extreme or egregious view on the merits of the adjudication.
E.
ANALYSIS
38. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through materials on record, the only question
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
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Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies INC.
that falls for our consideration is whether the Division Bench of the
High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment
and order?
39. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into few relevant provisions of law and also look into
few decisions of this Court and various High Courts.
40. Order XLI Rule 1(3) of the CPC reads thus:-
"1. Form of appeal - What to accompany memorandum.-
xxx
(3) Where the appeal is against a decree for payment
of money, the appellant shall, within such time as the
Appellate Court may allow, deposit the amount disputed
in the appeal or furnish such security in respect thereof
as the Court may think fit."
41. Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC reads as under:-
"Order XLI Rule 5.