# LINKS ADVERTISERS & BUSINESS PROMOTERS v. COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE

- **Citation:** [1977] 3 S.C.R. 670
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-04-21
- **Bench:** P. K. Goswami, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/links-advertisers-business-promoters-v-commissioner-corporation-of-the-city-of-7228
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949-S. 136, third proviso,
cl. (e)-;;Scope. ot-Adv~rtisement fronting a street put up lVithin railtvay premises
Fronting' meaning of.
Words and Phrases-"fronting" meaning o/.
. Section 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 provtdes that every person who erects, exhibits etc., over any land or structure
any advertisement or \Vho displays any advertisement to public view in any place,
whether public or private, shall pay on every advertisement a tax levied by the
Corporation.
Clause (e) of the third proviso to the section enacts that no
such tax shall be levied on any advertisement which is exhibited within any
rail~ay station or upon any wall or other property of a railway, except any
portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any street.
An advertisement facing a public street was put up by the appellant adjacent
to the compound fencing of a railway station but within the railway pr,emise!I:.
The Municipal authorities levied tax on the advertisement. The
apnellant's
writ petition challenging the levy was dismissed by a single judge of the High
Court and this decision was upheld by a division bench.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that the expression "frontlng any
street" occurring in the proviso qualified the railway property and
not the
advertisement.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. (a) Since the advertisements were fronting public street and
were expos~d to public view, were not covered by the exemption contemplated
by the proviso and were, therefore exigible to tax. [677 D] ·
(b) The word "fronting" qualifies not the wall or property mentioned in the
latter part of the proviso but "advertisement". The test laid down by the proviso is that the Court has to see if the advertisem~nt affixed whether inside the
compound of the railway or not fronts the street. If it fronts the street or
faces the street, even if it is within the railway premises it will be exigible to
tax. [674 D & Fl
(c) The word "fronting" has been used in the proviso not in any legal Otl
technical sense but it ordinary parlance. It is not a term of art but one that
signifies its meaning according to common notions. [675 D]
The Corporation of Madras v. Messrs The Oriental Mercantile Company
Ltd., Madras, [1966] 2 M.L.J. 440 and Ware Urban District Council v. Gaunt &
Others. [1960] 3 All E.R. 778, 787 distinguished.
2. The view of the single Judge that since the public street to which the
advertisements were facing, ran along the railings with no other obst~cle between
the advertisement and the public view, it could reasonably be said. that they
were fronting public street is correct.
On the other hand .. the view of the
Division Bench that the proviso would only apply to advertisements of such
hoardings whose ownership lav with the railway or whi~h .. ~elone-ed !O
the
railway is not borne out. by cl. (e).
Th~ que<;tton of e~1gib1htv to tax ts relata.ble not to the ownership of the hoardmgs but their Situs. [676 G-H]
LINKS ADVERTISEllS \'. COMMR. (Fazal Ali, J.)
671

## Text

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LINKS ADVERTISERS & BUSINESS PROMOTERS
v.
COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF
BANGALORE
April 21, 1977
[P. K. GOSWAMI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J
City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949-S. 136, third proviso,
cl. (e)-;;Scope. ot-Adv~rtisement fronting a street put up lVithin railtvay premises
Fronting' meaning of.
Words and Phrases-"fronting" meaning o/.
. Section 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 provtdes that every person who erects, exhibits etc., over any land or structure
any advertisement or \Vho displays any advertisement to public view in any place,
whether public or private, shall pay on every advertisement a tax levied by the
Corporation.
Clause (e) of the third proviso to the section enacts that no
such tax shall be levied on any advertisement which is exhibited within any
rail~ay station or upon any wall or other property of a railway, except any
portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any street.
An advertisement facing a public street was put up by the appellant adjacent
to the compound fencing of a railway station but within the railway pr,emise!I:.
The Municipal authorities levied tax on the advertisement. The
apnellant's
writ petition challenging the levy was dismissed by a single judge of the High
Court and this decision was upheld by a division bench.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that the expression "frontlng any
street" occurring in the proviso qualified the railway property and
not the
advertisement.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. (a) Since the advertisements were fronting public street and
were expos~d to public view, were not covered by the exemption contemplated
by the proviso and were, therefore exigible to tax. [677 D] ·
(b) The word "fronting" qualifies not the wall or property mentioned in the
latter part of the proviso but "advertisement". The test laid down by the proviso is that the Court has to see if the advertisem~nt affixed whether inside the
compound of the railway or not fronts the street. If it fronts the street or
faces the street, even if it is within the railway premises it will be exigible to
tax. [674 D & Fl
(c) The word "fronting" has been used in the proviso not in any legal Otl
technical sense but it ordinary parlance. It is not a term of art but one that
signifies its meaning according to common notions. [675 D]
The Corporation of Madras v. Messrs The Oriental Mercantile Company
Ltd., Madras, [1966] 2 M.L.J. 440 and Ware Urban District Council v. Gaunt &
Others. [1960] 3 All E.R. 778, 787 distinguished.
2. The view of the single Judge that since the public street to which the
advertisements were facing, ran along the railings with no other obst~cle between
the advertisement and the public view, it could reasonably be said. that they
were fronting public street is correct.
On the other hand .. the view of the
Division Bench that the proviso would only apply to advertisements of such
hoardings whose ownership lav with the railway or whi~h .. ~elone-ed !O
the
railway is not borne out. by cl. (e).
Th~ que<;tton of e~1gib1htv to tax ts relata.ble not to the ownership of the hoardmgs but their Situs. [676 G-H]
LINKS ADVERTISEllS \'. COMMR. (Fazal Ali, J.)
671
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 325/1976.
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(From the Judgment and Order dated the 3.12.1975 of the Karnataka H:gh Court in Writ Appeal No. 284/74).
V. S. Desai, Sanjev Aggarwal and R. B. Datar, for the appellant.
S. S. Java/i, Jagannath Shetty and B. P. Singh for resp. No. 1.
S. N. Prasad and Girish Chandra, for the Intervener Union of
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India.
Nemo for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J.-Whether hoardings containing
advertisements
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fixed in the premises of a railway station fronting a public street are
exigible to tax under the provisions of s. 136 of the City of Bangalore
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Act No. LXIX of 1949)- hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'-is the substantial question of law involved in this appeal by certificate.
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and the point
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raised by counsel for the appellant is one of first impression
and
undoubtedly requires serious consideration.
The appellant is
a
firm of advertising commercial goods and other items by putting up
hoardings containing advertisements on properties taken on lease or
licence from various owners.
The appellant also has been putting up
hoardings on railway lands in the compound of the Bangalore Railway
Station.
In the instant case, we are only concerned with the hoardE
ings containing advertisements put up adjacent to the railway
compound fencing but within the railway premises by being placed on
girders affixed to the earth.
The fencing of the railway compound is
adjacent to and faces a public street.
It is also not disputed by the
parties that the advertisements are put up at sufficient height so as to
be clearly visible to and attract the attention of the members of the
general public passing through the public street.
The appellant has
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produced photographs of some of the hoardings which demonstrate
these facts.
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The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bangalore being of the
opinion that the hoardings containing advertisements put up by the appellant were exigible to tax issued a demand notice dated March 7
1973 calling upon the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 5871-83 as
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advertise~~nt tax inc!uding arrears.
The !1ppellant !epresented to
the Mun1c1pal authonties that as the hoardmgs contalning advertisements were situate within the railway premises they squarely fell within
clause (e) of the third proviso to s. 136l of the Act. The Municipal
Corporation did not accept the contention of the appellants and pressed for paying up the tax.
The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High · Court
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of Karnataka praying that the order of the Corporation demanding
payment of tax be quashed, because the advertisements were clearly
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 3 s.c.R.
exempt from tax by virtue of the afore~aid proviso. The writ peti- ·
tion was in the first instance heard by a single Judge who by his order
·dated April 4, 1974 overruled the contention of the appellant and dismissed the petition.
Thereupon the appellant filed an appeal under
the Letters Patent before a Division Bench which also affirmed the
order of the single Judge, though on different grounds.
The Division
Bench later on being approached under Art. 133 of the Constitution
granted a certificate of fitness and hence this appeal before us.
The only point that has been raised before us i.s that the boardings
containing advertisements squarely fall within the exemption contained
in the third proviso to s. 13 6
of the Act and, therefore, they
are
not exigible to tax.
The High Court found that as the advertisements
did not belong to the Railway nor for the purpose of the Railway, the
proviso in question did not apply and the· Single Judge was right in
holding that the advertisements were exigible to tax.
The single Judge
had, however, found that as the advertisements were much abm·e the
railings _which faced the public street, the proviso had no application.
Before examining the view· of the High Court, it may be necessary
to extract the relevant portions of the ~tatute which we are called .
upon to interpret. The relevant part of s. 136 of the Act runs. tbus :
"Every person who erects, exhibits, fixes or retains upon
or over any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure any
advertisement or wh.o displays any advertisement to public
,-iew in any manner whatsoever, in any place whether public
or private, shall pay on every advertisement which is so
erected, exhibited, fixed, retained or displayed to public view,
a tax calculated at such rates and in such manner and subject to such exemptions, as the corporation may, with the
- approval of the Government, by resolution determipe :
~
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x
"Provided further that no such tax shall be levied on
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any advertisement which is not a sky-sign and whichG
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( e) is exhibited within any railway station or upon any wall
or other property of a railway except any portion of the
surface of such wall or property fronting any street.
Exp/a11atio11 1.-The word 'structure' in this section shall include any movable board on wheels used as an advertisement
or an advertisement medium."
(Eniphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Act which is the charging section clearly shows ·
that the intention of the statute was to tax certain types of advertisements. The pith and substance of the entire s~ction, therefore, is the
taxation of advertisements fixed; erected or exh!b1ted on any land,
building. wall, hoarding, structure etc.
Thus it is manifest,
that
s. 136 contemplates tax on advertisements and not tax on premises or
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LINKS ADVERTISERS v. COMMR. (Fazal Ali,!.)
673
building'.
This clear distinction has to be kept in mind in construing
the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act which falls for determination in
this case, particularly in view of some of the autl1orities relied upon
by the appellant which deal with tax on premises rather than tax on
advertisements.
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The essential conditions necessary for the applicatio1i of s. l 36
of the Act areB
( i) that a person should erect .. exhibit, fix or retain any
advertisement upon any land, building, wall, hoarding
or structure or display any advertisement in any
manner;
(ii) that erection. exhibition. fixation or retention or display of that advertisement must be exposed to public
view; and
(iii l that the advertisement must be exhibited in any place
public or private.
The sine qua 11011 for the application of this s.ection is, therefore, tltat
the advertisements displayed by any person must be to public view in
any manner whatsoever.
Once these conditions are satisfied, the
person who exhibits the advertisements is liable to pay tax on such
advertisements As, however, the Act was merely to regulate the
premises falling within the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, it
is
obvious that the premises which did not fall within the Corporation or
which belonged to other autonomous authorities could not be exigibl.e
to tax: unless expressly so provided.
Furthermore, it appears that
the object of the Municipal Corporation in charging tax was to keep
the public premises clean and water-tight and protect adverti9elllenlq
which may amount to nuisance, because the Act lays down a proce.-
dure which has to be followed before the adve1tisem.ents could
be
exhibited.
Consistent \\ith this object, therefore, the third proviso to
s. 136 of the Act grants an exemption from tax on any adverti9ement
which is exhibited in any railway station or upon any wall or other
property of a railway.
Here also an exception is canoed out which
is tha! if such an advertisement, even though on any portion of the
railway property, faces any street it will not earn the exemption.
The central argument put forward before us by Mr. V. S. Desai
couusel for the appellant is that the expression "fronting any street"
appearing in cl. (e) of the third proviso to s. 136 qualifies the railway property and not the advertisement so that the fact that
the
advertisement fronting the street or which is exposed to public view
or is visible to the public from the public street wm not make the
advertisement exigible to tax, if the advertisement is within the railway premises or is adiacent to the compound wall or any other property wl1ich itself is fronting the street.
In other words, the contention was that having regard to the terminology of the word "fronting" it j5 not possible to conceive that two portion~ 0f the pronerty can
front a street at one and the same time, unless they are in the same
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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line.
From the photographs produced before us, as also before the
High Court, it appears that the hoardings containing the advertisements
are no doubt fixoed just 2 or 3 feet behind the compound fencing of
the railway station premises.
Mr. Desai, therefore, contended that
once the compound wall which is in front of the girders on which the
advertisements are fixed faces the street, there is no question of the
advertisement facing the street. Secondly, it was contended that the
rest of fronting the street as contained in the third proviso is
that
what is fronting the street is not the advertisement but the property of
the railway.
In other words, it was argued that as in the instant case
the compound wall already fronted the street, the hoardings containing
the advertisements being behind the compound wall, though adjacent
to it, cannot be said to front the street, because two properties cannot
front the street at the same time.
We have given anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, but on a proper interpretation of the proviso we are unable to
accept the same.
To begin with, if the proviso is read with referenre
to the context, then it is absolutely clear that the verb "fronting" qualifies not the wall or the property but the advertisement.
The central
subject-matter of s. 136 as also of the proviso is not a place or building
but advertisement which alone attracted tax.
If we read the third
proviso in the following manner, then the intention of the statute re.
comes absolutely clear :
"Provided further that no such tax shall be levied on any
advertisement
( e) which is exhibited within any railway station or
upon any wall oc other property of a railway except any
portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any
street.''
(Emphasis supplied)
The verb "fronting'', therefore, does not qualify wall or property mentioned in the latter part of the proviso but the noun advertisement. The
test, therefore, laid down by this proviso is that the Court has to see
whether the advertisement affixed whether inside the compound of
the railway or not fronts the street.
If the advertisement fronts the
sueet or faces the street even if it is within the railway premises, it
will be exigible to tax.
For instance if the hoardings containing the
advertisements were affixed just behind the compound wall and the
advertisements did not face the street at all but faced the other side of
the railway station their back being to the street, then the advertisements will certainly be exempt from tax and the proviso would clearly
apply.
This seems to us to be the natural interpretation of the proviso having regard to the context in which it is placed.
Mr. Desai learned counsel for the appellant relied on the definition of the word "fronting" as used in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary,
4th End., at p. 1121, where the learned author while defining "fronting" observed thus :
"Fronting.
(1) Premises "fronting, adjoining, or abutting" on a STREET, and as such chargeable with expense
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LINKS ADVERTISERS r. COMMR. (Fazal Ali, I.)
675
of road-making under Public Health Act 1875 (c. 55), s.
150, did not need to be absolutely contiguous."
In the first place the author defines the word "fronting" within the
meaning of the Public Health Act, 1875, which levied tax on premises.
The author was not at all concerned with tax on advertisement
as in the instant case.
In the case referred to in the book, the Court
was called upon to judge the expenses on road-making under the Public
Health Act. It is, therefore, manifest that these considerations would
not apply to the facts of the present case.
On the other hand in Webster's Third New International Dictionary
Vol. I, the word "front" used as a verb is defined thus :
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"something that confronts or faces forward: as ( l) : a
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bee of a building; esp. the face that contains the principal
entrance. . ......................... put a facing upon
(e.g. the building with brick) 5 : to face or look forward
have the front toward, opposite, or over against the houses
the street)."
According to the aforesaid dictionary meaning
"fronting"
merely
means that the article should face or have its front toward, opposite or
over against the house or the street.
In our opinion the word "front- ,
ing" has been used in the proviso not in any Iegal or technical sense
but as used in ordinary parlance.
It is not a term of art but
one
that signifies its meaning according lo common notions.
For these
reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that as the advertisements upon the hoardings in the instant case were undoubtedly facing
or fronting the, street they were exigible to tax and the fact that they
were affixed on the earth which formed the compound of the railway
premises would make no difference in view of the plain and unambiguous language of the proviso.
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Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a decision of the
Madras High Court in The Corporation of Madras v. Messrs The
Oriental Mercantile Company Ltd., Madras.(') This authority, however, can have no application to the facts of the present case, because to
begin with, there is nothing to show that the hoardings containing the
advertisements were in any way fronting or facing the street.
On
the other hand, the advertisements were merely on the outside wall
within the railway compound.
In these circumstances, therefore, this
case does not appear to be of any assistance to the appellant.
Reliance was then placed on a decision of the Queen's Bench
Division in Ware Urban District Council v. Gaunt and Others(") and
particularly on the observations of Ashworth, J., where
the Judge
observed as follows :
·
"The remaining issue is, in a sense, the most troublesome
<;f all, namely, whether it is open to the appellants to apportion part of the expense on premises situate on the westerly
(I)
[1965] 2 M.L.J. 440,
(2)
[l96J] 3 All E. R. 778, 787.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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side of Walton Road but separated from it by the public footpath.
This issue involves as an ancillary problem the question whether part of the expense should in any event be apportioned on the public footpath.
Section 6 of the Act of
1892 provides, inter alia, that
" .... the expenses incurred by the urban authority in
executing private street works shall be apportioned (subject
as in this Ac_t mentioned) on the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting on such street or part of a strret." "
The observations extracted above will show that there also the Court
was dealing not with a tax on advertisements but a tax on premises,
and the question of the frontage was interpreted having regard to the
place where the premises were situate.
In the same judgment, the
learned Judge observed as follows :
"In each case, as it seems to me, regard must be paid to
the context in which the words appear and, quite apart from
any decided cases, I am inclined to think that the context in
the present case points to an enlarged rather than a restricted
meaning of the word "adjoin". "
(Emphasis ours)
It is, therefore, clear that the meaning of the words used in a particular
statute has to be construed with reference to the context and not in
isoiation, nor is it possible to lay down any rule of universal application in a matter like this.
For these reasons, therefore, this authority
also does not appear to be apposite so far as the present case is concerned.
The Single Judge of the High Court, while interpreting the proviso,
observed as follows :
"These advertisements in question are displayed on
the
hoardings standing close to the cement fencing at the .outer
mark of the railway property. The cement railings are
hardly about 3 feet in height and the advertisement boards
are very much above the railings.
The Public street to
which the advertisements are facing runs along the cement
railings, with no other obstacle between the advertisement
boards and the public view.
Therefore, it can reasonably,
be said that they are fronting the Public Street."
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the
Single Judge.
The Division Bench of the High Court, however, while upholding
the judgment of the Sin~e Judge, observed as follows :
"In the instant case, we are not faced with any situation
as the one envisaged in the second part of the exemption
clause relative to advertisement on a wall or other property
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LINKS ADVERTISERS v. COMMR. (Fazal Ali, J.)
677
uf the railway 'frontage by street'.
We are concerned herein
with the case of a hoarding put up by and belonging to the
appellant and not the railway.
Hence, it is plain that no
exemption on that score could be claimed on behalf of the
appellant."
The High Court does not appear to have interpreted the proviso corA
rectly.
The view of the High Court that the proviso would only apply
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to advertisements of such ho<1rdings whose ownership lies with
the
Railway or which belong to the Railway is not borne out by cl. (e)
of the third proviso to s. 136.
In other words the question of exigibility to tax is relatable not to the ownership of the hoarding
but its
situs.
Even if the hoarding does not belong to the Railway but
to some private party, if it does not front the street and is situated
within the Railway premises1 or within the compound of the railway
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premises it is clearly exempt.
We, therefore, do not approve of the
line of reasoning adopted by the Division Bench.
On a close and careful interpretation, therefore, of cl. (e) of the
third proviso to s. 136 of the Act we are clearly of the opinion that on
the facts proved in the present case as the hoardings containing the
advertisements were fronting the public street and we.re clearly exposI)
ed to public ·, iew and the members of the public passing through the
street, they are not covered by the exemption contemplated by
the
proviso and are, therefore, exigible to tax.
The demand notice,
therefore, served on the appellant by the Municipal Corporation for
payment of tax is not legally erroneous.
The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal dismissed.
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