# LTD., CALCUTTA v. ITS WORKMEN

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 589
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-02-11
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, K. SuBBA Rao, N. Ra.r.AGOPA.LA AYYANGAR, J. R. MuDHOLKAR, T. L. Venk.At.Ar.Am.A Aiy.Ar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ltd-calcutta-v-its-workmen-2483
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Closure of branch-Retrenchment of
workmen-Right to be absorbed in other branches-Branch if an
industrial establishment-Individual
dispute and industrial
dispute-DiBtinction-Dispute raised by majority of workmen
if an industrial dispute-Competence of State Government
t~
make reference-"lndustrial dispute" "industrial establishment", meaning of-Industrial Dispute. Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),
ss. 2(k), 10, 25G.
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
provided : "Where any workman in an industrial csta:
blishment •... is to be retrenched and he belongs to a
1962
Jardine ilendersen '
Lit.
V,
The W 011'mtn
Wonchoo J.
1961
·--
March 6.
1962
Tiu M augnn1nl of
lndiata Cabl1 C..,
lid. a a/cull•
v.
111 Wor.bntn
590 SUPREME <;JOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
particular category of workmen in that establishment ....
the employer shall orclinariJy retrench the \\·orkrnan who
was the last to be employed in that category .... "
The appellant company which was carrying on business
in the 1nanufacture and sale of electric cables, wires etc., had
a nurnber of branch(:; iucluding Arn!Jala all over India.
~ta
registered office was at Calcutta.
The business of the Ambala
branch consisted, apart from the sale of goods manufactured
by the appellaut, in the execution of cc1 tain contracts with the
Government. After the contracts were completed the appellant considered that, having regard to the volume of its own
busi.ness in that area, the 1naintcnancc of a branch at Arnbala
was unrcmunerativc, and decided to close it.
Accordingly on
May 8, 1958, the appellant terminated the ,erviees of all its
workmen at 1\mbala, numb,ering 11 in all, paid them their
salaries etc., and wound up the branch.
On a repre!entation
made by six of the workmen who had hem discharged that
the closure of the branch \Vas unjustified, that all the branches
of the company formed 'one unit the retrenchment should be
done according to All-India scnioritr basis, and that the
workmen had a legal right to get employment in the other
branches, the Punjab Government referred the matter for
adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, on the
questions whether the retrenchment was justified and legal
under s. 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, !947, and
whether the seniority of workmen in all the branches of the
company should be pooled for the purpose of effecting
retrenchment. By an order dated February 11, 1960, the
Tribunal directed the appellant company to take back the six
workmen in their employment with effect from May 8, 1958,
so that there was no break in the continuity of service of any
of them.
The appellant challenged the legality of the order on the
grounds, inter alia, (I) that after the closure of the branch at
Ambala it had no place of business on the State of Punjab and
that, in consequence, the Government of Pu?jab had no
jurisdiction to make the reference, (2) that the disputes of the
workmen were individual disputes and not industrial disputes
as defined in the Act and that, therefore, the Governme.nt had
no power to refer the same for adjudication, and (3) that, in
any case, the branch at Ambala wa'i an industrial establish·
ment within s. 25G of the Act and that having been ciosed no
relief cou!d be granted to the \\'Orkrncii under that section. After
the·Government of Punjab had made the reference, the Delhi
Union and the Union of Kanpur branch appeared before the
Tribunal and supported the cause of the six workmen.
The
---
3 s.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
evidence in this case showed (I) that though all the employees
of the company were treated alike in the matter of provident
fund, bonus
and similar benefits, the rules relating to the
category of workmen and their scales of wages for the various
branches w81 e different, (2) that each branch had its own
labour union, maintained its own accounts and had its own
banking accounts, and (3) that the workmen when recruited
for the particular branch were to be employed only there.
Held, (I) t

## Text

_Characters 0–39,676 of 49,964. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39676 for what follows._

38.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'i: REPORTS
589
been paid on the basis of the trading results of the
previous year and depended upon the profits earned
in the previous year. In the .oircumstances it cannot be held that one month's pay as closing bonus
is payable as an implied condition of service irrespective of the profit made by the appellant. It
seems to have been of the nature ·of profit bonus,
even though it may have been paid at a uniform
rate for ten years.
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the
order of the tribunal and reject the claim of the.
workmen for any closing bonus over and above
that paid by the appellant for the year 1958.
In
the circumstances we order the parties to bear
their own costs.
Appeal aUowed.
THE MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN CABLE CO.,
LTD., CALCUTTA
v.
ITS WORKMEN
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA Rao, N. Ra.r.AGOPA.LA
AYYANGAR, J. R. MuDHOLKAR and T. L.
VENK.AT.AR.AM.A AIY.AR, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Closure of branch-Retrenchment of
workmen-Right to be absorbed in other branches-Branch if an
industrial establishment-Individual
dispute and industrial
dispute-DiBtinction-Dispute raised by majority of workmen
if an industrial dispute-Competence of State Government
t~
make reference-"lndustrial dispute" "industrial establishment", meaning of-Industrial Dispute. Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),
ss. 2(k), 10, 25G.
Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
provided : "Where any workman in an industrial csta:
blishment •... is to be retrenched and he belongs to a
1962
Jardine ilendersen '
Lit.
V,
The W 011'mtn
Wonchoo J.
1961
·--
March 6.
1962
Tiu M augnn1nl of
lndiata Cabl1 C..,
lid. a a/cull•
v.
111 Wor.bntn
590 SUPREME <;JOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
particular category of workmen in that establishment ....
the employer shall orclinariJy retrench the \\·orkrnan who
was the last to be employed in that category .... "
The appellant company which was carrying on business
in the 1nanufacture and sale of electric cables, wires etc., had
a nurnber of branch(:; iucluding Arn!Jala all over India.
~ta
registered office was at Calcutta.
The business of the Ambala
branch consisted, apart from the sale of goods manufactured
by the appellaut, in the execution of cc1 tain contracts with the
Government. After the contracts were completed the appellant considered that, having regard to the volume of its own
busi.ness in that area, the 1naintcnancc of a branch at Arnbala
was unrcmunerativc, and decided to close it.
Accordingly on
May 8, 1958, the appellant terminated the ,erviees of all its
workmen at 1\mbala, numb,ering 11 in all, paid them their
salaries etc., and wound up the branch.
On a repre!entation
made by six of the workmen who had hem discharged that
the closure of the branch \Vas unjustified, that all the branches
of the company formed 'one unit the retrenchment should be
done according to All-India scnioritr basis, and that the
workmen had a legal right to get employment in the other
branches, the Punjab Government referred the matter for
adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, on the
questions whether the retrenchment was justified and legal
under s. 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, !947, and
whether the seniority of workmen in all the branches of the
company should be pooled for the purpose of effecting
retrenchment. By an order dated February 11, 1960, the
Tribunal directed the appellant company to take back the six
workmen in their employment with effect from May 8, 1958,
so that there was no break in the continuity of service of any
of them.
The appellant challenged the legality of the order on the
grounds, inter alia, (I) that after the closure of the branch at
Ambala it had no place of business on the State of Punjab and
that, in consequence, the Government of Pu?jab had no
jurisdiction to make the reference, (2) that the disputes of the
workmen were individual disputes and not industrial disputes
as defined in the Act and that, therefore, the Governme.nt had
no power to refer the same for adjudication, and (3) that, in
any case, the branch at Ambala wa'i an industrial establish·
ment within s. 25G of the Act and that having been ciosed no
relief cou!d be granted to the \\'Orkrncii under that section. After
the·Government of Punjab had made the reference, the Delhi
Union and the Union of Kanpur branch appeared before the
Tribunal and supported the cause of the six workmen.
The
---
3 s.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
evidence in this case showed (I) that though all the employees
of the company were treated alike in the matter of provident
fund, bonus
and similar benefits, the rules relating to the
category of workmen and their scales of wages for the various
branches w81 e different, (2) that each branch had its own
labour union, maintained its own accounts and had its own
banking accounts, and (3) that the workmen when recruited
for the particular branch were to be employed only there.
Held, (I) that in coming to a decision on the question
whether a particular branch of company is an industrial establiShment under s. 25 G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
the decisive elements are the location of the esiablishmen'I: and
the functional integrality i.e., the. existence of one code relat ..
ing to the categories of workmen "and their scales of wages,
and that, as in the present case, the branches Were located in
different places and there was also a lack of functional integrality, the Ambala branch was a separate industrial establishment.
Associated Cement Companies v. Their Workmen, (1960)
I S.C .R. 703, relied on.
·India Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Their Workmen,(1957)2 L.Il.J.
506 and Tulsidas Khimji v. F. Jeejeebhoy, (1960) 19 F.J.R.
396, approved.
·
The question whether a branch or a department is in
itself an industrial establishment within s. 25 G of the Act is
one of mixed fact and law, and the correct inference to be
drawp from the facts established is one of law open to con•
sideration by the Court.
(2) that what imparts to the dispute of a workman the
1 character of industrial dispute is that it affects the rights of
the workmen as a class, so that where the dispute of a
workmen is sponsored by a Union or by a considerable number
of workmen it becomes an industrial dispute withiH s, 2(k)
of the Act.
In order that an individual dispute can validly become
an industrial dispute by being supported by a Union or by a
considerable number of workmen such support must precede
the reference.
·
Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. v. RaghuntUh
Gopal Patwardhan, (1956) S.C.R. 956, The newspapers Ltd.
v. The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., (1957) S.C.R. 754 and
Bombay Union of Journalists v. "Hindu'', Bombay, (1961)
2 L.L.J. 436, relied on.
1961
The Management of
Indian Cable Co.,
Lid. Calculla
v.
lta Workmen
1'62
'Thi ?J ano11ment of
"lndt4n c.blt Ce.,
·Ltd.; Caktllla
v.
I ts-Workmen
li92 SUPRE.ME COUR'i. REPORTS [1962] SUP!'.
(3) that in considering whether the Punjab Goverhment
\\'as cotnpctcnt t~ n1ake die order of reference, the principle
that a court or tribunal \'lould have jurisdiction if the parties
reside v..·ithin ju1is<liction or if the subject matter of the dispute
~ubstantially arises Vl'ithin jurisdiction, \Vas applicable.
L<,/bhai Tricum/a/ .!Jtills Ltd.'" l'in and otltera, ( 1956)
I. L.L.J. 557, approvtd and applied.
In the instant case, as the majority of the \vorkmen in
tbc A1nbala branch had joined in the dispute, it was an industrial dispute, and as the dispute \Vas in Punjab, the reference
ma'1e by the Punjab Goverrunent was proper, but as the cstahlishment had been closed and the closure itself was not
impugned, s. 25 G had no application, and therefore, the respondent workmen were not entitled to any relief under that
section.
Crvu, APPELLATE Jc:RISllICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 402 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated
February 11, 1960, of tho Industrial Tribunal,
Punjab, Reference No. 5 of 1959.
G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and
Ra1.1inder Narain, for the appellant.
C. B. Aggarwal, H. C. Aggarwal apd Janardan
Sharma, for the respondents.
1962. March 5. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKA'J'ARAMA AIYAR, J.-This is an appeal
by spt,'<lial leave against the award of the Industrial
Tribunal, Punjab, passed in Reference Ko. 5 ofl959
on February 11, 1960.
The appellant is a Public
Limited Company incorporated under the Indian
Companies Act, 1913, and it carries on business in
the manufacture and sale of electric cables, wires
etc. Its registered office is at Calcutta and its fao-
. tory is located at Jamshedpur. Before January I,
'1956, it had no branches and was selliIJg its goods
through McEsrs Gillanders Arbuthnot and Co., as its
agents. During this period, a company incorporated in England and called the British Insulated
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT ~EPORTS
593
Callendars Cables Ltd. referred to as the B.I.C.C.
Ltd., in these proceedings was carrying on business
in the sale of cables and wires in India with
, branches at Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Delhi,
Trivandrum, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Kanpur, Bangalore and Ambala. Towards the end of 1955, the
B.I.C.C. Ltd. decided to stop its trading in India
and to close its branches. The appellant Company
then decided to take them over and run them as its
own.
The workmen in the service of the B.I:C.C.
Ltd. were most of them offered re-employment on
terms and conditions contained in a communication
dated November 23, 1955, sent by the a,ppellant to
them, and they having accepted them the branches
began to function as those of the appellant from
January l, 1956.
Among the branches thus taken
over was the one at Ambala. The business of that
· branch consisted, apart from the sale of goods manufactured by the appellant, in the execution of the
contracts of the B.I.C.C. Ltd., with the Government
of Punjab, which it had taken over. These contracts were about to be completed in the beginning of
1958, and as, having regard to the volume of its
own business in that area, the appellant considered
that the maintenance of ·a branch at Ambala was
unremunerative, it decided to close it. Accordingly on May 8, 1958, it terminated the services of all
its workmen at Ambala, numbering 11 in all, paid
them their salaries, wages in lieu of notice, retrenchment
compensation,
gratuity, and
provident
fund, and wound up the branch.
According to the
appellant, the workmen accepted these amountB
without any protest and co·operated with the management in the despatch of its goods to Delhi and
other places. It is the case of the work;men that
they received the amounts uuder protest.
But
nothing, however, turns on thi"·
On June 5, 1958,
six of the workmen who had been discharged on
1962
The M anagn,;..t•J .
lntlian Gahl~ c,,., ·
Ltd
Y, .
,
Its Worhnen
Aiy11rJ.
1912
Th. JI-'"""' of
l11iia O.bl• Co.,
Lt&. Oalcutto
••
/l.s Worl:men
A\>.•r J.
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
:lfay 8, 19;!8, sent a representation to the managemont complaining th>tt the closL1re of tho branch was
unjL1stilied, that as all the branchos of tho Company
formed one unit, tho retrenchment should be done
according to "All India soniority basis" and that
the workmen. had a legal right to get employment in
the other branches. A copy of this representation
was sent to the Punjab Government, which issued a
notification on .February :!, 1959, referring the dispute for adjudication to the Indus'trial Tribunal.
Punjab, under s. (I )(d) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, J 947, hereinafU-r referrrd to as "the Act." The
reference was in these terms :-
"Whether the retrenchment of the following workmen of Ambala Branch of the Indian
Cable Company Ltd., is justified and legal
under the provisions of section 25 G of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether
the soniority of workmen in all the branches
of the company was pooled for tho purpose of
effecting retrenchment? If not, to what relief
are the following workmen entitled ?
Then follow the names of the six workmen.
Bofore the Tribunal, the appellant raised certain preliminary objections to the maintriinability
of the referedce. By its order dated August Ii,
1959, the Tribunal overruled these objections. Then
the matter was heard on the merits, and on February II, 1960, the Tribunal pronounced its award
directing tho appellant to take back the "six workmen in thoir employment with effect from 8-5·1958
so that there is no break in tho continuity of service
of any of them" and to pay them "their full wages
from 8-5-1958 till the date they are absorbed". It
is against this a.\l'ard that the present appeal by
special leave has beon brought.
:...
3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
The appellant has urged the following contentions in support .of this appeal:-
( 1) The Tribunal was not competeμt to
entertain or adjudicate on the reference.
(2) The Punjab Government was not
competent to make the order of reference
dated February 2, 1959.
(3) The disputes of the workmen were individual disputes and not industrial dispputes
as defined in the Act and that, in consequence
the Government had no power to refer the
same for adjudication.
(4) The branch at Ambala was an industrial establishment within s. 25G and that
having been closed no relief could be granted
to the workmen under that section.
( 1) The question' as to the competence of the
Tribunal to entrtain or adjudicate on the reference
could shortly be disposed of as it is covered by our
decisions in The Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. Their
Workmen (I) and M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. v.
Bhri A.N. Gujral and others(') with whioh the present
appeal was heard. The material facts bearing on
this question are that Shri A.N. Gujral was appointed to the· Industrial Tribunal on April 28, 1953,
when he was over sixty years of age. The validity
of his appointment is impugned on the ground that
it is not in accordance withs. 7(3)(c) of the Act.
Then, on April 9, 1957, Shri A. N. 'Gujral was
appointed as presiding officer of a new Tribunal constituted under s. 70 of the Act. The validity of this
appointment is attacked on the ground that as his
appointment as Tribunal on April 28, 1953, was invalid he was not qualified to be appointed under
s. 7A(3)(b) of the Act.
Then again, under s.·7C(-b),
Shri A. N. Gujral would have had to retire on June
4, 1957, when he would have attained the age of
(1) C.A. No. 18B of 1961 decided on February 8, 1963.
(2) C.A. No. 375 of 1960 decided on Februaty 12, 1962.
J96:1
The JL ana,nn&il oJ
Indian C•ble c,, .. ,
Ltd., CtJlcuttd
v.
Its Workmen
Ai}iar J.
llMI
TM M 411•tt""111 of
lnJian C"blt Co.,
Ltd. Calctltta
••
Ila Workmen
A.iymJ.
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SuPP.
sixty-fil·e.
But the Punjab Log!slature then enacted Act 8 of 1957
raising tho ago of retirement
under s. iC (b) from
sixty-fivo to
sixty-seven.
This law, it is said, is repugnunt to Art. 14 of the
Constitution as its object was to benefit one individual Shri A. N.
Gujml am! tho
notifications
under the Act extending his term of office from
time to
time
am in opera.ti ve.
The present
reference which was made to him on February
:l, 1959, is said to he invalid on the ground that
Sbri Gujra.l was not validly in office. On June
4, 1959, the term of office of Shri A. N. Gujral
expired, and Shri Passey, retired .Judge of the
Punjab High Court was appointed as
Tribunal in
his place. The present reference came up before
him and resulted in the award dated February
11, l!J60, which is the subject matter of the present
appeal It is said that a.s the reference was not
validly
pending before Shri A. N. Gujral, Shri
Passey Wll.B not seized of it as his successor and
that as there was no fresh reference to him, the
proceedings are without
jurisdiction and void.
We have held in our Judgments in The Atl.as Cycle
Industries case. (1) and
M /s Dalmia Dudri Cement
case(') tha.t the notification Jated April 28, 1953,
appointing Shri A. ~- Gujral as Tribunal under
s 7(3) of the Act and the notification dated April 19,
1957,
appointing him as the Presiding Officer
under s .. 7C are valid, that the Punjab Act 8 of
1957 is not unconstitutional, and the notifications
extending the tenure of office of Sbri A. N. Gujral
till ,Juno 4, 1959, are intra i·ires.
1<,ollowing the8e
decisions, we must overrule this contention.
(2) We shall nox:t consider the question as
to the competence of the Punjab Government to
make the order of reference dated February 2, 1959.
The contention of tho appellant is that after the
closure of the branch at Ambala 011
May 8, 1958,
it had no place of business in the State of Punjab,
(1) C.A No. IBB of 1''61 decided OD February S, 1962.
(2) C.A. No. 375 of 1960 decided OD February 12, 1962.
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
and that, in consequence, on February 2, 1959, the
Government of Punjab had no jurisdiction to make
the reference. Section 10 of the Act provides that
when an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended
the appropriate
Government
may refer it to a
Tribunal for adjudication. Section 2 (a)
defines
appropriate Government as meaning
the Central
Government in relation to certain classes of disputes and State Government in relation to other
industrial disputes. It is common ground that the
dispute with which we are concerned is not one
falling within the
jurisdiction
of the Central
Government and that it is only the State Govern·
ment that has the competence to make the refer.
ence. The point in controversy is as to which of
the States has jurisdiction to do
so.
The Act
contains no provisions bearing on this
question,
which must, consequently, be decided on
the
principles governing the jurisdiction
of Courts to
entertain actions or proceedings. Dealing with a
similar question
under the provisions
of the
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Chagla,
C. J. observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal. Mills Ltd, v.
Vin and other (1):
"But what we are concerned with to
decide is : where did the dispute substantially
arise? Now, the Act does not deal with th'e
cause of action, nor does it indicate what
factors will confer jurisdiction upon the
Labour Court.
But applying the well-known
tests of jurisdiction, a court or tribunal would
have jurisdiction if the parties reside within
jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the
dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction ..
-In onr o'pinion, these principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has juris·
diction to make a reference under s. 10 of the
Act.
(I) [1955]1.L,L.J. 557,558.
The M (lnagem1nl of
1 ndiaii COO/I Co., ·
Ltd. Calcutta
'v,
lit Workmen
AYar J.
Tiu JI"""'""'"' •f
I ru/icn C~blt C..,
Ltd. Cd-u11•
..
Its Workmt"
598
SUPREM~ COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Discussing the
question on
the
principles
stated above, it is not m dispute that the appellant
was not carrying on business anywhere in Punjab
on the date of the reference. The Punjab Government would, therefore have jurisdiction to make
the reference only if the ca.use of action had arisen
wholly or in part within the State. If the validity
of the closure of the br<inch had itself been in dis··
pute, the ca.use of action must undoubtedly be held
to have arison within the State and the reference
would be competent. It is argued for
the respondents that as the retrenchment on which,
the
dispute h'18 arisen was made in Amhala, the State
of Punjab had jurisdiction to refer under s. IO of
the Act, the question of the appropriate reliefs to
be granted
under s.
25G.
But the
appellants
contend that when once the closure itself is accepted
as valid and binding, then there could be no queRtion of retrenchment,
which can only be with
reference to a continuing industry as held by this
Court in Pipruioh Sugar Mill.s J,td. v. P.ipmidi Sugar
Mil/.s Jfazdoor Union(')and llariprasarl Shii:slwnkar
Shukla v. A. D. /Jivikar (') :<nd that to
attract
s. 2.'iG. it must be hold that the Calcutta office and
the branches all form one establishment and that
in that viow RR relief under that section could be
granted only in relation to branches situate in
other States, no part of the ca.use of action could
be held to havo arisen within the State of Punjab.
In the view we are taking on
the question as to
whether. the branch at Ambala was an industrial
establishment within s. 25G,
we do not consider
it necessary
to express any
opinion on
this
question.
(3) It is next contended for the appellant
that the disputes raised by the respondent-workmen
were not industrial disputes as defined in the Act
but merely individual disputes, and that in consequence the Government had no power to refer
(I) [1956] S. C.R. 872.
(2) [1957) S.C.R. 121.
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
them to a tribunal under s. 10 of the Act.
Section
2 (k) defines industrial dispute as meaning "any
dispute or
difference between
employers and
employers, 01
between employers and workmen,
or between workmen and
workmen,
·which is
connected with the employment or non-employment
or the terms of employment or with the conditions
of labour, of any
person." According to the
appellant a dispute can be an industrial
dispute
within this
definition only when
it is raised by
workmen and not merely
by one of them. The
respondents. on the other hand,
contend that on
its true construction, s. 2(k) will comprehend even
a dispute between an employer and a single workman, and the observations in R v. National Arbitration Tribunal (') are relied on as supporting that
position. There the question discussed was whether the expression "dispute or difference between
. employers
and workmen" in
Article 7 of the
Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940, would cover a dispute between
an employer and one workman, and Lord Goddard,
C. J., answered it in the affirmative,
basing himself on s. I (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889,
which provides
that words in
the plural shall
include the singular.
The argument is that, having
regard to ·the rule of interpretation embodied in
s. 13 (2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the ratio
of this decision is equally applicable to the construction of s. 2 (k) and that it must be held to
include a dispute between an
employer and a
single workman.
This question however is not res integra. It
has been considernd in a number of cases in this
Court and decided adversely to the present contention of the respondents. In Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan (')
the point in controversy was whether an individual
(1) (1951] 2 All. E.R. 828,831.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 955 .
. .
1969
The ManaRement of
Indian Cable Ct.,
Ltd. Co/cull•
v.
Its Workmen
.A{yar J,
1962
Thi M""ag"""'I of
lndi.,. Coblt C..,
Lid. c./au14
v.
/Is. Jf 01km,n
""'"" ·'·
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
dispute was an industrial dispute within s. 2 (k)
o~ the Act.
After stating that three divergent
vwws had been expressed on the
question and
that tho preponderance of judicial opinion was in
favour of t.he view that a
dispute between an
· employer and a single employee could not per se be
an industrial dispute but that it might beoome one
if it was taken up
by a
Union or a
number of
workmen, this Court observed:
"there is considerable reason behind it.
Notwithstanding that the language of s. 2 (k)
is wide enough to cover a dispute between
an employer and a single employee, the scheme
of the fodustrial Disputes Act does
appear
to contemplate that the machinery provided
therein should he set in motion, to settle only
disputes which involve the rights
of work·
men as a class and that a dispute touching
the individual rights of a workman was not .
intended to be the subject of an adjudication
under the Act, when the same had not been
taken up by the Union or a number of workmen." (p. 964 ).
This view was adopted in
Th,; Newspapers
LW..
v. '/'he
State
l11d1rnt.rial
'/'rihmzal,
C. P.
(1)
where the point arose
directly for
decision.
Discussing
th<.'
meaning
of
the expression "industrial dispute" in the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act which is the same as s. 2(k)
of the Act, this Court observed that though on the
rule of construction laid down in s. 13(2) of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, the plural would include
the singular, in the context of the
legislation,
the
word
"workmen"
did
not
include
"a workman", and that a disput-0 between an employer ancl a single workman did not fall within the
dofinition of industrial dispnte. Both these decisions
were followed by thia Court in Bombay Union of
(1)':.(1~571 S. C.~R. 754.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
Journalists v. "Hindu", Bombay (1) and the law was
thus stated :-
"Therefore, the applicability
of the
Industrial Disputes Act to an individual dispute as diHtinguished from a dispute involving
a group of workmen is excluded, unless the
workmen as a body or a considerable section
of them make common cause· with the individual workman". (p. 439).
The respondents seek to distinguish these decisions
on the ground that in all of them the dispute was
raised by a single workman, whereas in the present
case six of the workmen have joined in making a
demand. They urge that a dispute ceases to be an
individual dispute and becomes an industrial dispute
when more than one workman joins in it. It is true
th'.it in the decisions citerl above the dispute was
raised by a single workman. But the reasons on
which these decisions ·rest, viz., that the policy behind the Industrial Disputes Act is to protect workmen as a class against unfair labour practices and
not to enact. special provisions ·for enforcing the
claims of individual workmen, would equally militate against the contention that a dispute which is
essentially individual in character would become an
industrial dispute merely because two persons haye
joined in it. What imparts to the dispute of a
workman the character of industrial dispute is that
it affects the rights of the workmen as a class. That
is why the above decisions lay down that the dispute of a single workman would become an industrial dispute when it is sponsored by a Union or by
a considerable number of workmen; for it can then
be taken that it does affect them as a class. No
hard and fast rule can laid down as to the number
of workmen whose association will convert an individual into an industrial dispute; That must depend on the facts of each case, and the nature of ·
(1) [1961] 2. L,L.J. 436.
1962
The Managem1mt of
Indian Cable Co.,
Ltd Calcutta
v.
Its Workmen
Aryar J.
1961
Tiu Manot1t1llnl of
Indian Cab/, Co.,
LJd. C•k11Ua
v.
Its Workmm
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
the dispute. The group might even be a minority,
as held by this Court in Associal.ed Cement Companie.~
Lt,d. v. Their Workmen(l).
But. it must he such as
to lead to an inference that the dispute is onf> which
affects workmen as a clas~.
In this veiw, we shall have now to consider whether the dispute of tho respondents was taken up by
a Union, or by a largo number of workmen. The
Ambala branch had a Union of the workmen of the
appellant company, and that has not moved in the
matter. The Delhi branch of the appellant has its
own union, and it wrote to the Con'cilation Officer.
Delhi, on December IO, I 958, to intervene in the dispute, but he replied on December Ii, 1958 that ho
had no jurisdiction in the matter. Thereupon the
union withdrew its application. According to the respondents the Commercial Elll ployees' Union in Delhi
was also moved hy them to take up their ca ust• and
it did so, hut this is not established. ~for1•over as it
is admitted that no other employees of the appPllant company were members of this Union, it would
have had, un the decision of this Court in Hombay
Union of Journali'.sts v. "Ilindn", Bombay('), 110 locus
standi to take up the dispute.
After the Government of Punjab had made tho reference on February
2, 1959, the Delhi Union appeared before the Tribllllal in Mareh 19ii9, and so did the Union of the
Kanpur branch in April 19.59, and both of them
supported the respondents. It is argued that this
was sufficient to clothe the disputes of the respondents with the character of indurtrial dispute. But
if a reference can validly be made only if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehondcd, and if an individual dispute becomes an industrial di8pute only
when it is supported by a Union or hy a considerable
number of workmen, that support mtrnt necessarily
precede the reference and from the foundation for
it. The intervention, therefore, of tho Delhi Union
(1) [1960] 3. S.C,R. 157.
(2) [1961] 2 L. L. J. 436,
..
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
in March, 195.9 and of the Kanpur Union in April,
1959, cannot give vali<lity to the reference, if it was
not valid when it was made. That has been held
by this Court in Bombay Union of .Journalists v.
"The Hindu", Bombay(l), where it was observed that
the validity of a reference must be judged on the
facts as they stand on the date of . reference and
that just as a withdrawal of the support by a union
after a reference is made cannot render it invalid,
likewise the support by it after the date ofreference
cannot make it valid. If, therefore, the validity of
the reference dated February 2, 1959, depended
upon whether the cause of the respondents had been
taken up by a Union, the question will have to be
answered in the negative.
It is then contended for the respondents that
even apart from the support of the union, their dispute mu.st be considered to be an industrial dispute,
because six of the workm•:n have joined in it, and
if regard is had only to the Ambala branch, they
even constituted a majority. To this the appellant
replies that th" claim of the respondents that retrenchment should have been made nuder s. 25 G of
the Act after pooling for purposes of seniority all the
branches proceeds on the footing that all the branches from one establishment, that that is also the
basis on which the refnence dated February 2,
1959, is made, that therefore in deriding whether
a considerable number of workmen have joined in
the dispute, regard must bR had to the number of
workmen in all-the branches, and that was 860, and
that six out of 860 was an infinitesimal number, a
mere drop in an ocean, and that therefore the disputes did not become industrial disputes.
The
respondents retort that the contention of the appellant that in discharging the respondents, it had not
violated s. 25 G proceeds on an assertion that the
Ambala branch is a distinct industrial establishment,
(I) [1961] 2. L.L.J. 436 .
196Z
The Manag1ment oj
lndi•n Cable Co.,
W. Calcutta
y,
Ies Worlmen
A.!Jiar J.
1962
Tire ·.lft111agtmtnl of
lndioJt Cabk Co.,
Lid. Calculi a
v.
It> ·W .,kmen
Ai]or J,
604
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1962] SuPP.
and that on th:1t footing the rospondentA from a
majority of the workmen hPing Rix out of eleven.
ft is manifest that the st11,nd t11,ken hy both the
parties on tho question whether the <lispu til in backed by a considerable number of workmen is inconsistent. with the stand t:1ken by them on the question
whether tho discharge of the workmen at Ambala
wa~ in contravention of s. 2!lG of tha Act. In this
situation tho course which we propose to adopt is
first to determine whethor the branch at Amba.la is
a sep;1rat{l industrial establishment withins. 25 G of
the Act, and then ciecidc the rights of the parties in
nccordancc therewith.
( 4) Section 25 G provides tha.t when it is proposeci to retrench
workinen on thi> ground of
s1irpl11sage the rule tha.t the List t<i eorne should ho
the first to go should ordinarily be observed. Rut
this is subject to two limitations. It operates only
within the establishment in which the retrenchment
i~ to be m>1dc
and to the c;itogory to which the
retrenched workmen belong. It is these two factors
that are determin11,tive of the true s~cipe of the
section.
~ow what is an industrinl establishment ?
Then· is a definition of it given in the Explanation
to s. 2:3 A(:!} but that is limited to ss. 2;>C, :!5D 'lnd
2.~E. There being no definition of th() expression
in thn.t Act applicable to s. '.!.5Q, w" must construct
it in its ordinary sonRe, guideci by such indir,ations
as th" context might furnish. [n Prai:at Kumar ](ar
v. W.'J'.C. Parker ('),Harries, C .• T., observed that the
words "indu&rial establishment" meant tho place at
which the workmen were employed, and that accordingly s. 2;{ of the Act which impo,cs 11 prohibition
11gain"t strikes by any "workman who i~ employed,
in anv industrial establishment.", "could n'lt cover a
case Zlf workmen in Bombay strikiug against an
employer with whom employees in Calcutta hav~ a
(I) 1949] J.F.J.R. 245.
•
3 S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
dispute." According to this view, it is of the essence
of the concept of an industrial establishment that
it.is local in its set-up. This is also implicit in the
Explanation to the definition of "lay·off" in s.2(kkk)
of the Act, that "every workman whose name is
borne on the muster rolls of the industrial establish·
ment and who presents himself for work at the
establishment at the time appointed for the purpose
during normal working hours on any day and is not
given employment by the employer within two
hours of his so presenting himself shall be deemed
to have been laid-off for that day within the meaning , of this clause."
If this be the correct connotation of thll words
"industrial establishment", then the branches of a
company located in different places must be held
to be distinct "industrial establishments", for purposes of s. 25G.
This question came up directly
for decision before ohe Madras High Court in I ndi.a
Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Their workmen('). In that
case, a company whose business was to manufacture
and sell tyres had its head office in Bombay and a
branch office at Madras. There were sub-depots
at Ernakulam, Bangalore and Vijawada within the
jurisdiction of the Madras Branch. The company
retrenched some of the workmen at the Madras
office as surplus, and on that a dispute was raised
by them that as the retrenchment had been made
without pooling all tbe depots as one unit, s. 25G
had been infringed. The Tribunal accepted that contention and held that the retrenchment was bad. The
correctness of this decision having been questioned
in a petition under Art. 226, the Madras High Court
held on an examination of the scheine of the Act and
on a review of the authorities, that if an industry
had establishments located in different places, each
of them would be a separate industrial establishment
within s. 25G of the Act, and that accordingly the
office at Madras was one industrial establishment
(1) [1957] 2 L.L.J. 506.
1952
The· M tm~gettwnt of
I nd;on Cable ·Co.,
Ltd. ·calcUlli2
V,·
Its Wolkintn ·
Aiyar J.
196?
"fh1 .If ""'fl••""' of
Indian Cablt Co.,
Lu. C.lcu114
v.
Ii. Werkmrn
006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
and that the sub-depots in the different States were
separate industrial establishments.
On the factf1,
this decision is very near the present case and is
strongly relied on for the appellant.
We should, in this connection, refer also to
s. lO(lA) of the Act, wherein it is provided" that
when the dispute relates to industrial establishmonts in more than one State, tho Central Government might refer it for adjudicat10n to a National
Tribunal.
This provision is based on the notion
that the industrial establishments of a concern
situated in different States are distinct establishments.
Then again on the terms of s. 250, the relief
provided therein is to be granted within the category of workmen who are proposed to be discharged. This posits that there is one code governing
the grades of workmen an<l their scales of wages
and that is ordinarily possible only when the establishment is functioning at a given plaoe. If there
arc different branches in different places and there
are different scales of wages, the rule laid down in
s. 250 would be incapable of compliance unless all
the branches have one sea.le of wages and the rules
provide for automatic transfer from place to place
having regard to the seniority and grades.
Thus
whether we have
rogar<l to the popular sense of
the words 'industrial establishment', or to the limitation of relief under s. 25G to workmen in the
same category, the conclusion would appear to bo
inescapable that each branch of a company should
normally be regarded as a distinct industrial establishment.
Bearing th.e above principles in mind, we may
now proceed to consider whether, on the facts
found the Amba.la branch is an industrial establishment. The Tribunal bas held tha.t it is not and
the respondents insist that it is a finding of fact
with which thia Court cannot interfere in an appeal
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
607
1962
under Art. 136 of the Constitution. We are unable to agree.
In Associated Central Companies v.
Their W orlcmen (1), this Court has held that the question whether a factory at Chaibasa and a quarry at
Rajanka owned by the appellant were two different
establishments for the purpose of s. 25E was not
merely one of fact, as its determination involved
the
application of the correct tests underlying
s. 25E, and in that view, this Court examined the
correctness of the conclusions of the Tribunal and
reversed its decision on the merits. In our judgment, the question whether a branch or a department is in itself an industrial establishment within
s. 25G is likewise one of mixed fact and law, and
the correct inference to be drawn from the fact
established is one of Jaw open
~o consideration by
this Court, vide also the decision of the Born bay
High Court in Tulsidas Khimji v. Ji'. Je,ejeebhoy (2),
where a .finding by the Tribunal that four departments of a firm which were all parts of one establishment was set aside in an application under
Art. 226, the Court holding that it was not purely
a question was fact.
T111 M "tlnagemen t OJ '
Indian Cable Co.,
Ltd. Caleutta
We may now proceed to examine the facts of
the present case.
The Tribunal begins its award
with the statement, "it. may be held straightaway
that the workmen have not been able to prove
strictly any common pool of seniority". The appellant contends that having regard to the scope of the
reference, the Tribunal should have on this finding
answered
it against the respondents. What the
Tribunal did was that it then went on to examine
certain
other facts and
stated its conclusion
thus:-
"All these facts establish abundantly that
each of the branches of the I. C. C. is ot a
separate industrial entity or establishment but
only a component part of the cent·ral unit a ""
Calcutta to which it belongs. It is thus the
(l) (1960] l S.0.R. 703.
(2) [1960] 19 F:J.R. 396. ·
••
Its Wo,kmen'
AV-tar J,
1961
Thi JI onagtmt11I of
l11dian CJbk lo"
Lid. Calcutta
v.
Its Jf orkmtn
Ai.JarJ.
tlos SUPREME cou1rr HEPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Company (f. C. C.) that forms the industrial
unit and it must have as required by s. 25G
of the Industrial Disputes Act given effect to
the principle of last come first
go when the
occasion for the retrenchment had arisen."
Now the facts on which the above conclusion was
reached may be classed into two categories-those
which have reference to the managPment of the
industry. and those which '>ear on the service conditions of the workmen.
Dealing with tho former,
the Tribunal finds that it is the company with its
registered office at Calcutta that controls and runs
all the branches, that it is the company that employs the workmen and dismisses them, thqt the
six respondents were appointed not by tho Ambala
branch but by the company and that they were discharged on May 8, 1958, by the company, that the
branches do not prepare each its own individual
annual balance sheet but that it is only the company
that prepares its annual balance sheet including
therein the accounts of all the branches and that.