# LUHAR AMRIT LAL NAGJI v. [1960] DOSHI J A YANTILAL JETHALAL AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 842 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1960 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1956 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/luhar-amrit-lal-nagji-v-1960-doshi-j-a-yantilal-jethalal-and-others-1900 - **Pages:** 16 ## Headnote Hindu Law-Father's anticedent debt-Pious obligation of sons to pay-Onus. A Hindu father, speculating in gold and silver, lost heavily and sought to recoup by borrowing on a mortgage. The mortgagee obtained a decree and sought to execute it by sale of the mortgaged property. The sons and the wife sued for a declaration that the decree was not binding since the debt though antecedent was immoral (avyavaharik). The trial court found in their favour and on appeal the District Judge affirmed its decision. On second appeal the High Court held that it was for the plaintiffs to prove not merely that the antecedent debt was immoral but also that the mortgagee had notice of the said character of the debt and since they had led no evidence to discharge that onus, they were not entitled to a decree. The plaintiffs came up on appeal by special leave : Held, that the High Court took the correct view of the law and the appeal must fail. • Any attempt to test the correctness of the principles laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer, which have held the field for more than three quarters of a century, purely in the light of ancient Sanskrit texts would now not merely be hit by the principle of stare decisis, which must inevitably come into operation, bnt would also be inexpedient and futile. Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh, (r879) L.R. 6 I.A. 88 and Brij Narain v. M angla Prasad (r923) L.R. SI I.A. r29, applied. The principles laid down in those two cases make no distinction between an alienation made for the payment of the father's antecedent debt and an alienation made in execution of a decree passed against him and in both cases the sons must j>rove not only the immoral character of the antecedent debt but also the know ledge of the alienee. Case-law considered. CrVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 29, 1953, of the former Saurashtra High Court in Civil Second Appeal No. 82 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated April 29, 1952, of the District Judge, Rajkot, in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1952. · • I -· - 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 843 W. S. Barlingay and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the 1960 appellant. · · Luhar A111ritlal M. L. Jain, for respondent No. 1. Nag;i 1960. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was v. delivered by Doshi ]ayantilal j ethalal GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special _ leave raises an interesting q 11 uestion of H 1 . ind~ Law. dif Gajendragadkar J., a Hindu son wants to cha enge an a ienatwn ma e by his father to pay his antecedent debt is it necessary for him to prove not only that the said antecedent debt was immoral but also that the alienee had notice of the immoral character of the said debt ? The High Court has held that the son must prove both the immoral character of the debt and notice of it to the alienee; the correctness of that view is challenged before us by the appellants in the present appeal. The appellants are two brothers, Amritlal and Mohanlal Nagji, and their mother, Bai Jakal Arjan. The three appellants and respondent 2, Nagji Govind, the father of appellants 1 and 2 and the husband of appellant 3, constitute an undivided Hindu family. Repondent 2 executed a mortgage deed in favour of ·respondent 1, Jayantilal Doshi, in respect of the joint. famil:y property for Rs. 2,000. This document was executed on February 5, 1946. In 1950, respondent 1 sued respondent 2 on his mortgage, obtained a decree for sale and filed an application for execution' for sale of the mortgaged property. Sale was accordingly ordered to be held. At that stage the appellants filed the present suit on April 30, 1951, and claimed a. declaration that the decree passed in the mortgage suit (Civil Suit No. 589 of 1949) in favour of respondent 1 and against respondent 2 was not. binding in respect of the 3/4th share of the appellants in the mortgaged property ; they also asked for a perpetual injunction restra ## Text 1\.fay 4. 842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS LUHAR AMRIT LAL NAGJI v. . [1960] DOSHI J A YANTILAL JETHALAL AND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Hindu Law-Father's anticedent debt-Pious obligation of sons to pay-Onus. A Hindu father, speculating in gold and silver, lost heavily and sought to recoup by borrowing on a mortgage. The mortgagee obtained a decree and sought to execute it by sale of the mortgaged property. The sons and the wife sued for a declaration that the decree was not binding since the debt though antecedent was immoral (avyavaharik). The trial court found in their favour and on appeal the District Judge affirmed its decision. On second appeal the High Court held that it was for the plaintiffs to prove not merely that the antecedent debt was immoral but also that the mortgagee had notice of the said character of the debt and since they had led no evidence to discharge that onus, they were not entitled to a decree. The plaintiffs came up on appeal by special leave : Held, that the High Court took the correct view of the law and the appeal must fail. • Any attempt to test the correctness of the principles laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer, which have held the field for more than three quarters of a century, purely in the light of ancient Sanskrit texts would now not merely be hit by the principle of stare decisis, which must inevitably come into operation, bnt would also be inexpedient and futile. Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh, (r879) L.R. 6 I.A. 88 and Brij Narain v. M angla Prasad (r923) L.R. SI I.A. r29, applied. The principles laid down in those two cases make no distinction between an alienation made for the payment of the father's antecedent debt and an alienation made in execution of a decree passed against him and in both cases the sons must j>rove not only the immoral character of the antecedent debt but also the know ledge of the alienee. Case-law considered. CrVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 29, 1953, of the former Saurashtra High Court in Civil Second Appeal No. 82 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated April 29, 1952, of the District Judge, Rajkot, in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1952. · • I -· - 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 843 W. S. Barlingay and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the 1960 appellant. · · Luhar A111ritlal M. L. Jain, for respondent No. 1. Nag;i 1960. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was v. delivered by Doshi ]ayantilal j ethalal GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special _ leave raises an interesting q 11 uestion of H 1 . ind~ Law. dif Gajendragadkar J., a Hindu son wants to cha enge an a ienatwn ma e by his father to pay his antecedent debt is it necessary for him to prove not only that the said antecedent debt was immoral but also that the alienee had notice of the immoral character of the said debt ? The High Court has held that the son must prove both the immoral character of the debt and notice of it to the alienee; the correctness of that view is challenged before us by the appellants in the present appeal. The appellants are two brothers, Amritlal and Mohanlal Nagji, and their mother, Bai Jakal Arjan. The three appellants and respondent 2, Nagji Govind, the father of appellants 1 and 2 and the husband of appellant 3, constitute an undivided Hindu family. Repondent 2 executed a mortgage deed in favour of ·respondent 1, Jayantilal Doshi, in respect of the joint. famil:y property for Rs. 2,000. This document was executed on February 5, 1946. In 1950, respondent 1 sued respondent 2 on his mortgage, obtained a decree for sale and filed an application for execution' for sale of the mortgaged property. Sale was accordingly ordered to be held. At that stage the appellants filed the present suit on April 30, 1951, and claimed a. declaration that the decree passed in the mortgage suit (Civil Suit No. 589 of 1949) in favour of respondent 1 and against respondent 2 was not. binding in respect of the 3/4th share of the appellants in the mortgaged property ; they also asked for a perpetual injunction restraining respondent I from executing the said decree in respect of their share. To this suit the mortgagor, respondent 2, was impleaded as a party. In their plaint the appellants have stated that respondent 2 had speculated in gold and silver and · had thereby lost a large amount of money which he sought to make up by borrowing amounts from several creQ.itors.. One of such creditors was Dharsi Sham~i, S44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960] z960 to whom Rs. 2,000 were payable by respondent 2. According to the appellants the impugned mortgage Luhar Amritlal h d b d b d .C h Nagji a een execute y respon ent 2 ior t e payment v. of the said debt of Rs. 2,000, and since the said debt Doshi Jayantilal was immoral or avyavaharik the appellants were not fethalal bound by it. The claim was resisted by both respondent I and Gajendragadk•• ]. respondent 2 who pleaded that the mortgage had been executed for the payment of debts which were binding on the family and that there was no substance in· the plea of immoral debts raised by the appellants. It was also alleged by them that the mortgaged property was not the property of the undivided Hindu family. On these pleadings the trial court framed a, ppropriate issues. It found that the mortgaged property was the coparcenary property of the family, that the mortgage-deed in question had been executed to pay off a debt which was immoral and that in consequence the mortgage was not binding against the appellants. According to the trial court the debt contracted by respondent 2 to pay the losses incurred by him in speculative transactions must be held to have been contracted for illegal and immoral purposes and as such the subsequent alienation for the payment of the said debt cannot bind the appellants. The trial court also observed that respondent I had not stepped into the witness box to give evidence to show that he had made any enquiries about the existence of any antecedent debts payable by respondent 2. In the result the suit filed by the appellants was decreed. Against the said decree respondent 1 preferred an appeal before the District Judge, but the District Judge agreed with all the findings made by the trial court and dismissed the said appeal. Respondent I then took the matter before the High Court of Saurashtra in second appeal. The High Court agreed that the mortgaged property wa8 the property of the joint Hindu family and that respondent 1 had made no attempt to prove any enquiry on his part before he entered into the transaction. The High Court did not think it necessary to conRider whether the antecedent debt due to Dharsi Sbamji, for the repaymeut of which. the impue;ned ... 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 845 mortgage was created, was in law immoral or illegal, 1960 it proceeded to deal with the appeal on the assumption 1-uhar A mritlal that the said debt was illegal or immoral. On that Nagji assumption the High Court considered the material v. principles of Hindu Law and held that it was for the Doshifayantilal appellants to prove not only that the antecedent debt 18!!:.~!al was immoral or illegal, but also that respondent I had Gajendragadkar 1. notice of the said character of the debt ; and since the appellants had led no evidence to discharge this onus they were not entitled to claim any relief against respondent I. On this finding the second appeal preferred by respondent I was allowed and the suit filed by the appellants was ordered to be dismissed. It is against this decree that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. On behalf of the appellants Dr. Barlingay has urged that the principles of Hindu Law do not justify the view taken by the High Court that the appellants had to prove the alienee's knowledge about the immoral character of the antecedent debt. He concedes that the judicial decisions on this point are against his contention; but he argues that there is paucity of caselaw on the subject, and that, having regard to the importance· of the point raised by him, we should examine the true legal position by reference to the texts rather than by reference to judicial decisions . J,et us then set out the appellant's argument based on the textual provisions of Hindu Law. The doctrine of pious obligation under which sons are held liable to discharge their father's debts is based solely on religious considerations; it is thought that if a person's debts are not paid and he dies in a state of indebtedness his soul may have to face evil consequences, and it is the duty of his sons to save him from such evil consequences. The basis of the doctrine is thus spiritual and its sole object is to confer spiritual benefit on the father. It is not intended in any sense for the benefit of the creditor. As has been observed by the Privy Council in Sat Narain v. Das (1 ) this doctrine "was not based on any necessity for the protection of third parties but was based on (r) (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 384, 395· • x960 Luha,- Ani,-itlal Nagji v. Doshi ] ayantilal ]ethalal Gajendragadkar J. 846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960) the pious obligation of the sons to see their father's debts paid." This doctrine inevitably postulates that the father'R debts which it is the pious obligation of the sons to repay must be vyavaharik. If the debts are not vyavaharik or are avyavaharik the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be invoked. The expression 'avyavaharik' which is generally used in judicial decisions has been based on the text of Usanas which has been quoted by Mitakshara in commenting on the relevant text of Yajnavalkya ('). According to Usanas, whatever is not vyavaharik has not to be paid by the son. 'Na vya vaharikam' are the words used by U sanas, and put in a positive form they mean 'avyavaharik'. Colebrooke has translated these words as meaning "debt for a cause repugnant to good morals". These words have received different interpretations in several decisions. Sometimes they are rendered as meaning "a debt which as a decent and respectable man the father ought not to have incurred": Darbar Khachar v. Khachar Hansar (2); or, "not lawful, usual or customary" : Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad (3); or, "not supportable as valid by legal arguments and on which no.right could be established in a court of justice in the creditor's favour": Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanathan Chetty ('). But it appears that in Hemraj v. Khemchand(') the Privy Council has, on the whole, preferred to treat Colebrooke's translation as making the nearest approach to the real interpretation of the word used by Usanas; whatever may be the exact denotation of the word, it is clear that the debt answering the said description is not such a debt as the son is bound to pay, and so as soon as it is shown that the debt is immoral the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be invoked in support of such a debt. In this connection, it has also been urged by Dr. Barlingay that the onus placed on the sons to prove the immoral character of the debt is already very heavy. In discharging the said onus the sons are required to prove not merely that their father who (I) Yajnavalkya, ii, 47. (2) (1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom. 348, 351. (3) (19II) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 86z, 868, 869. (4) (19I2) I.L.R. 37 M•d. 458, 46o. (5) I.L.R. [1943j All. 727. • 1 .----; . 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 847 contracted the impugned debt lived an extravagant or rg6o immoral life but they are required to establish a direct Luhar A mrillal connection between the immorality of the father and Nagji the impugned debt. If this onus is made still more v. onerous by requiring the sons to prove that the alienee Doshi /ayantilal had knowledge of the immoral character of the anteceJe~al' dent debt, it would virtually make the sons' taskGajendragadkar J. impossible, and notwithstanding the sprit underlying the doctrine of pious obligation the sons in fact would be compelled to pay the immoral or impious antecedent debt of their father. That is why the rule which requires that the sons should prove the knowledge of the alienee is inconsistent with the basis of the doctrine of pious obligation. Thus presented the argument is no doubt simple and prima facie attractive. The question which we have to consider is whether we should attempt the task of examining the texts and determining the true effect of the original provisions of Hindu Law in spite of the fact that the point raised is covered by judicial decisions which have been treated for many years as laying down the correct law on the subject. Before answering this question it is necessary to consider the relevant judicial decisions. In 1874, the Privy Council had occasion th consider this branch of Hindu Law inGirdhareeLal v. KantooLalandMuddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lal (1). It appears that Kantoo Lal and his minor cousin had brought a suit to recover posse~sion of certain properties belonging to their family which had been sold respectively by a private sale and at court auction. The private sale had taken place on July 28, 1856, and the deed had been executed by the fathers of the two plaintiffs. The case of the plaintiffs was that they were not bound by the impugned transaction. The Principal Sudder Ameen dismissed the suit but the High Court set aside that decision and a warded Kan too Lal one-half of his father's share. The claim made by the other plaintiff was dismissed on the ground that he had not been born at the time of the impugned transaction. The decree passed in favour of Kantoo Lal was challenged by the alienee before the Privy Council. Evidence showed that at the (t} (1874) L.R. I I.A. 32x. .r960 Luhar Amrillal Nagji .v. Doshi J ayantilal jethalal Gajendragadkaf' j. 848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960] time when the sale deed was executed a decree had been obtained against Bhikharee Lal, the father of Kantoo Lal, upon a bond executed by him in favour of his creditor and an execution had issued against him upon which the right and share in the property had been attached. It was therefore thought necessary to raise money to pay the debt of Bhikharee Lal and get rid of the execution. It was on these facts that the Privy Council had to consider whether Kantoo Lal was justified in challenging the binding character of the sale transaction. In dealing with this point the Privy Council referred with approval to the rule which had been enunciated by the Board earlier in the case of Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussummat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1). The rule of Hindu Law bad been thus stated by Lord Justice Knight Bruce in that judgment: "The freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the father's debt, has respect to the nature of the debt, and not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt". Then the Privy Council held that if the debt of the father had been contracted for immoral purpose the son might not be under arty pious obligation to pay it ; but that was not the case before the Board. It' had not been shown that the' bond upon which the decree was obtained was for immoral purpose; and on the other hand, it a.ppeared that an action had been brought on the bond, a decree had been passed on it and there was nothing whatever to show thattbe debt was tainted with immorality. The Privy Council also noticed that Kantoo Lal bad brought the action probably at the instigation of the father, and, we may add, that is many times the feature of such litigation. On these facts the Privy Council set aside the decree passed by the High Court and held that Kan too Lal was not entitled to any relief. It would thus be seen that this decision merely shows that where any alienation has been effected by the father for the payment of his antecedent debt and the said antecedent debt is not shown to be immoral the .son cannot challenge the validity of the alienation. Since the antecedent debt was not shown to be immoral no question arose as to (t) (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393, 421. r- I 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 849 what would be the nature of the onus which the son r96o would have to discharge if the antecedent debt is in Luhar Amritlal fact shown to be immoral. Nagji In regard to the· auction sale which the plaintiffs v. challenged in that suit the Privy Council held that a Doshi Jayantilal d . . l b d Jethalal purchaser un er an execut10n 1s sure y not oun to __ go back beyond the decree to ascertain whether the Gajend•agadk1Jr J. court was right in giving the decree, or having given it, in putting up the property for sale under an execution upon it. Evidence showed that the auction purchaser acted bona fide, had made enquiries and was satisfied that the decree had been properly passed and purchased the property at auction sale on payment of valuable consideration. On these facts it was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. This decision als0 was not concerned with the position that would arise if the antecedent debt had in fact been proved to be immoral. That question arose before the Privy Council in Suraj Bunsi Kaer v. Shea Prashad Singh( 1). In that case an ex parte decree for money had been obtained against a Hindu governed by Mitakshara on a mortgage bond, the property .mortgaged being ancestral immoveable estate. Under the said decree the mortgaged property was attached amt·· t~e decree-holder sought to bring the said property to sale. Prior to the execution sale, however, the judgment-debtor died and his infant sons and co-heirs filed a petition of objections; but they were referred to a regular suit. In the suit which they filed they challenged the binding character of the debt and claimed appropriate relief against the execution creditor and the purchasers. The Privy Council held that as between the infant sons of the judgmentdebtor and the execution creditor neither the sons nor the ancestral immoveable properties in their hands was liable for the father's debt; and as regards the purchasers, it was held that, since they had purchased after objections had been filed by the plaintiffs, they must be taken to have had notice actual or constructive thereof and therefore to have purchased with the knowledge of the plaintiffs' claim ana subject to the result of the suit to which they had been referred, (I) (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 88. 850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960] z96o The subordinate judge decreed the claim, set aside Luhar Amritlal the mortgage bond, the decree thereon and the execuNagji tion sale thereof. By this decision the mortgage, the v. decree and the execution sale in regard to the alienor's Doshi Jayantilal share had also been set aside. The High Court, howl ethalal d h d _ ever, reverse t at ju gment and dismissed the suit. G•jendragadkar ]. The Privy Council partly allowed the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, and held that the shares of the plaintiffs were not bound either by the mortgage deed, the decree or the execution sale. Thus it is clear that in that case the Privy Council held that the antecedent debt was for immoral purposes and that the auction purchaser had notice of it. But in dealing with the question of law raised before it the Privy Council had occasion to examine the relevant provisions of Hindu Law and the decisions bearing on them. Amongst the decisions considered by the Privy Council was the case of Kantoo Lal (1 ). Sir James Col vile, who delivered the judgment of the Board, referred to the case of Kantoo Lal (1) and observed that "this case then, which is a decision of this tribunal, is undoubtedly an authority for these propositions : 1st. that where joint ancestral property has passed out of a joint family, either under a conveyance executed by a father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in execution of a decree for the father's debt, his sons, by reason of their duty to pay their father's debts, cannot recover that property, unless they show that the debts were contracted for immoral purposes, and that the purchasers had notice that they were so contracted; and 2ndly, that the purchasers at an execution sale, being strangers to the suit, if they have not notice that the debts were so contracted, are not bound to make inquiry beyond what appears on the face of the proceedings ''. The first proposition which has been laid down in this judgment as deduced from Kantoo Lal's case (1) is clear and unambiguous. Where ancestral property has been alienated either under a conveyance executed by the father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in executic11 of (I) (1874) L.R. I I.A, 321, ..._ ____ .. , ..... ~· _,___-· 3•3.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS. ·-.· . . 851 ...... ~ .· a. decree for the father's debt; the sons have to prove .· · 'r~oo · not only that the antecedent debts ,were immoral: but· . also that the purchasers had notice that. they were SO LuAaiv~ftr."1al contracted .. .,: -\Vith . respect, it : is open to argument . v. . whether the two propositions inevitably arise from the Doshi Jayattilal . earlier . decision of ihe :Privy Council in Kantoo Lal's Jet1tarai case (1~ ; : bu~ since ·J8:79.when this proposition was thusGajendragadAar:f.' enunciated it has apparently been accepted by all the · · courts in India as the correct statement of Hindu Law ·· ) . on the point. : . ··.:. ·, ..: ;,, , ' :·' '·: ·:; ._. ,, : ... . :, · ~: . ,In Sat.Narain v~- Behari , Lal, (9) ~ while .. dealing with :· the que_stion as·"to whe~her the ·.property of the joint r . family consisting of an insolvent Hindu father, and his ... sons does not, by vi~tue of the ' father's adjudication as insolvent; b~caina· vested in the. official assignee, Sir · J'ohn Edge, has incidentally referred to these two propositions with approval. No decision has been cited ... -. before us .. where the correctness . of these propositions has ever hE'.en doubted . or questioned ... · \ . \ , _ ·. '. .. ; '. , . _ .In this connection· it may be relevant to· recall: that soon after the Privy Council pronounced its.judgment in .. the: case of Kantoo Lal (1) Bb~ttacha.ryya, :in his Tagore Law Lectures on· the . '~ Law:· relating to Joint . . .·,' Hindu Family~, (pp. 549, 550), examined the said deci. ·. ; ~--.. sion and_ obs_erved that "many in the profession think . ·,.·:·: that the case dealt a. death-blow'. to the institution of. Hindu family, that it has done a.way with the essential · ',' · feature of that institution, 'that· it .has rendered the · ' . father independent of the control of his sons in dealing > · with allcestral : property which ; had-:all along been looked upon. as a. common fund belonging. as much to · the a·ans a.a to. the . father".·. Having thus _expressed --· .· his surprise at . the decision Mr. Bhattacharyya. also added that· " _th~ shifting of the burden _of proof to the · 'son . ..imposed · _upon him, a , difficulty'._ which is almost : _ practically insuperable". Nevertheless, .. he ~. has ·not failed to take notice of the fact that.the promulgation · ·of the princ.iple which was adopted.by the Privy Coun· cil had become almost a necessity to . put:an end.to serious abuse which had become rife in the !Iitaksha.ra. . districts ; . and. he has added that ~' in those places. the fathers _of families knowing well that ancestral -pro-· perties ·:were s~cure against the ~ c~i~s .. C?f th~4-... own '" - :-.• . •" •" (1) (187-tl LR. l l.A. $2'• (2) (1924) LR. $2 t.~~ 2i. ~· . \ '· -----·~.;,,;. ......-.. ~._...-·~~~~~~ .. - ·.·: . .:.. . .. ~· . 852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960) r960 creditors bad established almost a regular system of inveigling innocent persons of substance to lend Luhar Amritlal Nagjt . money to them and when a decree was obtained and v. properties were attached they used to put forward Do