# M. N. SAMRA1H v. MAROTRAO AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1979] 3 S.C.R. 1078
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-05-04
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, V. D. Tulzapurkar, R. S. Pathak
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-n-samra1h-v-marotrao-and-ors-7741
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

Ufe Insurance Corporation of Jnditl (Staff) Regulations 1960, Regulations
25 and 39 vis-a-vis Section 15(g) of the City of Nagpur G'orporation Act,
1948, arnbit and limit and the imporl and interpretation of -
Whether Rl!gu·
lation 25(4) read with Section 15(g) of the Corporation Act 1948 constitutes
or amounts to an ineligibility or disqualification for a whole ti111e salaried
employee oj L.I.C. to become a member of any local authority.
Clause (g) of Section 15 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 l•ys
down that "no person shall be eligible for election as a Councillor if he is
under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, ineligibie to be
a member of any local authority. Under sub-!ection (4) of the Iife Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, "No employee shall canvass
D
or otbenvise interfere or use his influence in connection' with or take part in an
election to any legislature or local authority".
However proviso (iii) to the,
~aid sub-section lays down that "the Chairman may permit an employee to
offer hintself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the employee
so permitted shall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this
regulation so as to attract punishment under Regulation 39, ibid.
E
F
H
The appellant (in C.A. 2406/77) and a returned candidate as :i councilk1r
from ward No. 34 of Nagpur was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation.
lie had not sought or got the Chairman's pern1ission to
stand for
the election, 'Nith the result the election petition filed by his
nearest rival
respondent I and appellant in C.A. 356 o.f 1978 on this sole ground of taboo
was accepted by the Court's. below.
The direction given by th'e trial court
declaring respondent 1 as an elected candidate was however set aside by the
High Court and hence C.A. 356 of 1978 against that part of the decision by
respondent 1 in C.A. 2406/77.
Allowing C.A. 2406/77 and dismissing CA. 356178. the Court
HELD'
IPcr Krishna Iyer, ].]
1. The impact of Regulation 25(4) is not to impose
ineligibility on an
L.I.C. employee to be a member of a Municipal Corporation. Its effect is not
on the candidature but on the employment itself.
The sole and whole object
of Regulation 25 read with Regulation 39, is to lay down a rule of conduct
for the 1 .. .1.C. employees.
Among the 01any things forbidden are for instauce
prohibition or acceptance of gifts or speculation in stocks and share. Obviously
neither Regulation 32 can be read as invalidating a gift to an L.I.C. employee
under the law of gifts, nor Regulation 33 as nullifying transfer of stocks and
shares speculatively purchased by the L.l.C, employee. · Lik'e1.vise, Regulation
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M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO
1079
25 while it does n1andate that the employee shall not participate in an election
A
to a local authority cannot be read as nullifying the election or disqualifyin:
the candidate.
The contravention of the Regulation invites dWciplina.ry aclioa
which may range from censure to dismissal.
[lOBBH, 1089A-B, 1091G]
2. Section I5(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 relates to
the realm oi election law and eligibility to be a member of a local autbodty.
Jneliglbility nuist flow from specific provision of laV.1 designed to deny eligi·
bility or to lay down disqualification.
[l089C]
3. If a rule of conduct makes it undesirable, objectionable or punishable
for an employee to participate in election to a local authority, it is a distortion, even an exaggeration out of proportion. of that provision to extract out
of it a prohibition of a citizen's franchise to be a member in the shap! of a
disqualification from becoming a member of a loc:il authority.
The thrust of
Regulation 25 is disciplinary and not disqualificatory.
Its intent imposes its
limit, language U!!ed by a legislature being only a means of communicating its
will in the given environment
This is clear from the fact that t.hb Chairman is gh·en the power under Prov

## Text

_Characters 0–39,320 of 80,340. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39320 for what follows._

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1078
M. N. SAMRA1H
v.
MAROTRAO AND ORS.
AND VICE VERSA
May 4, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J
Ufe Insurance Corporation of Jnditl (Staff) Regulations 1960, Regulations
25 and 39 vis-a-vis Section 15(g) of the City of Nagpur G'orporation Act,
1948, arnbit and limit and the imporl and interpretation of -
Whether Rl!gu·
lation 25(4) read with Section 15(g) of the Corporation Act 1948 constitutes
or amounts to an ineligibility or disqualification for a whole ti111e salaried
employee oj L.I.C. to become a member of any local authority.
Clause (g) of Section 15 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 l•ys
down that "no person shall be eligible for election as a Councillor if he is
under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, ineligibie to be
a member of any local authority. Under sub-!ection (4) of the Iife Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, "No employee shall canvass
D
or otbenvise interfere or use his influence in connection' with or take part in an
election to any legislature or local authority".
However proviso (iii) to the,
~aid sub-section lays down that "the Chairman may permit an employee to
offer hintself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the employee
so permitted shall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this
regulation so as to attract punishment under Regulation 39, ibid.
E
F
H
The appellant (in C.A. 2406/77) and a returned candidate as :i councilk1r
from ward No. 34 of Nagpur was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation.
lie had not sought or got the Chairman's pern1ission to
stand for
the election, 'Nith the result the election petition filed by his
nearest rival
respondent I and appellant in C.A. 356 o.f 1978 on this sole ground of taboo
was accepted by the Court's. below.
The direction given by th'e trial court
declaring respondent 1 as an elected candidate was however set aside by the
High Court and hence C.A. 356 of 1978 against that part of the decision by
respondent 1 in C.A. 2406/77.
Allowing C.A. 2406/77 and dismissing CA. 356178. the Court
HELD'
IPcr Krishna Iyer, ].]
1. The impact of Regulation 25(4) is not to impose
ineligibility on an
L.I.C. employee to be a member of a Municipal Corporation. Its effect is not
on the candidature but on the employment itself.
The sole and whole object
of Regulation 25 read with Regulation 39, is to lay down a rule of conduct
for the 1 .. .1.C. employees.
Among the 01any things forbidden are for instauce
prohibition or acceptance of gifts or speculation in stocks and share. Obviously
neither Regulation 32 can be read as invalidating a gift to an L.I.C. employee
under the law of gifts, nor Regulation 33 as nullifying transfer of stocks and
shares speculatively purchased by the L.l.C, employee. · Lik'e1.vise, Regulation
•
.le
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M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO
1079
25 while it does n1andate that the employee shall not participate in an election
A
to a local authority cannot be read as nullifying the election or disqualifyin:
the candidate.
The contravention of the Regulation invites dWciplina.ry aclioa
which may range from censure to dismissal.
[lOBBH, 1089A-B, 1091G]
2. Section I5(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 relates to
the realm oi election law and eligibility to be a member of a local autbodty.
Jneliglbility nuist flow from specific provision of laV.1 designed to deny eligi·
bility or to lay down disqualification.
[l089C]
3. If a rule of conduct makes it undesirable, objectionable or punishable
for an employee to participate in election to a local authority, it is a distortion, even an exaggeration out of proportion. of that provision to extract out
of it a prohibition of a citizen's franchise to be a member in the shap! of a
disqualification from becoming a member of a loc:il authority.
The thrust of
Regulation 25 is disciplinary and not disqualificatory.
Its intent imposes its
limit, language U!!ed by a legislature being only a means of communicating its
will in the given environment
This is clear from the fact that t.hb Chairman is gh·en the power under Proviso (iii) to Section 25(4) to permit such
participation by an en1ployee depending on the circumstances of each case.
Even the range of punishment is variabl'e.
{1089C-E]
4. There is no ground in public policy to suppott the plea to magnify
lhe disciplinary prescription into a disenfranching taboo. To revere the word
to reverse the sense is to do injustice to the art of int.erpretation. Permission is
a won.1 of wide import and may even survive the death of the person who
permits.
Equally clearly, where a statute does not necessarily insist on pre~
viQUi permission, it may be granted even later to have retrospective effect, or
permission once granted may be retracted. [1089E, H, 1090A]
5. The strictly literal construction may not often be logical if the context
indicates a contrary legislative intent.
Courts are not victims of verbalism but
are agents of the functional success of legislation, given flexibility of meaning,
if the law will thereby hit the target intended by the law-maker.
A
polkyorien.ted understanding of a legal provision which does not do violence to the
text or the context gains preference as against a narrow reading of the words
used. So viewed, the core purpose of Regulation 25(4) is not to clamp down
disqualifications regarding elections but to lay down disciplinary forbid.dance
on conduct of government servants qua government
servants
contravention
of which would invite punishment.
This is a purpose oriented interpretation.
[1087H, lOBBA, 1090E-FJ
Dr. Hui/on ''· f'/1ilfips, 45 Del. 156, 160, 70A. 2d 15, 17 (1949); quoted
with approval.
Samfatulla Sarkar v. Surja Krunar Mo11dal, A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 382
(DB);
Utlam Si11Rh , .. S. Kripa/ Si11gh, A.LR. 1976 Punj. & Har. 176, approved .
. Naraya11a.rn>a1ny Naidu v. Krishnan1urthy and Anr., I.L.R. (1958) Mad.
513; explained.
6. Another persua55ive factor bas'ed on a broader constitutional principle
supporting the se_mantic attribution is this : The success of a democracy to
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1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
A
'tourniquet' excess of authority depends on citizen participation.
An
inert
citiz.enry indifferent to the political process is an 'enemy of the
Republic's
vitality.
Indeed, absolutism thrives on inaction of the members of the polity.
Therefore activist involvement in various aspects
of public
affairs by
a5
many citizens as can be persuaded to interest themselves is a sign of the health
and strength of our democratic system. Local self-Government and adult fran·
chise give constitutional impetus to the citizens to take part in public
adB
minis:ration.
Of course, this does not n1ean that where a plain conflict of
interests between holding an office and taking part in the political affairs of
government exists, a disqualification cannot be imposed in public interest. The
rule ia participation,
the exception exclusion.
Viewed from that angle if a
government servant or an employee of the L.I.C. participates in
local ad·
m.jnistration or other election it may well be that he may forfeit his position as
government servant or employment, if dual devotion is destructive of effi·
C
ciency as employee and be subject to disciplinary action-a matter
which
depends on a given milieu and potential public mischief.
[1091C.·F]
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7. In election law, a defeated candidate cannot claim a seat through an
election petition, merely out of speculative possibilities of success. [1092B]
8. It is true that there is no common law rule applicable in this area and
election statutes have to be strictly construed, but that does not doctrinally
drive the Court to surrender to bizarre verbalism when a different construction
may inject teasonableness into the provision.
Section 428 of the Corporation
Act aims at sense and when a plurality of contestants are in the run other tha.n
the one whose selection is set aside predictability of the next highest becomes
a misty venture. The ru1e in section 428 contains the corrective in such situatiortsi
and the pregnant expr'ession
against whose election no cause or objection
i.9:
found' gives jurisdiction to the Court to deny the declaration by the next highest
and to direct n fresh election when the constituency will speak.
[1092C-B]
Pyare Saheb Guizar Chhotumiyan Sawazi v. Dashrath Was11deo and Ors.,
1977 Mah. LJ. p. 246; approved.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 619; [1975] l SCC 421, held
inapplicable.
F
Per Tult.apurkar J. (contra)
G
H
1. 'fhe words "any law for the time being in force" occurring in Section
15(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 in the context refers to the
law in force at the relevant time, that is, at the time of nomination or election
when the question of disqualification or ineligibility arises for consideration.
[10970-B]
2.
On proper construction Regulation 25(4) of the LI.C. (Staff) Regulations 1960 read with Section 15(g) of the Corporation Act imposes a disqualification on or creates an ineligibility for the employees of
Life Insurance
Corporation to stand for election to any local authority.
[10980]
(a) In the first place the heading of the Regulation clearly shows
that it
d'eals with the topic and intends to provide a prohibition against standing for
election.
Secondly, cl. ( 4) of the said Regulation in plain and expre>s terms
provides : (No employee shall .... take part in an election to any
local.
authority").
In other words, by using negati•e language it puts a compkte
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M. N. SAMRATII V. MAROTRAO
1081
embargo r~ubject to proviso (iii)] upon every e111ployee from taking part in
.an election to any local authority.
[1097F-H)
(b). To say that Regulation 25(4) merely creates a prohibition aga::rrst
'Standing for election but does not create any ineligibility or disqualification to
stand for an election is merely to a quibble at words.
There is no <listinclion
be-tween a legal prohibition against a person standing for election and
the
imoosition of an ineligibility or disqualification upon him so to stand.
[1097H, 1098A]
(c) It i:~ true that the purpose of framing Staff Regulations was and is to
define the terms and conditions of service of the en1ployees of the L.lC. and
that being the purpose it is but natural that a provision for imposition
of
penalties for breach of such Regulations \vould also be made therein.
In fact
the validitv of such prohibition contained in the concerned
Regulation rests
upon the ~ostulate that it prescribes a code of conduct for the employees and
as such it \Vould be within the Regulation making po\ver conferred on
the
L.J.c·. under s. 49 of the, L.I.C. Act, 1956 but while prescribing a cod~· of conduct the Regulation simultaneously creates a disqualification or ineligibility for
the e1nploy'cc to s'<!•:ld for ele::tion to any local authority.
[1098A-C]
A
B
(d) 'fo construe Regulation 25(4) as rnere!y p,rescrib'.ng a code of con::!uct
D
breach ·whereof is made punishable under Regulation 39 and not itnposing a
disqualification. or· ineligibility upon the employees to stand for election to a
'local authority would amount to rendering a resid·uary provision like s. 15(g)
in the Corporafion Act otiose.
[1098C-D]
3. The ca~es falling within the aspecls emerging from Regulation ~ ::ind
proviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) nrc completely taken out of the prohibition
·contained in Regulation 25(4).
Proviso (iii) to Regulation 25(4) is similar to
the proviso tc- s. 15 of the Corporation Act under which
a disquaiification
under els. (e), (f), (g), or (i) could be removed by an order of the Provincial
Go\--ernn1ent in that behalf and obviously when any one of those disqualifications
·is removed by an order of the Provincial Government under the
proviso the
case \l.'OU!d clearly be outside s. 15.
Jn other words, the two aspects (i) that
certain employees under Regulation 2 would not be governed by the
Stan
·Regulations at all and would not, therefore, he hit by the prohibition and (ii)
that upon permission being obtained from the Chairman under proviso (iii l
the employee would be outside the prohibition have no bearing on the queslith'
of pro~er constn1ction of Regulation 25(4).
[1098E-F]
In the in~tant case the returned candidate suffered a disqualification or ratht.:.r
•.vas under an ineligibility under Regulation 25(4) read with s. 15(g) of the
Corporation Act, 1948 \.Vh~ch vitiated his election; if he were keen on active
participation in the democratic process it \Vas open to h.lm to do so lby either
resigning his post or obtaining the Chairman's permission before off~rina his
-candidature. ~ut. his . right as a citizen to keep up the Republic'<; vitaiit; by
actiYe parttc1pat1on 1n the political process cannot be secured to him by a
purpose-ori'entated construction of the relevant Rer::lation.
[11010-FJ
G. /\larayanaswa1ny Naidu v. C. Krishnan1urtli}
... nd dnr.
I.L.R.
1938,
Mad. 513; explained 2nd approved.
13-409 SCI/79
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108:?
SUPREME COURT REPO~TS
(1979] J S.G.1C
Aid. Su;·ufatulla Sarkar v. Su~ia. Kumar Monda/, A.~.R. 195,5 D_I.
.J~·~~
distinguished.
, /
Uttc.ni Sir.gh v. S. Kripal Singh a11d Anr., A.I.R. 1976 P & H 176; di3·
approved.
HELD FURTHER (Concurring)
"
u
.. 4. C.A 356 of 1978 should be dismissed. · The declaration granted to the
appellant by the learned · Assist<:mt Judge under s. 428(2) of the Corporation
Act, 1948 should never have been granted. It is truo that the election-petitioner
secured the next highest number of votes but that by itself would not enlitlo
him to get a declaration in his favour that he be deemed to have been duly
elected as r Councillor from Ward No. 34. [l 102G-H]
C
5. s~ction 428(2) is not t.hat absolu.te for the relevant part of sub-s. ' (2)
. .. provides that if the election of the returned candidate is eith.:r declared to bcnuU :ind . void or is set aside the District Court "shall direct that the caodid:it:~
if any, in whose favour next highest number of valid votes is recorded afte.._,
the said person or after all the persons who have returned at the s:iid election. ·
and again.ti whose election no cause or objection is found shall ~ deemed tohavc been elected". The words "against whose election no cause or objr.ction.
D
is foundft give jurisdiction to the District Court to deny the declaration to the
cand.idate who bas secured the next best vofes. [l 103A-B]
.
6. The High Court has rightl}"'taken the view that there was 00 material ORrecord to show how the voters, who had voted for the returned candida!e, would
have cast th ~ir votes bad they known about the disqualification . . [11038-C]
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Obsen•ation
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· 1. Judges and lawyers always clamour for legislative simplicity and when·
legislative simplicity is writ large on the concerned provision and the text of th!
provision is unambiguous and not susceptible to dual interpretation, it would
not be permissible for a court, __ by indulging in nu.ances semantics and inter-·
pre!ative acrobatics to reach the opposite conclusion than is Warranted by its
plain text and make it plausible or justify it by spacious referenc.es to the object, purpose or schem'e of the legislation or in the name of judici2.I activism ..
.
[1093A·B]
i. Prefaces and exo~dial exe.rcises, · perorations .. and s.!rmons as also the5es
almost every judgment irrespective of wheth'er the subject or the ·context or
languag: that· needs simplification, have ordinarily no proper place . in judicial'
pronou:icements.. In any ·case. day in and day out indulgence in th<!se- in
almost every jud~ment irrespective of whether the subjec't or the . . Context or·
the oc:::i.sion demands it or not, serves little purpose, and surely such indulgence
becomes indefensible · when matters are to be ·disposed of in terms of settle-·
meat arrived at between the parties or for the sake ·of expounding the law while
~eje::tiog the approach to the Court at the threshold on prelirnin:lry grounds
such :is non-maintainability laches and the like. Judicial activism in m:lay·
cases Is the result of legislative inactivity and the role of a Judge as a law-maker
has been applauded but it h:ls been
c~iticised also lauded-when it is played
within the common law tradition but criticised when it is carried to extremes.
_ • , ,
[1101F-H, 1102A·Bl
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M. N. SAMRATH V. MAROTRAO
1i)8 J
Pathak, I. (Concurring)
1. Section 15 of ·the N<\:;pur Curporation Act declares a person ineligible
for election as a Councillor on any one of the several grounds. Ile may be ineligi!Jle because he ic:. not a citizen of India, that is t0 say, he lacks in point
of legal stJ-;us.
He mey alsQ be ineligible in point of lack of capac\ty defined
bY referenc~ to disqualifying circumstances, for exan1ple,' he may nave beep
adjudged by a competent court to be cf unsound mind
The disqualification
may be found, by nature of clause (,g) under the pi·ovisions of anv subsistffit,
Jaw.
But the Jaw must provide that he· is ineligible to be a member of any
Joc~1l authority.
The law n1ust deal with ineligibility for men1bership, and in
the context of section 15, that must be ineligibility for election.
Il must be
a law concerned with eiections.
C!ause (g) is a residual clause, not UllCt)ffin1only found \V~rever provision of an election law sets forth specified category
of ·disquaiified or ineligible person and thereafter includes a residual clause,
leaving the <lefinition of remaining categories of the other laws. These other
laws must also be election laws.
An example is the Representation of
the
People Act, 1951 Y.ihich is relevant to Article 102(1)(e) a.nd
Article
191
(l)(e) of tl:ie C'..onstitution.
Since section 15 of the Nagpur Corporatioo Act
is a provision of the election Iaw, clause (g) must be so construed that the la\v
pro\•iding for ineligibility contemplated therein must also be of the same nature,
that is to say. cledion law.
[1104G-H, 1105A-C]
2. Regulation 25(4) of the (Staff) }{egulations is not a law, dealing with
tlections.
Chapter III of the (Staff) Regulations, in which Regulation 25 is
found, deals with 'conduct, discipline and appeals' in regard to employees of
the Life Insurance Corporation of India. A conspectus of the provisions contained in t.be Chapter, from section 20 to 50 shows that it deals with nothing
else. This is a body of provisions defining and controlling the co"J.duct of en1ployEea in order to ensure efficiency and discipline· in
the Corporation, and
providing for penalt:es (Section 39) against erring employees.
Regulation 25
prohibits participation in politics and standing for eJections.
Regulation 25(4)
forbids an employee not only from taking part in an election to any 1egi~1atnrc
or local authority, but also from C?;nvassing or otherwise interfering or using
his influence, in connection with such an election. If . he does, be will be
guilty of a breach of discipline, punishable 11nder Regulation 39.
Reeulation
25(4) is a norm of discip!ine.
In substance it is nothing else. In sub;;tancf', it
is not a pro,·ision of election la\v. It cannot be construed as defining a ground
of electoral ineligibility, All that it says to the employee is: "while you n1ay
b~ eiigible for election to a legislature or Jocal authority, by virtue of your
local status or capacity, you shall not exercise that right if you wish to conform to the discipline of your service." [1105D-G]
3. The right to stand for election flows from the election law-Reoulation
25(4) does not take away or abrogate the right; it merely seeks to rest;ain the
employee from exercising it in the interest of service discipline. If in fact the
employee exercises the right, he may be punished under Regulation 39 \Vi~h any
of the penalties visited on an employee-a penalty V/hich takes its colour from
the relevance of 'employment, and has nothing to do with the election law. No
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penalty under Chapter III of the (Staff) Regu]la,tions can provide for invaliH
dating the election of an employee to a legislature or a local authority.
[1105G-H, 1106A]
A
B
I 084
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 S.C.R.
V/hen the restraint on standing for election imposed by Regulation 25(4)
has to be removed, it is by the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation
of India under the third proviso.
When he does so, it is as a <:uperior in the
hi~rarchy of service concerned 'vith service discipline.
He does not do so as
an authority concerned \\-'ith elections.
Therefore Regulation 25 ( 4) of the
Slaff P~egulations is not a law within the contemplation of Section 15(g) of
the l'\'agpnr Corporation Act.
Sc.marth n1ust, therefore, succeed in his app'eal.
~fhat being so, Marotrao must fail in his.
Samarth having been July el-ect~d
to the office of Councillor Marotrao cannot claim the same office tor himsdf.
[l 106A.C, D]
G. 1\!arayanaswan1y Naid11 v. C. Krishnan111rthy & Anr. TLR
[1958]
Mad.
513, di:-.approved.
!i1d. Sorafatulla Sarkar v. Suraj Kumar Manda!, A.l.R. 1935
Cal. 302:
llttcun Singh v. S. Kirpnl Singh, AIR 1976 Punj. & Har. 176; approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2406,177 and
356;78.
·n
Appeal~ by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
1-9 .. /7 of the Bombay High Court i11 SCA No. 1/77.
A. P. Deshpande and M. S. Gupta for the Appellant in CA No.
2406/77 and Respondent in CA No, 356178.
H JV. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellant in CA No.
E
356/78 ar.d for the Respondent in CA No. 2406/77.
F
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The following Judgments of the Court were delivered
KRISHNA IYER, J.
A tricky issue of statutory construction, beset
with semantic ambiguity and pervasive possibility, and a prickly proYision which, if interpreted literally, leads to absurdity and if
construed liberally, leads to rationality, confront the court in these dual
app8als by special leave spinning around the eligibility for candidature
of an employee under the Life Insurance Corporation and the declaration of his rival, 1st respondent, as duly returned in ~ City Corporation
c'ection.
A tremendous trifle in one sense, since almost the whole
tcnn has run out.
And yet, divergent decisions of Division Benches
cf Madras and Calcutta and a recent unanimous ruling of a Bench of
five judges of Punjab and Haryana together with the Bombay High
Court's decision under apoeal have made the precedential
erudition
s•1fliciently conflicting for this Court to intervene and declare the Jaw,
guided by the legislative text but informed by the imperatives of our
ccmtitutional order. The sister appeal filed by the respondent relates
to thot part of the judgment of the High Court reverses the declaration
grunted by the trial judge that he be deemed the returned candidate.
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M. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishna Iyer, !.)
10 85
This little preface leads us on to a brief narration of the admitted
facts.
The appellant (in C.A. 2406 of 1977) was a candidate for
election to the Corporation of the City of Nagpur from Ward 34 and
his nearest rival was the I st respondent, although
there were other
candidates also. Judged by the plurality cl votes, the appellant secured
a large lead over his opponents, and wos declared elected. The Ci'd of
the poll process is often the beginning of the forensic process at the
instance of the defeated candidates with its protracted trial a"d ap~1eals
upon appeals, thus making elections doubly expensive
and terribly
traumatic. The habit of accepting defeat with grace, save in gross cases,
is a sign of country's democratic maturity. J\nyway, in the present case,
when the appellant was declared the returned candidate the respmcdent
challenged the verdict in court on a simple legai ground of ineligibility
of the !ormer who was, during the election, a development officer under
the Li [e Insurance Corpora ti en (for short. the UC) . The leth<el legal
infirmity, pressed with success, by the respondent was that under Regulation 25 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (briefly, the Regulations) framed by the LIC, all its employees \Vere under an en1bargo on taking part in n1unicipal elections,
save with the permission of the Chairman. Therefore, the appellant
who was such ar: employee and had not sought or got the Chccirman's
permission laboured under a legal ineligibility
as
contempfated in
s. 15(g) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act). Both the Courts below shot down the poll
verdict with this statutory projectile and the aggrieved' appellant urges
before us the futility of this invalidatory argument.
Section 15 ( g) is seemingly simple and reads :
15. No person shall be eligible for election as a Councillor if hexx
xx
xx
(g) is under the provisions of any law for the time being
in force, ineligible to be a men1ber
o( any local
authority;
So, the search is for any provision of law rendering the returned candidate ineligible to be a member.
The fatal discovery
of ineligibility
made b; the respondent consists in the incontestable fact that the
appellant was at the relevant time an LIC employee bound by the
Regulations, which have the force of Law, having been framed under
s. ~9 of the LIC Act, 1956. The concerned clause is Regulation 25 ( 4)
which reads thus :
A
B
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R
1086
SUP:~L:\.JE COURT REPORTS
[ 1979] 3 S.C.R.
A
"25(4) No employee shall canvass or otherwise
interfere
B
c
D
or use his infinence in connection with or take part
in an elect;on io any legislature or local authority.
Provided thatxx
xx
xx
(iii) the Chairman may permit
an
employee
to
offei; himself as a candidate for election to a
local authority and the employee so permitted
shaU not be deemed to have contravened the
provisions of this regulation.
xx
xx
A complementary regulation arming the Management with power
to take action for breach of this ban is found in Regulation 39 wliich
states :
39(1). Without prejudice to the provisions
of
other
regulations. any one or more of the following penalties for
good and sufficient reasons. and as hereinafter provided be
imposed by the disciplinary authority specified
in
Schedule on an employee who commits a breach of regulations
of the Corporation, nr . ..... "
E
The crucial issue is whether this taboo
in
Regulation 25(4)
spells electoral ineligibility or merely sets mies
of
conduct
and
discipline for employees .. violation of which will
he
visited
with
punishment but does not spill over into the area of election law,
Two decisions, one of Calcutta Sarafatulln Sarkar v. Surja Kumar
F
Mon~1l(') and the other of Punjab & Haryana Uttam Singh v. S. Kirpal
Singh(') support the appellant's position that mere mies regulating
service discipline and conduct, even though they have the force of law,
canno'. operationally be expanded into an interdict on candidature or
amount to ineligibility for standing for election.
Chakravarthi, C.J.,
speaking for a Bench
of the
Calcutta High Court,
upheld the
G
stand : Cl
"ft appears to me to be 'abundantly' clear that in so
l'ar as the Government Servants' Conduct Rules provide
tor discipline and document (conduct?) and, in doing so,
forbid conduct of certain varieties their aim is merely regnH
Jation of the conduct of Government servants,
as
such
(1) A.T.R. 1955 Cal. 382.
(2) A. I. R. 1976 P. &. H. 176.
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M. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishna Iyer, J.)
1087
servants, and that aim is sought to be attained by prescribing certain rules of correct conduct and laying down penalties for their breach. If a Government .servant disregards
any of the Rules which bear upon discipline and conduct
and conducts himself in a manner not approved by the
JI. ulcs c r forbidden by them, he mm· incur the penalties
?or which the Rules provide. It cannot, however, be that
any of his other rights as a citizen will be affeded.
Taking
the present case, if a Government servant
violates
the
prohibition against offering himself as a candidate for election to one or another of the bodies mentioned in Rule 23,
he may incur ·dismissal or such
other
penalty
as
the
authorities may consider called for, but the breach of the
conditions of service committed by him cannot disenfranchise or take away from him any of the rights which he has
in the capacity of the holder of franchise.
While, therefore, a Government servant offering himself for ele.ction to one of the bodies mentioned in Rule 23.
may bring upon himself disciplinary action, which may go
as far as dismissal, the consequence cannot also
be that
his e:ection will be i·nvalid or that the validity of his election
will be affected bv the breach. The disqualification imposed
by Rule 2 3 is of the nature of a personal bar which can
he overstepped only at the Government servant's peril as
rerards his membership of a service under the Government.
[t ls not nnd cannot be an absolute disqualification l'n the
nature of ineligibility.
What the Rule enjoins is that a GoV'crnment
servant
shall not take part in any election and that he shall also not
take part in the form of offering himself as a candidate ....
The prohibition is directed at peroonal conduct and
not
at rights owned by the Government servant concerned. Illustrations of an absolute prohibition of tho nature of a real
disqualification or ineligibility will be found in Sections 63E(l) and 80-B, Government of India Act,
1915-19 and
Article l 02 and 19 J of the present Constitution which deal, in
both cases. with gualificaticin for election, to the Central or
the S1ate Legislature."
A
B
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In his view.
the core purpose of
Regulation 25 ( 4) is not to
H
clamp down disqualifications
regarding elections but to lav
down
disciplina:y
forbiddance on conduct
~f government
ser;ants qua
1088
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 S.C.R.
A
go>'-"rnme'nt servants contravention of which would invite punishment.
B
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E
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If we may say so, this is a purpose-oriented interpretation.
A Five·J udge Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court adopted this reasoning in a situation akin to ours and repelled the further
submi»ion that tho disqualification was founded on the policy that
an employee of the Corporation, if he became a memhcr of the Legislature or City Corporatio'n would not be able to carry out his functions.
The court also dissen:ed from a Division
B .. :nch decision of
the Madras High Court which took a contrary view.
lt is fair to notice the Madras ruling before we discuss the fund 1 ·
mentals and declare the law as we read it to qc.
In th•:
Madras
case Narayanaswamy v. Krishnamurth,(') which related to an Assembly scat) r'1e court felt that the point was not free from difficulty but
reached !he conclusion that the Regubtion made by the UC was
perhaps intended to ensure undivided attention upon their duties as
such employees but it also operated as a disqualification. The contention before the court was somewhat different. The question posed was
whether the concerned Regulation could be treated as law which fulfilled the requirements o[ Art. J 91 (1) (e) of the Constitution.
The
major eo~sideration of the court was as to whether a regulation to
ensure proper performance of duties by the employees of the Corporation cculd also he treated as a law imposing disqualification.
Even
so. making a liberal approach to the line of reasoning of the court we
may consider the observation as striking a contrary note.
We do not examine, not having been invited to do so,
whztl1cr
Parliament or its drlegat•e could enact a law relating to elections to
local bJdies, a topic which falls within the State List.
We
confine
ourselves to the sole question debated at the Bar as to the ambit and
limit, the impoct and in"crpretation of Regulatio"n 25 ( 4) of the UC
Regulations, vis a vis s. 15 (g) of the Act.
The Regulations have been framed under s.49 of the UC Act
and a conspectus of the various chapters convincingly brings home
the purpose thereof. All the Regulations and the Schedules exclusively dev0te thcms·2~vcs to defining the terms and co·nctitions of service
of the staff.
Regulation 25 co·ncs within chap'er !IT
dealing with
conduct and discipline of the employees.
Regulaticm 39 deals with
penalties for misconduct and Regulation 40 deal' with appeals.
The
inference is irresistible that the sole and whole object of Regulation
25, read 'vith Rcgu1aticn 39. is ;o 1'1y do\\"n a ru:c of conduct for the
1 .. R. (1958) Mnd. 51).
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M. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishn.a Iyer, !.)
1089
LIC cmployoes.
Among the many things forbidden are, for instance,
prohibition of acceptance ot gifts or speculation in stocks and shares.
Obviously. \Ve cannot read Regulation 32 as invalidating a gift to an
UC employee under the law of gifts, or Regulation 33 as nullifying
transfer of stocks and shares speculatively purch<>\•cd by an LlC employee. Likewise, Regulation 25 while it docs mandate tha:t the employee shall not participate in an election to a
local authority cannot
be read as nullifying the election or disqualifying the candidate.
The
contravcntio'n of the Regulation invites disciplinary action. \Vhich n1ay
range fro1n censure to dismissa1.
S•oction 15 ( g) relates to the realm o[ election low and eligibility
to be a member of a local authority.
Ineligibility must flow from a
specific provisinn Of ~a\V dr~igncd to deny eligibility Of to luy dO\Vll
disqualification. If a rule of conduct makes it undesirable, objectionable or punishable for an cmploye•c to participate in electio'ns to a
local authority. it is a distortion, even an exaggeration out of proportion, of that provision to extract out o[ it a prohibition of a citizen~s
franchise to he member in the 1shapc of a disqualification from becoming a memkr o[ a local authority.
The thrust of Regulation 25 is
discip1inary not disqua1ificatory.
lts inte·nt irr1poses its 1in1it, language
used by a ~egi~:a~urc being only a mc:ins of co1n1nunicating its \Vill in
the given e·nvironmcnt. This is obvious from the fact that the Chairman is given the po\\\?r to pcnnit such participation by an employee
depending o'n the circun1:stanccs of each case.
Even the
range of
punish111ents is variable.
No ground rooted in public policy compels
us to inagnify
~he disciplinary prescription into a
disi~nfranchising
taboo.
To rev-ere the v.'ord to reverse the sense is to do i'njustice to
the art of interpretation.
Reed Dickerson quotes a passage, from an
American case to highlight the guideline : ( ')
"Th.:: meaning of son1c \'v'Ords in a statute may be enlarged or restricted in order to harmonize them with
the
legislative intent of the entire statute .... lt is the spirit ....
of the statute which should ~ovcrn over the literal mccning."
·rhcre 1s a further dit1icultv in construing the Regulation c:s stipulating U!1 inL·hgibility for candidμture because there is a prov;so therein
for tho C:1airmai~ t~ grant pcnilission to the employ~e to participate in
elections.
Pcnn1ss1011 is a \.Vor<l of wide import and inay even survive
the death of _the person who permits (Kally v. Cornhill Insw·ance Co.
(1) The Interpretation and Applic.ation of Statutes by Recd n:ckcr.<;cn. p. 199.
c
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I 0 90
SUPRE~IE CCUr!T Rr:~O:{TS
[1979] 3 S.C.R.
Ltd.(')
Equally clearly, where a statute does not necessarily insist
on previous per!!J.ission it may be granted even later to have retrospective efft:ct.
Or permission once· granted may be retracted. These
legal pessibilitics will create pnzz!cso.me anomalies if we .treat the
Reguh!ion as a ban on participation in election.
An employee may
stand as a· candidate after securing permission, but in the course of
the election the Chairman may withdraw the permission.
What happens then ? An employee may be refused permission in the beginning and if he still contests and wins it is conceivable that the Chairman may grant him permission which may _remove the disability. In
such a ca~e,., one who was ineligible at one stage becomes eligible at
~
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.
.
a later stage.
Other odd consequences may also be conceived of,
although it is not necessary to figure them cut. The rationale of the
Regulation, rather, its thrust, is di~ciplinary_ 11_otdisqi:alificatcry.
It is quite conceivable, if the legislature so expresses itself unequivocally, that even in a law dealing with disciplin~ry control,
to
enforce electoral disqualifications provided the legislature l1os competence.
The prese.tit provision do.~s not go so far.
Ev"n assuming that !iterality in construction has tenability in given
circumstances, the doctrinal clevelopmont in the nature of _judicial interpretation takes us to other methods like the teleological, the textual,
the. co,..tcxtual and the functional.
The strictly literal may ~ot often
be logicJl if the context indicates a contrary legislative intent. Courts
are net victims of verbalism but are agents of th~ functional success
of legislation, given flexibility of mcar.ing, if the. law will thereby hit
the target intended by the law-maker.
Here the emphasis lies on the
function, utility, aim and purpose which the provision !1as to fulfil. A
policy-oriented understanding of a legal provision which does not' do
violence to the text or the context gains preference as against a narro\V
reading of the words used.
Indeed, this approach is a version of the
plain meaning rule,(') and has judicial sanction. In Hutton v. Phillips
the Supreme Court of Delaware said : (')
"(Interpretation) involves far
more· than picking out
d:ctionary definitions of words or -expressions used.
Consideration of the context and the setting is ind!spensable properly to ascertain a .meaning.
Iri saying th?J a verbal expression is plain or unambiguous. we mean little mere than
that we are convinced that virtually anyone competent to
(t) [1964] 1 All. E. R. 321, H.L. per Lord Dilhorne, L. C. at p. 323.
('.!) The Interpretation and Application of Statutes by Reed Dickerson p. 231.
Cl) 45 Del .156, 160, 70 A. 2nd 15, 17 (1949).
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M. N. SAMRATH v. MAROTRAO (Krishna Iyer, !.)
understand it, and desiring io'rly and impartially lo ascertain
its dgnification, would attribute to the expression i;1 its con··
text a meaning such as the one we derive, rather than any
other; and would consider any different meaning, by companson, strained, or far-fetched, or unusual, or unlikely."
1091
This perceptive process leaves us in no doubt about the soundness
of the interpretation whkh has appealed to the Full Bench of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court.
There is a broader comtitutional principle
which supports
this
semantic attribution.
The success of our demoracy to
'tourniquet'
zenry indifferent to the political process is an enemy of the Republic's
vitality.
Indeed, absolutism thrives on inaction of the members of
the polity. Therefore, activist involvement in various aspects of public
affairs by as many citizens as can be persuaded to interest themselves
is a sign of the health and strength of our democratic system. Local
self-government and adult franch.~se give constitutional impetus to the
citizens to take part in public adn1i11i~!ration. Of course. thi-: does not
mean that where a plain conflict of i:itercsts between holdin~ an office
and taking part in the political
affair~ of government exists, a disqualification cannot be imposed in public interest.
The rule is participation.