# M. Narayanan Nambi1r v. Slate of Kera/a

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 724
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-04-10
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 155 of 1961
- **Bench:** S. J. Imam, K. Sujjba Rao, N. lU.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J. R. MuoHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-narayanan-nambi1r-v-slate-of-kera-a-2799
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Prevention of
Corruption-Public aervanl-Abuae of
official po8ition-Violalion of principle• of natural jualicePrevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), s. 5 (1) (d).
The appellant was convicted under s. 5 (l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, on the ground that by abusing
his position as a puhlk servant he obtained an assignment of
Government land in the name of his brother-in-law without
revealing the relationship and by undervaluing the trees 1tand·
ing on the land. The High Court on appeal directed that a
statement showing the value of the timber calculated on the
basis contended by the appellant may be submitted by either
of the parties. The appellant did not file any statement but a
statement was filed on behalf of the prosecution. The High
Court without giving ·an opportunity to the appellant to file
objections to the correctness of the report and the reliability of
the statement filed by the prosecution relied upon the statement
to come to the conclusion that there had been an under-valua·
tion by the appellant. It was contended thats. 5(l)(d) did
not apply to the case and that before the High Court there had
been a failure of natural justice.
Htld, that a penal statute must be construed strictly and
only such thing< arc offences as come within not merely the
letter but also the spirit of the statute.
Dyle. v. Elliot, (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 184, referred to.
He/,d, further, that considering the object and scope of the
Prcvtntion of Corr11ptio11 Act, 1947, the expression 'otherwise'
ins. 5 (l)(d) is emp!oycd to bring i11 eve;t abll'!'. of official
position by a pubhc servant. But the JUX!aposttmn of the
word 'otherwise' with the WC.,rds 'corrupt' or 'illegal means'
and the fact that dishonesty is implicit in the word •abuse',
indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention as an ingredient
of the offence and innocuous a~t~ wi/) nvt l>c covel'Cd by the
.aid clau'f:,
' I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'i's
725
Held, further, that the spirit of the Act which is in accord
with the words used therein is to take in every form of corruption, and the facts in the instant case if established constitute
an offence under s. 5(l)(d).
Ram Kriahna v. State of Delhi, [1956] S.C.R. 182 and
Dlianuhwar Narain Saxcna v. Dellii Adminiatration, [1962] 3
S.C.R. 259, referred to.
Held, also that before the High C'.ourt, there had been
violation of the principles of natural justice and that the matter
had to go back to the High Court for the appellant being given
an opportunity to meet the material put in by the prosecution
before the High Court.

## Text

724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
19•2
M. NARAYANAN NAMBIAR
ti.
STATE OF KERALA
{S. J. IMAM, K. SUJJBA RAO, N. lU.TAGOPALA
AYYANGAR and J. R. MuoHOLKAR, JJ.)
Prevention of
Corruption-Public aervanl-Abuae of
official po8ition-Violalion of principle• of natural jualicePrevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), s. 5 (1) (d).
The appellant was convicted under s. 5 (l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, on the ground that by abusing
his position as a puhlk servant he obtained an assignment of
Government land in the name of his brother-in-law without
revealing the relationship and by undervaluing the trees 1tand·
ing on the land. The High Court on appeal directed that a
statement showing the value of the timber calculated on the
basis contended by the appellant may be submitted by either
of the parties. The appellant did not file any statement but a
statement was filed on behalf of the prosecution. The High
Court without giving ·an opportunity to the appellant to file
objections to the correctness of the report and the reliability of
the statement filed by the prosecution relied upon the statement
to come to the conclusion that there had been an under-valua·
tion by the appellant. It was contended thats. 5(l)(d) did
not apply to the case and that before the High Court there had
been a failure of natural justice.
Htld, that a penal statute must be construed strictly and
only such thing< arc offences as come within not merely the
letter but also the spirit of the statute.
Dyle. v. Elliot, (1872) L.R. 4 P.C. 184, referred to.
He/,d, further, that considering the object and scope of the
Prcvtntion of Corr11ptio11 Act, 1947, the expression 'otherwise'
ins. 5 (l)(d) is emp!oycd to bring i11 eve;t abll'!'. of official
position by a pubhc servant. But the JUX!aposttmn of the
word 'otherwise' with the WC.,rds 'corrupt' or 'illegal means'
and the fact that dishonesty is implicit in the word •abuse',
indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention as an ingredient
of the offence and innocuous a~t~ wi/) nvt l>c covel'Cd by the
.aid clau'f:,
' I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'i's
725
Held, further, that the spirit of the Act which is in accord
with the words used therein is to take in every form of corruption, and the facts in the instant case if established constitute
an offence under s. 5(l)(d).
Ram Kriahna v. State of Delhi, [1956] S.C.R. 182 and
Dlianuhwar Narain Saxcna v. Dellii Adminiatration, [1962] 3
S.C.R. 259, referred to.
Held, also that before the High C'.ourt, there had been
violation of the principles of natural justice and that the matter
had to go back to the High Court for the appellant being given
an opportunity to meet the material put in by the prosecution
before the High Court.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 155 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated April 10, 1961 of the Kerala High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 1960.
B . .R. L. Iyengar and T. S. Venkataraman, for
the appellant.
V. Narayana Menon and Sardar Bahadur, for
the respondent.
1962. December 5. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
1961
M. Nu•fllWI
./taNMr
v.
Stale of K1ralo
SUBBA R.Ao, J .-This appeal by special leave
Sub/la R .. ,J,
is preferred against the judgment of the High Court
of Kerala, confirming that of the Special Judge,
Trivandrum, convicting the accused under s, 5(2),
read withs. 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, (2 of 1947), hereafter called the Act, and
sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. l,OOOj-, or in
default to undergo · simple imprisonment for four
months.
The appellant. was a Special Revenue Inspector
for land assignment at Manantoddy in Wynad Talu~
in the old Malabar district.
1962
M. Narayanan
Nambi1r
v.
Slate of Kera/a
Subba Rao, J.
726 SUPREME COUR.'I' REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
The case of the prosecution was that he, by
abusing his position as a public servant, got 4 acres
and 80 cents of Government land in R. S. No. 376/2
of Tavinhal village assigned in the name of his
brother-in-law P. V. Gopinathan Nambiar without
revealing the fact that he was his brother-in~law and
by making false entries in the relevant records show·
ing that the said land contained only 97 trees valued
at Rs. 165/-, whereas the land had actually 150 trees
worth Rs. 1450/·. The suppression of the fact that
the assignee was his brother-in-law and the underestimate of the value of the land were dishonestly
made to circumvent the rules governing the assign·
mcnt of lands to landless poor.
The Special Judge and on appeal the High
Court held that the appellant dishonestly under·
estimated the extent and the value of the trees in the
said land with a view to help his brother-in-law and
thereby committed an offence under s. 5(2), read with
s. 1(4) ·of the Act. Hence the appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before
us 2 points: (1) Section 5(l)(d) of the Act does not
apply to a case of wrongful loss caused to Government
by a public servant who by deceit induced it to part
with its property: (2) The High Court acted errone·
ousl y in relying upon a report dated April 5, 1961,
made by the District Forest Officer, Kozhikode, filed
by the Public Prosecutor after the appeal was reserv·
ed for judgment without giving an opportunity to
the appellant to file objections thereto or contesting
the correctness of the valuation given therein.
·
As the first contention turns upon the provisions
of s. 5( I), it will be convenient to read the same :-
5. (I) A public servant is said to commit the
offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge
of hisduty-
(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or
I
• -
l! S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any
person for himself or for any other person, any
gratification (other than legal remuneration)
as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in
s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code, or
(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or
agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable
thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from
any person whom he knows to have been or to
be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be
transacted by him, or having any connection
with the official functions of himself or of any
public servant to whom he is subordinate, or
from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, or
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own
use any property entrusted to him or under his
control as a public servant or allows any other
person so to do, or
( d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or
by otherwise abusing his position as public
servant, obtains for himself or for any other
person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.
We are concerned in this case with 5(l)(d) of the Act.
Under that clause if a public servant by corrupt or
illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as
public servant obtains for himself or for any other
person valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, .he
will be guilty of criminal mis-conduct, punishable
under s. 5(2) of the Act with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than one year and which
may extend to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
1961
M. Narayanan
Namliar
v.
State oj· n·eral~
Subba Rao, J.
1962
M.Ntrqyanan
Natlf/Jial
••
Stule of Kerala
S•bbaRao, J.
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
The learned counsel contends that clause (d) being a
penal provision, shall be strictly construed; and that
if so construed, it would only take in cases of direct
benefit obtained by a public servant for himself or
for any other person from a third party in the manntr
described therein and does not cover a case of a
wrongful loss caused to the Government by abuse of
his power.
This conclusion, the argument proceeds, flows
from three circumstances: ( 1) The benefit obtained in
clause (b) must be similar to that provided for in
clauses (a) & (b) i. e., benefit obtained from a third
party; ( 2) The case of wrongful loss to the Government
is provided by clause (c) and any oth1:r loss which
does not fall within that clause is outside the scope of
the section; (3) Though the word 'obtains' has a
wide meaning in the setting in which it appears in
clause (d) but in view of the fact that the same word
is used in a limited sense in clauses (a) & (b), it
should he given a limited meaning, namely, "gets a
benefit from a third party". It takes colour from
the same word used in clauses (a) & (b). He finally
contends that the construction he is seeking to put
forward for our acceptance fits in the general scope
and scheme of the Act and that the Legislature
intended to leave the losses caused to the Government
by the deception caused by its public servant to be
dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the
Indian Penal Code or other appropriate laws.
At
the outset we may say that the argument is. rather
subtle but on a deeper scrutiny of the provisions and
the clear phraseology used therein, we find that the
contention is not sound.
Before we construe the relevant provisions oi
the section in the light of the criticism levelled by the
learned counsel, it will be useful and convenient to
know briefly the scope and the object of the Act.
The long title of the Act reads:
2 S.C;R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
'An Act for the more effe tive prevention of
bribery and corruption'.
The preamble indicates that the Act was passed
as it was expedient to make more effective provision
for the prevention of bribery ·and corruption. The
long title as well as the preamble indicate that the
Act was passed to put down the said social evil i. e.
bribery and corruption by public servant. Bribery
is a form of corruption. The fact that in addition
to the word "bribery" the word "corruption" is used
shows that the legislation was intended to combat
also other evils in addition to bribery. The existing
Jaw i.e. Penal Code was found insufficient to eradi ·
cate or even to control the growin~ evil of bribery
and corruption corroding the pubhc service of our
country. The provisions broadly include the existing
offences under ss.
161 & 165 of the Indian Penal
Code committed by public servants and enact a new
rule of presumptive . evidence against the accused.
The Act also creates a new offence of' criminal mis·
conduct by public servants though to some extent it
overlaps on the pre-existing offences and enacts a
rebuttable presumption contrary to the well-known
principles of Crimmal Jurisprudence. It also . aims
to protect honest public servants from harassment by
prescribing that the investigatfon against.them could
be made only by pol.ice officials of particular status
and by making die sanction of the Government or
other appropriate officer a pre-condition for their
prosecution.
As it is a socially useful measure
conceived in public interest, it should be liberally
construed so as to bring about the desired object. i.e.
to prevent corruption among public servants and to
prevent harassment of the honest among them.
A decision of.the Judicial Committee in Dyke
v. Elliot, (1) cited by the learned counsel as an. aid
for constru~tion neatly states the principle and therefore may be extracted :-Lord Justice James speaking
(I) (1172) L. R. f P. C. UH, 191,
IHI
M. NaraJRMll
Nmnbiar
...
Stah ef K1rala
Subia Roa, J.
1962
M.Naropon
Na111biar
v.
Stale 1!/ J,·erala
Subba Rao, J.
1:10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
for the Board observes at p. 191 :-
"No doubt all penal Statutes arc to be construed
strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that
the thing charged as an offence is within the
plain meaning of the words used, and must not
strain the words on any notion that there has
been a slip, that there has been a casus omi8sus,
that the thing is so clearly within the mischief
that it must have been intended to be included
and would have been included if thought of.
On the other hand, the person. charged has a
right to say that the thing charged, although
within the words, is not within the spirit ·of the
enactment. But where the thing is brought
within the words and within the spirit, there a
penal enactment to be construed, like any
other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the
Court is not to find or make any doubt or
ambiguity in the language of a penal statute,
where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly
not be found or mad!' in the same language in
any other instrument."
In our view this passage, if we may say so, restates
the rule of construction of a penal provision from a
correct perspective.
As we will presently show the
case of the appellant on the facts found clearly falls
not only within the words of clause (d) but also
within its spirit. Indeed if his argument be accept·
ed not only we will be doing violence to the language
but also to the spirit of the enactment. First taking
the phraseology used in the clause, the case of a
public servant causing wrongful loss to the Govern·
ment be benefiting a third party squarely falls within
it. Let us look at the clause "by otherwise abusing
the position of a public servant", for the argument
mainly turns upon the said clause. The phraseology
is very comprehensive. It covers acts done "other·
wise" than by corrupt or illegal means by an officer
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
abusing his position. The gist of the offence under
this clause is that a public officer abusing his position
as a public servant obtains for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. "Abuse" means lilis-use i.e. using his
position for something for which it is not intended.
That abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or
otherwise than those means. The word 'otherwise' has
wide connotation and if no limitation is placed on it,
the words 'corrupt', 'illegal', and 'otherwise' mentioned in the clause become surplusage, for on that
construction every abuse of position is gathered by the
clause. So some limitation
will have to be put
on that word and that limitation is that it takes
colour from the preceding words along with which it
appears in the clause, that is to say something savouring of dishonest act on his part. The contention of the
learned counsel that if the clause is widely construed
even a recommendation made by a public servant
for securing a job for another may come within the
clause and that could not have been the intention of
the Legislature. But in our view such innocuous
acts will not be covered by the said clause. The
juxtaposition of the word 'otherwise' with the words
"corrupt or illegal means" and the dishonesty implicit
in the word "abuse" indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on his part to bring him within
the meaning of the clause. Whether he abused hill
position or not depends upon the facts of each case;
nor can the word 'obtains' be sought in aid to limit
the express words of the section. 'Obtain' means
acquire or get. If a corrupt officer by the said
means obtains a valuable thing or a pecuniary
advantage, he can certainly be said to obtain the
said thing or a pecuniary advantage; but it is said
that in clauses (a) & (c) the same word is med and
in the context of those clauses it can only mean
getting from a third party other than the Government and therefore the same meaning must be given
to the said word in clause (d).
'Obtains' in clause
1961
Al. Narayanan
J{ambiar
••
State of Kerala
Subha RM, J.
1962
M. NDTayanan
Nombiar
v.
State of Kerala
SubOa Uao, J.
'732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
(a) & (b) in the context of those provisions may
mean taking a bribe from a third party, but there
is no reason why the same meaning shall be given
to that word used in a different context when that
word is comprehensive enough to fit in the scheme of
that provision. Nor can we agree that as dishonest
misappropriation has . been provided for in clause
( c), the other cases of wrongful loss caused to the
Government by the deceit practised by a public officer should fall outside the section. There is no rear.on why when a comprehensive statute was passed to
prevent corruption, this particular category of corruption should have been excluded therefrom because
the consequences of such acts are equally harmful to
the public as acts of bribery. On a plain reading of
the express words used in the clause, we have no
doubt that every benefit obtained by a public servant
for himself, or for any other person, by abusing his
position as a public servant falls within the mischief
of the said clause.
Coming to the spirit of the provision, there cannot be two views.
As we have expressed earlier,
the object of the Act was to make more effective
provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Bribery means the conferring of benefit by
one upon another, in cash or in kind, to procure an
illegal or dishonest action iu favour of the giver.
Corruption includes bribery but has a wider connotation.
It may take in the use of all kind of corrupt
practices. The Act was brought in to purify public
administration. When the Legislature used cmnprchensive terminology in ~. 5( l )(d) to achieve the said
purpose, it would be appropriate not to limit the
content by r:onstruction when particularly the sipirit
of the statute is in accord with the words
u~cd
thcrei11,
Two uecisions of this court cited at the Bar
indicate that a wide construction was placed by this
Court on the provisions of s. 5(1 )( d) of the
Act.
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
In Rmn
Krishrm v. The Strite of Delhi, (')
the appellants were prosecuted for offering brihr to
a Railway Officer for hu~hing up the case against
them. In that context, s. :\( l)(d) was construed hy
this court. At p. 188 Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J.,
speaking for the court made the following observation:
"Apart from 'corrupt and illegal means', we
have also the words 'or by otherwise abusing
his position as a public servant'. If a man
obtains a pecuniary advantage by the abuse of
his position, he will be guilty under sub-clause
( d).
Sections Hil, 162 & Hl:l refer to a motive
or a reward for doing <lr forbearing to do
something, showing favour or disfavour to any
person, or for inducing such conduct by the
exercise of personal influence. It is not necessary for an offence under clause (d) to prove
all this. It is enough if by abusing his position
as a public servant a man obtains for himself
any pecuniary advantage, entirely irrespective
of motive or reward for showing favour or disfavour."
This Court again in DhaMshwar Narain Saxena v.
The Delhi Atlministration. (') pointed the wide net
cast by this provision in order to put down corruption.
There the appellant was an Upper Division Clerk in
the office of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. He
knew one Ram Nara who was a fireman serving
in Delhi Fire Brigade. The latter sought the assistance of the appellant who had nothing to do with
the issuing of licences of fire-arms which was done
by the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi.
The appellant took a bribe in order to get the licence
for him. It was argued that a'! it was not the duty
of the appellant to issue licences or do something in
connection therewith, he did not commit any offence
within the meaning of s. 5 (l)(d) of the Act. This
fl) l19'6J 8.C.ll. 182,
~2) ~1962) S 8.0.R, ~$9.
1962
Jlf. J{.Jrd')J1mm1
.Yambinr
v.
S/11/e oj· Ktr11l•
1962
M . .1YaraJanan
.J{ambiar
v.
Stat1 of Keralr!
Subha Rao, J.
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
Court rejected his contention. Sinha, C.J., speaking
for the Court observed at p. l!l8 : "The legislature
advisedly widened the scope of the crime by giving a
very wide defimtion in s.5 with a view to punish those
who, holding public office and taking advantage of
their position obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage."
.
The observations made by this Court in the
above two cases though made in a different context
show the comprehensive nature of the said provision.
We therefore hold that the accused in order to assign
the land to his brother-in-law underestimated the
value of the said land to conform with the rules and
thereby abused his position as a public servant and
obtained for him a valuable thing or a pecuniary
advantage within the meaning of the said clause and
therefore is guilty of an offence under sub·s. (2)
thereof.
It is next contended that the said finding was
vitiated by the fact that the High Court in arriving
at the finding relied upon a valuation list prepared
by the District Forest Officer and filed into court
without giving an opportunity to the appellant to
canvass its correctness. The admitted facts relevant
to the argument may be stated. The arguments in
the appeal were concluded on March 22, l!J6 l.. 0 n
April 6, 1961, the Public Prosecutor filed a Valuation list purporting to have been made by the
District Forest Officer, Kozhikode. No notice of
this list was given to the appellant and therefore he
did not-fiie any objections. On April 10, 1961, the
High Court delivered the judgment basing its finding
on the said Valuation list and rejecting the appeal.
Before the Special Leave was granted by this court,
a report was called for from the High Court with
regard to the said facts.
The report sent by the
Registrar is as follows :-
"The learned Counsel for the appellant
conteμded before the High Court that the
--
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
method of calculation adopted by P.W. 15 in
assessing the value of the timber was not
co;rect and that the following method should
have been adopted viz., 'in the case of timber
trees to calculate the value of each tree at the
rate given in the Madras Forest Manual for
that particular species, and for fuel trees, to
calculate the value at the official rate for cart
load fixed by the Government.'
Thereupon
the Court . directed in open court that a statenent showing the value of the timber calculat·
=d by the above method may be submitted
by either of the parties. No statement was
filed by
the
appellant's counsel and on
6-4-1961 the State filed a statement. Since
the statement was meant only to ass:st the
Court in calculating the correct value of the
timber along the lines suggested by the appellant's counsel the matter was not posted for
further argument.''
The appellant denied in his affidavit filed before us
that any direction was given by the court before the
judgment was reserved but the Public Prosecutor
filed an affidavit to the effect that such a statement
was made in the open court. We have no reason to
reject the report of the Registrar and the affidavit
filed by the Public Prosecutor. Even so, the fact
remains that the learned Judge acted upon a docu·
ment filed by the respondent without giving an
opportunity to the appellant to file objections or to
contest its reliability. We think the principles of
natural justice require that no court shall give a
finding whether on fact or law and particularly on
facts without giving an opportunity to all the contesting parties.
As that principle has been violated
in this case, we have no option but to set aside the
finding of the learned Judge on the question of the
valuat~on of the trees on the plot assigned to the
appel1~1tt's brotl)er-iIJ·l~w. We, therefore, set aside
1962
M. NaT0.)'11411
.Namhiar
v.
Stai. of 1' 11•la
Suiba Roo, J,
1962
Al. J\'ftr"J'tlnan
,f\·(1111bf11r
v.
Statr '!l J(aalrr
Subba Ran, J.
1962
Dernnbtr, G.
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963]SUPP.
this finding and request the High f'..ourt to submit
a revised finding' on the said question within two
months from tbe receipt of the record. The respondent may file a further statement if I e so chooses
to explain or even to correct the valuation list already filed by it. Thereafter an opportunity will
be given tq the appellant to file his objections. The
objections filed by the appellant in this Court may
be also considered by the High Court. The High
Court will s,1bmit the finding. on the evidence
already on record including the said
objections
and
statements.
The
parties
may
file objections to the finding within two weeks from the
date the said finding is received.
The appeal will
be posted a.~ early as possible after obj~cti, 'llS are
filed or after the expiry of the time given for filing
the objections.
011se rem-itted for suhrnission of fresl1 finding.
THE INDIAN OXYGEN LIMITED
v.
WORKMEN A~D OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GuPTA and
J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
In<!ustrial Dispute-II' age scales-0/assijical ion.
The appellant contended that though the wage scales
were fixed in 1949, as in 1957, the question of revi•ion of
wage scales had hc•n brought hefore another Tribunal which
rcfuse<l 1evision except in the case of Maz<loors I and 2, revision
ought not to have been allowed and that. the Tribunal had
compared the wage scales of the appellant with those with
which they were not comparable and further that the Tribum1)