# M/S. BENGAL BHATDEE COAL CO v. SHRI RAM PRABESH SJNGH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 709
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-s-bengal-bhatdee-coal-co-v-shri-ram-prabesh-sjngh-ors-2808
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
M/S. BENGAL BHATDEE COAL CO.
v.
SHRI RAM PRABESH SJNGH & ORS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANcnoo, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
J. C. S11A:H, JJ.)
Induatrial Di8pute-Ob8truction by some workmen of the
work of other workmen-$how cauae notice served-Found guilty
by the mai11<1gemsnt-Powera of the Tribunal-Whether unconscionable punishment would amount to
victimiaation-!nduatrial
Diapulea Act, 1947 (14 of 1~47), ••· 10, ?3(2)(b).
The reapondents were the employees of the appellant and
while a strike was going on in the concern of the appellant they
physically obstructed the loyal and willing trammers from working in the colliery and insisted on other workmen to join them
in the obstruction. A charge sheet was served on the respon•
dents and they were asked to show cause why di<ciplinary action
should not be taken against them. , The respondents submitted
their explanation and on an inquiry held by the welfare
officer they
were
found guilty
and the welfare
officer
recommended their dismissal. The appellant filed an applica•
tion before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 (2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and the tribunal approved of the
dismissal. Thereafter reference was made under s. IO of the
Act and the present appeal is by way of special leave against
the order of the Industrial Tribunal made in that reference.
The Tribunal has held that the enquiry by the management
was proper but it further held that the dismissal amounted to
victimisation.
The main question in the appeal was whether there wu
victimisation.
Hdd, where a domestic inquiry is held ~roperly the
tribunal cannot sit in appeal on the finding• of the domestic
tribunal and it can only interfere with the punishment inflicted
u a result of the domestic inquiry where there is want of good
f•ith or basic error or the violation of the principles of natural
justice or where the findinga arc perverse or basclesa or the Cale
ii one of victimisatloA.
w ..... ,1.
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Though in a cue of proved misconduct normally the
imposition of a penalty may be within the discretion or the
management there may by crues where the punishment of
dismissal for misconduct proved may be unconscionable or so
grotsly out of proporlion to the nature of the offence that the
tribunal Jlll!Y be able to draw an Inference of victimisation
merely from the punishment inflicted. Such was not the case
here.
Nalional Tolia= Co. of India. Ltd. v. Fourth Indu.trial
Tnbwnal, (1960) 2 L.L.J. 175, referred to.
I

## Text

I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
M/S. BENGAL BHATDEE COAL CO.
v.
SHRI RAM PRABESH SJNGH & ORS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANcnoo, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
J. C. S11A:H, JJ.)
Induatrial Di8pute-Ob8truction by some workmen of the
work of other workmen-$how cauae notice served-Found guilty
by the mai11<1gemsnt-Powera of the Tribunal-Whether unconscionable punishment would amount to
victimiaation-!nduatrial
Diapulea Act, 1947 (14 of 1~47), ••· 10, ?3(2)(b).
The reapondents were the employees of the appellant and
while a strike was going on in the concern of the appellant they
physically obstructed the loyal and willing trammers from working in the colliery and insisted on other workmen to join them
in the obstruction. A charge sheet was served on the respon•
dents and they were asked to show cause why di<ciplinary action
should not be taken against them. , The respondents submitted
their explanation and on an inquiry held by the welfare
officer they
were
found guilty
and the welfare
officer
recommended their dismissal. The appellant filed an applica•
tion before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 (2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and the tribunal approved of the
dismissal. Thereafter reference was made under s. IO of the
Act and the present appeal is by way of special leave against
the order of the Industrial Tribunal made in that reference.
The Tribunal has held that the enquiry by the management
was proper but it further held that the dismissal amounted to
victimisation.
The main question in the appeal was whether there wu
victimisation.
Hdd, where a domestic inquiry is held ~roperly the
tribunal cannot sit in appeal on the finding• of the domestic
tribunal and it can only interfere with the punishment inflicted
u a result of the domestic inquiry where there is want of good
f•ith or basic error or the violation of the principles of natural
justice or where the findinga arc perverse or basclesa or the Cale
ii one of victimisatloA.
w ..... ,1.
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Though in a cue of proved misconduct normally the
imposition of a penalty may be within the discretion or the
management there may by crues where the punishment of
dismissal for misconduct proved may be unconscionable or so
grotsly out of proporlion to the nature of the offence that the
tribunal Jlll!Y be able to draw an Inference of victimisation
merely from the punishment inflicted. Such was not the case
here.
Nalional Tolia= Co. of India. Ltd. v. Fourth Indu.trial
Tnbwnal, (1960) 2 L.L.J. 175, referred to.
I
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 24 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated
November 23,
1960, of the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad in reference No. 31 of
1960.
M. C. Se!;Jlvad, Nrmicoomar Chakrararty and
B. P. Mahe8hwari, for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurlhi, for Dipat Datta Choudhri,
for respondents Nos. l to 13.
1963. January 23. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANcHoo, J~-This is an appeal by special
leave agains• the order of the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal,
Dhanbad. The brief facts'
necessary for present purposes are these. A dispute
was referred by the Central Govemmrnt under s. 10
of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947,
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) with reference to
the thirteen workmen involved in this appeal ill.the
following terms :-
''Whether
the dismissal ·of the !ollowing
thirteen workmen of Bhat.dee Colliery 1wa
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7ll
justified 7 If not, to what relief are they entit·
led and from which date ?" ..
It appears that the thirteen workmen had physically obstructed the surface trainmers working in the
colliery on different dates, namely, October, 20,
·October 27, and November· 3, 1959. Some of
them had also incited the other workmen to join in
this act of obstructing the loyal and willing trammen
so that they may be prevented from working. This
happened during a strike which was .begun on
October 20, 1959 by the Colliery Mazdoor Sangh
ti:> which the thirteen workmen in question belonged.
In consequence the appe lant served charge·sheets on
the thirteen workmen on November 9, 1959 charging
that "they physically obstructed the surface trammers
on duty at No. 1 and 2 Inclines from performing
their duties· and controllirig . the movemc;nt of the
tubs by sitting in-between tram.line track and ipciting" on various
dates, . thus violating regulation 38 (1) (b) of the Coal Mines Regulations. They
were asked to explain within 48 hours why disciplinary action
should not
be taken against them
under r. 27 (19) and r .. 27 (20) of the Coal Mmes
Standing Order. The workmen submitted their
explanations.and an inquiry was het.d by the Welfare
Officer of the appellant. The Welfare Officer found
all -d!i;-"thirteen workmen guilty of the charges
framed against them and recommended their dismissal.
As another reference wa~ pending before
this very tribunal in November 1959, the appellant
made thirteen applications to the tribunal under
s. 33 (2) (b) of the Act for approval of the action
taken. Though the workmen submitted their replit's ·
in those proceedings they did not contest them thereafter, and the tribunal approved of the. action taken.
Thereafter the present reference waa made ·under
s •. 10 of the Act.
The case put forward by the workmen in the
present reference wu that theTf was no proper
1969
M/s. B1ng.J Bh.U11
Coal Co.
v.
Shri Ram Pr•lm/J
,,.i,,,,,
w.-1 .... / ....
IH3
M/1. 61111<1 6/toU#
C.ol c..
••
Sltl Ra. F niHi11
s;.p
w...,,1.
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS[I964]VOL.
enquiry as the workmen were not given a chance to
defend themselves.· It was further submitted that
the dismissals were nothing but victimisation pure and
simple for trade union activities.
The tribunal apparently he! i that the inquiry
was proper, though it has not said so in so many
words in its award. It may be added that it could
hardly do otherwise, for it had already approved of
the action taken on applications made under s. 33 (2)
(b) of the Act. If the inquiry had not been proper,
the tribunal would not have approved of the dis·
missals. But the tribunal held that this was a case
of victimisation. It therefore set aside the order of
dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the thirteen workmen within one month of irs order becoming
operative and ordered that they should be treated as
on leave without pay during the period of forced
unemployment. It did not grant back wages as the
workmen had also contributed to their forcc:d unem ·
ployment to some extent.
In the present appeal, the appellant contends
that there was no evidence to justify the conclusion
of the tribunal that the dismissals w~re an act of un ·
fair labour practice or victimisation.
We are of
opinion that this contention of the appellant must
prevail. The tribunal was not unaware of the fact
that where a domestic inquiry is held properly. the
tribunal does not sit in appeal on the findings of the
domestic tribunal and it can only interfere with the
punishment inflicted as a result of the domestic
10quiry where there is want of good faith or basic
error or violation of the principles of natural justice,
or where the findings are perverse or baseless or the
case is anr of victimisation or unfair labour practice.
We have already indicated that the tribunal did not
find that there was any basic error or violation of the
principles of natural justice in the holding of the
mquiry; nor did it fipd that the findings of the inquiry
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
officer were perverse or baseless. It could hardly do
so in the face of its own approval of the action taken
on applications made to it under s. 33 (2) (b) of the
Act, for if it had found that the inquiry was not
proper, it would not have approved of the action
taken against the workmen by the appellant when it
was approached under s. 33 (2) (b). We must there·
fore proceed on the assumption that the inquiry was
held properly and the inquiry officer who held the
inquiry was justified on the evidence before him in
coming to the conclusion which he did, namely, that
the charges h"ad been proved.
The trib,mal however posed a further question
as to victimisation in this way : "But even if I assume
that these men were .. guilty .of the offence complained
of, let me pause and consider if there is victimisation."
It then pro~eeded to .poinf 011t that the .workmen
concerned had put in ten years service or more and
their previous record of service was good. They were
important office bearers of the union and some;of them
were also protected workmen.
It then referred to
previous disputes between the appellant and the
union of which these workmen were members and
was of the view that the union and its leaders were
"eye-sore to the appellant." The tribunal was, ho.w·
ever.conscious that me~ely because certain workmen
were protected workmen they were not thereby given
complete immunity for ~nything that they might do
even, though it might be misconduct meriting dis·
missal. But it, pointed out that the misconduct com·
plained in this case entailed fine, suspension or dismissal of the workmen, and the appellant. chose dis·
missal, which was the extreme penalty. It referred
to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Natiooal
Tobacco Company of India Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial
Tribunal('), where it was held that in a case where
the punishment meted out was unconscionable or
grossly out of proportion to the nature of the offence
that may itself be a ground for holding that the
1163
M/1. Bmgal iJll4tdu
Coal Co.
y,
Sliri Ram P1•b1Jh
Sing/a
Wanchoo, J.
/gfj
JI /1. Bn1al BAald.1
Cool Co.
y.
SM &m Pr16uh
s;..1h
W-.loo,J.
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
dismissal was an act of victimisation. It seems to have
held that the punishment of dismissal in this case was
unconscionable or at any rate grossly out of proportion to the nature of the offence and therefore came
to the conclusion that this was a case of victimisation.
Now there is no doubt that though in a case of
proved misconduct, normally the imposition of a
penalty may be within the discretion of the management there may be cases where the punishment of
dismissal for the misconduct proved may be so unconscionable or so grossly out of iJroportion to the
nature of the offence that the tribunal may be able
to draw an inference of victimisation merely from the
punishment inflicted. But we are of opinion that the
present is not such a case and no inference of victimi·
sation can be made merely from the fact that punishment of dismissal was imposed in thia case and 11ot
either fine or suspension.
It is not in dispute that a
strike was going on during those days when the misconduct was committed.
It was the case of the
appellant that the strike was unsatisfied and illegal
and it appears that the Regional Labour Commis·
ioner, Central, Dhanbad, agreed with this view of the
appellant. It was during such a sn-ike that the mis·
conduct in question took place and the misconduct
was that these thirteen workmen physically obstructed
other workmen who were willing to work from doing
their work by sitting down between the tramlines.
This was in our opinion serious misconduct on the
part of the thirteen workmen and if it is found-as it
has been found-proved punishment of dismissal
would be perfectly justified. It cannot therefore be
1aid looking at the nature of the offence that the
punishment inflicted in this case was grossly out of
proportion or was unconscionable, and the tribunal
was not justified in coming to the conclusion that
this was a case of victimisation because the appellant
decided to dismiss these workmen and wu not pn:·
pared to let them off with fine or IUlpC!Olion.
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7~5
There 'is practically no other evidence in
support of the finding of the tribunal. It is true that
the relations between the appellant and the union to
which these workmen belonged were not happy.
It
is also proved that there was another union in existence in this concern.
Perhaps the fact that there
were two unioris would in itself explain why the relations of the appellant with one of the unions- to
which these workmen belonged were not happy. But
the fact that the relations between an employer and
the union were not happy and the workmen concerned were office-bearers or active workers of the
union would by itself be no evidence to prove victimisation, for if that were so, it would mean that the
office-bearers and active workers of a union with
which the employer is not on good terms would have
a carte blanche to commit any misconduct and get
away with it on the ground that relations between
the employer and the union were not happy. We
are therefore of opinion that the finding of victimisation in this case is based merely on conjectures and
surmises. We have already considered the main reason
given by the tribunal, namely, the nature of the
punishment, and have held that that cannot be said to
be unconscionable or grossly out of proportion to the
nature of the offence.
·
Another re~son given by the tribunal in support
of the finding of victimisation is also patently wron_g.
The tribunal says that in reports rnade to the police
certain persons were mentioned as having taken part
in the misconduct of October 27, 1959; but in the
written-statement filed by the appellant two other
persons, namely Ratan Gope and Sohan Gope who
were not mentioned in the police report, were also
mentioned as having taken part in the incident of
October 27.
The tribunal there by concluded that
Sohan Gope and Ratan Gope were falsely implicated
in the incident of October 27. Curiously, however, it went on to say that this might be a mistake
1963
M /1. Bengal 8"4t4'1
Cool Co .
••
Shri Ram Prol>aA
Singh
Wanchoo, J.
1963
M/s. Btn_~al fJ!rattkt
Goal C'AJ.
v.
Shri Ram Pfah1sh
Si11gh
WD1U'hoo, J.
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
but added that it meant dismissal of these people
and the finding in this respect was not only wrong
but perverse.
It does appear that by mistake in
para. 5 of the appellant's written statement before
the tribunal names of Ratan Gope and Sohan Gope
are mentioned as having taken part in the incident
of October 2i.
But the charge-sheets which were
given to them were only about the incident of
October 20. The finding of the domestic inquiry also
was with respect to the incident of October 20. So
it seems that there was no justification for the tribunal to hold that the finding was perverse, because
there was no finding that these two persons had taken
part in the incident of October 27.
There can be
little doubt that there was a mistake in the written
statement of the appellant for there was no charge
a~ainst these two people about the incident of
October 27 and no finding about it by the ·welfare
Officer. The tribunal therefore was patently wrong
in using this mistake as evidence of victimisation.
We are therefore of opinion that there is no evidence
worth the name in the present case to support the
tribunars finding as to victimisation and consequent
want of good faith. In the circumstances the tribunal's award must be set aside.
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the
award of the tribunal and uphold the dismissal of the
thirteen workmen concerned.
In the cireum~tances
there will be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
'