# M/s. BINANI COMMERCIAL 00., LTD v. RAMANLAL, MAGANLAL MEHTA

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 626
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 371of1957
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-s-binani-commercial-00-ltd-v-ramanlal-maganlal-mehta-2279
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Control of ,supply-Non-ferrous metals-Statute cmpoweri11g
Government to fix maximum quantity that may be sold-Notification
fixing rnch maximum-Validity of-Agreement to sell more tha11
maximum quantity fixed-If void-Supply and Prices of Goods Act,
r950 (70 of r950), ss. 4 and 5-Government of India Notification
dated September 2, r950.
The Supply and Prices of Goods Act, 1950, made provisions
for the control of prices, supply and distribution of certain goods
essential to the national economy. Section 4(1 )(c) empowers the
Central Government to fix the maximum quantity of such goods
which may be sold to any person in one transaction. Section 4(2)(a) provides that the maximum quantities may be fixed
for the same goods differently in different localities or for different classes of dealers or producers. Section 5(r)(c) provid,•s that
no dealer or producer shall sell or agree to sell or offer for sale
goods exceeding the maximum fixed under s. 4.
The Central
Government issued a notification prohibiting dealers and procincers from selling any non-ferrous metal exceeding one ton except
upon a declaration by the purchaser that the quantity did not
exceed his requirements for three months. The appellant entered into an agreement to sell to the respondent 300 tons of
zinc. The respondent did not take the entire quantity and the
appellant filed a suit for damages for breach of contract. The
respondent resisted the suit on the ground that the agreement
was void as it offended s. 5(1)(c) of the Act. The appellant contended that the notification was invalid as only an immutable
arithmetical maximum could have been fixed for each non-ferrous metal but the notification did not do so and also as it die!
not fix the maximum by reference to different classes of deale1s
and producers according to s. 4(2)(a). It was further contendecl
that the notification applied only to a sale and not to an agreement to sell and as such the agreement did not offends. 5(r)(c'.
Held, that the notification was perfectly valid and that t e
agreement was void as it offended s. s(r)(c) of the Act. Section 4(1)(c) did not require the fixing of an immutable arithmetical maximum as a large number of goods were intended to be
covered by the Act which would be required by different clas;es
of persons under a variety of circumstances. Section 4(2){a)
was merely an enabling provision and did not oblige the
Government to fix the maximum differently for different classes
of dealers and producers; s. 4(2)(a) was not a proviso to s. 4(1)(c).
Once the maximum was fixed, then by the combined operatiJn
of s. 4(r)(c) and s. 5(1)(c) an agreement to sell or an offer to sell
such goods in excess of the maximum was immediately hit.
2 S.C.R. SUPRE:MEl COURT REPORTS
627

## Text

z961
fl.Jay r.
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
M/s. BINANI COMMERCIAL 00., LTD.
v.
RAMANLAL, MAGANLAL MEHTA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Control of ,supply-Non-ferrous metals-Statute cmpoweri11g
Government to fix maximum quantity that may be sold-Notification
fixing rnch maximum-Validity of-Agreement to sell more tha11
maximum quantity fixed-If void-Supply and Prices of Goods Act,
r950 (70 of r950), ss. 4 and 5-Government of India Notification
dated September 2, r950.
The Supply and Prices of Goods Act, 1950, made provisions
for the control of prices, supply and distribution of certain goods
essential to the national economy. Section 4(1 )(c) empowers the
Central Government to fix the maximum quantity of such goods
which may be sold to any person in one transaction. Section 4(2)(a) provides that the maximum quantities may be fixed
for the same goods differently in different localities or for different classes of dealers or producers. Section 5(r)(c) provid,•s that
no dealer or producer shall sell or agree to sell or offer for sale
goods exceeding the maximum fixed under s. 4.
The Central
Government issued a notification prohibiting dealers and procincers from selling any non-ferrous metal exceeding one ton except
upon a declaration by the purchaser that the quantity did not
exceed his requirements for three months. The appellant entered into an agreement to sell to the respondent 300 tons of
zinc. The respondent did not take the entire quantity and the
appellant filed a suit for damages for breach of contract. The
respondent resisted the suit on the ground that the agreement
was void as it offended s. 5(1)(c) of the Act. The appellant contended that the notification was invalid as only an immutable
arithmetical maximum could have been fixed for each non-ferrous metal but the notification did not do so and also as it die!
not fix the maximum by reference to different classes of deale1s
and producers according to s. 4(2)(a). It was further contendecl
that the notification applied only to a sale and not to an agreement to sell and as such the agreement did not offends. 5(r)(c'.
Held, that the notification was perfectly valid and that t e
agreement was void as it offended s. s(r)(c) of the Act. Section 4(1)(c) did not require the fixing of an immutable arithmetical maximum as a large number of goods were intended to be
covered by the Act which would be required by different clas;es
of persons under a variety of circumstances. Section 4(2){a)
was merely an enabling provision and did not oblige the
Government to fix the maximum differently for different classes
of dealers and producers; s. 4(2)(a) was not a proviso to s. 4(1)(c).
Once the maximum was fixed, then by the combined operatiJn
of s. 4(r)(c) and s. 5(1)(c) an agreement to sell or an offer to sell
such goods in excess of the maximum was immediately hit.
2 S.C.R. SUPRE:MEl COURT REPORTS
627
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
371of1957.
Binani Commdr~
cial Co., Ltd.
v.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August
22, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 49
of 1955.
Ramanlal,
JIJoganlal JJehla
0. B. Agarwala, J. R. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain
and 0. G. Mathur, for the appellant.
Ajit H. Mehta and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
1961. May 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises from aGaj•ndragadkar ].
suit filed by M/s. Binani Commercial Co. Ltd., on the
Original Side of the Bombay High Court against the
respondent Ramanlal Maganlal Mehta. In its suit the
appellant sought to recover from the respondent a
sum of Rs. 93,053-3-0 which represented the loss
suffered by it in the transaction in question or in the
alternative damages for Rs. 88,229-3-0 for breach of
the con tract in respect of the said transaction.
The appellant is a Limited Company and it carries
on business in Bombay as metal merchants, bankers
and commission agents. The respondent also carries
on business in Bombay under the name and style of
M/s. Balasinor Export and Import Co., and also as
M/s. Ramanlal and Sons. In January 1952 the appellant agreed to sell to the respondent 300 tons of Electrolytic Zinc at the rate of Rs. 171 per cwt. against
delivery orders issued under the regulations of the
Metal Traders Association, Ltd., for Posh Sudi 15
delivery (January 12, 1952). The respondent promised to pay for the said goods by January 21, 1952 and
to take delivery thereafter. The respondent paid to
the appellant several sums aggregating Rs. 1,56,000
as a deposit for the price of the said goods. The
appellant tendered the said goods to the respondent
whereupon he arranged to take delivery of only 160
tons and made payments on account. The appellant
then tendered the balance of 140 tons to the respondent but the respondent failed and neglected to take
delivery of the said balance and to pay for it. As a
628
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
r96r
result of the respondent's default in taking delivery
B .
. c
the appellant had to sell the balance in the falling
inani
ommer~
cial co
Ltd
market at Rs. 81 per cwt., and that had resulted in
....
· the Joss to the appellant. That in brief is the nature
Ramanlal,
of the claim made by the appellant against the resMaganlal Mehta pondent.
.
dk 1
This claim was resisted by the respondent on several
Ga1•ndraga
ar
d
Th
. . 1
d
d b
h'
h
groun s.
· e prmc1pa groun urge
y
un,
owever, was that the transaction in suit for the sale of
300 tons of Electrolytic Zinc was in contravention of
the provisions of Supply and Prices of Goods Act,
1950 · (70 of 1950) and cl. (b) of the Government of
India Notification No. 1(4)-32(17)50 issued on September 2, 1950. According to the respondent the said
transaction was void and illegal and therefore the
appellant's claim was not maintainable in Jaw.
The
respondent also raised other contentions on the merits
without prejudice to his principal contention about
the illegality of the contract.
The suit was tried by Coyajee, J. on the Original
Side of the Bombay High Court.
The principal
defence raised by the respondent was tried as a preliminary issue by the learned Judge. On this preliminary issue, the learned Judge held that the defence
set out by the respondent was not good and not
applicable to the facts and .circumstances of th~ case.
His conclusion, therefore, was that the contract was
valid. The learned Judge, after delivering this interlocutory judgment, proceeded to try the issues on the
merits, and having found in favour of the appellant
on the said issues he directed that the matter be
referred to the Commissioner for taking accounts to
ascertain the damages suffered by the appellant in the
light of the directions given in the Judgment.
Against this decision the respondent preferred an
appeal and the Division Bench of the Appeal Court
allowed his appeal. Before the Court of Appeal only
one point was argued and that was in regard to the
validity of the contract. The Court of Appeal has
held, reversing the conclusion of the trial Judge, that
the defence raised by the respondent was good and
tha.t the contract in quAstion was invalid. In the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
result the Appeal Court has directed that the appelx96x
!ant's suit should be dismissed with costs.
The Binani Commer·
a.ppellant then applied for and obtained a certificate
cial co., Ltd,
from the said High Court and it is with that certificate
v.
that it has come to this Court by its present appeal;
Ramanlal,
and the main contention raised by Mr. Agarwala on Moganlal Mehl•
behalf of the appellant is that the view taken by the
--
Division Bench in upholding the contention of the Gajendragadkar /.
respondent against the validity of the contract is erroneous in law. It is, therefore, necessary at the outset
to refer to the material provisions of the Supply and
Prices of Goods Act 70 of 1950 (hereafter called the
Act) and to examine very broadly its scheme and purpose.
The Act has been passed in pursuance of a resolution under Art. 249 of the Constitution for the control
of prices of certain goods and the supply and distribution thereof. Article 249 confers on Parliament the
power to legislate in regard to a matter in a State List
but the said power can be exercised only in national
interest and after the Council of State passes a
resolution in that behalf supported by at least twothird of the members voting. There is no doubt
that the Act has been passed in national interest
because national interest undoubtedly required that
the supply and prices of certain types of goods
should be controlled by the Central Legislature. The
prices in regard to those goods which are essential for
national economy are apt to vary from place to place,
and unless the supply of goods is rationally controlled
the goods may be available in plenty in one place and
may not be available in adequate measure in another.
It is with a view to make the supply of controlled
goods fairly available in the country at a reasonable
price that the Act purports to impose the necessary
restrictions to regulate the supply and sale of the said
goods. Section 2 of the Act defines goods as meaning
goods to which the Act applies. Section 3 provides,
inter alia., that the Act applies to the goods specified
in the Schedule and to such other goods that the Central Government may by a notified order specify in
So
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
x96x
that behalf. Section 4 deals with t.he fixing of maxiB .
~c
mum prices and maximum quantities which may be
1nan1
ommer· h ld
ld
h'l
5 .
. t'
cial co .. Ltd.
e
or so , w l e s.
imposes restric 10:as on posse~-
v.
sion and sale by dealers and producers where max1Ramanlal,
mum is fixed under s. 4. Under s. 6 is imposed a
Maganlal Mehta general limitation of quantity which may be possessed
. --
at any one time, and the proviso to sub-s. (1) makes it
Ga1endragadkar f. clear that it does not apply to the persons specified
in els. (a) and (b) of the proviso. A duty to declare
possession of excess stocks is imposed by s. 7, while
s. 8 imposes an obligation to sell goods as therein specified. Failure to comply with the requirements of the
said section is made an offence under the Act. Under
s. 13 power is conferred on the Central Government to
regulate production and distribution of goods, and
s. 16 confers power on the Central Government to
authorise by general or special order any officer not
below the rank of an inspector of police to effect
search and seizure for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of this Act. It is thus clear that the sections of the Act have been so framed as to give effect
to the object of the Act to regulate and control the
supply and prices of goods which are brought within
the purview of the Act in the interest of national
economy.
In the present appeal we are directly concerned
with the notification issued under s. 4(l)(c). It is,
however, necessary to read s. 4.
Section 4 provides
thus:
"4.
(1) The ·Central Government may, by notified order, fix in respect of any goods-
(a) the maximum price or rate which may be
cha.rged by a dealer or producer;
(b) the maximum quantity which may at any
one time be possessed by a dealer or producer;
(c) the maximum quantity which may in one
transaction be sold to any person.
(2) Any such order may-
(a) fix maximum prices or rates and maximum
quantities for the same description of goods differently in different localities or for different classes of
dealers or producers;
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B,EPORTS
631
(b) instead of specifying the maximum price or
1961
rate to be charged, direct that that price or rate . :--c
d ·
Binani
omm~t'~
shall be compute Ill such manner and by reference
cial co., Ltd.
to such matters as may be provided by the order."
v.
Section 5 imposes restriction on possession and sale by
Ramanlal,
dealers and producers in cases covered by s. 4 and Maganlal Mehta
Provides by sub-s. (l)(c) that no dealer or producerG . d--dk 1
a1~n raga
ar ,
shall sell or agree to sell or offer for sale to any person
in any one transaction a quantity of any goods exceeding the maximum fixed under cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of
s. 4. It would be recalled that the respondent's contention is that the contract in suit is void because it
contravenes the provisions of s. 5(l)(c) in that it does
not comply with the requirements of the notification
issued under s. 4(l)(c). Thus, for deciding the narrow
controversy between the parties it would be necessary
to determine the scope and effect of the provisions of
s. 4(1)(c) and the notification issued under it and the
provisions of s. 5(1)(c).
Let us now read the notification. The notification
provides:
"(b) No such dealer or producer shall sell any
non-ferrous metals exceeding one ton unless he has
obtiiined a declaration in writing from the buyer
that the quantity proposed to be sold ·to him does not
exceed his requirements for consumption for three
months or in case the buyer is a dealer his requirements for normal trade for three months."
What does the notification provide? It provides that
no dealer shall sell any non-ferrous metals exceeding
1 ton unless the other requirement of the notification
is satisfied. In other words, the notification imposes
in the first instance a general ban on sale of non-ferrous metals beyond 1 ton but this ceiling is not ab.
solute. Sale beyond 1 ton can be validly effected provided the dealer obtains a declaration in writing from
the buyer that the quantity proposed to be sold to
him does not exceed his requirement for consumption
for three months. It also allows latitude to sell more
than 1 ton in the case of a buyer who is a dealer. The
effect of the notification, therefore, is that two kinds
of ceilings are imposed and thereby two maxima are
632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
fixed.
Upto 1 ton sale can be effected without any
B .
. c
declaration; beyond 1 ton sale can be effected either
inani
om1ner~
•
.
cial Co., Ltd.
to a consumer or to a dealer provided the consumer
v.
or the dealer makes a declaration that the quantity
Ramanlal,
sold to him does not exceed his requirements for
Maganlal Mehta three months. It is common ground that no declaraG . d-dk 1 tion was given by the respondent to the appellant
aien raga ar ·before the agreement to sell was made, and so the
respondent contends that agreement to sell more than
1 ton of the non-ferrous metal in question is violative
of the requirements of the notification and as such it
contravenes s. 4(l)(c) read with the notification and
attracts s. 5(l)(c) of the Act.
Mr. Agarwala contends that this notification docs
not fix the maximum quantity because according to
him the requirement of the section can be satisfied
by fixing an arithmetical quantity and that too in an
immutable form.
The argument is that the failure to
comply with the provisions of the relevant sections of
the Act is made penal, and so it is necessary to fix one
maximum quantity in respect of a specified non-ferrous metal, and since that has not been done by the
notification it is invalid. We are not impressed by this
argument. Having regard to the large number of goods
intended to be covered by the Act and the variety of
circumstances under which they would be required by
different classes of persons or dealers it would be entirely unrealistic to suggest that the maximum which
is required to be fixed by s. 4(l)(c) is the maximum
determined in arithmetical term and fixed immutably
in all cases. Besides, s. 4(2)(a) itself indicates that
different maxima can be prescribed by reference to
different localities or different classes of dealers or
producers. Therefore, the argument that in the absence
of the fixation of any arithmetical quantity of the
immutable maximum the notification is bad must be
rejected.
Then it is urged that the notification is in valid
because it is inconsistent with the provisions of s. 4(2)
(a). It would be noticed thats. 4(2)(a) enables the Central Government to fix maximum prices or rates and
maximum quantities for the same description of goods
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
differently in different localities or for different ciasses
r96r
of dealers or producers. It is urged that the maximum 8 .
:--c
,
inani
omm~f~
to be fixed under s. 4(1)(c) must therefore be the maxi.
cial co .. Lia.
mum fixed by reference to different classes of ·dealers
v.
or producers, and since the impugned notification does
Ramanlal,
not purport to do so it is inconsistent with s. 4(2)(a) Maganlal Mehla
and therefore invalid. This contention is clearly mis- c . d --.ak 1
conceived. It is obvious thats. 4(2)(a) cannot be read "1'" '"K" "' ·
as a proviso and cannot be pressed into service for
the purpose of controlling s. 4(l)(c). Section 4(2)(a)
is an enabling provision and it is intended mer.ely to
serve the purpose of showing that notwithstanding
the provisions of s. 4(l)(c) which refers to persons it
may be open to the Central Government to prescribe
the maximum either in the way of prices or rates or
quantities by reference to different localities or different classes of dealers or producers. Section 4(l)(c)
speaks of the fixation of maximum quantity which
may in one transaction be sold to any person, and
lest it be said that the maximum cannot be fixed in
reference to classes of dealers or producers the Legislature has added the enabling provision as s. 4(2)(a).
Therefore to rely on s. 4(2)(a) for the purpose of construing s. 4(l)(c) appears to us to be wholly unreasonable. Now, if we look at s. 4(l)(c), as we must, it is
obvious that the notification is perfectly consistent
withs. 4(l)(c) inasmuch as it prescribes the maximum
by reference to consumers as well as dealers.
There is one more argument which has been very
strongly pressed before us by Mr. Agarwala which
still remains to be considered. He contends that
though the notification may have prescribed a maximum quantity under s. 4(l)(c) we cannot ignore the
fact that a.s the notification is worded contravention
of the requirements of the notification would not
attract the provisions of s. 5(l)(c) in the present case.
The argument is this. The notification prescribes the
maximum for sale at any one time, and sale in the
context must mean actual sale.
The notification
therefore cannot refer to or cover cases of agreement
to sell or offer to sell. In the present case the appellant
no doubt agreed to sell to the respondent a quantity
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
'96'
contrary to the condition prescribed by the notifica.
Binaui-;;;m,,,er. tion; but, at the stage of the agreement to sell the
cial Co., Ltd.
notification would not apply and so the agreement is
v.
perfectly valid. If by bis failure to give the neces.
Ramanlal,
sary declaration the respondent has made the perfor.
Magnnlal Mehta mance of the contract illegal be cannot take ad van.
.
---
tage of his own default and st11mp the whole of the
Ga1cn.tragadkar J. trnnsaction as illegal under s. 5(l)(c). In our opinion
this argument is based on a misconception of the
effect of the provisions of s. 4(l)(c) and s. 5(l)(c) read
together and of the notification issued un<ler s. 4(l)(c).
The scheme of the two sections is plain. Under
s. 4(l)(c) the Central Government by a notified order
is required to fix the maximum quantity which may
be sold to any one person in one transaction, and that
the impugned notification has done. Once the maximum is thus fixed by a notified orders. 5 immediately
comes into operation, and it provides that in regard
to commodities the maximum quantity of which h;:i.s
been determined by a notified order under s. 4(1)(c)
there is a prohibition against agreement to sell, offer
for sale, or sale in respect of the said commodities
contrnry to the requirements of the notification. In
other worus, once a notified order fixes the maximum
in respect of the sale of any goods the agreement to sell
the goods or the offer for the sale of such goods above
the maximum specified in the notification for the purposes of sale is immediately hit, not by virtue of the
notification as such but by the combined operation of
the provisions of s. 4(l)(c) and the notification issued
under it and the provisions of s. 5. Therefore, in our
opinion, it is futile to suggest that because the notifi.
cation refers only to sale and not to an agreement Lo
soils. 5(l)(c) would not hit the present contract in suit.
In this connection, we ought to add that any argu.
ment based on the distinction between an agreement
to sell and the actual sale as well as on the conduct
of the respondent is really not open to the appellant
at this stage. The judgment of the learned trial Judge
as well as of the Appeal Court clearly show that the
appellant's learned cousel Mr. Mis~ree expressly con.
ceded before both the Courts that if under the relevant
'
-i
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
clause of the notification it is held that a maximum has
1961
been validly prescribad then the respondent's defence
1
1
Binani Commer~
wou d be va id and the appellant would have no case
cial Co .• Ltd.
on tho point of law. In fact the Appeal Court has
v.
referred to this concession more than once in the
Ramanlal,
course of its judgment and it has made it perfectly Magan/al Mehta
clear that on the appellant's side it was expressly
. --
stated before the Court that if the point of law raised Ga;endragadkar J.
by the appellant about the invalidity of the notification failed he would be out of Court. That is why we
think that the point raised by Mr. Agarwala that
the agreement to sell was valid in this case is really
not open to him.
It is true that in the trial Court the learned Judge
has ma<le certain observations that it appeared to be
an implied term of the contract that the buyer would
be ready and willing to give the declaration at the
time of actual sale and it also appears that the learned
Judge thought that it was not open to the respondent
to take up the defence about the invalidity of the
agreement to sell. It is difficult to see how these
observations can be reconciled with the concession
made by the appellant's counsel even before the trial
Court; but we have referred to these observations
because it is on these observations that Mr. Agarwala
wanted to build up an argument that the respondent
is precluded from disputing the validity of the agreement to sell and so his default in giving a declaration
should be taken into account in dealing with the point
of law urged by him. In our opinion, apart from the
fact that in view of the concession made by the
appellant's counsel this argument cannot be raised,
we are satisfied that there is no substance in it. As
we have just indicated the scheme of ss. 4{l){c) and 5
is clear and so any distinction between a sale and
an agreement to sell is obviously invalid. That is
why we have no doubt that Mr. Mistree was perfectly
justified in making the concession that he did.
· In the result the appeal fails but there would be no
order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.