# M/S. LAKSHMICHAND BAIJNATH v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 415
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Bench:** T.L.Venkataramaaiyar, P.B.Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-s-lakshmichand-baijnath-v-the-commissioner-of-income-tax-west-bengal-1546
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Income Tax-Partition in Hindu undivided-family-Proceedings under s. 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act-Scope-Receipt of
amount in accounting year-Assessee's plea of capital receipt rejected
-Liability to tax as business receipt-Indian Income-tax Act, I922
(XI of I922), s. 25A.
For the assessment year 1946-47 the appellant, a Hindu
undivided family carrying on business, filed a petition before the
Income-tax Officer, under s. 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, claiming that there had been a partition in the family on
April 24, 1945. As regards the income assessable under s. 23 of
the Act, the appellant's case regarding six sums aggregating to
Rs. 2,30,346 shown in the accounts as the sale proceeds of ornaments, was that at the partition the jewels of the family were
sold and that the price realised therefrom was invested in the
business. The Income-tax Officer held that the partition was
true and that the family had become divided into five groups,
but as regards the amount of Rs. 2,30,346 aforesaid he rejected
the explanation given by the appellant as to how the amount
came to be received and held that the amount was not the
proceeds of the family jewels sold but represented concealed
profits of the business. He accordingly included the said amount
in the taxable income. 'The appellant's contentions, inter alia,
before the Appellate Tribunal were (1) that the order passed
under s. 25A of the Act by the Income-tax Officer must be held
to have decided the factum of a partition in the family as well
as the 'possession and division of the jewels, as set up by the
appellant, and that it was not open to the Department to contend that the amount in question did not represent the value of
the family jewels; and (2) that, in any case, there was no
evidence to show that the amount represented undisclosed
profits.
Held, that when a claim is made under s. 25A of the Indian
Income·tax Act, 1922, the points to be decided by the Incometax Officer are whether there has been a partition in the family,
and, if so, what the definite portions are in which the division
had been made among the members or groups of members. The
question as to what the income of the family assessable to tax
under s. 23(3) was, would be foreign to the scope of an enquiry
under s. 25A, and any finding thereon would not be conclusive in
assessment proceedings under s. 23.
November 13.
. 416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
Held, further, that the assessee in the present case having
failed to explain satisfactorily the truth of what is a credit in
Lakshmichand
business accounts, the Income-tax Officer was entitled to draw
Baijnalh
the inference that the amount credited represents in reality a
v.
receipt of an assessable nature.
Commissioner of
c
A
J
c· 1 A
Income-lax
!VIL
PPELLATE
URISDICTION :
Ivi
ppeals NOS.
V enkatara#UI
Aiyar J.
271-272 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 19, 1953, of the Calcutta .High Court
in Income-tax Reference Neis. 6 & 7 of 1950.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, A. K. Dutt, S. K. Kapur
and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R.H. Dhebar and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1958. November 13. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-The appellant was a Hindu
undivided family carrying on business as piecegoods
merchants in the city of Calcutta. The present proceedings relate to the assessment of its income for the year
1946-47, the previous year thereto being June 12, 1944,
to April 24, 1945. In the course of the assessment, the
appellant filed a petition under s. 25-A of the Incometax Act, 1922, claiming that there had been a partition
in the family on April 24, 1945. On May 27, 1945, the Income-tax Officer enquired into both these matters, the
factum of partition and the quantum of income chargeable to tax, and pronounced orders thereon on June 30,
1945. On the petition under s. 25-A, he held that the
partition was true, and that

## Text

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
M/S. LAKSHMICHAND BAIJNATH
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
WEST BENGAL
(T.L.VENKATARAMAAIYAR,P.B.GAJENDRAGADKAR
and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)
Income Tax-Partition in Hindu undivided-family-Proceedings under s. 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act-Scope-Receipt of
amount in accounting year-Assessee's plea of capital receipt rejected
-Liability to tax as business receipt-Indian Income-tax Act, I922
(XI of I922), s. 25A.
For the assessment year 1946-47 the appellant, a Hindu
undivided family carrying on business, filed a petition before the
Income-tax Officer, under s. 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, claiming that there had been a partition in the family on
April 24, 1945. As regards the income assessable under s. 23 of
the Act, the appellant's case regarding six sums aggregating to
Rs. 2,30,346 shown in the accounts as the sale proceeds of ornaments, was that at the partition the jewels of the family were
sold and that the price realised therefrom was invested in the
business. The Income-tax Officer held that the partition was
true and that the family had become divided into five groups,
but as regards the amount of Rs. 2,30,346 aforesaid he rejected
the explanation given by the appellant as to how the amount
came to be received and held that the amount was not the
proceeds of the family jewels sold but represented concealed
profits of the business. He accordingly included the said amount
in the taxable income. 'The appellant's contentions, inter alia,
before the Appellate Tribunal were (1) that the order passed
under s. 25A of the Act by the Income-tax Officer must be held
to have decided the factum of a partition in the family as well
as the 'possession and division of the jewels, as set up by the
appellant, and that it was not open to the Department to contend that the amount in question did not represent the value of
the family jewels; and (2) that, in any case, there was no
evidence to show that the amount represented undisclosed
profits.
Held, that when a claim is made under s. 25A of the Indian
Income·tax Act, 1922, the points to be decided by the Incometax Officer are whether there has been a partition in the family,
and, if so, what the definite portions are in which the division
had been made among the members or groups of members. The
question as to what the income of the family assessable to tax
under s. 23(3) was, would be foreign to the scope of an enquiry
under s. 25A, and any finding thereon would not be conclusive in
assessment proceedings under s. 23.
November 13.
. 416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
Held, further, that the assessee in the present case having
failed to explain satisfactorily the truth of what is a credit in
Lakshmichand
business accounts, the Income-tax Officer was entitled to draw
Baijnalh
the inference that the amount credited represents in reality a
v.
receipt of an assessable nature.
Commissioner of
c
A
J
c· 1 A
Income-lax
!VIL
PPELLATE
URISDICTION :
Ivi
ppeals NOS.
V enkatara#UI
Aiyar J.
271-272 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 19, 1953, of the Calcutta .High Court
in Income-tax Reference Neis. 6 & 7 of 1950.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, A. K. Dutt, S. K. Kapur
and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R.H. Dhebar and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1958. November 13. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-The appellant was a Hindu
undivided family carrying on business as piecegoods
merchants in the city of Calcutta. The present proceedings relate to the assessment of its income for the year
1946-47, the previous year thereto being June 12, 1944,
to April 24, 1945. In the course of the assessment, the
appellant filed a petition under s. 25-A of the Incometax Act, 1922, claiming that there had been a partition
in the family on April 24, 1945. On May 27, 1945, the Income-tax Officer enquired into both these matters, the
factum of partition and the quantum of income chargeable to tax, and pronounced orders thereon on June 30,
1945. On the petition under s. 25-A, he held that the
partition was true, and that the family had become
divided into five groups. As regards the income assessable under s. 23, the dispute related to six sums aggregating to Rs. 2,30,346 shown in the accounts as the
sale p~oceeds of ornaments. The case of the appellant
with reference to these sums was that at the partition
the jewels of the family were sold in six lots, that the
price realised therefrom was invested in the business,
and that the credits in question related thereto. The
Income-tax Officer declined to accept t!Jis explanation.
He observed that while the books of the appellant
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
showed that what was sold was ornaments, the accounts
1958
of Chuniial Damani to whom they were stated to have
been sold, showed sale of gold.
He also pointed out
Lakshmichand
Baijnath
that while the weight of the ornaments according to
v.
the partition agreement, Ex. A, was 3422 tolas, the Commissioner of
weight of gold which was actually sold to the purchaIncome-tax
ser was 3133 tolas. The explanation given by the appellant for this discrepancy w~s that the jewels in
Venkatarama
Aiyar ].
question had come down to the amily through several
generations, and were not pure. The Income-tax Officer
rejected this explanation, because he held that the
weight which was actually deducted for impurities in
the accounts of the purchaser was almost negligible,
and that what was sold was thus pure gold and not
gold in old family jewels.
He also remarked that the
sales were in round figures of 500 tolas, and that "if
the assessee had been taking old ornaments broken or
unbroken for sale it is inconceivable that on three occasions out of six he took gold weighing 500 tolas in
round figure." He also referred to the fact that there
was no list of the family jewels, and that there was
nothing in the family accounts to show what jewels
were held by the family. He accordingly held that the
story of sale of family jewels was not true, and that
the sum of Rs. 2,30,346 represented concealed profits
of the business, and he included the said amount in the
taxable income. He also followed it up by an order
imposing tax on the appellant under the Excess Profits
Tax Act.
The appellant took both these orders in appeal to
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who again went
into the matter fully, and observed that the appellant
had been changing his version as to the true character
of the sales from time to time. Dealing with the discrepancy of 289 tolas between the weight shown in
the partition agreement, Ex. A, and that appearing in
the accounts books of Chunilal Daimani, he remarked
that while the explanation of the appellant before the
Income-tax Officer was that it was due to alloy a.nd
brass in the jewels, before him the position taken up
was that it was due to pearls and stones which
53
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
r95s
had been removed from the jewels, and that the gold
contained in the jewels was pure gold.
He did not
La~h.niich:•• accept this explanation as, in his opinion, the jewels
··~~·•
which were stated to have been in existence for three or
Commissioner of four generations should have contained much more of
Income-tax
alloy than was shown in the accounts of the purchaser.
He also considered that the sale of gold in round figVenkata.ania
ures of 250 or 500 tolas lwas a circumstance which threw
Aiya. 1·
considerable doubt as to the truth of the appellant's
version. In the result, he confirmed the findings of the
Income-tax Officer, and dismissed the appeals.
Against these orders, the appellant appealed to the
Appellate Tribunal. There, he sought to rely on a certain proceedings book as showing that the family
jewels were really broken up, and that w!i.at was sold
to Chuni!al Damani was the gold thus separated. As
this proceedings book forms the real sheet-anchor of
the appellant's contention before us, it is necessary to
refer to the facts relating thereto in some detail. On
February 20, 1945, the members of the family entered
into an agreement, Ex. A, to divide their joint properties among the five branches, of which it was constituted. In sch. B to this document are set out the jewels to be divided, and their total weight is, in round
figure, 3422 tolas. Then we have the proceedings book,
and that purports to be a record of the decisions ta.ken
by the members of the family from time to time for
implementing Ex. A. The minutes of the meeting held
on February 23, 1945, show that the pearls and stones
imbedded in the jewels were to be removed and divided
among the members, and that a goldsmith called Inderba.n was engaged for the purpose of breaking up the
jewels. Then we have the minutes of a meeting held
on February 28, 1945, and therein, it is recited that
the weight of the pearls, stones and copper removed
was, again in round figure, 289 tola.s, and deducting
this out of 3422 tolas being the weight of the jewels
set out in Ex. A, the gold which was available for partition was 3133 tolas. It is recorded that this quantity should be sold in the market and the sale proceeds
credited in the capital accounts of the business.
And
then we have the la.st of the proceedings dated April 21,
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
1945, which record that gold weighing 3133 tolas was
sold and the price credited in the accounts.
Now~ if
these minutes are genuine and give a correct picture
as to what really took place, they would go a long way
to support the version given by the appellant as to how
he came by the sums making up a total Rs. 2,30,346.
Quite naturally, therefore, the appellant applied to the
Tribunal to receive the proceedings book in evidence,
and the ground given in support of the application
was that it had been filed before the Income-tax
officer but had not been considered by him.
Then the question was raised as to whether the proceedings book was, in fact, produced before the Incometax Officer. The argument of the appellant was that
the deci@ion taken at the meeting dated April 21, 1945,
which forms the concluding portion of the book had
been translated into English at the instance of the Income-tax Officer, the original being in Hindi, that the
said translation was marked Ex. B and contained the
endorsement of the Officer "Original produced", and
that accordingly the book must have been produced
before the Officer. But the 'l'ribunal was not impressed by this argument. It observed that the book iselft
had not been initialled by the Officer, and that though
the minutes of the meeting dated April 21, 1945, were
genuine, there was no certainty that when it was
shown to the Income-tax Officer it was contained in
the book now produced, that such minutes could have
found a place in another book as well, and that, therefore, the book which was sought to be admitted before
it in evidence was not proved to be the book which
was produced before the Officer. It was also of the
opinion that the minutes of the previous meetings
conld not have been shown to the Officer. It accordingly refused to receive the book in evidence, and
relying on the other circumstances mentioned in the
order of the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, it held that the sum of
Rs. 2,30,346 was not the proceeds of the family jewels
sold but secret profits made by the appellant in business.
Another contention raised by the appellant before
I958
Laksiltnicha11d
/Jaijnath
v.
Comniissioner of
Income-tax
Venkalarama
Aiyar ).
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
1958
the Tribunal was that in the proceedings under s. 25A,
the Income-tax Officer had held, after making enLak.shmichand
quiry, that the partition set up b.v it was true, and
Baijnat!z
v.
that as accordiug to the appellant, the partition oonCommissio11" of sisted in the division, inter alia, of family jewels
I11comc-tax
weighing 3422 tolas, the Income-tax Officer must be
held to have decided ~hat the family was in possession
Ve11kt4laran,ui
f
d
.4iya1' J.
o the i·ewels mentioned in Ex. A and had divide
them in the manner set out in Ex. B, and that as that
order had become final, it must conclude the present
question in favour of the appellant. The Tribunal
repelled this contention on the ground that the order
under s. 25A only decided that there was partition in
the family, and that it had no bearing on the issues
which arose for decision in the assessment proceedings.
In the result, both the appeals were dismissed.
Pursuant to an order of the High Court of Calcutta
dated December 7, 1950, passed under s. 66(2) of the
Act, the Tribunal referred the following questions for
its opinion :
(1) "Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
was bound by the findings of fact of the Income-tax
Officer relating to the nature and division of ~he assets
of the joint family in question which he arrived at
in his enquiry under Section 25A(l) of the Indian
Income-tax Act ?
(2) Whether there was any material or evidence
upon which the taxing authorities could legally hold
that the amount of Rs. 2,30,346 (Rupees two lakhs
thirty thousand three hundred and forty-six) represented undisclosed profits of the accounting year in
question ? "
'l'he reference was heard by Chakravarti, C. J., and
Lahiri, J., who !>y their judgment dated June 19,
1953, answered the first question in the negative and
the second in the affirmative. The appellant then
filed an application under s. 66A(2) for leave to appeal
to this Court, and that having been dismissed, has
preferred the present appeals on leave granted by this
Court under Art. 136.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the
appellant, raised the following contentions:
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
(1) In view of the order of the Income-tax Officer
1958
under s. 25A, it was not open to the Department to
f R
2 30 3
d
Lah:,J11nic'1and
contend that the sum o
s. ; ; 46 ocs not repre-
.
Baijnath
sent the value of family jewels.
v.
(2) The finding of the Income-tax authorities that Commi.,ioner of
the said amount represents concealed profits of business
T11c':!:.'::_1ax
is not supported by legal evidence and is, in any event,
Venkatarama
perverse.
Aiyar J.
(3) There is no evidence that the amount in question represents profits of business, and it was therefore
not chargeable to tax under the provisions of the
Excess Profits Tax Act.
(1) On the first question, the appellant relied on
certain observations in the order of the Income-tax
Officer passed under s. 25A as amounting to a. decision
that the family had the jewels mentioned in Ex. A,
and that what was actually divided was only the price
received therefor. Now, when a claim is made under
s. 25A, the points to be decided by the Income-tax.
Officer are whether there has been a partition in the
family, and if so, what the definite portions a.re in
which the division had been made among the members or groups of members. The question as to what
the income of the family assessable to tax under
s. 23(3) was, would be foreign to t~c scope of an
enquiry under s. 25A. That section was, it should
be noted, introduced by the Indian Income-tax
(Amendment) Act, 1928 (3 of 1928), for removing a
defect which the working of the Act as enacted in
1922 had disclosed.
Under the provisions of the Act
as they stood prior to the amendment, when the
assessee was an undivided family, no assessment could
be made thereon if at the time of the assessment it had
become divided, because at that point of time, there
was no undivided family in existence which could be
taxed, though when the income was received in the
year of account the family was joint. Nor could the
individual members of the family be taxed in respect
of such income as the same is exempt from tax under
s. 14(1) of the Act. The result of these provisions was
that a joint family which had become divided at
the time of the assessment escaped tax altogether. To
422
SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z95B
remove this defect, s. 25A enacted that until an order
Lah,hmi<hand
is made under that section, the family should be
Baijnath
deemed to continue as an undivided family.
When
v.
an order is made under that section, its effeot is that
Commi"io"" of while the tax payable on the total income is apporIncome-t•x
tioned among the divided members or groups, all of
them are liable for the tax payable on the total income
Venkatarama
Aiyar ].
of the family.
What that tax is would depend on the
assessment of income in proceedings taken under
s. 23, and an order under s. 25A would have no effect
on that assessment. It is in this context that we
must .read the observations in the order under s. 25A
relied en for the appellant. In fact, that order does
not expressly decide that the family had the jewels
mentioned in Ex. A, and that they were converted
into cash as claimed by the appellant. Nor could such
a finding be implied therein, when regard is had to
the scope of the proceedings under s. 25A and to the
fact that the order under s. 23(3) holding that the sum
of Rs. 2,30,346 did not represent the value of the
family jewels sold was passed on the same date as
the order under s. 25A and by the very same officer.
(2) The next question is and that is what was really
pressed before us-whether the sum of Hs. 2,30,346
represents the price of family jewels sold or whether
it is concealed business profits. That clearly is a
question of fact the finding on which is open to attack
in a reference under s. 66 only if it could be shown
that there is no evidence to support it or that it is
perverse. Now, the contention of Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri for the appellant is that the finding that it is .
concealed profits was reached by the Income-tax
Officer and by the Appellate Assistant Comrnissioner
by ignoring the very material evidence furnished by
the proceedings book, and that the Appellate Tribunal
had erroneously refused to receive the book in evidence. This contention raises two controversies: (i)
Was the proceedings book which w11s produced before
the Tribunal the book which was produced before the
Income-tax Officer? (ii) If it was, were the minutes
of the meeting prior to April 21, 1945, relied on by the
appellant before the Income-tax Officer? Whatever
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
view one might be inclined to take on the former
question, so far as the latter is concerned, it is perLakshmichand
fectly plain that they were not. On May 27, 1947,
Baifnath
the enquiry was held on both the petitions under
. v._
s. 25A and on the quantum of income assessable to tax Comm 25siontr of
Income·tax
under s. 23(3).
Exhibit D is an extract from the order
sheet of the Income-tax Officer, and it runs as follows:
venkatarama
"Regarding credits amounting to Rs. 2,30,346-6-3
Aiyar J.
in the a/c. Udoyaram Bhaniram the representatives state that besides the evidence produced, which
are noted below, they are not in a position to produce
any further evidence.
(i) Account books of the assessee containing the
details of the amounts aggregating the aforesaid sum.
(ii) Sale statements rendered by Chunilal Damani,
copies of which have been filed.
(iii) Roker ofChunilal Damani containing entries
for purchase of gold, sold by the assessee family along
with Surajrattan Bagri the accountant of Chunilal
Damani.
(iv) Statement of Lakhmichand Bhiwaniwalla
and Pannalal Bhiwaniwalla, member of the assessee
family."
This statement is signed by the counsel for the appellant. It is clear from the above that the proceedings
book was not relied on as evidence on the character
of the receipts making up the sum of Rs. 2,30,346.
The fact appears to be that the appellant produced
the proceedings book in support of his petition under
s. 25A for the purpose of establishing that there was
a completed partition, and relied only on the minutes
of the meeting held oil April 21, 1945, in proof thereof, and that is why that alone was translated in
English and marked as Ex. B. It is also to be noted
that there is no reference in the order of assessment
by the Income-tax Officer under s. 23(3) to the minutes
of the meetings prior to April 21, 1945, and that they
were not even translated, as was the record of the
meeting dated April 21, 1945. The obvious inference
is that they were not relied on by the appellant, and
were therefore not considered by the Officer. It is also
\
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
/'
•958
significant that the order of the Income-tax Officer
refers to sale of ornaments broken or unbroken. The
Laksliinichand
B•i.inath
story that the gold which was separated from the
v.
jewels after removing the pearls and stones was meltCommi.<Sioner of ed and sold in quantities of 250 or 500 tolas, which
Inrnme-tax
was the argument pressed before us, was not put for.
ward before him.
Venkafara1na
Aiy., J.
It is argued that in the appeal against the order of
the Income-tax Officer the ground was definitely
taken that the proceedings book had been produced
before him, and that it was also prominently mentioned in a petition supported by affidavit filed by the
appellant. But the order of the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner does not deal with this matter either,
and it is inconceivable that he would have failed to
consider it if it had been pressed before him. It is
also to be noted that the appellant who had obtained
a return of the proceedings book from the Income-tax
Officer did not file it before the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, nor did he niove for its admission in
evidence. Apart from taking the grounds to which
we were referred, the appellant appears to have presented his case before the· Appellate Assistant Commissioner precisely on ti).e same lines on which he
pressed it before the Income-tax Officer. In view of
these facts, we a.re unable to hold that in refusing to
admit the proceedings book as e.vidence in the appeal,
the App!lllate Tribunal acted perversely or unreasonably. Indeed, counsel for the appellant did not contend in the High Court that the Tribunal had acted
illegally or unreasonably in refusing to admit the proceedings book in evidence. That being so, it ca.nnot
be said tha.t the finding given by the Tribunal on an
appreciation of the facts and circumstances already
set .out is unsupported by evidence or is perverse.
The position may thus be summed up : In the business accounts of the appellant we. find certain sums
credit.ed.
The explanation given by the appellarit
as to bow the amounts came to be received is rejected
by all the Income-tax authorities as untenable. The
credits are .accordingly treated as business receipts
which are chargeable to tax. In V. GovindarajUlu
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
Mudaliar v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, HyderaIg58
bad (1), this Court observed:
Lakshniichand
"There is ample authority for the position that
Baijnath
where an assessee fails to prove satisfactorily the source
v.
and nature of certain amounts of cash received Commissioner of
during the accounting year, the Income-tax Officer is
Income-ta•·
entitled to draw the inference that the receipts are of
Venhataranw
an assessable nature."
Aiyar J.
That is precisely what the Income-tax authorities
have done in the present case, and we do not find
any grounds for hofding that their finding is open to
attack as erroneous in law.
(3) Lastly, the question was sought to be raised
that even if the credits aggregating to Rs. 2,30,346
are held to be concealed income, no levy of excess
profits tax can be made on them without a further
finding that they represented business income, and
that there is no such finding.
When an amount is
credited in business books, it is not an unreasonable
inference to draw that it is a receipt from business.
It is unnecessary to pursue this matter further, as
this is not one of the questions referred under s. 66(2).
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
(1) (1958) 34 I.T.R. 807, 810 •
. H
Appeals dismissed.