# M/S MAYAVTI TRADING PVT. LTD v. PRADYUAT DEB BURMAN

- **Citation:** [2019] 12 S.C.R. 123
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-09-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 7023 of 2019
- **Bench:** R. F. Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy, Surya Kant
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-s-mayavti-trading-pvt-ltd-v-pradyuat-deb-burman-33137
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sub-section (6-A)
to s.11 [Amendment Act, 2015] and s.11 [Amendment Act, 2019] -
Effect of - Held: After the amendment Act of 2019, s.11(6A) has
been omitted because appointment of arbitrators is to be done
institutionally, in which case the Supreme Court or the High Court
under the old statutory regime are no longer required to appoint
arbitrators and consequently to determine whether an arbitration
agreement exists.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sub-section (6-A)
to s.11 [Amendment Act, 2015] - Effect of - Held: s.11(6A) is
confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been
laid down in the judgment Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port
Limited (2017) 9 SCC 729 in paras 48 and 59.
United India Insurance Company Limited v. Antique Art
Exports Private Limited (2019) 5 SCC 362 - overruled.
Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017)
9 SCC 729 : [2017] 10 SCR 285; SBP & Co. v. Patel
Engineering Ltd. and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618 : [2005]
4 Suppl. SCR 688; ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals
Limited v. ANS Constructions Limited and another,
(2018) 3 SCC 373 : [2018] 2 SCR 598; Garware Wall
Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions &
Engineering Ltd., (2019) SCC OnLine SC 515 -
referred to.
 [2019] 12 S.C.R. 123
123
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 12 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
(2019) 5 SCC 362
overruled
Para 4
[2017] 10 SCR 285
referred to
Para 4
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688
referred to
Para 7
[2018] 2 SCR 598
referred to
Para 8

## Text

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M/S MAYAVTI TRADING PVT. LTD.
v.
PRADYUAT DEB BURMAN
(Civil Appeal No. 7023 of 2019)
SEPTEMBER 05, 2019
[R. F. NARIMAN, R. SUBHASH REDDY AND
SURYA KANT, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sub-section (6-A)
to s.11 [Amendment Act, 2015] and s.11 [Amendment Act, 2019] -
Effect of - Held: After the amendment Act of 2019, s.11(6A) has
been omitted because appointment of arbitrators is to be done
institutionally, in which case the Supreme Court or the High Court
under the old statutory regime are no longer required to appoint
arbitrators and consequently to determine whether an arbitration
agreement exists.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sub-section (6-A)
to s.11 [Amendment Act, 2015] - Effect of - Held: s.11(6A) is
confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been
laid down in the judgment Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port
Limited (2017) 9 SCC 729 in paras 48 and 59.
United India Insurance Company Limited v. Antique Art
Exports Private Limited (2019) 5 SCC 362 - overruled.
Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017)
9 SCC 729 : [2017] 10 SCR 285; SBP & Co. v. Patel
Engineering Ltd. and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618 : [2005]
4 Suppl. SCR 688; ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals
Limited v. ANS Constructions Limited and another,
(2018) 3 SCC 373 : [2018] 2 SCR 598; Garware Wall
Ropes Ltd. v. Coastal Marine Constructions &
Engineering Ltd., (2019) SCC OnLine SC 515 -
referred to.
 [2019] 12 S.C.R. 123
123
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124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 12 S.C.R.
Case Law Reference
(2019) 5 SCC 362
overruled
Para 4
[2017] 10 SCR 285
referred to
Para 4
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688
referred to
Para 7
[2018] 2 SCR 598
referred to
Para 8
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7023
of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2019 of the High
Court at Calcutta in A.P. No. 565 of 2018.
 Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Utpal Majumdar, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi,
Ms. Samten Doma, Abhishek Thakral, Sagnik Majumdar, Advs. for the
Appellant.
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sonia Dube, Ms. Labanyasree Sinha,
S. Chakraborty, Ms. Kanchan Yadav, Ms. Surbhi Anand, Bhav Ratan
(for M/s. Victor Moses & Associates), Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. F. NARIMAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the respondent at considerable length.
3. On the facts of this case, we do not propose to interfere with
the impugned decision of 12.03.2019 and, therefore, do not find it
necessary to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India.
4. Having said this, however, during the course of argument, a
recent decision of this Court was pointed out, namely, United India
Insurance Company Limited vs. Antique Art Exports Private
Limited, (2019) 5 SCC 362. In this judgment, purportedly following
Duro Felguera, S.A. vs. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017) 9 SCC
729, this Court held:
"20. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent
that after insertion of sub-section (6-A) to Section 11 of the
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Amendment Act, 2015 the jurisdiction of this Court is denuded
and the limited mandate of the Court is to examine the factum
of existence of an arbitration and relied on the judgment in
Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd. [(2017) 9
SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764] The exposition in this
decision is a general observation about the effect of the amended
provisions which came to be examined under reference to six
arbitrable agreements (five agreements for works and one
corporate guarantee) and each agreement contains a provision
for arbitration and there was serious dispute between the parties
in reference to constitution of Arbitral Tribunal whether there
has to be Arbitral Tribunal pertaining to each agreement. In
the facts and circumstances, this Court took note of sub-section
(6-A) introduced by the Amendment Act, 2015 to Section 11
of the Act and in that context observed that the preliminary
disputes are to be examined by the arbitrator and are not for
the Court to be examined within the limited scope available for
appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act.
Suffice it to say that appointment of an arbitrator is a judicial
power and is not a mere administrative function leaving some
degree of judicial intervention; when it comes to the question
to examine the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement,
it is always necessary to ensure that the dispute resolution
process does not become unnecessarily protracted.
21. In the instant case, prima facie no dispute subsisted after
the discharge voucher being signed by the respondent without
any demur or protest and claim being finally settled with accord
and satisfaction and after 11 weeks of the settlement of claim
a letter was sent on 27-7-2016 for the first time raising a voice
in the form of protest that the discharge voucher was signed
under undue influence and coercion with no supportive prima
facie evidence being placed on record in absence thereof, it
must follow that the claim had been settled with accord and
satisfaction leaving no arbitral dispute subsisting under the
agreement to be referred to the arbitrator for adjudication."
5. Section 11 (6A) was added by the amendment Act of 2015 and
states as follows:
"11. (6A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High
Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or
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sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination
of the existence of an arbitration agreement."
6. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate, has pointed out
that by an amendment Act of 2019, which has since been passed, this
sub-section has now been omitted. Section 3 of the amendment Act of
2019 insofar as it pertains to this omission has not yet been brought into
force. The omission is pursuant to a High Level Committee Review
regarding institutionalization of arbitration in India, headed by Justice B.
N. Srikrishna. The Report given by this Committee is dated 30th July,
2017. The omission of the sub-section is not so as to resuscitate the law
that was prevailing prior to the amendment Act of 2015. The reason for
omission of S. 11(6A) is given in the Report as follows:
"Thus, the 2015 amendments to section 11 are geared towards
facilitating speedy disposal of section 11 applications by: (a)
enabling the designation of any person or institution as an appointing
authority for arbitrators in addition to the High Court or Supreme
Court under section 11; (b) limiting challenges to the decision made
by the appointing authority; and (c) requiring the expeditious
disposal of section 11 applications, preferably within the prescribed
60-day time period.
While these amendments no doubt facilitate the speedy disposal
of section 11 applications to a large extent, they do not go all the
way in limiting court interference. Pursuant to the amendments,
the appointment of arbitrators under section 11 may be done: (a)
by the Supreme Court or the High Court; or (b) by a person or
institution designated by such court in exercise of an administrative
power following section 11(6B). In either case, the amendments
still require the Supreme Court / the High Court to examine whether
an arbitration agreement exists, which can lead to delays in the
arbitral process as extensive evidence and arguments may be led
on the same.
The Committee notes that the default procedure for appointment
of arbitrators in other jurisdictions do not require extensive court
involvement as in India.
For instance, in Singapore, the relevant provision of the IAA
provides that where the parties fail to agree on the appointment
of the third arbitrator, within 30 days of the receipt of the first
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request by either party to appoint the arbitrator, the appointment
shall be made by the appointing authority (the President of the
SIAC) by the request of the parties. (See section 9A(2) read with
sections 2(1) and 8(2), IAA)
The arbitration legislation of Hong Kong incorporates Article 11
of the UNCITRAL Model Law relating to the appointment of
arbitrators. Like in the case of Singapore where the SIAC is the
appointing authority for arbitrators, the default appointment of
arbitrator(s) is done by the HKIAC. (Section 13(2) read with
section 24, AO)
In the United Kingdom, in the case of default of one party to
appoint an arbitrator, the other party may appoint his arbitrator as
the sole arbitrator after giving notice of 7 clear days to the former
of his intention to do so. (Section 17, AA) The defaulting party
may apply to the court to set aside the appointment. (Section 17(3),
AA) In case of a failure of the appointment procedure, any party
may apply to the court to make the appointment or give directions
regarding the making of an appointment. (Section 18(2), AA)
The Committee recommends the adoption of the practice followed
in Singapore and Hong Kong in the Indian scenario - apart from
avoiding delays at court level, it may also give impetus to institutional
arbitration.
xxx xxx
Recommendations
1. In order to ensure speedy appointment of arbitrators, section
11 may be amended to provide that the appointment of
arbitrator(s) under the section shall only be done by arbitral
institution(s) designated by the Supreme Court (in case of
international commercial arbitrations) or the High Court (in
case of all other arbitrations) for such purpose, without the
Supreme Court or High Courts being required to determine
the existence of an arbitration agreement."
Thus, it can be seen that after the amendment Act of 2019, Section
11(6A) has been omitted because appointment of arbitrators is to be
done institutionally, in which case the Supreme Court or the High Court
under the old statutory regime are no longer required to appoint arbitrators
and consequently to determine whether an arbitration agreement exists.
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7. Prior to Section 11(6A), this Court in several judgments beginning
with SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr.(2005) 8 SCC
618 has held that at the stage of a Section 11(6) application being filed,
the Court need not merely confine itself to the examination of the existence
of an arbitration agreement but could also go into certain preliminary
questions such as stale claims, accord and satisfaction having been
reached etc.
8. In ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals Limitedvs.ANS
Constructions Limited and another,(2018) 3 SCC 373, this Court in a
case which arose before the insertion of Section 11(6A) dismissed a
Section 11 petition on the ground that accord and satisfaction had taken
place in the following terms: -
"31. Admittedly, no-dues certificate was submitted by the
contractee company on 21-9-2012 and on their request completion
certificate was issued by the appellant contractor. The contractee,
after a gap of one month, that is, on 24-10-2012, withdrew the nodues certificate on the grounds of coercion and duress and the
claim for losses incurred during execution of the contract site
was made vide letter dated 12-1-2013, i.e. after a gap of 3 1⁄2
(three-and-a-half) months whereas the final bill was settled on
10-10-2012. When the contractee accepted the final payment in
full and final satisfaction of all its claims, there is no point in raising
the claim for losses incurred during the execution of the contract
at a belated stage which creates an iota of doubt as to why such
claim was not settled at the time of submitting final bills that too in
the absence of exercising duress or coercion on the contractee
by the appellant contractor. In our considered view, the plea raised
by the contractee company is bereft of any details and particulars,
and cannot be anything but a bald assertion. In the circumstances,
there was full and final settlement of the claim and there was
really accord and satisfaction and in our view no arbitrable dispute
existed so as to exercise power under Section 11 of the Act. The
High Court was not, therefore, justified in exercising power under
Section 11 of the Act."
9. The 246th Law Commission Report dealt with some of these
judgments and felt that at the stage of a Section 11(6) application, only
"existence" of an arbitration agreement ought to be looked at and not
other preliminary issues. In a recent judgment of this Court, namely,
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Garware Wall Ropes Ltd.vs.Coastal Marine Constructions &
Engineering Ltd., (2019 SCC OnLine SC 515), this Court adverted to
the said Law Commission Report and held: -
"14. The case law under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, as it
stood prior to the Amendment Act, 2015, has had a chequered
history. In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Mehul
Construction Co., (2000) 7 SCC 201 ["Konkan Railway I"], it
was held that the powers of the Chief Justice under Section 11(6)
of the 1996 Act are administrative in nature, and that the Chief
Justice or his designate does not act as a judicial authority while
appointing an arbitrator. The same view was reiterated in Konkan
Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd., (2002)
2 SCC 388 ["Konkan Railway II"].
15. However, in SBP & Co. (supra), a seven-Judge Bench
overruled this view and held that the power to appoint an arbitrator
under Section is judicial and not administrative. The conclusions
of the seven-Judge Bench were summarised in paragraph 47 of
the aforesaid judgment. We are concerned directly with subparagraphs (i), (iv), and (xii), which read as follows:
"(i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High
Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11(6) of the
Act is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power.
 xxx xxx xxx
(iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the
right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier
part of this judgment. These will be his own jurisdiction to
entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the
existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on
the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief
Justice or the designated Judge would be entitled to seek the
opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator
qualified in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act if the need arises
but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of the
Chief Justice or the designated Judge.
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(xii) The decision in Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltd. v. Rani
Construction (P) Ltd. [(2002) 2 SCC 388] is overruled."
16. This position was further clarified in Boghara Polyfab (supra)
as follows:
"22. Where the intervention of the court is sought for appointment
of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11, the duty of the Chief
Justice or his designate is defined in SBP & Co. [(2005) 8 SCC
618]. This Court identified and segregated the preliminary issues
that may arise for consideration in an application under Section 11
of the Act into three categories, that is, (i) issues which the Chief
Justice or his designate is bound to decide; (ii) issues which he
can also decide, that is, issues which he may choose to decide;
and (iii) issues which should be left to the Arbitral Tribunal to
decide.
22.1. The issues (first category) which the Chief Justice/his
designate will have to decide are:
(a) Whether the party making the application has approached
the appropriate High Court.
(b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and whether
the party who has applied under Section 11 of the Act, is a
party to such an agreement.
22.2. The issues (second category) which the Chief Justice/
his designate may choose to decide (or leave them to the
decision of the Arbitral Tribunal) are:
(a) Whether the claim is a dead (long-barred) claim or a
live claim.
(b) Whether the parties have concluded the contract/
transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights
and obligation or by receiving the final payment without
objection.
22.3. The issues (third category) which the Chief Justice/his
designate should leave exclusively to the Arbitral Tribunal are:
(i) Whether a claim made falls within the arbitration clause (as
for example, a matter which is reserved for final decision of a
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departmental authority and excepted or excluded from
arbitration).
(ii) Merits or any claim involved in the arbitration."
17. As a result of these judgments, the door was wide open for
the Chief Justice or his designate to decide a large number of
preliminary aspects which could otherwise have been left to be
decided by the arbitrator under Section 16 of the 1996 Act. As a
result, the Law Commission of India, by its Report No. 246
submitted in August 2014, suggested that various sweeping
changes be made in the 1996 Act. Insofar as SBP & Co. (supra)
and Boghara Polyfab (supra) are concerned, the Law
Commission examined the matter and recommended the addition
of a new sub-section, namely, sub-section (6A) in Section 11. In
so doing, the Law Commission recommendations which are
relevant and which led to the introduction of Section 11(6A) are
as follows:
 "28. The Act recognizes situations where the intervention of
the Court is envisaged at the pre-arbitral stage, i.e. prior to the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, which includes sections 8,
9, 11 in the case of Part I arbitrations and section 45 in the
case of Part II arbitrations. Sections 8, 45 and also section 11
relating to "reference to arbitration" and "appointment of the
tribunal", directly affect the constitution of the tribunal and
functioning of the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, their
operation has a direct and significant impact on the "conduct"
of arbitrations. Section 9, being solely for the purpose of securing
interim relief, although having the potential to affect the rights
of parties, does not affect the "conduct" of the arbitration in
the same way as these other provisions. It is in this context the
Commission has examined and deliberated the working of these
provisions and proposed certain amendments.
 29. The Supreme Court has had occasion to deliberate upon
the scope and nature of permissible pre-arbitral judicial
intervention, especially in the context of section 11 of the Act.
Unfortunately, however, the question before the Supreme Court
was framed in terms of whether such a power is a "judicial"
or an "administrative" power - which obfuscates the real issue
underlying such nomenclature/description as to -
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-the scope of such powers - i.e. the scope of arguments
which a Court (Chief Justice) will consider while deciding
whether to appoint an arbitrator or not - i.e. whether the
arbitration agreement exists, whether it is null and void,
whether it is voidable etc.; and which of these it should
leave for decision of the arbitral tribunal.
-the nature of such intervention - i.e. would the Court
(Chief Justice) consider the issues upon a detailed trial and
whether the same would be decided finally or be left for
determination of the arbitral tribunal.
30. After a series of cases culminating in the decision in SBP v.
Patel Engineering, (2005) 8 SCC 618, the Supreme Court held
that the power to appoint an arbitrator under section 11 is a "judicial"
power. The underlying issues in this judgment, relating to the scope
of intervention, were subsequently clarified by RAVEENDRAN
J in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd.,
(2009) 1 SCC 267, where the Supreme Court laid down as follows
-
"1. The issues (first category) which Chief Justice/his designate
will have to decide are:
(a) Whether the party making the application has approached
the appropriate High Court?
(b) Whether there is an arbitration agreement and whether the
party who has applied under section 11 of the Act, is a party to
such an agreement?
2. The issues (second category) which the Chief Justice/his
designate may choose to decide are:
(a) Whether the claim is a dead (long barred) claim or a live
claim?
(b) Whether the parties have concluded the contract/transaction
by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights and obligation
or by receiving the final payment without objection?
3. The issues (third category) which the Chief Justice/his designate
should leave exclusively to the arbitral tribunal are:
(a) Whether a claim falls within the arbitration clause (as for
example, a matter which is reserved for final decision of a
departmental authority and excepted or excluded from
arbitration)?
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(b) Merits of any claim involved in the arbitration."
31. The Commission is of the view that, in this context, the same
test regarding scope and nature of judicial intervention, as
applicable in the context of section 11, should also apply to sections
8 and 45 of the Act - since the scope and nature of judicial
intervention should not change upon whether a party (intending to
defeat the arbitration agreement) refuses to appoint an arbitrator
in terms of the arbitration agreement, or moves a proceeding before
a judicial authority in the face of such an arbitration agreement.
32. In relation to the nature of intervention, the exposition of the
law is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Shin
Etsu Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre, (2005) 7 SCC 234,
(in the context of section 45 of the Act), where the Supreme
Court has ruled in favour of looking at the issues/controversy only
prima facie.
33. It is in this context, the Commission has recommended
amendments to sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996. The scope of the judicial intervention is only restricted
to situations where the Court/Judicial Authority finds that the
arbitration agreement does not exist or is null and void. In so far
as the nature of intervention is concerned, it is recommended that
in the event the Court/Judicial Authority is prima facie satisfied
against the argument challenging the arbitration agreement, it shall
appoint the arbitrator and/or refer the parties to arbitration, as the
case may be. The amendment envisages that the judicial authority
shall not refer the parties to arbitration only if it finds that there
does not exist an arbitration agreement or that it is null and void.
If the judicial authority is of the opinion that prima facie the
arbitration agreement exists, then it shall refer the dispute to
arbitration, and leave the existence of the arbitration agreement
to be finally determined by the arbitral tribunal. However, if the
judicial authority concludes that the agreement does not exist, then
the conclusion will be final and not prima facie. The amendment
also envisages that there shall be a conclusive determination as to
whether the arbitration agreement is null and void. In the event
that the judicial authority refers the dispute to arbitration and/or
appoints an arbitrator, under sections 8 and 11 respectively, such
a decision will be final and non-appealable. An appeal can be
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maintained under section 37 only in the event of refusal to refer
parties to arbitration, or refusal to appoint an arbitrator."
18. Pursuant to the Law Commission recommendations, Section
11(6A) was introduced first by Ordinance and then by the
Amendment Act, 2015. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
which were appended to the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Bill, 2015 which introduced the Amendment Act,
2015 read as follows:
"STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
xxx xxx xxx
6. It is proposed to introduce the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Bill, 2015, to replace the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, which inter alia, provides for the
following, namely:-
(i) to amend the definition of "Court" to provide that in the
case of international commercial arbitrations, the Court should
be the High Court;
(ii) to ensure that an Indian Court can exercise jurisdiction to
grant interim measures, etc., even where the seat of the
arbitration is outside India;
(iii) an application for appointment of an arbitrator shall be
disposed of by the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case
may be, as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour should
be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days;
(iv) to provide that while considering any application for
appointment of arbitrator, the High Court or the Supreme Court
shall examine the existence of a prima facie arbitration
agreement and not other issues;
(v) to provide that the arbitral tribunal shall make its award
within a period of twelve months from the date it enters upon
the reference and that the parties may, however, extend such
period up to six months, beyond which period any extension
can only be granted by the Court, on sufficient cause;
(vi) to provide that a model fee Schedule on the basis of which
High Courts may frame rules for the purpose of determination
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of fees of arbitral tribunal, where a High Court appoints
arbitrator in terms of section 11 of the Act;
(vii) to provide that the parties to dispute may at any stage
agree in writing that their dispute be resolved through fast track
procedure and the award in such cases shall be made within a
period of six months;
(viii) to provide for neutrality of arbitrators, when a person is
approached in connection with possible appointment as an
arbitrator;
(ix) to provide that application to challenge the award is to be
disposed of by the Court within one year.
7. The amendments proposed in the Bill will ensure that arbitration
process becomes more user-friendly, cost effective and lead to
expeditious disposal of cases.
xxx xxx xxx"
19. A reading of the Law Commission Report, together with the
Statement of Objects and Reasons, shows that the Law
Commission felt that the judgments in SBP & Co. (supra) and
Boghara Polyfab (supra) required a relook, as a result of which,
so far as Section 11 is concerned, the Supreme Court or, as the
case may be, the High Court, while considering any application
under Section 11(4) to 11(6) is to confine itself to the examination
of the existence of an arbitration agreement and leave all other
preliminary issues to be decided by the arbitrator."
10. This being the position, it is clear that the law prior to the 2015
Amendment that has been laid down by this Court, which would have
included going into whether accord and satisfaction has taken place, has
now been legislatively overruled. This being the position, it is difficult to
agree with the reasoning contained in the aforesaid judgment as Section
11(6A) is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been laid
down in the judgment Duro Felguera, S.A. (supra) - see paras 48 &
59.
11. We, therefore, overrule the judgment in United India
Insurance Company Limited (supra) as not having laid down the correct
law but dismiss this appeal for the reason given in para 3 above.
M/S MAYAVTI TRADING PVT. LTD. v. PRADYUAT DEB
BURMAN [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 12 S.C.R.
12. Mr. Rohatgi now requests us for an extension of the status
quo order granted by the trial court for a period of one week from today
so that he may adopt other proceedings. This request is granted.
Ankit Gyan
Appeal dismissed.