# M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPARTMENT

- **Citation:** [2019] 11 S.C.R. 508
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-08-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5397 of 2010
- **Bench:** Abhay Manohar Sapre, Dinesh Maheshwari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-s-natesan-agencies-plantations-v-state-rep-by-the-secretary-to-government-33055
- **Pages:** 46

## Headnote

Wildlife Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - ss. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 27 and 28 - Recovery of damages - Appellant-partnership
firm had taken land on lease from its owner, the Mutt for purpose
of cultivating commercial crops - The registered lease was for a
period of 5 years i.e. 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977 - The State issued
notification dated 06.03.1976 for the purpose of wild life sanctuary
which included the land in question - Thereafter, a fresh long-term
lease for a period of 25 years (from 01.07.1977 to 30.06.2002)
was made - The appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in
question excluded from the sanctuary, however were unsuccessful
- Thereafter, award of compensation for acquisition was under
consideration, but instead of making award, the collector issued
order dated 19.11.1993, excluding the land in question from the
limits of wild life sanctuary - Aggrieved, the Mutt and the appellant
filed writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the
Single Judge - However, the Division Bench of the High Court did
not approve the order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court
and dismissed the writ petition while leaving it open for the appellant
and the Mutt to approach the appropriate forum in their claim for
damages - The Division Bench also acknowledged the power of
the Government to withdraw from the notification and to refuse an
award under the Land Acquisition Act - Thereafter, on 08.06.1998
appellant instituted the civil suit for recovery of damages against
the State on the ground that the appellant was debarred from 1976
to 1993 from utilising the land in question - Single Judge of the
High Court decided in favour of the appellant - However, Division
Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit - On appeal, held:
 [2019] 11 S.C.R. 508
508
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After issuance of the notification dated 06.03.1976 and inclusion
of the land in question, there was absolutely no occasion for the
appellant acquiring any further right in the land after expiry of the
term of lease on 30.06.1977 - So, the second lease (i.e. a lease for
25 years) was of no effect - Appellant had acquired no right under
the said second lease and least any right against the State -
Therefore, appellant had no right to claim damages - Further,
appellant was not dispossessed and there was nothing on record to
suggest that appellant was prevented by the State from going inside
the forest and collecting usufructs - Thus, there was no basis for
the appellant to maintain an action for damages.
Limitation Act, 1963 - s.14 - Applicability of - Appellantpartnership firm had taken land on lease for purpose of cultivation
of commercial crops - A notification dated 06.03.1976 was issued
vide which land in question was acquired for sanctuary - The
appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in question excluded
from the sanctuary but were unsuccessful - Thereafter, instead of
awarding compensation, the collector on 19.11.1993 excluded the
land in question from the sanctuary - Aggrieved, appellant filed
writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the Single
Judge - However, Division Bench of High Court dismissed the writ
petition while leaving it open for the Mutt and the appellant to
approach the appropriate forum to claim damages - Division Bench
also held that it was open for appellant to seek exclusion of the
period during which they were prosecuting the matter in the High
Court - Appellant filed civil suit for recovery of damages, which
was decided in its favour by the Single Judge of the High Court,
however, Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit
- On appeal, held: It is settled that for applicability of s.14 of the
limitation Act and exclusion of time spent in earlier proceeding, the
matter-in-issue in both the earlier and the later proceeding must be
the same - In the present case, the appellant in the earlier proceeding
sought exclusion of the land from sanctuary and that State ought to

## Text

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M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS)
v.
STATE REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPARTMENT
(Civil Appeal No. 5397 of 2010)
AUGUST 20, 2019
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND
DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Wildlife Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - ss. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 27 and 28 - Recovery of damages - Appellant-partnership
firm had taken land on lease from its owner, the Mutt for purpose
of cultivating commercial crops - The registered lease was for a
period of 5 years i.e. 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977 - The State issued
notification dated 06.03.1976 for the purpose of wild life sanctuary
which included the land in question - Thereafter, a fresh long-term
lease for a period of 25 years (from 01.07.1977 to 30.06.2002)
was made - The appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in
question excluded from the sanctuary, however were unsuccessful
- Thereafter, award of compensation for acquisition was under
consideration, but instead of making award, the collector issued
order dated 19.11.1993, excluding the land in question from the
limits of wild life sanctuary - Aggrieved, the Mutt and the appellant
filed writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the
Single Judge - However, the Division Bench of the High Court did
not approve the order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court
and dismissed the writ petition while leaving it open for the appellant
and the Mutt to approach the appropriate forum in their claim for
damages - The Division Bench also acknowledged the power of
the Government to withdraw from the notification and to refuse an
award under the Land Acquisition Act - Thereafter, on 08.06.1998
appellant instituted the civil suit for recovery of damages against
the State on the ground that the appellant was debarred from 1976
to 1993 from utilising the land in question - Single Judge of the
High Court decided in favour of the appellant - However, Division
Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit - On appeal, held:
 [2019] 11 S.C.R. 508
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After issuance of the notification dated 06.03.1976 and inclusion
of the land in question, there was absolutely no occasion for the
appellant acquiring any further right in the land after expiry of the
term of lease on 30.06.1977 - So, the second lease (i.e. a lease for
25 years) was of no effect - Appellant had acquired no right under
the said second lease and least any right against the State -
Therefore, appellant had no right to claim damages - Further,
appellant was not dispossessed and there was nothing on record to
suggest that appellant was prevented by the State from going inside
the forest and collecting usufructs - Thus, there was no basis for
the appellant to maintain an action for damages.
Limitation Act, 1963 - s.14 - Applicability of - Appellantpartnership firm had taken land on lease for purpose of cultivation
of commercial crops - A notification dated 06.03.1976 was issued
vide which land in question was acquired for sanctuary - The
appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in question excluded
from the sanctuary but were unsuccessful - Thereafter, instead of
awarding compensation, the collector on 19.11.1993 excluded the
land in question from the sanctuary - Aggrieved, appellant filed
writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the Single
Judge - However, Division Bench of High Court dismissed the writ
petition while leaving it open for the Mutt and the appellant to
approach the appropriate forum to claim damages - Division Bench
also held that it was open for appellant to seek exclusion of the
period during which they were prosecuting the matter in the High
Court - Appellant filed civil suit for recovery of damages, which
was decided in its favour by the Single Judge of the High Court,
however, Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit
- On appeal, held: It is settled that for applicability of s.14 of the
limitation Act and exclusion of time spent in earlier proceeding, the
matter-in-issue in both the earlier and the later proceeding must be
the same - In the present case, the appellant in the earlier proceeding
sought exclusion of the land from sanctuary and that State ought to
take the land and pay compensation - Whereas, the claim in the
present suit was founded on the ground that the plaintiff had
suffered loss due to the proceedings under Wild life (Protection)
Act, 1972 and then, due to exclusion of the subject land from
acquisition - The relief claimed in the present suit and matter-inM/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC.
TO GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT.
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issue cannot be said to be same as was in issue in the earlier
proceeding - Therefore, s.14 of the Limitation Act not applicable in
the present case.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : Claim for damages by the appellant-whether
sustainable?
1. It is beyond the pale of doubt that in the scheme of the
Wildlife Protection Act 1972, issuance of a notification under
Section 18 thereof has the peculiar and striking effect, of arresting
the accrual of any right in the land comprised within the limits of
the area specified in such notification except by way of
testamentary or intestate succession (vide Section 20 ibid.). Even
if the appellant was given the land in question on lease for a period
of 5 years from 01.07.1972, that period came to an end on
30.06.1977. On this date of completion of the term of the lease,
indisputably, the notification under Section 18(1), which was issued
on 06.03.1976, was in operation and it had been the specific
assertion of the appellant that the subject land was included in
the said notification. That being the position, there was absolutely
no occasion for the appellant acquiring any further right in the
land in question after expiry of the term of his lease on 30.06.1977.
For this reason alone, this Court clearly of the view that the so
called second lease deed, said to have been executed in favour
of the appellant on 20.03.1978 was of no effect. In other words,
the notification under Section 18(1) having been issued on
06.03.1976, no right in the land in question could have been
acquired except by succession and hence, acquiring of any right
by the appellant in the subject land, said to be covered by the
said notification dated 06.03.1976, by way of a lease, was absolutely
out of question. [Para 16] [543-B; 544-A-C]
2. The entire substratum of the case of the appellant is
knocked to the ground once it is found that the appellant had
acquired no right under the said second lease dated 20.03.1978
and least any right against the State. Noteworthy it is that in all
the previous litigations, initially seeking exclusion of land in
question from the sanctuary; then seeking compensation for its
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inclusion; and then questioning its exclusion, the Mutt had been
an active participant. In fact, the last petition seeking to question
the exclusion was filed jointly by the Mutt and the appellant.
However, the Mutt has not joined the claim for damages in this
suit. The appellant had no right whatsoever to claim damages
with reference to the alleged cause of action based on the order
of exclusion dated 19.11.1993 for the reason that the alleged
second lease was of no effect and the appellant had acquired no
right thereunder. In other words that if at all the exclusion order
dated 19.11.1993 furnished any right to maintain an action against
the State, only and only the Mutt could have maintained such an
action but not the appellant. The suit filed by the appellant is
liable to be dismissed on this count alone. [Para 16.1] [544-D-G]
3. The Division Bench has rightly observed in the impugned
judgment that there is nothing on record to establish that the
original owner and the plaintiff were prevented from going inside
the forest and collecting the usufructs. In a comprehension of
the facts on record and the law applicable, it cannot be said that
the plaintiff-appellant was prevented from exercising its lawful
rights in any unlawful manner by the State. Hence, there
appears no basis for the appellant to maintain an action for
damages. [Para 17.2] [545-F-G]
Limitation
4. Section 14 is one such provision in the Limitation Act
that provides for exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting one
civil proceeding bona fide in a Court not having jurisdiction, while
computing limitation in any suit where the matter in issue is same
as that of the earlier proceeding. [Para 21.4] [548-C]
5. In the present case, except the fact that the earlier writ
petition in challenge to the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993 was
civil proceeding and the plaintiff might have been prosecuting
with due diligence, none of the other requirements of Section 14
of the Limitation Act are satisfied. The basic requirement, that
the matter in issue in the earlier and the later proceeding ought
to be the same; and both the proceedings, earlier and later, ought
to relate to the same cause of action and for the same relief, is
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC.
TO GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT.
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totally missing. Rather, the matter in issue in the earlier
proceeding could well be contradistinguished from the matter in
issue in the present suit. In the said earlier proceeding, the
plaintiff-appellant joined the Mutt to assert that the respondentState was not entitled to exclude the land in question from
sanctuary; and that the State ought to take the land and ought to
pay compensation as proposed by some of its officers. On the
other hand, the claim in the present suit is founded on the ground
that the plaintiff has suffered loss due to the proceedings under
the Act of 1972 and then, due to exclusion of the subject land
from acquisition. The relief claimed in the present suit and matter
in issue herein cannot be said to be the same as had been in
issue in the earlier proceeding i.e., the said writ petition against
the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993. Apart from the fact that
the earlier proceeding i.e., the said writ petition was for a different
relief for quashing the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993, it is
also pertinent that the said writ petition was dismissed on merit
and not for want of jurisdiction. Applicability of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is totally ruled out in this case. [Para 21.5]
[551-D-H; 552-A]
Thiru John v. Returning Officer & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC
540 : [1977] 3 SCR 538 ; Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh
Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 802 ;
Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank Financial
Services Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 94 : [2006] 2 Suppl.
SCR 1 ; Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (Dead)
by LRs. (1993) Supp (2) SCC 149 : [1992] 1 Suppl.
SCR 620 ; Kasturi Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC
1039 : [1965] SCR 375 ; N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v.
State of A.P. (1994) 6 SCC 205 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR
144 ; Union of India v. Sancheti Food Products Ltd.
(2015) 15 SCC 447 ; Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal
Council, Tonk & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 100 : [1996] 5
Suppl. SCR 227 ; Union of India v. Shring Construction
Co. (P) Ltd. (2006) 8 SCC 18 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR
273 ; State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors.
(2000) 5 SCC 712 : [2000] 3 SCR 644 - referred to.
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Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand AIR 1951
SC 16 : [1950] SCR 852 ; Madhavrao Narayanarao
Patwardhan v. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu and Ors. AIR
1958 SC 767 : [1959] SCR 564 ; Zafar Khan and Ors.
v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and Ors. 1984 (Supp) SCC
505 : [1985] SCR 287 - relied on.
Kashinath Shankarappa v. The New Akot Cotton
Ginning and Pressing Co. Ltd. AIR 1951 Nagpur 255
- approved.
Case Law Reference
[1977] 3 SCR 538
referred to
Para 9
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 802
referred to
Para 9
[2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 9
[1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 620
referred to
Para 9.1
[1965] SCR 375
referred to
Para 9.3
[1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 144
referred to
Para 9.3
(2015) 15 SCC 447
referred to
Para 9.3
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 227
referred to
Para 9.4
[2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 273
referred to
Para 9.4
[2000] 3 SCR 644
referred to
Para 9.4
[1950] SCR 852
referred to
Para 10.3
[1959] SCR 564
relied on
Para 21.4.1
[1985] SCR 287
relied on
Para 21.4.2
AIR 1951 Nagpur 255
approved
Para 21.4.4
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5397
of 2010.
From the final Judgment dated 26.02.2007 of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in O.S.A. No.193 of 2002 and O.S.A. No.178 of
2003.
A.K. Ganguli, Sr. Adv., Ms. Barnali Basak, V. Ramasubramanian,
M. Munusamy, Ms. L. Maheswari, Advs. for the Appellants.
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC.
TO GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT.
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K. Rama Moorthy, Sr. Adv., M. Yogesh Kanna, S. Partha Sarathi,
S. Raja Rajeshwaran, Pushkin Rajkumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Introduction
1. In this appeal by special leave, the plaintiff-appellant, said to be
a partnership firm, has called in question the common judgment and
decree dated 26.02.2007 in O.S.A. Nos. 193 of 2002 and 178 of 2003
(with C.M.P. No. 8947 of 2006) whereby, the Division Bench of High
Court of Judicature at Madras, while allowing the appeal filed by the
defendant-State and while dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiffappellant, has reversed the judgment and decree dated 15.10.2001, as
passed by the learned Single Judge in C.S. No. 561 of 1998; and has
dismissed the appellant's suit for recovery of damages.
1.1. This matter, arising out of the aforesaid suit for recovery of
damages, carries a peculiar and chequered history of its own, with
assortment of several undisputed actual facts, a few disputed facts, and
varied rounds of litigations. In a brief outline of the subject matter, it may
be noticed that the plaintiff-appellant had allegedly taken certain parcels
of land1 on lease (initially for a period of 5 years in the years 1971-1972
and later, for a period of 25 years in the years 1977-1978) from its owner
Sri Nanamamalai Jeer Mutt, Nanguneri2 for plantation and co-related
purposes. The case of the plaintiff-appellant has been that by virtue of a
notification dated 06.03.1976, as issued by the Government of Tamil
Nadu, the land in question was proposed to be included in a wild life
sanctuary under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 19723 and several
propositions for award of compensation were actively considered by the
authorities concerned, who were also under the mandate of the High
Court to finalise the award of compensation at the earliest. The grievance
of the plaintiff-appellant has been that on one hand, the land in question
was not allowed to be used because of the proposal for its acquisition
1 Comprising field Nos. 805/1, 805/3, 805/4, 806, 807,808 & 809 in Kalakkadu Village
and field No. 495 in Malayadipudur Village (Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelveli District), in
all admeasuring 197.36 acres - Hereinafter referred to as 'the land in question' or 'the
subject land'.
2 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Mutt'.
3 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' or 'the Act of 1972'.
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for wild life sanctuary and on the other hand, no amount of compensation
was paid; and then, the defendant-respondent chose to exclude the land
in question from the limits of the said wild life sanctuary by way of an
order issued on 19.11.1993. The plaintiff-appellant and the Mutt
challenged the said order dated 19.11.1993 in the High Court by way of
a writ petition. On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge of the High Court
allowed the writ petition so filed by the appellant and the Mutt but the
Division Bench, in its judgment and order dated 18.09.1997, set aside
the order so passed by the Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition
while upholding the powers of the State Government to withdraw from
the notification in question. The Division Bench, however, left it open for
the writ petitioners 'to take appropriate civil action for quantifying
their damages'; and also observed that for the purpose of such an action,
it was open for the writ petitioners 'to rely on the provisions of the
Limitation Act for excluding the period during which they had been
prosecuting the matter in this Court'. Thereafter, the plaintiff-appellant
instituted the civil suit in question against the defendant-respondent,
seeking recovery of damages to the tune to Rs. 1,31,95,000/- together
with interest @ 18% per annum, for having been allegedly deprived of
the use of the land in question on the proposition for acquisition. A learned
Single Judge of the High Court, by way of the judgement and decree
dated 15.10.2001, partly decreed the suit, holding the plaintiff entitled to
a sum of Rs. 86,88,000/- together with interest @ 9% per annum from
the date of suit until realisation. However, in the appeal preferred by the
defendant-State, the Division Bench of the High Court found no case
for award of any damages to the plaintiff and, by its impugned judgment
and decree dated 26.02.2007, reversed the decree of the learned Single
Judge and dismissed the suit. Hence, the plaintiff-appellant has preferred
this appeal.
The relevant background and factual matrix
2. The relevant background and factual aspects of the matter
could be briefly summarised as follows:-
2.1. The appellant, a partnership firm, had taken the land in question,
admeasuring 197.36 acres, on lease from its owner, the Mutt, for the
purpose of cultivating commercial crops such as tea, coffee and
cardamom over 80 acres of the total available land. The appellant has
alleged that the land in question was given on lease on 15.11.1971 but
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC. TO
GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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the registered lease deed in that regard was executed by the Mutt on
01.07.1972, for a period of 5 years i.e., from 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977.
2.2. By G.O.Ms. No. 183 dated 06.03.1976, issued under Section
18(1) of the Act of 1972, the Government of Tamil Nadu stated its approval
of the proposal of Chief Conservator of Forests to notify Kalakkadu
Reserve Forest in Tirunelveli District as a sanctuary for the protection
and development of wild life therein. This allegedly included the aforesaid
197.36 acres of land leased to the appellant.
2.3. On 23.03.1975 and on 17.09.1976, the appellant applied for
clear felling of trees in 10 acres of land out of the said 197.36 acres but
excluding the 80 acres already under plantation. However, the District
Collector, by his communication dated 16.11.1976, refused to grant such
a permission to the appellant on the grounds that the land in question
was demarcated under the said notification for the purpose of wild life
sanctuary; and felling of trees may affect the soil conservation and
moisture conservation measures in the locality.
2.4. Thereafter, on 14.07.1977, the District Collector issued a
proclamation under Section 21 of the Act of 1972 specifying the limits of
the sanctuary and requiring any person having any right to file the claim
in Form No. 8 under the Wild Life Protection (Tamil Nadu) Rules, 19754.
The appellant would submit that the land in question was not included in
this proclamation dated 14.07.1977.
2.5. The appellant would further submit that when the land in
question was not included in this proclamation dated 14.07.1977 and the
lease period under the aforesaid lease deed dated 01.07.1972 had expired
on 30.06.1977, the Mutt was requested to execute a long-term lease in
favour of the appellant for developing the plantation in a better manner.
According to the appellant, on 20.03.1978, the Mutt granted a fresh
long-term lease of the land in question in its favour for a period of 25
years (from 01.07.1977 to 30.06.2002) after obtaining permission of the
Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments and after
consultation with the District Collector. We shall refer to the question
relating to the alleged permission of the said Commissioner hereafter a
little later.
2.6. Continuing with the factual matrix, it is noticed that on
28.08.1978, the Collector issued another proclamation under Section 21
4 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1975'
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calling upon the persons claiming any right in or over the land covered
thereunder to prefer a written claim within two months under the Rules
of 1975. On 31.08.1978, the Collector issued the same proclamation in
Tamil language, while also stating that the earlier notification dated
14.07.1977 was cancelled. According to the appellant, the land in question
came to be included within the proposed sanctuary only under these
notifications issued in the year 1978.
2.7. After the notifications aforesaid, various proceedings and
exchange of communications took place where on one hand, the appellant
and the Mutt made several attempts to get the subject land excluded
from the proposed sanctuary and on the other hand, on 24.06.1984, the
appellant filed a written statement in the award inquiry along with the
claim in Form No. 8 under the Rules of 1975, claiming compensation to
the tune of Rs. 41,36,866/-. The authorities concerned also exchanged
various inter-departmental communications for the purpose of assessment
of the amount of compensation. All these proceedings and
communications need not be elaborated herein but it may be noticed that
on 01.08.1985, the Collector rejected an application filed by the appellant
for registration of Cardamom Estate in the land in question on the ground
that the land was to be acquired for the purpose of setting up of the wild
life sanctuary. Thereafter, on 23.03.1990, the Collector addressed a
communication to the Special Commissioner and the Commissioner of
Land Administration that the compensation together with solatium
and interest for the land belonging to the Mutt was estimated at
Rs. 72,98,661/-. On 03.12.1990, the said Special Commissioner reduced
the total estimated compensation to Rs. 65,06,453/- and requested the
Government to pass appropriate order as regards the application of the
relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 18945 to the present
case. Further to this, on 05.03.1991, the Principal Chief Conservator of
Forests informed the concerned Secretary to the Government about the
expected liability of interest in relation to the award to be made in relation
to the land in question.
2.8. While the proceedings aforesaid remained pending but no
award had been made, the Mutt chose to challenge the proposal for
acquisition of the land in question by way of a writ petition (W.P. No.
685 of 1991) before the High Court. The present appellant was arrayed
5 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1894'
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC. TO
GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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as the fourth respondent in that writ petition. The respondent-State stated
in its counter affidavit in the said writ petition, inter alia, that 'the State
Government had applied their mind to the requirement of making
publication under Section 18 of the said Act and found it was valid
and had effected the publication in question under Section 18 of
the Central Act 53 of 1972'; and that it was 'not possible to exclude
the lands of the petitioner from the limits of the Sanctuary. It will
defeat the very purpose of creating the Sanctuary'.
2.9. The said writ petition filed by the Mutt was, however, dismissed
by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 13.07.1991, inter alia,
with the observations that Section 11-A of the Act of 1894 did not apply
to the proceedings in question and that if an illusory compensation was
awarded, the writ petitioner shall have the right to challenge the same.
The Mutt also preferred an intra-court appeal but, on 20.01.1992, the
same was dismissed as withdrawn by the Division Bench with the direction
to the Collector to expedite the proceedings for making the award of
compensation.
2.10. Thereafter, on 09.03.1992, a fresh notice for award inquiry
was issued by the Collector under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act of
1894. In response, the Mutt sent a letter claiming compensation to the
tune of Rs. 92,81,346/-. On the other hand, it appears from the submissions
made that on 30.03.1992, the appellant filed the statement claiming
compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,09,60,000/- for the market value of
coffee, cardamom and tea plantations; Rs.96,00,000/- towards anticipated
development of cardamom; and another Rs. 96,400/- towards the cost
of the building constructed. The appellant also claimed 30% solatium
and 12% p.a. interest from the date of notification until the date of award
and 15% p.a. future interest on the total amount of compensation.
2.11. On 16.04.1992, the award proceedings were completed and
a draft award was forwarded by the District Revenue Officer to the
Special Commissioner. However, since the respondent did not take further
steps for making the award, another writ petition, being W.P. No. 6931
of 1993, was preferred, jointly by the Mutt and the appellant, seeking
directions for early making of the award. This writ petition was disposed
of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 11.08.1993 with
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directions for making the award within four weeks from the date of
receipt of the order6.
2.12. After passing of the aforesaid order dated 11.08.1993, when
the matter was being processed by the authorities concerned, the Chief
Conservator of Forests (WL) and Chief Wildlife Warden, suggested on
25.08.1993 that the proposed acquisition of the land in question may be
dropped in view of the huge cost involved and acquisition of the land in
question being not necessary. With reference to these facts, an application
was moved on behalf of the respondent before the High Court on
21.09.1993, seeking six weeks' further time to enable the Commissioner,
Land Administration to issue suitable directions to the Collector. It appears
that on such an application, the High Court, by its order dated 26.10.1993,
extended the time for making the award.
2.13. Thereafter, on 19.11.1993, the Collector, Tirunelveli, in the
purported invocation of the powers under clause (a) of sub-section (2)
of Section 24 of the Act of 1972, excluded the land in question from the
limits of the wild life sanctuary. This order had the effect of releasing
the land in question from the proposed acquisition and thereby, obviating
the necessity of making the award of compensation.
2.14. The aforesaid order dated 19.11.1993, as issued by the
Collector, Tirunelveli, had been the bone of contention in this matter.
According to the appellant, the Collector having earlier taken the decision
to acquire the land in question, compensation was required to be paid;
and the authorities passed on dictates to the Collector to issue the said
order dated 19.11.1993 only in order to circumvent the order passed by
the High Court. The appellant has particularly referred to the letter dated
12.11.1993 by the Deputy Secretary, Forest Department to the Special
Commissioner, wherein it was stated that the proposed wild life sanctuary
could not meet the exorbitant cost of land acquisition and this acquisition
6 The learned Single Judge directed in the order dated 11.08.1993 thus:
"Hence I direct the competent authority, viz., Special Commissioner and
Commissioner for Land Administration to take into consideration the valuation
proposals sent in Collector's Office reference K2/1498/83 dated 20.6.1990 and
12.9.1990, and approved by the Special Administration and due representations
of the 2nd petitioner dated 10.7.92 and the representations of the 1st petitioner
dated 19.10.1992 and further representations of the 1st petitioners, if any, and
the proposal of the District Collector Tirunelveli, the 2nd respondent herein and
pass appropriate orders within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order
from the Court."
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC. TO
GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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was not required on priority. It is submitted that pursuant to this
communication dated 12.11.1993, the Special Commissioner sent the
letter dated 17.11.1993 to the Collector, Tirunelveli to exclude the land in
question from the limits of the proposed sanctuary under clause (a) of
sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 1972; and thus the Collector
issued the questioned order dated 19.11.1993.
2.15. The said order dated 19.11.1993 was challenged jointly by
the Mutt and the appellant by way of a writ petition in the High Court,
being W.P. No. 21721 of 1993. The present appellant also filed a contempt
petition (No. 340 of 1994) complaining of disobedience of the orders
earlier passed by the High Court. On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge
of the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the said order
dated 19.11.1993; and also held the officers concerned guilty of contempt
and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each of them. However, the order
so passed by the learned Single Judge was questioned by the respondentState by way of an intra-court appeal, being WA No. 1041 of 1995, that
was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment
dated 18.09.1997 but with several remarks and observations against the
respondent-State and while leaving it open for the writ petitioners to
approach the civil Court for recovery of damages.
2.16. The observations made by the Division Bench in its judgment
dated 18.09.1997 have formed the basis of the claim made by the appellant
in the civil suit leading to this appeal. Having regard to the subject matter
of this appeal and the questions involved, pertinent it would be to take
note of the observations and findings in the judgment dated 18.09.1997
in the requisite details.
2.16.1. In its judgment dated 18.09.1997, the Division Bench in
the first place observed that when the Collector had already taken the
decision to acquire the land in question and to pay compensation, there
was no occasion to exercise the power under clause (a) of sub-section
(2) of Section 24 of the Act of 1972. The Division Bench also rejected
the argument of the Government Pleader that withdrawal from the
proceeding could be sustained in terms of Section 48 of the Act of 1894.
Nevertheless, the Division Bench was of the view that Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act, 18977 was applicable and could have been invoked
by the Government. However, even in this regard, the Division Bench
7 Hereinafter referred to as 'the General Clauses Act'.
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observed that the entire action of the officers of the Government, right
from conceiving the project in question to the late stage backing out, had
been thoughtless, casual and perfunctory.
2.16.2. Even while making such remarks that the impugned actions
had been thoughtless and the Government must suffer the consequences,
the Division Bench of the High Court observed that the appellant and
the Mutt had no right to insist on the Government to complete the
acquisition proceedings and to proceed with the project as a sanctuary.
After such remarks and observations, the Division Bench acknowledged
the power of the Government to withdraw from the notification and to
refuse an award under the Act of 1894. However, the Division Bench
further proceeded to observe that the Mutt and the appellant had a valid
case for claiming damages but in that regard, the damages suffered
shall have to be proved in the Court of law. It was, thus, left open for the
Mutt and the appellant to take appropriate civil action for quantifying the
damages. The Division Bench also left it open for them to seek exclusion
of the period during which they had been prosecuting the matter in the
High Court.8
2.16.3. With the aforementioned observations and findings, the
Division Bench of the High Court concluded that the decision of the
8 These observations of the Division Bench of the High Court had been as under: -
20. We do not propose to say that the Government is blemishless. On the
otherhand, the Government had acted thoughtlessly both at the stage of the
notification under section 18 and at the stage of withdrawal from the notification.
The Government must suffer the consequences of their action, both issuing
declaration under section 18 and in committing inordinate delay in passing the
award and ultimately withdrawing from the notification. But the damages
suffered by the respondents on account of the Government's acts of commission
and omission has to be proved in a Court of law. The respondents have no
doubt, a valid case against the Government for their acts of commission and
omission. The question is what is the actual remedy of the respondents. The
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy), is no
doubt applicable on the facts of the present case. But, we are only pointing out
that the remedy of the respondents is elsewhere. They have no right to insist on
the Government completing the acquisition proceedings and proceeding with
the project as a sanctuary. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we
concede the power of the Government to withdraw from the notification and
refuse to pass an award under the Land Acquisition Act. We keep it open to the
respondents to take appropriate civil action for quantifying their damages and
for this purpose, it is certainly open to them to rely on the provisions of the
Limitation Act for excluding the period during which they had been prosecuting
the matter in this Court."
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC. TO
GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]
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Government to exclude the land in question from the limits of proposed
sanctuary was sustainable by virtue of Section 21 of the General Clauses
Act and, while allowing the appeal, proceeded to dismiss the writ petition
while leaving it open for the writ petitioners, including the present
appellant, to agitate their rights in the appropriate forum. In view of this
decision, the contempt proceedings were dropped.9
2.17. In order to complete the chronicle of background, it may
also be noticed that the present appellant alone preferred a petition for
Special Leave to Appeal before this Court against the said judgment
dated 18.09.1997, which was dismissed in limine on 23.02.1998.
2.18. Only after conclusion of the aforesaid litigation with dismissal
of the petition for Special Leave to Appeal by this Court on 23.02.1998
that the appellant took up the action in civil Court for recovery of damages.
2.19. Before dilating on the facts and events relating to the action
for recovery of damages, it would be apt to summarise the material
facts and features noticed in the preceding paragraphs. Put in a nutshell, the sum and substance of the matter is that the land in question,
9 The Division Bench concluded on the matter as follows: -
"23....We are construing the letter of the Government in Letter No. Ms. No. 377
EDF dated 12.11.1993 and the consequential order of the Special Commissioner
and Commissioner of Land Administration in R.O. C. No. h2/34854/92 dated
17.10.1993 as constituting the decision of the Government to withdraw from the
inclusion of the lands of the respondents in the sanctuary, and the consequential
acquisition of the said lands. We are exercising our discretionary powers under
article 226 of the Constitution of India
 in holding that in the above two letters, the Government had taken a categorical
decision to withdraw from the notification and the consequential acquisition.
Therefore, we do not propose to take the order of the Collector dated 19.11.1993
for any purpose, as it simply follows the directions of the Government. Since the
notification and declaration was issued by the State Government under section
18 of the unamended Wild Life Protection Act, it is the government and the
government alone which can cancel
or modify the notification by invoking the power under section 21 of the General
Clauses Act. It is in this view of the matter, we uphold the decision of the
Government to exclude 197.36 acres of land, belonging to the respondents and
another extent of 148.55 acres from the limits of the proposed sanctuary. as
perfectly in order and within the powers of the Government. Consequently, the
prayer sought for in W.P. No. 21721 of 1993 cannot be granted and the writ
petition will stand dismissed. The appeal is
 allowed in the above manner, leaving it open to the respondents to agitate their
rights in an appropriate forum. Contempt appeal No. 6 of 1995 is also allowed.
There will be no order as to costs."
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said to have been taken by the plaintiff-appellant on lease from the Mutt,
was proposed to be included in the sanctuary for wild life by virtue of
the notification dated 06.03.1976; and the attempts on the part of the
Mutt and the appellant to get the land in question excluded from the
sanctuary did not meet with success. Though the matter relating to the
award of compensation for acquisition of the subject land was considered
by the authorities concerned, who were also directed by the High Court
to finalise the award at the earliest but, instead of making any award, the
Collector issued the order dated 19.11.1993, excluding the land in question
from the limits of wild life sanctuary. The Mutt and the appellant now
felt aggrieved of the proposition for such exclusion of the subject land
from the limits of the wild life sanctuary and again approached the High
Court by way of writ petition against the said order dated 19.11.1993.
On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the
writ petition so filed by the Mutt and the appellant. However, the Division
Bench of the High Court, in its judgment dated 18.09.1997, did not approve
of the order so passed by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the
writ petition while leaving it open for the Mutt and the appellant to
approach the appropriate forum in their claim for damages.
Civil suit for recovery of damages
3. Though having failed in its attempt to get the aforesaid order
dated 19.11.1993 annulled but, with reference to the observations made
and the liberty granted by the Division Bench of the High Court in its
judgment dated 18.09.1997, the appellant took up the action for claiming
damages from the respondent-State. In this regard, the appellant served
a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 01.03.1998
that did not evoke any response. Hence, the appellant instituted the civil
suit for recovery of damages on 08.06.1998. The civil suit was founded
on the facts referred hereinabove and on the grounds that from the first
day of the proceedings starting in the year 1976 and until dropping of the
same in the year 1993, the appellant was debarred from utilising the land
in question; and that due to pendency of litigation in the High Court from
the year 1993 and until 18.09.1997, the appellant could not file the suit
for damages. It was also submitted that in view of the rights specified,
and the liberty given, by the Division Bench of High Court, the suit was
maintainable and was not barred by limitation.
3.1. As regards the measure and quantum of damages, the
appellant referred to the alleged loss of earnings @ Rs. 2.31 lakhs per
M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SEC. TO
GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT.