# M/S SA VITA CHEMICALS (PVT.) LTD v. DYES AND CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1998] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 488
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1998-12-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 10611 of 1995
- **Bench:** S.B. Majmudar, M. Jagannadha Rao
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-s-sa-vita-chemicals-pvt-ltd-v-dyes-and-chemical-workers-union-and-anr-16523
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

Labour laws:
Trade unions-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention
C of Unfair Labour Practices Act, I97 I, Sections 24(/)(a), 6I (!) and 44Settlement between the management and the Union-Notice of strike during
the period of settlement-Format of notice-Held, format as prescribed under
Form I of Rule 22 of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention
of Unfair Labour Practices Rules-Four basic requirements of Form I has to
D be fa/filled for issuing strike notice-Typing of the notice in the same sequence
as prescribed in Form I or referred to in Section 24(I) is not a basic
requirement-Mode of service of notice is also not a basic requirement-On
facts, held all the basic requirements of Form I were complied with in the
notice in question--Contrary finding arrived at by the labour Court was
patently illegal and was rightly reversed by the High Court in exercise of its
E jurisdiction under Article 227-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union &
Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Rules, I975, Rule 22 read with Form
I-Maharashtra labour Court (Practice and Procedure Rules I975, Rules
50 and 5I.
F
Words and phrases-Phrase "covered by the settlement"-Meaning
of-In the context Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, I97I.
Constitution of India-Article 227-Jnterference under-Scope ofWhere the findings were patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal
G position on record-Held, interference was proper and justified.
Respondent Union had made a charter of demands to the appellant and
a settlement was arrived at before the Conciliation Officer between the
parties which was valid for a particular period. The settlement provided that
H the then existing practice of granting 12. days privilege leave for each
488
SAVITA CHEM. (PVT.)LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U.
489
completed 240 days' work per year and one day more for additional 12 days A
of work beyond 240 days was to continue and in all other respects, the
provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the existing rules were to apply.
During the operation of the settlement the respondent-Union gave a notice
of strike inter alia on the ground that there were illegal changes brought
about in the matter of computing privilege leave. The appellant filed an
application before the Labour Court seeking a declaration that the respondent- B
Union had gone on an illegal strike under Section 24(1)(i)(a) to (i) of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention of Unfair Labour
Practices Act, 1971 (the "Act"). Labour Court came to the conclusion that
the strike notice issued by the respondent-Union was not required by law and
was contrary to the provisions of Section 24(l)(i) of th~ Act, and declared C
the strike as illegal. Respondent-Union challenged the order of the Labour
Court by filing a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the
order of the Labour Court and held that the strike was not illegal. Hence
this appeal •.
It was contended by the appellant that the notice of st,rike was violative D
of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act as the same was not in proper form and was
contrary to Rules 50 and 51 of the Maharashtra Labour Courts (Practice
and Procedure,) Rules, 1975. It was also contended by the appellant that the
said ground of strike was covered by the settlement.
Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The Labour Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1975
in Maharashtra are for guidance of the Labour Courts and for regulating
E
the practice and procedure of those courts. Thus, Rules 50 and 51 which are
part and parcel of these Rules, cannot have anything to do with format of the F
notice of strike which a Union has to give to the management as per Section
24(1)(a) of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. Prescribed format for the purpose of the
said provision will necessarily be as per Form I as was laid down by Rule
22 of the Rules framed by the State Gove

## Text

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A
M/S SA VITA CHEMICALS (PVT.) LTD.
v.
DYES AND CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION AND ANR.
DECEMBER 11, 1998
B
[S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]
Labour laws:
Trade unions-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention
C of Unfair Labour Practices Act, I97 I, Sections 24(/)(a), 6I (!) and 44Settlement between the management and the Union-Notice of strike during
the period of settlement-Format of notice-Held, format as prescribed under
Form I of Rule 22 of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention
of Unfair Labour Practices Rules-Four basic requirements of Form I has to
D be fa/filled for issuing strike notice-Typing of the notice in the same sequence
as prescribed in Form I or referred to in Section 24(I) is not a basic
requirement-Mode of service of notice is also not a basic requirement-On
facts, held all the basic requirements of Form I were complied with in the
notice in question--Contrary finding arrived at by the labour Court was
patently illegal and was rightly reversed by the High Court in exercise of its
E jurisdiction under Article 227-Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union &
Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Rules, I975, Rule 22 read with Form
I-Maharashtra labour Court (Practice and Procedure Rules I975, Rules
50 and 5I.
F
Words and phrases-Phrase "covered by the settlement"-Meaning
of-In the context Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, I97I.
Constitution of India-Article 227-Jnterference under-Scope ofWhere the findings were patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal
G position on record-Held, interference was proper and justified.
Respondent Union had made a charter of demands to the appellant and
a settlement was arrived at before the Conciliation Officer between the
parties which was valid for a particular period. The settlement provided that
H the then existing practice of granting 12. days privilege leave for each
488
SAVITA CHEM. (PVT.)LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U.
489
completed 240 days' work per year and one day more for additional 12 days A
of work beyond 240 days was to continue and in all other respects, the
provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the existing rules were to apply.
During the operation of the settlement the respondent-Union gave a notice
of strike inter alia on the ground that there were illegal changes brought
about in the matter of computing privilege leave. The appellant filed an
application before the Labour Court seeking a declaration that the respondent- B
Union had gone on an illegal strike under Section 24(1)(i)(a) to (i) of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union & Prevention of Unfair Labour
Practices Act, 1971 (the "Act"). Labour Court came to the conclusion that
the strike notice issued by the respondent-Union was not required by law and
was contrary to the provisions of Section 24(l)(i) of th~ Act, and declared C
the strike as illegal. Respondent-Union challenged the order of the Labour
Court by filing a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the
order of the Labour Court and held that the strike was not illegal. Hence
this appeal •.
It was contended by the appellant that the notice of st,rike was violative D
of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act as the same was not in proper form and was
contrary to Rules 50 and 51 of the Maharashtra Labour Courts (Practice
and Procedure,) Rules, 1975. It was also contended by the appellant that the
said ground of strike was covered by the settlement.
Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The Labour Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1975
in Maharashtra are for guidance of the Labour Courts and for regulating
E
the practice and procedure of those courts. Thus, Rules 50 and 51 which are
part and parcel of these Rules, cannot have anything to do with format of the F
notice of strike which a Union has to give to the management as per Section
24(1)(a) of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. Prescribed format for the purpose of the
said provision will necessarily be as per Form I as was laid down by Rule
22 of the Rules framed by the State Government. Format I shows that the
notice must contain, amongst others, the following basic requirements:
G
(506-D-Ef
(i) the name of the trade union giving notice, its address and the date
of the notice;
(ii) the name of the employer and full address of the undertaking for H
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A which the notice is meant;
(iii) clear indication in the notice about the call for strike of the
workmen employed in the undertaking and the date from which the strike
is to be resorted to;
B
(iii) and the reason for the proposed strike. (506-F-G]
1.2. If all these four requirements are fulfilled, in substance, the basic
requirements of Form I will get satisfied . It is not as if the notice must be
typed in the same sequence in which Form I is drafted or that it must mention
Section 24(1). The latter are mere formal requirements. Similarly, whether
C notice is given by registered post or by hand delivery is also not a basic
requirement. It refers to the mode of service. In the present case, admittedly
the notice was duly served on the management. Sending of copies of notice
to the mentioned persons is also not a part of the basic requirement of the
notice. All the four basic requirements of Form I have been complied with
D in the present case. The name and address of the trade union which served
the notice are clearly mentioned, the date of the notice is also indicated, the
name of the addressee of the notice and his address are also mentioned,
namely, it has been addressed to the Factory Manager of the Company who
was in charge of the Company at the relevant time and under whom the
workmen proposing to go on strike were actually working . It is also clearly
E mentioned as to from which date the strike is proposed to be resorted to, as
it is mentioned that the strike would be resorted to on the expiry of 14 days
from the date of receipt of letter-cum-notice. It is also clearly mentioned that
the letter will be treated as notice for going on the proposed strike. Then
follows the heart of the notice, namely, the reasons why the proposed strike
F has to be resorted to. As regards para 2 of Form I it did not apply to the facts
of the present case and had to be treated to have been struck off for the
purpose of issuing strike notice. Therefore, it has to be held that the notice
was perfectly valid strike notice. (506-H; 507-A-E; 508-C]
1.3. The grievance made in the impugned strike notice did not pertain
G to any modification of the crystallised rights regarding privilege leave granted
to the workmen under the settlement but it pertained to an entirely different
grievance based on a situation which was posterior to the settlement of
rights and obligations regarding privilege leave between the parties. Thus,
this grievance about non-implementation of the crystallised terms of settlement
cannot be said to be a matter "covered" by the settlement for purposes of the
H definition of"illegal strike". It can be said to be amounting to a grievance
SA VITA CllEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U.
491
in connection with the non-implementation of the settlement in its true and A
correct perspective. That of course, would also amount to allegation of unfair
l:ibour practice on the part of the employer as reflected by a conjoint reading
of Section 26 and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act. But such an allegation has
nothing to do with the question whether it also amounts to going behind the
settlement. The Labour Court was patently in error when it took the view B
that because of the alternative remedy available to the workmen viz. filing
a complaint about alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the management,
they could not have resorted to a more drastic remedy of strike under the
provisions of the Act. (510-G-H; 511-A-B]
1.4. One must see the express terms of the settlement with a view to C
finding out as to which matters are covered by the settlement. This necessarily
would connote that the settlement in express terms must refer to a matter
which is subsequently made a subject matter of notice of strike. In the
instant case, all that the settlement had guaranteed is the right of the
workmen to earn 12 days' privilege leave for 240 days worked in a year and
an additional one day for every 12 days beyond 240 days worked in a year. D
The question regarding the correct method of computation of the leave under
the settlement is not expressly covered by the terms of the said settlement.
Any grievance in connection with the same, therefore, has to be treated to
be outside the compass of the settlement. (512-D-F(
2. The phrase "covered by the settlement" as found in Section 24 is
not defined by the Act nor is it defined by the Bombay Industrial Relations
Act, 1946 or by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, in view of
Section 3(18) of the Act one can turn to the general dictionary meaning of
E
the term "covered". After taking the exercise, one would find that the term
"covered" is more restrictive in nature as compared to the terms "arising F
out or• or "referable to". Question of implementation of the terms of the
settlement may be said to be a matter "arising out or' the settlement or
"referable to" the settlement but it is certainly not "covered" by the
settlement. Therefore, matters which were not expressly covered by the
settlement can be made the subject-matter of grievance by the parties G
concerned while arriving at a settlement and if a strike is resorted to by the
union of workmen on that ground, it cannot be said that the said strike would
be hit by the provisions of Section 24(l)(i) of the Act. Hence, it must be held
that the impugned strike notice was not violative of Section 24(l)(i) of the
Act in so far as the grievance regarding computation of privilege leave was
concerned. The Labour Court had patently erred in its decision. This patent H
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A error was rightly set aside by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 227. (512-G; 513-C-D; 514-B-CI
Newman v. Bennett, 212 Kan 562, referred to.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition Black's law Dictionary, 5th
B Edition, referred to.
3. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court could
not have set aside the findings reached by the lower authorities where two
views were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad
and suffering from clear error of law. But as the findings reached by the
C Labour Court on relevant terms were patently erroneous and dehors the
factual and legal position on record, the said patently illegal findings could
not have been countenanced under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
by the High Court. In fact the High Court could have failed to exercise its
jurisdiction if it had not set aside such patently illegal findings of the Labour
D Court. [515-F-Hl
E
F
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed /shaque, (1955( I SCR 1104; Nagendra
Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, Assam, (1958( SCR
1240 and Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR (1984)SC 146,
referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10611 of
1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.92 of the Bombay High Court
in W.P. No. 2171of1983.
M.C. Bhandare, and N.B. Shettye, Sushi! Kumar Jain, A.P. Dhamija,
Pradeep Aggarwal, Umesh Bohare and A. Mishra for the Appellant.
Ms. Anitha Shenoy and Sanjay Parikh for the Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. The appellant company, on grant of leave to
appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has brought in challenge
the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court who
allowed the Writ Petition tiled by Respondent Nq. I Union under Article 227
H of the Constitution of India and quashed the decision of the Presiding Officer,
SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD.''· DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]
493
First Labour Court, Thane. By the said decision, the First Labour Court, A
Thane, took the view on an application moved by the appellant company that
Respondent No. I union had gone on an illegal strike from 30th March, 1983
pursuant to the strike notice dated 14th March, 1983. In the impugned
judgment, learned Single Judge of the High Court took the contrary view and
held that the appellant had failed to establish that the strike in question was B
illegal.
In order to appreciate the grievances of the appellant against the decision
I
of the High Court, it will be necessary to have a glance at the background
facts.
Introductory Facts:
The appellant is a company registered under the Comμanies Act, 1956
c
and is carrying on the business of chemicals at Thane in the State of
Maharashtra since more than 38 years. Respondent No.I is a workers' union
registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Respondent No. I union had D
submitted a charter of demands to the appellant on I st April, 1981. During
negotiations a settlement was arrived at before the Conciliation Officer between
the parties on 8th March, 1982. The said settlement was valid up to December
1984 .. The settlement, inter a/ia, amongst others, covered the following two
demands; i) Demand No.14 - Privilege Leave; ii) Demand No.26 Medical
Check-up; It is the case of the appellant company that during the subsistence E
of the aforesaid settlement, Respondent No. I union sent a letter of demand
to the Factory Manager of the appellant company on 14th March, 1983. As
per the said letter, various demands were raised and it was submitted by
Respondent No. I union that it would go on strike on the expiry of 14 days
from the date of service of the notice. According to Respondent No. I, the F
said notice was to be considered as notice for going on strike. The Factory
Manager of the appellant company sent a reply to the notice of Respondent
No. I on 23rd March, 1983. Respondent No. I union, having gone on strike
from 30th March, 1983, sent a replication on 2nd April, 1983.
The appellant company which is governed by the Maharashtra G
Recognition of Trade Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,
1971 (hereinafter ref..:rred to as the 'Maharashtra Act') filed an application
under Section 25 of the Maharashtra Act before the Labour Court. Thane,
seeking a declaration that Respondent No. I, union had gone on an illegal
strike. In the said application. the appellant's case was that the said strike was
illegal under Section 24( 1 )(i)(a) and (i) of the Maharashtra Act. The said H ·
494
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A application was moved as per the provisions of Section 24(1) read with
Section 25( I) of the Maharashtra Act.
The Labour Court, after hearing the parties, by its order dated 20th May,
1983 came to the conclusion that the letter dated 14th March, 1983 was not
a strike notice as required by1law and was also contrary to the provisions of
B Section 24( I )(i) of the Maharashtra Act. It, therefore, declared that the strike
resorted to by the workmen and the staff members with effect from 30th
March, 1983 was illegal.
Respondent No. I challenged the said order of the Labour Court in the
aforesaid writ petition which was registered as Writ Petition No.2171 of 1983
C in the High Court. As noted earlier, learned single Judge of the High Court, .
by his order allowed the said writ petition and set aside the order of the
Labour Court and held that the strike was not illegal. The said decision was
rendered on 27th November, 1992. It is this decision, which is brought on the
anvil of scrutiny of this Court in this appeal.
D
RIVAL CONTENTIONS:
Shri M.C. Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended
that the Labour Court was perfectly justified in taking the view that the
impugned notice dated 14th March, 1983 was not legal and valid as it violated
E provisions of Section 24( I )(a) of the Maharashtra Act as the said notice of
strike was not in the prescribed form. He also submitted that the said notice
was contrary to Rules 50 and 51 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure)
Rules, 1975. That the notice did not recite that Respondent No. I union, being
a recognised union, obtained vote of majority of the members in favour of the
strike before serving the notice as required under Clause (b) of sub-section
F (1) of Section 24 of the Maharashtra Act. Consequently, according to the
learned senior counsel for the appellant, strike would become illegal also as
per Section 24( 1 )(b) of the Maharashtra Act. He next contended that the
impugned strike was also hit by Section 24( 1 )(i) of the Maharashtra Act as
it was resorted to pursuant to the said notice, during the period in which
(j settlement of 8th March, 1982 was in operation and the notice amongst others
was based also in respect of two matters covered by the settlement, namely,
Demand No.14 - Privilege Leave and Demand No. 26 - Medical Check-up, both
of which were settled pursuant to the aforesaid settlement. It was also
contended that once the Labour Court had come to the conclusion on facts
on the relevant issue in the light of the evidence laid before it and appreciated
H by it, it was not open to the High Court under Article 227 to set aside the
SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJl\:UDAR, J.]
495
findings of fact when there was no patent error reflected in the judgment of A
the Labour Court. He also tried to submit that the High Court should not have
entertained the writ petition as Respondent No. I had a remedy of going in
revision in the Industrial Court under Section 44 of Maharashtra Act though
ultimately the said contention was not seriously pressed. Learned senior
counsel for the appellant contended that in any case the impugned strike was B
clearly violative of the requisite provisions of Section 24 of the Maharashtra
Act and it was wrongly held by the High Court as not to have resulted in
an illegal strike. It was, therefore, contended that the decision of the learned
Single Judge is required to be set aside and the decision rendered by the
Labour Court deserves to be upheld.
Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the Respondent, on the other
hand, submitted that the appellant company had filed the application under
Section 24 iead with Section 25 of the Maharashtra Act only on the ground
c
that the strike in question was allegedly illegal as per the provisions of
Section 24(l)(a) meaning thereby it was alleged that the notice was not in the
prescribed form and also on the ground of violative of Section 24( I )(i); that D
no case was even alleged for voiding the notice and the ultimate strike on
the ground that provisions of Section 24( I Xb) were violated. It was also
submitted by her that the main requirements of the prescribed notice as per
Form-I read with Rule 22 of the Rules under the Act were complied with by
the said notice. That the notice was addressed to the authority of the company E
in charge of the management of the factory at the relevant time; that it was
clearly mentioned that there were grounds indicated therein which were
compelling Respondent No. I union to go on strike. Even the time for going
on strike was also mentioned as 14 days' after the service of the notice; that
clause-2 of the prescribed Fonn-l could not have applied as it was not the
case of the appellant company itself before the Labour Court that Respondent F
No. I was a recognised union as per the Maharashtra Act. Therefore, the
asterisk placed against clause 2 of Fonn-1 which permitted the striking off of
clause 2 when not applicable gets squarely applied to the facts of the present
case. She submitted that jn order to be a recognised union, certificate was to
be issued in favour of Respcndent No. I union, as seen from the definition G
of Section 3(13) of the Maharashtra Act. That it was not the case of the
appellant that provisions of Chapter III, especially, Sections I 0 to 12 were ever
complied with by Respondent No. I union so as to be treated as a recognised
union under the Maharashtra Act. Consequently, paragraph 2 of the prescribed
Form-I of the notice did not apply to Respondent No. I union. Therefore, there
was no occasion for Respondent No. I union to even whisper about obtaining H
496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A vote of majority of the members in the said notice as tried to be submitted
by learned senior counsel for the appellant. It was contended that the notice
in question substantially complied with the requirements of the said prescribed
form of the notice. Consequently, the Labour Court was in patent error when
it took the view that Respondent No. I had not given strike notice in the
B prescribed form and on that score Section 24(1 )(a) got attracted on the facts
of the present case. Such a patent error was rightly set aside by the High
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. She next contended that
as the appellant company did not invoke alleged violation of Section 24( I )(b)
before the Labour Court, there was no question of examining the said ground
either by the Labour Court or by the High Court. She submitted that the very
C fact that the said sub-clause (b) was not pressed in service by the appellant
company shows that it never treated Respondent No. I as a recognised union.
So far as the applicability of Section 24(l)(i) is concerned, she submitted that
the strike notice was not given during the currency of the settlement with
respect to any of the matters covered by the settlement. It was submitted that
Demand No.14 regarding the privilege leave as found in the settlement only
D granted crystalisation of the right of the workmen represented by Respondent
No. I union for getting privilege leave of 12 days for each completed 240 days
of work per year and further privilege leave of one day for every additional
12 days of work as provided therein. That the dispute raised in the strike
notice did not seek, in any way, to change the basis of the said grant of
E privilege leave but the grievance was entirely different as it pertained to the
proper computation of the privilege leave as per the terms of the settlement.
Jn a way it amounted to calling for correct and proper implementation of the
settlement for which Respondent No. I union could have filed a complaint
under Section 28 of the Act pertaining to unfair labour practice on the part
of the employer as found in Schedule IV Item 9 of the Maharashtra Act. But
F that did not take away the additional right of strike available to Respondent
No. I union on behalf of its workmen. It was also submitted that the very fact
that failure to implement the award was made by the legislature a subject
matter of the complaint, showed that such implementation would not be
covered by the settlement. It is for the simple reason that if it had already
G been covered by the settlement, even the more drastic remedy of strike for
getting the settlement implemented would have stood barred under Section
24(1)(i). In other words, it was contended that matters covered by the settlement
as per Section 24(1 )(i) would be only those matters which were expressly
referred to in the settlement. Computation of the benefit as per the agreed
tem1s in the settlement was not a matter which was covered by the settlement
H but was a matter even if arising out of the settlement was one which was
SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]
497
consequent upon the settlement. It was an independent matter for which there A
was no express provision in the settlement. It was posterior to the settlement
and not embedded therein. Consequently, Section 24(l)(i) also was not
applicable to the facts of the present .case and as the Labour Court had
committed a patent error in this connection it was rightly co!Tected by the
High Court. Similar was her contention regarding Demand No.26 about Medical B
Check-up. It was submitted that the said settlement had nothing to do with
the prevention of disease as Demand No.26 referred to medical treatment for
the disease which was already suffered by the workmen due to occupational
hazards. Prevention of s~ch disease which was the subject matter of impugned
notice was anterior to the question of medical check-up and was not covered
by the terms of the settlement. Even on that ground Section 24(J)(i) did not C
get attracted. That the High Court rightly corrected the patent error of the
Labour Court in this connection. It was, therefore, contended that the High
Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227, was justified in interfering
with the order of the Labour Court and in setting aside the patently erroneous
order of the said court. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves D
to be dismissed. She contended that 40 workmen who were out of job since
more than 15 years have suffered immensely and that their services have been
illegally terminated by the appellant company. This part of the grievance, in
our view, cannot form subject matter of the present proceedings and, therefore,
whatever remedies may be available to the concerned workmen, in this
connection, may be open to them in accordance with law. It will be equally E
open to the appellant company to resist the said future proceedings in
accordance with law if at all that occasion arises. We do not express any
opinion about the same. In this case, we are concerned with the short question
whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Labour Court's order
declaring the strike of the workmen from 30th March, i 983 illegal as per
provisions of Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(l)(i) of the Maharashtra Act. F
Aforesaid rival contentions give rise to the following points for our
consideration:
(i)
Whether the impugned strike notice of 14th March, 1983 given G
by Respondent No. I union on behalf of its members was violative
of Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act;
(ii)
Whether the impugned strike notice is liolative of provision of
Section 24(1 )(b) of the Maharashtra Act;
(iii) Whether the impugned strike notice was hit by Section 24(1)(i) H
498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A
of the Maharashtra Act;
B
c
(iv) Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was justified in interfering
with the findings reached by the Labour Court; and
(v)
What final order?
Before taking up the consideration of these aforesaid points, it will be
necessary to have a look at the relevant statutory scheme in the light
of which the controversies between the parties will have to be resolved.
STATUTORY SCHEME:
The Maharashtra Act is enacted, amongst others, for the recognition of
trade unions for facilitating collective bargaining for certain undertakings, to
state their rights and obligations; to confer certain powers on unrecognised
unions and to provide for declaring certain strikes and lock-outs as illegal
strikes and lock-outs, to define and provide for the prevention of certain
D unfair labour practices and to constitute courts (as independent machinery)
for carrying out the purposes of according recognition to trade unions.
Section 3, sub-section (13) defines a recognised union. Chapter III deals
with recognition of unions and lays down that the provisions of this chapter
E will apply to every undertaking, wherein fifty or more employees are employed,
or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months; Section 12 lays
down the procedure to be followed by the Industrial Court while granting
certificate of recognition to the applicant union. Chapter V deals with illegal
strikes and lock-outs. Section 24 covers these topics. The relevant provisions
of Section 24 read as under:
F
G
"24. Illegal strike and lock-out:- In this Act, unless the context
requires otherwise:-
(I) "illegal strike" means a strike which is commenced or continued-
(a)
without givin5 to the employer notice of strike in the prescribed
form, or within fourteen days of the giving of such notice;
(b) where there is a recognised union, without obtaining the vote
of the majority of the members of the union, in favour of the
strike before the notice of the strike is given:
H
( c)
xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx
SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD., .. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]
499
(d)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
A
( e)
xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx
(f)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(g) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(h)
xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx
(i)
during any period in which any settlement or award is in operation,
in respect of any of the mailers covered by the settlement or
award." (Emphasis supplied).
B
Section 25 deals with procedure to be followed for getting the declaration C
whether strike or lock-out is illegal. Sub-section ( 1) thereof which is relevant
for our purpose provides that:
"Where the employees in any undertaking have proposed to go on
strike or have commenced a strike, the State Government or the
employer of the undertaking may make a reference to the Labour Court D
for a declaration that such strike is illegal."
Sub-section (5) of Section 25 lays down that:
"Where any strike or lock-out declared to be illegal under this section
is withdrawn within forty-eight hours of such declaration, such strike E
or lock-out shall not, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be
illegal under this Act."
Chapter VI deals with Unfair Labour Practices. Section 26 thereof which is
the first section in that Chapter lays down that:
"unless the context requires otherwise, 'unfair labour practices' mean
any of the practices listed in Schedules II, III and IV."
Section 28 prescribes the procedure for dealing with complaints relating to
unfair labour practices. Sub-section (I) thereof provides :
"Where any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair
labour practice, then any union or any employee or any employer or
any Investigating Officer may, within ninety days of the occurrence
of such unfair labour practice, file a complaint before the Court
competent to deal with such complaint either under section 5, or as
F
G
the case may be, under section 7, of this Act:"
H
500
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A Schedule IV, which is relevant for our purpose, deals with General Unfair
Labour Practices on the part of employers. Item 9 thereof deals with failure
to implement award, settlement or agreement on the part of the employer
which would be treated as general unfair labour practice on the part of the
employers. It is in the background of the aforesaid statutory scheme that we
have to consider the points which arise ror our determination.
B.
Point No.I:
The factual matrix relevant for consideration of this point indicates, as
noted earlier, that there was a settlement arrived at between the appellant
company and Respondent No.I union on 8th March, 1982 which, amongst
C others, settled demand nos. 14 and 26 regarding privilege leave and medical
check-up. We will have occasion to deal with the terms of settlement regarding
these demands a little later when we will deal with point no.3. It is snfficient
for the present to mention that the aforesaid settlement was for three years
valid up to December, I 984. It is during the subsistence of the aforesaid
I D settlement that Respondent No. I union sent a letter of demand to the Factory
Manager of the appellant company on 14th March, 1983, as noted earlier. It
will be relevant at this stage to refer to the exact wording of the said letter.
It read as under:
E
"Ref. No. DCWU/146/1983
Hand Delivery
The Factory Manager,
Savita Chemicals P. Ltd.,
Plot No.17 A, Belapur Road,
Dated 14-3-1983.
F
Thane.
Sir,
We find that one Shri U.V. Sinkar and Shri Durga Prasad P.S.R.K.,
working as chemists in your company have been under the pretext of
G
retrenchment and/or slackness of work, removed by you. The ground
advanced is a cloak though factually the work under no circumstances
was reduced and there were junior most persons continued in the
employment in the similar category.
We may also bring to your notice that ever since the staff members
H
have enrolled themselves as members of our union, your management
SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND CW.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]
501
has started harassing them and you have been demanding their A
resignations from the primary membership of the union. Threats were
openly held that the union will be liquidated by the m!nagement.
We also find that the workmen are subjected to harassment and
the workmen who have been appointed as probationers are continued B
as probationers despite the fact that the law of the land namely
Employment Standing Orders Act 1946 which becomes applicable to
your establishment does not permit continuance of such ~mployees
as probationers for an indifinite period. "Similarly there have been
illegal changes brought about in the matter of computing the privilege
leave." There have been instances where the workmen under fabulous C
allegations are charge-sheeted and removed, and many more are
awaiting the charge-sheets. This has become the order of the day, and
the lives of the workmen in the company also have become intolerable.
(Emphasis supplied)
There are also difficulties and hazards emanating from the operations D
and no effective steps have been taken by your management to
prevent such hazards. It is very difficult to understand how the
management has been continuing its operations in a crude fashion
and exposing the workmen to serious types of hazards. The process
of sulphonation is positively causing dangerous effects on the lives E
of the workmen and no steps of any manner have been taken either
to modify and/or cure the processes whereby the ingredients or hazards
are reduced and the lives become tolerable. Similarly operation
containing Polyneuclear Aromatics and Alkylate is capable of causing
cancer to the work.men. It is rather tragic that no steps have been
taken to prevent such processes where large majority of the workmen F
not only in your company but those working surround your company
who are susceptible to such after effects are given any assurance by
way of rectifying the method and taking away the dangerous hazards
involved. Lives of the workmen are often becoming dangerous and
under no circumstances, it is possible for the workmen, considering G
the total indifference on the part of the management to continue
operation in the circumstances in which the management wants to
continue it. The workmen, therefore, have resolved that the total
attitude of the management towards resolution of the industrial dispute
and other relevant circumstances as stated hereinabove, which are
making the lives of the workmen very dangerous and are exposing H
A
B
c
D
502
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
them to the dangers and therefore, the workmen in order to prevent
the after effects and such dangers and also shabby treatment meted
•
out to the workmen and also the physical attacks lodged against the
workmen through anti-social elements employment (sic) by the
company, to protect themselves and their rights and on that account,
the workmen have decided to proceed on strike and that being so, this
notice is given to you. The workmen therefore, want you to treat this
letter to be treated as notice of strike and it may be noted that after
the expiry of 14 days from the date of receipt of this letter hereof, the
workmen will proceed on strike and the consequence in such
circumstances flowing there-from shall be your responsibility which
please note.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully
Sd/ -
General Secretary"
The said letter was addressed by Respondent No. I union to the Factory
Manager of the appellant company. As seen from this letter, the following
averments I to 8 contained therein had nothing to do with Section 24(1 )(i) of
the Act. (I) Firstly it was mentioned that one Shri U.V.S.inkar and Shri Durga
E Prasad P.S.R.K., working as chemists were wrongly retrenched. (2) Secondly
the grievance of Respondent No. I union was that the management had
started harassing the staff members who were enrolled as members of the
union and their resignations were being demanded from the primary membership
of the union. (3) The first part of the third grievance of the union was that
,
workmen were subjected to harassment and the workmen who had been
F appointed as probationers were continued as probationers despite the fact
that the law of the land, namely, Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946 did
not permit such continuance. Then followed the recitals which have been
strongly pressed in service by the learned senior counsel for the appellant,
in support of his submission, which in his view made the proposed strike
G
illegal under the relevant provisions of Section 24. lt will, therefore, be profitable
to extract the recitals in extenso. It has been mentioned in second part of
paragraph three of the notice as under:
"Similarly there have been illegal changes brought about in the matter
of computing the privilege leave."
H (4) The rest of the paragraph dealt with different grievances, namely, that
SA VITA CHEM. (PVT.) LTD. v. DYES AND C.W.U. [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.]
503
workmen under frivolous allegations were charge-sheeted and removed and A
many more were awaiting charge-sheets. (5) Then followed the fourth grievance
regarding the difficulties and hazards emanating from the operation of the
factory and that no effective steps had been taken by the management to
prevent such hazards. It was recited that the management had been continuing
its operations in a crude fashion and exposing the workmen to serious types B
of hazards. (6) It was then mentioned that the process of sulphonation was
positively causing dangerous effects on the lives of the workmen and no
steps of any manner had been taken either to modify and/or cure the processes
whereby the ingredients or hazards were reduced and the lives became
tolerable. (7) Similarly, operation containing Polynuclear Aromatics and Alkylate
was capable Qf causing cancer to the workmen. (8) Then the grievance was C
made that no steps had been taken to prevent such processes where large
majority of the workmen not only in the company but those working in the
surroundings of the company who were susceptible to such after effects were
not given any assurance by way of rectifying the method and taking away
the dangerous hazards involved. It was then recited that the lives of the
workmen were often becoming dangerous and under no circumstances, it was
possible for the workmen, considering the total indifference on the part of the
D
management to continue operation in the circumstances in which the
management wanted to continue the work. It was then recited that the workmen,
therefore, had resolved that considering the total attitude of the management
regarding resolution of the industrial dispute and other relevant circumstances E
as stated herein, they had decided to proceed on strike and that being so this
notice was given to the addressee. It was then mentioned in the notice that
the workmen wanted the addressee to treat this letter as notice of strike and
it was to be noted that after the expiry of 14 days from the date of receipt
of the letter, the workmen would proceed on strike. The said letter was replied
to on behalf of the company by its Factory Manager on 23rd March, 1983 F
refuting the allegations made in the strike notice and calling the representatives
of the union for discussion and settlement of the matter amicably. It is
thereafter that the members of Respondent No. 1 union went on strike from
30th March,. 1983 and then sent the replication through the union on 2nd
April, 1983 refuting the contents of the reply of the management dated 23rd G
March, 1983.
In the light of the aforesaid factual matrix, first question arises whether
the impugned notice of 14th March, 1983 fell foul on the touch-stone of
Section 24(1 )(a) of the Maharashtra Act.