# M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 868
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-07-17
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2017
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal, Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/m-sambasiva-rao-v-the-state-of-andhra-pradesh-38457
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Whether the High Court erred in convicting the appellant-accused
no.1 u/s.120B, IPC and ss.7, 13(2) r/w s.13(1)(d), Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 by reversing the finding of acquittal of the
Trial Court.
Headnotes†
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss.7, 11, 12, 13(2)
r/w13(1)(d) - Penal Code, 1860 - s.120B - Demand-andtrap proceedings - Evidentiary standard to prove - PW1complainant submitted the insurance claim and requested
the appellant-accused no.1 (Administrative Officer in the
Insurance Company) for early disposal of the claim - As per
the prosecution, the appellant demanded bribe for himself
and accused no.2-Regional Manager for settlement of the
claim - Complaint made - Trap set up - Cash, whisky bottle
and the shirt of accused no.3 (appellant's brother) were
seized - To prove criminal conspiracy between the appellant
and accused no.2, the prosecution relied on the call made
between them - Trial Court acquitted the accused persons -
High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant
and accused no.3 (accused no.2 passed away during the
pendency of the appeal in the High Court) - Interference
with:
Held: 1.1 Prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt the
demand of and acceptance of the bribe in the trap laid by PW12
(Inspector, CBI) - Present is a case of a fabrication, attempted
frame-up and botched-up trap with serious lapses committed by
the investigative agency - There are glaring contradictions in the
* Author
1184
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
prosecution evidence which cumulatively shake the foundations
of the prosecution case. [Paras 31, 38]
1.2 High Court itself relied on inferences and conjectures
alone - Even if the factum of phone call, as alleged, having
been made stands accepted, the contents of the conversation
are not available at all - Also, the protection of Art.20(3) of
the Constitution would apply and the appellant could not be
compelled to disclose the nature and content of the conversation,
assuming it happened - Further, mere fact that accused no.3
is the appellant's brother would not lead to a presumption in
law that the money taken by him was meant for the appellant
and that too, pursuant to demand being made by the appellant.
[Para 28, 37]
1.3 Moreover, on facts, the allegation of demand of bribe, as
projected by the prosecution, is shrouded in a cloud of dubiety -
Mere fact that accused no.3 is the appellant's brother would not
lead to a presumption in law that the money taken by him was
meant for the appellant and that too, pursuant to demand being
made by the appellant - Further, except for PW1, no other witness/
person was privy to the demand made to the complainant by the
appellant - This does not satisfy the requirement that in trap cases
where after a complaint is received, independent witnesses of
the trap team are also required to confirm the demand made by
the accused personally, which has not been done in the present
case - Thus, the procedure of the trap case itself from the very
inceptual stage suffers from serious legal lacuna, which cannot
be now overcome - For, the purpose of this requirement is that
before the trap is set into motion, there should be corroboration of
the allegation made by the complainant of actual and real demand
being made by the accused-public servant as a quid pro quo for
extending a favour to the complainant - On to the next stage of
actual laying of trap, there also the appellant was nowhere in the
picture - The prosecution's effort of still trying to bring him under
the ambit and scope of the corruption net clearly has not succeeded
in the circumstances. [Paras 29, 31, 37]
1.4 Furthermore, in a case where the accused persons were
acquitted by the Trial Court, there is a double presumption of
innocence which accrues in their favour - Hence, it was all the more
important for the High Court to have provided cogent reasoning
for disturbing the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
[Paras 34, 35]
[2025] 7 S.C.

## Text

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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1183 : 2025 INSC 868
M Sambasiva Rao
v.
The State of Andhra Pradesh
(Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2017)
17 July 2025
[Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in convicting the appellant-accused
no.1 u/s.120B, IPC and ss.7, 13(2) r/w s.13(1)(d), Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 by reversing the finding of acquittal of the
Trial Court.
Headnotes†
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss.7, 11, 12, 13(2)
r/w13(1)(d) - Penal Code, 1860 - s.120B - Demand-andtrap proceedings - Evidentiary standard to prove - PW1complainant submitted the insurance claim and requested
the appellant-accused no.1 (Administrative Officer in the
Insurance Company) for early disposal of the claim - As per
the prosecution, the appellant demanded bribe for himself
and accused no.2-Regional Manager for settlement of the
claim - Complaint made - Trap set up - Cash, whisky bottle
and the shirt of accused no.3 (appellant's brother) were
seized - To prove criminal conspiracy between the appellant
and accused no.2, the prosecution relied on the call made
between them - Trial Court acquitted the accused persons -
High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant
and accused no.3 (accused no.2 passed away during the
pendency of the appeal in the High Court) - Interference
with:
Held: 1.1 Prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt the
demand of and acceptance of the bribe in the trap laid by PW12
(Inspector, CBI) - Present is a case of a fabrication, attempted
frame-up and botched-up trap with serious lapses committed by
the investigative agency - There are glaring contradictions in the
* Author
1184
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Supreme Court Reports
prosecution evidence which cumulatively shake the foundations
of the prosecution case. [Paras 31, 38]
1.2 High Court itself relied on inferences and conjectures
alone - Even if the factum of phone call, as alleged, having
been made stands accepted, the contents of the conversation
are not available at all - Also, the protection of Art.20(3) of
the Constitution would apply and the appellant could not be
compelled to disclose the nature and content of the conversation,
assuming it happened - Further, mere fact that accused no.3
is the appellant's brother would not lead to a presumption in
law that the money taken by him was meant for the appellant
and that too, pursuant to demand being made by the appellant.
[Para 28, 37]
1.3 Moreover, on facts, the allegation of demand of bribe, as
projected by the prosecution, is shrouded in a cloud of dubiety -
Mere fact that accused no.3 is the appellant's brother would not
lead to a presumption in law that the money taken by him was
meant for the appellant and that too, pursuant to demand being
made by the appellant - Further, except for PW1, no other witness/
person was privy to the demand made to the complainant by the
appellant - This does not satisfy the requirement that in trap cases
where after a complaint is received, independent witnesses of
the trap team are also required to confirm the demand made by
the accused personally, which has not been done in the present
case - Thus, the procedure of the trap case itself from the very
inceptual stage suffers from serious legal lacuna, which cannot
be now overcome - For, the purpose of this requirement is that
before the trap is set into motion, there should be corroboration of
the allegation made by the complainant of actual and real demand
being made by the accused-public servant as a quid pro quo for
extending a favour to the complainant - On to the next stage of
actual laying of trap, there also the appellant was nowhere in the
picture - The prosecution's effort of still trying to bring him under
the ambit and scope of the corruption net clearly has not succeeded
in the circumstances. [Paras 29, 31, 37]
1.4 Furthermore, in a case where the accused persons were
acquitted by the Trial Court, there is a double presumption of
innocence which accrues in their favour - Hence, it was all the more
important for the High Court to have provided cogent reasoning
for disturbing the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
[Paras 34, 35]
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
1.5 Appellant entitled to benefit of doubt - Impugned Judgment set
aside and that of the Trial Court is restored - Appellant acquitted.
[Paras 38, 39]
Case Law Cited
Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2022) 5 SCR 104 : (2023)
4 SCC 731 - followed.
Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala [2022) 5 SCR 721 : (2022) 8 SCC
440; Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 11
SCR 1135 : 2023 SCC OnLine 1038 - relied on.
D Velayutham v. State [2015] 6 SCR 361 : (2015) 12 SCC
348 - referred to.
List of Acts
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution
of India.
List of Keywords
Procedure of the trap case; Demand-and-trap proceedings;
Settlement of claim; Request for Early disposal of claim; Demand
and acceptance of the bribe; Bribe; Demand of bribe; Bribe not
paid; Accident policy; Accidental death of insured; Teapoy; Tainted
currency; Cash seized; Whisky bottle; White shirt; Claim file pending;
Liaison; Regional Office; Administrative Officer; Insurance Company;
Regional Manager; Criminal conspiracy; Circumstance of conspiracy;
Demand and acceptance of the tainted currency; Trap team; Call
for fixation of the bribe; Phenolphthalein; Sodium carbonate solution
test; Solution turned pink; Moss-coloured shirt; Yellowish/brownish
tinge; Tainted cash; Quantum of the bribe; Vigilance inquiry; Posttrap proceedings; Quid pro quo; Two views possible; Fabrication and
attempted frame-up; Acquittal; Double presumption of innocence;
Phone call; Protection of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
391 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2015 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
State of Andhra Pradesh in CRLA No. 548 of 2006
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Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, Sunny
Kumar, Prateek Raushan, Amartya Bhushan, Yogit Mehra.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv., Mukesh
Kumar Maroria, Shubhendu Anand, Praneet Pranav, Shaurya Rai,
Nring Chamwibo Zeliang, Piyush.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
The present appeal challenges the Final Judgment and Order dated
21.08.2015/09.09.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No.548/2006
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Impugned Judgment') by the then
High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana
and the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the 'High
Court'), whereby the appellant/accused no.1 and accused no.3 (Mr.
M Venkata Siva Naga Prasad) were convicted, by reversing the
finding of acquittal recorded in the Final Judgment and Order dated
07.06.2005 passed in C.C. No.17/2000 on the file of the Court of the
learned Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Trial Court'), and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year, alongwith imposition of fine(s).
Accused no.2 (Mr. N Govindarao Naidu) passed away during the
pendency of the appeal in the High Court on 15.12.2013.
THE FACTUAL MATRIX:
2.
The appellant/accused no.1 was posted as an Assistant Administrative
Officer in United India Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to
as the 'Insurance Company'), Branch Office-II, Guntur (hereinafter
referred to as the 'branch'), in the year 1999. His duty was, inter
alia, to assist the Branch Manager in processing of claims submitted
in the branch. Accused no.2 was posted as the Regional Manager,
Visakhapatnam Region from June-October, 1999 and it was his duty
to process claims submitted through the branches and forward it to
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
higher authorities for approval. The branch supra of the Insurance
Company fell under his jurisdiction. Accused no.3 is the appellant's
younger brother and is engaged in agriculture and business.
3.
Mr. L Laxman Reddy had taken a Janata Personal Accident policy
(hereinafter referred to as the 'policy') from the branch on 21.11.1997
for a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs). After the accidental
death of the insured on 28.03.1999, his wife and nominee for the
policy, Mrs. Srilakshmi (PW2), submitted claim dated 05.06.1999 for
the insured sum in the branch. This claim was submitted through Mr.
L Srinivasa Rao, the surveyor appointed by the branch as instructed
by the appellant. The complainant/Mr. T Kotireddy (PW1) is the
maternal uncle of Mrs. Srilakshmi and was authorized to pursue the
settlement of the claim.
4.
During investigation, it emerged that Mr. L Srinivasa Rao had
submitted Investigation Report dated 13.07.1999 on the claim of
PW2 to the Manager of the branch on 20.07.1999. Thereupon, the
appellant made his recommendation on 16.08.1999 and sent the file
to the Branch Manager, who made his recommendation on 20.08.1999
and referred the file to the Senior Divisional Manager, who in turn,
on 15.09.1999, recommended settlement of the claim and ordered
to refer the file to the Regional Office for approval. The claim was
sent for settlement and onward transmission to higher authority to
the office of the accused no.2 on 18.09.1999.
5.
Meanwhile, PW1 after submitting the claim met the appellant and
requested for early disposal of the claim. Such request, for early
settlement of the claim, was reiterated by PW1 when he met the
appellant once again on 15.10.1999. It is then that the appellant
told him, as the prosecution's story goes, to arrange an amount
of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) as bribe for himself and
accused no.2 for settlement of the claim and travel with him on
17.10.1999 to Hyderabad, where accused no.2 was available, to give
him his share of the bribe. PW1 did not agree to pay the bribe and
did not go to Hyderabad. Thereafter, PW1 again met the appellant
on 20.10.1999 when the appellant told him that accused no.2 was
still in Hyderabad and PW1 should arrange for the bribe and book
two train tickets for their journey to Hyderabad by the NarsapurHyderabad Express on 22.10.1999. The appellant also told PW1 to
arrange for a bottle of whisky as accused no.2 was fond of liquor.
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PW1 was told to convey his confirmation to the deal in the morning
of 21.10.1999.
6.
PW1 gave a complaint on 21.10.1999 to Mr. N Vishnu (PW12),
Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
abbreviated to 'CBI'), Visakhapatnam, who was camping at the
Railway Retiring Room of the Vijayawada Railway Station, and on
his instructions, he purchased the tickets and called the appellant
to inform that the arrangement of money and berths in the train had
been done. The appellant was to meet PW1 near his coach at the
Guntur Railway Platform on 22.10.1999. Accordingly, PW12 secured
the presence of another CBI Inspector, Mr. S B Shanker and two
independent mediators, Mr. M Radhakrishnan and Mr. M Nagaraju
(PW3), Excise Inspectors, and along with the complainant prepared
the first mediators' report dated 22.10.1999. The report noted that
the tainted currency of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) and
whisky bottle was handed over to PW12. The numbers of each of the
eighty (80) tainted notes of Rs.500 denomination and batch number
of the whisky bottle was noted down. PW1 was instructed to signal
by wiping his face with a handkerchief soon after the demand and
acceptance of the tainted currency and the whisky bottle.
7.
The trap party led by PW12 boarded the Narsapur Express at
Vijayawada Station. The train left the station at 10:40 pm. When
the train reached Guntur, the appellant, with accused no.3, came
near S2 coach and informed PW1 that he was unable to come to
Hyderabad due to some personal problem and, instead, the accused
no.3 will accompany PW1. The train reached Secunderabad early
in the morning of 23.10.1999 and PW1 and accused no.3 checked
into the Rama Krishna Hotel. It is alleged that accused no.3 took an
appointment with accused no.2 on a call and thereafter, both left for
accused no.2's house. The trap team followed them. On reaching the
house of accused no.2, the independent witnesses saw accused no.2
waiting outside his house. PW1 and accused no.3 along with accused
no.2 went inside the house. Once inside, accused no.3 introduced
PW1 as the party and told accused no.2 that he had brought the
bribe. Thereafter, accused no.2 sent PW1 outside the room and both
these accused talked for some time, after which accused no.3 called
PW1 inside. Thereafter, PW1 requested accused no.2 for settlement
of the claim to which accused no.2 replied by stating that it would
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
be settled without delay. Then, on demand made by accused no.3,
PW1 handed over the bribe to accused no.3, who took out 10 tainted
notes amounting to Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) and kept
it in his shirt pocket and handed over the rest of the bribe amount
i.e., Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand) to accused no.2,
who instead of handling it, told accused no.3 to keep the same on
the teapoy. Accordingly, accused no.3 kept Rs.35,000/- (Rupees
Thirty-Five Thousand) on the teapoy. Accused no.3 also took the
whisky bottle from PW1 and placed it by the right side of the sofa
on which accused no.2 was sitting. After this, PW1 went outside and
gave the pre-arranged signal to the trap team, which rushed inside
the house. The cash from the teapoy and the shirt of accused no.3
was seized alongwith the whisky bottle. The hands of accused no.2
were subjected to phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate solution
test and the solution remained colourless. After this, the hands and
shirt pocket of accused no.3 were subjected to the chemical test
and the resultant solution turned pink. The numbers of the currency
notes and the whisky bottle tallied with the first mediators' report.
The white shirt worn by accused no.3 was also seized. All of this
was recorded in the second mediators' report dated 23.10.1999.
8.
On the basis of the above investigation, Crime No.RC.23(A)/99VSP came to be registered on 24.10.1999 under Section 120B of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC')
read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Chargesheet was filed against
the three accused on 28.06.2000 under Section 120B, IPC along
with Sections 7, 11, 12, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act. During
trial, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 13 and got marked Exhibits
P1 to P49 and also MOs 1 to 9. The appellant and accused no.3 did
not lead any evidence in defence. Accused no.2, on the other hand,
got examined DWs 1 and 2 and got marked Exhibits D1 to D6. After
appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court
found the accused not guilty of the offences alleged and, accordingly,
acquitted them of all the charges. Aggrieved, the State went up in
appeal to the High Court by filing Criminal Appeal No.548/2006.
After evaluation of the facts and evidence, the High Court vide the
Impugned Judgment allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant
and accused no.3 as under:
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Position
Sections
Sentence
Appellant/
accused no.1
Section 120B, IPC
and Sections 7,
13(2) read with
13(1)(d) of the Act
1 year's rigorous imprisonment
and fine of Rs.5,000 on three
counts, and in default of payment
of fine, additional simple
imprisonment for 2 months.
Accused no.3
Section 120B, IPC
and Sections 12,
13(1)(d) read with
13(2) of the Act
read with Section
109, IPC
1 year's rigorous imprisonment
and fine of Rs.5,000 on three
counts, and in default of payment
of fine, additional simple
imprisonment for 2 months.
9.
This Impugned Judgment, as noted above, is challenged before us.
APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS:
10. Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, at the outset submitted
that where two views are possible on the same evidence, and the
Trial Court's view favours the accused, the Appellate Court shall not
ordinarily interfere unless the findings are perverse or unreasonable
and based on no evidence. It was argued that, in a case of acquittal,
there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused
and the High Court should have reversed the acquittal only on cogent
grounds. In the present case, the High Court erred in reversing the
well-reasoned judgment of the Trial Court, which has scrutinized all
the evidence minutely.
11. It was pointed out that the appellant made his recommendation on the
claim on 16.08.1999 itself and sent the file to the Branch Manager,
who made his recommendation on 20.08.1999 and referred the
file to the Senior Divisional Manager, who in turn, on 15.09.1999,
recommended settlement of the claim and ordered to refer the file
to the Regional Office for approval. Thus, it was submitted that there
was no occasion for the appellant to collude with accused no.2 and
demand a bribe of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand), precisely
for the reason that there was lack of any official favour pending with
the appellant.
12. It was further submitted that the mother-in-law of PW2 had filed
O.S. No.63/1999 before the II Additional District Judge and also
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
preferred I.A. No.1163/1999 for restraining the Insurance Company
from disbursing the policy amount to the nominee, pending the
disposal of such suit. It was due to the order in this case that claim
settlement was delayed and not due to the alleged demand of bribe
by the appellant.
13. The only circumstance to establish conspiracy between the appellant
and accused no.2 is the call made on the night of 21.10.1999.
The High Court erred in drawing an adverse inference against the
appellant for denying the call and not coming forth with the contents
of the conversation. On the other hand, the Trial Court has rightly
appreciated this circumstance in the view of the background facts and
correctly noticed that if this was the only call, then the prosecution
had failed to establish as to when the apparent quantum of the bribe
was decided between the accused. The High Court also failed to take
note of the most important fact i.e., that the appellant and accused
no.2 were not on cordial terms as the accused no.2 had transferred
the appellant twice to different offices after receiving complaint(s)
against him. In such circumstance, it is inconceivable that the two
would enter into a conspiracy, as alleged by the prosecution.
14. It was contended that the first mediators' report noted that
phenolphthalein was only applied on the currency and not on the
whisky box. However, surprisingly the second mediators' report
conducted after the trap proceedings note that phenolphthalein
powder was collected from the whisky box and the chemical solution
turned pink. Learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court
had given a bizarre explanation for the same when it reasons that
since PW1 first handed over the tainted currency and then the whisky
box, the powder must have transferred from the currency onto PW1's
hand and then onto the box.
15. During trap proceedings, the white shirt worn by the accused no.3
was seized. However, the Trial Court notes that the shirt exhibited
in evidence was not white but rather it was moss-coloured. Another
bizarre explanation, in the learned senior counsel's opinion, that the
High Court provides, is that the white shirt seized in 1999 would
have turned moss-coloured as the colour would have withered away
due to dust.
16. It was argued that there were multiple inconsistencies in the
prosecution evidence. PW3 deposed that only two people went inside
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the house of accused no.2, whereas the second mediators' report
provides that three people went inside the house. Further, there is
inconsistency in the evidence with regard to the fact as to whether
accused no.2 was watering the plants or standing at the gate, when
the accused no.3 along with PW1 approached him. Moreover, there
is material contradiction in the depositions apropos construction
work going on in the upper portion of the house of accused no.2 on
the relevant day. PW1 was sent out by the accused present in the
house after entering the house. Some witnesses say that he came
out after 2-3 minutes, whereas others estimate the time period to be
15 minutes. Furthermore, the second mediators' report was prepared
belatedly. It was submitted that all these material inconsistencies and
contradictions would go on to show that the entire trap proceedings
are false and concocted.
17. It was further argued that accused no.2 in his defence states that
the then Superintendent of Police (hereinafter abbreviated to 'SP'),
Mr. A Sudhakara Rao came to his house and told him to be wise
enough to come out of the case, to which accused no.2 did not
agree. This, it was contended, is to be seen with the evidence of
PW12 who had deposed to the effect that he did not inform the SP
about laying of the trap from Hyderabad, but informed him about
the same only after his return to Visakhapatnam. This evidence is
falsified by the Tour Diary of the SP which shows that on 23.10.1999
he had reached Hyderabad and in that whole week, only a solitary
trap case was registered. This goes to demonstrate, again, that the
entire case was fabricated to falsely implicate the accused.
18. It was contended that there are too many loose ends in the case
of the prosecution, which has miserably failed to prove the charges
alleged against the appellant. We were reminded across the bar
that the two co-accused have passed away. The appellant is aged
around 74 years and suffering from multiple ailments. In view of the
above, learned senior counsel urged us to allow the appeal and
acquit the appellant.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
19. Per contra, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General
(hereinafter abbreviated to 'ASG'), contended that the Trial Court had
misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence and the High Court
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
has considered the same in the correct perspective. The High Court,
submitted the learned ASG, has every power to re-appreciate the
evidence and facts and interfere when the Trial Court's judgment
suffered from a perverse appreciation of the facts. It was submitted
that the Impugned Judgment is based on cogent reasoning and does
not call for any interference by this Court.
20. It was argued that the processing/clearing of the claim at the level
of the appellant before the date of demand is of no consequence,
as the demand made by the appellant was not to clear the file at
his level but to liaison with accused no.2 to get the claim settled.
This has been rightly noted by the High Court. The demand by the
appellant and acceptance of the bribe by the other accused has
been proven by the testimony of PW1, which remained unshaken
in the cross-examination. The High Court has correctly analyzed the
probative value of the evidence, including the deposition of PW1
and has rightly convicted the appellant. Reliance was placed on
D Velayutham v State, (2015) 12 SCC 348 to argue that the Court
has, previously, taken note of the byzantine methods of bribe-taking,
and where an evader escapes a trap, constructive receipt has to be
an alternate means of fastening criminal culpability.
21. It was contended that the injunction order passed in O.S. No.63/1999
was only with respect to disbursal of the amount. It should be noted
that despite the injunction, the Assistant Divisional Manager and the
Senior Divisional Manager approved the claim and forwarded the file
to the accused no.2 for settlement of the claim, subject to judgment
in the case. PW5 has deposed that accused no.2 instructed him to
keep the file pending. Further, there was no noting in the file to the
effect that it is pending due to vigilance enquiry.
22. Learned ASG further submitted that the appellant and accused no.2
were on cordial terms, as evident from the phone call made on
21.10.1999. This is also clear from the fact that even after receiving
corruption complaint against the appellant, accused no.2 transferred
the appellant locally in Guntur. Hence, it is clear that the transfer(s)
were done only as a formality. Another crucial fact noted by the
High Court is the call made by accused no.3 to accused no.2 on the
morning of 23.10.1999 to take an appointment. This call has been
proved through oral and documentary evidence and clinches that a
conspiracy was hatched.
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23. It was further contended that minor inconsistencies in the evidence
of the witnesses is natural and should be ignored by this Court.
On principally these grounds, learned ASG urged us to dismiss the
appeal and uphold the conviction.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
24. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant and
learned ASG for the State, considered their submissions and perused
the material on record. We have bestowed anxious consideration to
the issues involved. It is imperative to, at the outset, note that there are
multiple contested facts apropos the demand-and-trap proceedings
and given that there are divergent opinions expressed by the Courts
below, it is all the more appropriate to analyze and appraise the
evidence adduced. We may gainfully refer to the discussion by a
5-Judge Bench in Neeraj Dutta v State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4
SCC 731 with regard to the evidentiary standard to prove offence(s)
under the concerned provisions of the Act:
'88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the
guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter
of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct
evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.
88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also
be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public
servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribegiver without there
being any demand from the public servant and the latter
simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification,
it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In
such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the
public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand
and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is received by the
public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case
of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribegiver and the demand by the public servant respectively
have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue.
In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii),
respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the
Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be
an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it an
offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant
when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a
payment made which is received by the public servant,
would be an offence of obtainment under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand
and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification
may be made by a court of law by way of an inference
only when the foundational facts have been proved by
relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the
absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record,
the court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact
while considering whether the fact of demand has been
proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption
of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the
absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
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88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns "hostile", or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial,
demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in
the evidence of any other witness who can again let in
evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence.
The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of
acquittal of the accused public servant.
88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on
the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the
court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification
was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned
in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised
by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption
in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject
to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact
referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the former
is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary
in nature.'
25. Keeping in mind the aforesaid decision, we turn to the evidence on
record. On the point of demand of bribe by the appellant, the Trial
Court opined that the appellant and other officers of the Branch
Office had already approved the claim file and referred the file to
the Regional Office for its approval on 15.09.1999 and thus, there
was no occasion for the appellant to demand the bribe. The High
Court, on the other hand, has observed that the demand was made
to liaison with the accused no.2. To drive home the act of liaison, it
was alleged by the prosecution, and accepted by the High Court,
that since the bribe was not paid by PW1, the claim file was kept
pending in the Regional Office by accused no.2.
26. PW1 has spoken of the demand made by the appellant, wherein he
is stated to have specifically demanded Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty
Thousand) i.e., 5% of the claim amount to be shared between himself
and accused no.2, failing which, the claim will not be cleared. The
prosecution would contend that it is apparent then, that the demand,
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
if so made by the appellant, was clearly to liaison and the fact that
the claim was cleared at the Branch Office cannot be used to discard
the theory of demand. Having said so, this sole circumstance, as we
later discuss, cannot by itself prove the factum of demand having
been made by the appellant.
27. In order to present proof of criminal conspiracy between the appellant
and accused no.2, the prosecution had placed reliance on the call
made between them on 21.10.1999 at 21:45 hours. The Trial Court
disbelieved the criminal conspiracy on the ground that if this was the
only circumstance of conspiracy, then it was not proved as to when
the accused had arrived at an understanding on the quantum of the
bribe, which had been demanded earlier on 15.10.1999. The High
Court, on the other hand, has preferred to take a more plausible
view insofar as it states that it is not the prosecution's case that
this call was the first instance for fixation of the bribe. However, the
High Court then goes on to draw an adverse inference against the
accused for not divulging the contents of the conversation holding
the call to be a conspiratorial talk, which, in our view, ought not to
have been done, as the reasoning for the same is based on shaky
ground. The High Court's analysis of the call reads thus:
'20) Another instance which clinches the conspiracy
between AO1 and AO2, is the telephonic call made by AO1
on the night of 21.10.1999 from his residence telephone.
PW9, the Chief Accounts Officer of Telecom Department,
Guntur provided the particulars of the out going calls from
the telephone to phone No.358621 belonging to AO1
under Ex.P36. Ex.P37 is the covering letter for Ex.P36.
As per Ex.P36A entry, a phone call was made from this
telephone No.7745462 which admittedly belonging to
AO2 on the night of 21.10.1999 at 21.39 hours. In the
cross-examination of PW9 except denying that Ex.P36
particulars are not correct and unauthenticated nothing
was brought on record to disprove the authencity of call
particulars furnished by a responsible officer like PW9.
Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve Ex.P36A call
particulars which would show that on the crucial date
i.e. one day prior to the proposed visit of AO1 and PW1
to AO2 at Hyderabad, AO1 made a call to AO2. If AO1
and AO2 were not in good terms, there was no occasion
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for AO1 to make a call to AO2 that too when he was on
leave and stayed in his house at Secunderabad. When we
believe that the aforesaid call was made by AO1 to AO2
the logical conclusion is that AO1 owed a responsibility
to divulge as to the reason for his calling AO2. As already
stated supra, he was totally denying the authenticity
of Ex.P36 and specifically Ex.P36A calls. It could have
been a different thing had he admitted that he made a
phone call to AO2 and gave a reason for calling. In such
circumstances, the authenticity of his explanation would
have been discussed and decided. On the other hand, he
simply denied the authenticity of Ex.P36 and P36A. As
already held, the authenticity of Ex.P36 cannot be doubted
in view of evidence of PW9. It confirms that AO1 indeed
made a phone call to AO2. His flat denial of making phone
call on the pretext of inauthenticity of Ex.P36 prompts me
to draw an adverse inference against him to the effect that
the phone call was nothing but part of conspiratorial talk
between AO1 and AO2. In my esteem, this phone call
and another phone call made by A3 to AO2 about which
I will discuss at the relevant part of the judgment, are the
crucial pieces of evidence which fortify the prosecution
case on one hand and blast away the defence of all the
accused. Unfortunately the trial Court, it must be said,
on a perverse appreciation, has discarded the aforesaid
valuable piece of evidence. For discarding such a valuable
piece of evidence covered by above two phone calls, the
trial Court did not make a logical analysis basing on the
facts, evidence and circumstances but came to slipshod
conclusion. It is pertinent to narrate its conclusion covered
by para-26 of the judgment which reads thus:
"Para 26: Even with regard to the telephone
calls allegedly made to A2 by A3, there is
absolutely no dependable evidence as to who
actually spoke those calls and as to what was
that conversation. The same is the result of
the analysis with regard to the telephone call
allegedly made by A1 to A2 in the night of
21.10.1999."
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M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
With regard to phone call made by A3 to AO2 and the
perversity of finding of trial Court I will discuss later.
a) Sofaras first phone call made by AO1 to AO2 is
concerned, from the above observation of the trial Court
what we can understand is it disbelieved the said phone call
on the ground that there is no dependable evidence about
phone call and it is not known who actually spoke and what
was the nature of conversation. This observation is quite
inappreciable. Dependability of evidence is concerned, a
responsible officer of calibre of PW9 avouched authenticity
of Ex.P36 and P36A call data particulars. The trial Court
did not give any plausible reason for not accepting his
evidence. So, the dependability of Ex.P36 and P36A is
not a question at all. Then, the question of who spoke is
concerned, there can be no doubt because the call was
emanated from the residential telephone of AO1 and not
from a public booth or from some other telephone. The
recipient of the call being the higher officer of AO1 none
else than AO1 must have talked to AO2. It is true that
the Court has no benefit of conversion between AO1 and
AO2. However, as already observed supra, from the flat
denial of every thing by AO1 the adverse inference can
be drawn that they must have talked about the proposed
visit of AO1 and PW1 to the residence of AO2. It must
be noted that the trial Court gave illogical reasoning to
hold that the conversion between AO1 and AO2 even
if believed must not be in connection with the claim of
PW2 and bribe etc. The trial Court observed that if the
said phone call is accepted as the proof for the alleged
criminal conspiracy between AO1 and AO2 to come to
a common understanding regarding quantum of bribe of
Rs.40,000/- how come that on that day morning itself PW1
could already mention the said amount as demanded by
AO1 in Ex.P4- complainant and held that there was no
conspiracy at all. It must be noted that it is not the case
of the prosecution that through this phone call only, AO1
and AO2 for the first time conspired and fixed the bribe
amount. They might have discussed about their conspiracy
and fixed the bribe amount through another phone call by
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a different phone number. What the prosecution intended
to establish is that the phone call in Ex.P36A is a part of
their conspiracy but not the first one for fixation of bribe
amount. Hence, the above circumstances clearly establish
the conspiracy between AO1 and AO2.' (sic)
(emphasis supplied)
28. From the above extract, rather portions thereof, it is quite clear that
the High Court itself has relied on inferences and conjectures alone.
Even if the factum of phone call, as alleged, having been made stands
accepted, it is clear that the contents of the conversation are not
available at all. That aside, surely the protection of Article 20(3) of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Constitution')
would apply and the appellant could not be compelled to disclose
the nature and content of the conversation, assuming it happened.
In this background, much has also been said about the nature of
the relationship between the appellant and the accused no.2. The
prosecution has strived to prove that they shared a cordial relationship
while the defence has argued that there was antagonism between
them in view of the orders passed by accused no.2 transferring the
appellant twice. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that one Mr. K
Venkata Reddy, stating to be a close friend of Mr. L Laxman Reddy
(PW2's deceased-husband) had written a letter dated 04.08.1999 to
accused no.2 informing him that the appellant is demanding a bribe
to settle PW2's claim and requested for settlement of the claim as
also suitable action against the appellant. This letter was forwarded
by accused no.2 to Mr.