# MADAN LAL PURI v. SAIN DAS BERRY

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 935
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-07-27
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/madan-lal-puri-v-sain-das-berry-5465
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

933
MADAN LAL PURI
v.
SAIN DAS BERRY
July 27, 1971
A
re. A. VAIDIALINGAM, A. N. RAY AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.]
B
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, ss. 14(1)(e) and 39(2)-Jurisdiclio11 of
High Court.
The respondents who was the landlord of certain premises, filed an
application under s. 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for the
eviction of the appellant, who was the lessee, on the ground inter alia,
C
that the respondent required the premises bo.nafide for his occupation as
a residence for himself and his family members. The Rent Controller found
that the requirement of the landlord was not bonafide and dismissed the application. The order was confirmed in appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal. Tho respondent filed an appeal to the High Court under s. 39(2) of the
Act Before the High Cow:t both parties agreed that the case should he
remanded to the Tribunal for a finding on the question whether the premises available with the respondent could be considered to be •reasonably
D
suitable residential accommodation' as contemplated by s.- 14(l)(e).
On
remand, the Tribunal reported that the premises in the occupation of the
respondent were not reasonably sufficient for the respondent and his family.
The appellant however contended before the High Court, ignoring this
finding of the Tribun,J, that on the concurrent findings of the two sub·
ordinate authorities that the landlord's requirement was not bonafide, there
was no question of law involved and so the High Court had no jurisdiction under s. 39(2) to consider the correctness of those findings. The High
E
Court rejected the contention and held, that, in view of the finding on
remand the decision of the subordinate authorities dismissing the respon.
dent's application was erroneous.
fn appeal to this Court,
HELD: This Court in Kam/a Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra, C.A. No. 2150
of 1966 dated 26-9-1969 held that a finding on the issue whether the requiremenl of a landlord is bonafide is a finding on mixed questions of
law and fact and not on facts only. Therefore, it was open to the High
Court, when exercising jurisdiction under s. 39(2), to consider in proper
cases the correctness of such a finding.
[939E-G]

## Text

933
MADAN LAL PURI
v.
SAIN DAS BERRY
July 27, 1971
A
re. A. VAIDIALINGAM, A. N. RAY AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.]
B
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, ss. 14(1)(e) and 39(2)-Jurisdiclio11 of
High Court.
The respondents who was the landlord of certain premises, filed an
application under s. 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for the
eviction of the appellant, who was the lessee, on the ground inter alia,
C
that the respondent required the premises bo.nafide for his occupation as
a residence for himself and his family members. The Rent Controller found
that the requirement of the landlord was not bonafide and dismissed the application. The order was confirmed in appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal. Tho respondent filed an appeal to the High Court under s. 39(2) of the
Act Before the High Cow:t both parties agreed that the case should he
remanded to the Tribunal for a finding on the question whether the premises available with the respondent could be considered to be •reasonably
D
suitable residential accommodation' as contemplated by s.- 14(l)(e).
On
remand, the Tribunal reported that the premises in the occupation of the
respondent were not reasonably sufficient for the respondent and his family.
The appellant however contended before the High Court, ignoring this
finding of the Tribun,J, that on the concurrent findings of the two sub·
ordinate authorities that the landlord's requirement was not bonafide, there
was no question of law involved and so the High Court had no jurisdiction under s. 39(2) to consider the correctness of those findings. The High
E
Court rejected the contention and held, that, in view of the finding on
remand the decision of the subordinate authorities dismissing the respon.
dent's application was erroneous.
fn appeal to this Court,
HELD: This Court in Kam/a Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra, C.A. No. 2150
of 1966 dated 26-9-1969 held that a finding on the issue whether the requiremenl of a landlord is bonafide is a finding on mixed questions of
law and fact and not on facts only. Therefore, it was open to the High
Court, when exercising jurisdiction under s. 39(2), to consider in proper
cases the correctness of such a finding.
[939E-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No. 848 of
p
1971.
G
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
December 7, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 110-D
of 1966.
Hardev Singh, K. P. Kapur and H. L Kapur, for the appel-
~~.
H
S. K. Mehta, K. L. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja, for the respondent.
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938
SUPREME COURT REPORT5
[1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J.-In thas appeal, Mr. Hardev Singh, learned
counsel on behalf of the tenant-appellant, challenges the judgment and order dated December 7, 1970 of the Delhi High Court
.iJi S.A.O. No. 110-D of 1966. Special leave has been granted by
this Court limited to the question whether the High Court was
justified, in view of s. 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
(hereinafter called the Act) in setting aside the decisions of the
two subordinate authorities, dismissing the application filed
by
the respondent-landlord for evicting the appellant.
The facts leading up to this appeal may be brielly stated.
The appellant took on lease, the first lloor of the premises in
question from the respondent on January 22, 1964 on a monthly
rent of Rs. 250. The respondent who was the owner of the entire
premises was then occupying the ground floor.
The landlord
filed an application, before the Rent Controller on November 26,
1964 for eviction of the appellant from the portion in his occupation as lessee, on two grounds; (a) that the tenant has sub-let a
part of the premises, and (b) that he required the premises bona
fide for his occupation as a residence himself and his family
members. The latter claim was based under cl. (e) of the proviso
to sub-section (I) of s. 14 of the Act, which is as follows:-
"that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a
residence for himself or for any member of his family
dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any
person for whose benefit the premises are held and that
the landlord or such person has no other reasonably
suitable residential accommodation;"
The tenant opposed the claim of the landlord on both the
grounds.
He denied the allegation of sub-letting.
He also contended that the landlord's requirement for his occupation was
not bonafide. The tenant's plea was that the portion of the premises in his occupation was sufficient for his purpose. The Rent
Controller accepted the plea of the tenant that there was no subletting. He also accepted his plea that the requirement of the
landlord for his occupation was not bona fide. On these findings,
the landlord's application was
dismissed.
These two findings
were also confirmed in the appeal filed by the landlord before the
Rent Control Tribunal.
The question.
regarding
sub-letting,
having been decided against the landlord by both the Tribunals,
no longer survives and it was also not agitated before the High.
Court. It may be stated at this stage that the findings of both the
tribunals on the question of bonafide requirement were recorded
against the landlord, on the sole ground that the landlord must
M. L. PURI v. s. o. BERRY (Vaidialingam,J.)
937
have foreseen his requirement for
additional accommodation
A
even at the time when he let out a part of the premises on January
22, 1964 to the appellant and therefore he was not entitled to ask
for eviction under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-section (!) of s. 14
of the Act. It is the view of both the Tribunals that when eviction
is asked for within about 11 months of the letting, the claim of the
landlord cannot be considered to be bonafide.
'
B
The landlord carried the matter in appeal before the High
Court under s. 39 of the Act. That section runs as follows :-
"39(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),
an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order
made by the Tribunal within sixty days from the date
of such order ;
Provided that the High Court may entertain the
appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days,
if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufli·
cient cause from filing the appeal In time.
(2) No appeal shall lie under sub-section (I), unless the appeal involves some substantial question of
)aw."
Before the High Court, counsel for both parties made a
representation that the Rent Control Tribunal has not recorded
· a finding on the question whether the premises avaiable with the
landlord can be considered to be "reasonably suitable residential
accommodation" as contemplated by cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14
(!). Hence they made a joint request to remand the case to the
Tribunal for a finding on the said question on the basis of the
evidence already on record.
Accepting this joint request, the
learned ,Judge remanded the case to the Tribunal.
The latter,
after a consideration of the materials on record as well as the
extent of the premises in the occupation of the landlord and also
having due regard to the number of family members living with
the latter, held, in his report dated May 4, 1970, that the portion
of the premises in the occupation of the landlord was not reasonably sufficient for a family consisting of the landlord, his wife,
his son, son's wife and their chlldren. On this basis, he recorded
a finding that the premises in the occupation of the respondent
were not reasonably suitable for his residence.
So far as we could see, the correctness of these findings recor·
ded by the Rent Control Tribunal, in favour of the landlord, do
not appear to have been challenged by the tenant before the High
Court when. the appeal came up for final hearing. On the other
hand, we find that the same contentions that were raised regard·
·ing the bonafide requirement of the landlord and which found
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acceptance at the hands of the Rent Controller and the Tribunal
before remand were again raised by the tenant-appellant before
the High Court. That is, in short, the appellant herein was con·
testing before the High Court, the appeal of the landlord, ignoring the findings of the Tribunal dated May 4, 1970. The main
point that was urged by the appellant before the High Ccurt was
that as the two subordinate Tribunals have recorded concurrent
findings negativing the claim of the landlord regarding his bonafide requirement of the premises, the appeal filed by the landlord
did not involve any substantial question of law. On this basis
the appellant pressed for the dismissal of the landlord's appeal.
On the other hand, the respondent urged that both the subordinate
Tribunals have not properly considered the question of the land·
lord's requirement ; and that the findings recorded against him
were on irrelevant consideration. According to the landlord the
• various material factors which have to be taken into account for
adjudicating upon such a claim, have not been properly borne
in mind by both the Tribunals. Quite naturally the landlord
placed considerable reliance on the findings recorded on May 4,
1970 in his favour by the Tribunal.
The High Court rejected the contention of the appellant that
it has no jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the findings
recorded by the two subordinate authorities especially when the
relevant matters to be taken into account for deciding such a
question have not been borne in mind by those authorities. The
High Court is of the view that the rejection by the Rent Con·
troller and the Tribunal of the claim of the landlord on the sole
ground that he should have anticipated his requirement for the
next 10 or II months when he let out the premises on lease on
January 22, 1964, was erroneous. The High Court has further
observed that none of the subordinate authorities have held that
after letting out the premises on January 22, 1964 and before
filing the application for eviction on November 26, 1964, the land·
lord has made any demand from the tenant for payment of higher
rent. Finally, the High Court having due regard to the above
circumstances and the size of the family of the landlord and the
findings recorded by the Tribunal on May 4, 1970 held that the
decision of the two subordinate authorities dismissing the land·
lord's application was erroneous. On the other hand, the learned
Judge held that the landlord has made out ~is claim. under cl. (e)
of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Act. On this reasomng the learn·
ed Judge reversed the decision of the Rent Controller an~ !he
Tribunal and allowed the application of the landlord for ev1ct10n
of the appellant. The appellant was given six months' time for
v~cating the premises.
Mr. Hardev Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, .has
very strenously urged that in view of the concurrent findings.
M. L. PURI v. s. o. BERRY (Vataratrngam, J.)
recorded by the two subordinate tribunals, there was no question
of la~ much less a substantial question of law arising for consideration before the High Court in the appeal filed by the landlord. Hen,e he urged that the interference by the High Court
with the concurrent findings so recorded was not justified. Learned counsel further pointed out that the landlord has not made out
his claim under cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Act. Mr.
Hardev Singh referred us to certain decisions of this Court dealing with the question, under what circumstances it can be considered that a substantial question of law arises. We do not think
it necessary, in the circumstances of this case, to refer to those
decisions, as in our opinion they have no bearing on the short
question that arises for consideration before us,
namely,
the
power of the High Court under s. 39, to consider the correctness
of a finding regarding bonafide requirement under cl. (e) of the
proviso to s. 14(1) of the Act.
As we have already pointed out, the sole question that has
to be decided by us is whether the High Court in reversing the
decisions of the Rent Controller and the Tribunal, in the circumstancc3 of this case, can be considered to have exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 39(2). We are satisfied that the High Court has
not exceeded its jurisdiction in any manner.
The argument of Mr. Hardev Singh that the High Court has
exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 39(2) of the Act when it reversed the finding of the two subordinate authorities on the question
of bonafide requirement has, in our opinion, no substance.
In
Smt. Kam/a Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra('), this Court observed as
follows:
" ...... Whether on the facts proved the requirement
of the landlord is bona fide,
within the meaning of
s. 14(!)(e) is a finding on a mixed question of law and
fact ...... "
From the above observations it is clear that an inference drawn
by the subordinate authorities that the requirement of the respon·
dent was not bonafide, could not be regarded as conclusive. The
High Court, in proper cases, has ample jurisdiction to Interfere
with that finding and record its own conclusions on the basis of
the materials on record.
We may also point out that in the case before us the position
is made worse for the appellant in view of the finding recorded
by the Tribunal in favour of the landlord on May 4, 1970. We
have already pointed out the circumstances under which a finding
was called for by the High Court. The High Court has accepted
those findings and held in favour of the landlord that he has
(l) C. A. No. 2150of1966 decided on 26-9-1969.
939
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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made out a case under cl. (e) of the proviso to
s. 14(!) of the
Act.
Mr. Hardev Singh referred us to the decision of this Court
reported in Bhagwan Dass and another v. S. Rajdev Singh and
another('), wherein it has been observed :
"A second appeal lies to the High Court against the
decision of the Rent Control Tribunal under Section 39(2)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, only if the appeal
involves some substantial question of law. The Rent
Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal, on a consideration of the relevant terms of the agreement and oral
evidence and the circumstances found that a clear case
of sub-letting was established. On that finding no question of law, much less a substantial question
of law,
arose."
The first part of the above extract lays down the nature of
the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under s. 39(2) of the
Act.
In that decision, on facts, it was found both by the Rent
Controller and the Tribunal, on a relevant consideration of the
materials on record, that a case of sub-letting was established.
On such a finding concurrently arrived at by both the
authorities, it was held by this Court that no question of law, much
Jess a substantial question of law arose for consideration before
the High Court.
But the facts in the case before us are entirely different. We
have already pointed out that the question that fell to be considered by the High Court was whether the claim made by the
landlord under cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Act was
bonafide. As already pointed out, this Court, in Smt. Kam/a
Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra(''), has held that a finding on such an
issue is not one of fact alone but is a finding of mixed question
of law and fact, and that it was open to the High Court when
exercising its jurisdiction under s. 39(2) of the Act, to consider
the correctness or otherwise of such a finding.
The findings recorded on such an issue by the subordinate tribunals are not
conclusive.
From the above discussion, it follows that the High Court
has not exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 39(2) of the Act.
In
consequence, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear theit own costs.
H
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
(l) A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 986.
(2) c. A. No. 2150of1966 decided on 26-9-1969.