# MADHYA PRADESH) v. MORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 106
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 40 to 110of1955
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, J. c. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/madhya-pradesh-v-moradhwaj-singh-and-others-1816
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

] agirs, Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactmentV indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act, I952
(XI of I952), ss. 22(r), 37,
Schedule cl. (4)(e)-Code of Civil
Procedure (Act V of I908), s. 9-Constitution of India, Art. JI A.
;.
These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity
of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms
Act, 1952 (XI of 1952). Applications were made before the
Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the
ground that various provisions of the Act placed unreasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner held that the
Act, excepting s. 22(1), s. 37 and cl. (4)(e) of the Schedule to the
Act, was constitutionally valid. The State appealed against
that part of the order which declared the three provisions
unconstitutional and one of the petitioners appealed against the
order declaring the rest of the Act constitutional.
Held, that the appeal OD the State must be allowed and that
of the petitioner dismissed.
It was not correct to say that s. 22 of the Act, which lays
down the scheme for giving effect to s. 7(a) of the Act which
permits the Jagirdars to remain in possession of certain lands
even after the abolition of their jagirs, is a piece of colourable
~
legislation and, therefore, ultra vires the Legislature. That
section cannot be said to discriminate as between jagirdars on
the one hand and other occupants of land, to whom s. 28(1)
applies, on the other, since they belong to distinct and different
classes.
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
107
Even assuming that they belong to the same class and s. 22
r960
is discriminatory, that section is protected by Art. 31A of the
Constitution.
State of V. P.
The question as to colourable legislation is really one
v.1
relating to legislative competency and there can be no doubt that Moradhwaj Singh
the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature was perfectly competent to
enact the impugned provisions under Entry 18, List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa. [1954]
S.C.R. l and Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer (Now
Rajasthan). [1959] Suppl. (1) S.C.R. 478, relied on.
There was no substance in the contention that s. 37 of the
Act is repugnant to s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
consequently ultra vires the State Legislature. The Vindaya
Pradesh Legislature had undoubtedly the power under Entry 3,
List II of the Seventh Schedule to make a provision likes. 37 of
the Act and, once it did so, the last part of s. 9 of the Code
would apply and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would be
barred by s. 9 of the Code read with s. 37 of the Act.
Nor was it correct to say that cl. (4)(e) of the Schedule
deprives the J agirdar · of his proprietary interest without
compensation. Although he may have to pay rent for the land
remaining with him, no revenue for such land was any longer
payable by him and the revenue is taken into account in
assessing compensation.
The entire Act, therefore, falls within the protection of Art.
31A of the Constitution and, in view of the decisions of this Court,
its constitutional validity is beyond question .
. Case-law referred to.

## Text

106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960J
z960
The only other point that was argued at the bar
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was a question of fact, namely, whether the corrupt
Shri Bal wan Singh practice alleged had been proved. On that point
;;.,;
I am in perfect agreement with the view expressed
Lakshmi Narain by my learned brothers and have nothing to add.
Sarkar ].
z960
February, 24
Appeal dismissed.
THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH
(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)
v.
MORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
] agirs, Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactmentV indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act, I952
(XI of I952), ss. 22(r), 37,
Schedule cl. (4)(e)-Code of Civil
Procedure (Act V of I908), s. 9-Constitution of India, Art. JI A.
;.
These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity
of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms
Act, 1952 (XI of 1952). Applications were made before the
Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the
ground that various provisions of the Act placed unreasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner held that the
Act, excepting s. 22(1), s. 37 and cl. (4)(e) of the Schedule to the
Act, was constitutionally valid. The State appealed against
that part of the order which declared the three provisions
unconstitutional and one of the petitioners appealed against the
order declaring the rest of the Act constitutional.
Held, that the appeal OD the State must be allowed and that
of the petitioner dismissed.
It was not correct to say that s. 22 of the Act, which lays
down the scheme for giving effect to s. 7(a) of the Act which
permits the Jagirdars to remain in possession of certain lands
even after the abolition of their jagirs, is a piece of colourable
~
legislation and, therefore, ultra vires the Legislature. That
section cannot be said to discriminate as between jagirdars on
the one hand and other occupants of land, to whom s. 28(1)
applies, on the other, since they belong to distinct and different
classes.
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,....,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
107
Even assuming that they belong to the same class and s. 22
r960
is discriminatory, that section is protected by Art. 31A of the
Constitution.
State of V. P.
The question as to colourable legislation is really one
v.1
relating to legislative competency and there can be no doubt that Moradhwaj Singh
the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature was perfectly competent to
enact the impugned provisions under Entry 18, List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa. [1954]
S.C.R. l and Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer (Now
Rajasthan). [1959] Suppl. (1) S.C.R. 478, relied on.
There was no substance in the contention that s. 37 of the
Act is repugnant to s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
consequently ultra vires the State Legislature. The Vindaya
Pradesh Legislature had undoubtedly the power under Entry 3,
List II of the Seventh Schedule to make a provision likes. 37 of
the Act and, once it did so, the last part of s. 9 of the Code
would apply and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would be
barred by s. 9 of the Code read with s. 37 of the Act.
Nor was it correct to say that cl. (4)(e) of the Schedule
deprives the J agirdar · of his proprietary interest without
compensation. Although he may have to pay rent for the land
remaining with him, no revenue for such land was any longer
payable by him and the revenue is taken into account in
assessing compensation.
The entire Act, therefore, falls within the protection of Art.
31A of the Constitution and, in view of the decisions of this Court,
its constitutional validity is beyond question .
. Case-law referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 40 to 110of1955.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
November 12, 1953, of the former Judicial Commissioner's Court, Vindhya Pradesh, Rewa, in Misc.
Applications (Writ} Nos. 51 to 119 and 121 of 1953.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, M. Adhikari, Advocate-General for the State of 11I adhya Pradesh
and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.As. Nos. 40
to 109 of 55) and respondent (in C.A. No. 110/55).
K. B. Asthana, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents
(in C.As. Nos. 40, 51, 52, 54, 65 and 100/55) and
appellant (in C.A. No. 110/55).
1960. February, 24. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
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W ANCHOO, J.-These sevety-one appeals on certificates granted by the Judicial Commissioner ofVindhya
State of v. P.
Pradesh arise out of seventy petitions under art. 226
Moradh;~j Singh of the Constitutio_n filed befor~ that Court challengin~
the constitutionality of the V mdhya Pradesh AbohWan,hoo J.
tion of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No. XI ofl952,
(hereinafter called the Act). They were disposed of
by a common judgment by the Judicial Commissioner.
We shall also dispose of these appeals, by a common judgment. Seventy (Nos. 40 to 109), out of these
appeals, are by the State of Vindhya Pradesh (now
Madhya Pradesh) while one (Ko. llO) is by the
Brijindar Singh, a jagirdar.
The case of the petitioners in the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner was that the Act was unconstitutional
as various provisions in it placed an unreasonable
restriction on the exercise of the fundamental rights
guaranteed to the petitioners under Part III of the
Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner held that
the Act was constitutional, except for three provisions
thereof, namely, s. 22(1), s. 37 and cl. (4) (e)
of the
Schedule to the Act. The seventy appeals by the
State are with respect to this part of the order declaring these three provisions unconstitutional. The appeal
of Brijindar Singh is against that part of the order by
which the rest of the Act was held constitutional.
We shall first deal with the appe11.l of Brijindar
Singh. Learned counsel . for Brijindar Singh was
unable-and in our opinion rightly-to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act as a whole in view of art.
31-A of the Constitution and the decisions of this
Court in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir
Kameshwar Singh (1), Visweshwar Rao v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh (2), Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The
State of U.P. (3), K. G. Gajapati Narayan Dea v. The
State of Orissa ('), Thakur Amar Singhji v. The State
of Rajasthan ('), Raja Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup v.
The State of Assam (6), Sri Ram Ram Narain v. The
State of Bombay ('), Raghubir Singh v. The State of
Ajmer (now Rajasthan) (8) and Atma Ram v. The State
of Punjab ('), relating to similar legislation in the
(I) [r952) S.C R. 889.
(2) [r952] S.C R. ro20.
(3) [1952) S.C.R. 1056.
(4) [r954] S.C.R. I.
(5) [1955J 2 S.C.R. 303.
(6) [r956] S.C.R. 303,
(7) [r959] Suppl. (I) S.C R. 489
(8) [r9;9] Suppl. (I) S.C.R. 47•
\9) [r959] Suppl. (r) S.C.R. 74~.
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
109
States of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh
r96o
Orissa, Rajasthan, Assam, Bombay, Ajmer and Punjab.
State of V, P.
It is not necessary therefore to examine the provisions
v.
of the Act in detail. In the circumstances, Appeal Moradhwaj Singh
No. 110 is dismissed; but as it was not pressed we
think it right that the parties should bear their own
Wanchoo J.
costs of this appeal.
Now we turn to the appeals by the State. The
object of the Act is to resume jagir-lands. Sec. 5 provides for the appointment of a date for the resumption
of any class of jagir-land by notification and power is
given to the State Government to fix different dates
for different classes of jagir-lands. Sec. 6 provides for
the consequences of such resumption. Sec. 7, however
lays down that notwithstanding anything contained
in s. 6, certain lands will remain in possession of jagirdars and cl. (a) thereof is material and may be quoted
here-
" The jagirdar shall continue to remain in possession of his sir and khudkasht to the extent and subject to the conditions and restrictions specified in
Ch. IV."
Seo. 10 and the subsequent sections appearing in Ch. III
of the Act provide for compensation and the Schedule
provides the manner in which the compensation shall
be computed. ·Then comes Ch. IV, which deals with
sir and khudkasht lands. Sec. 20 provides for an application by the jagirdar for allotment of land for personal
cultivation. Sec. 21 provides for an enquiry by the
Tahsildar on such application in the prescribed manner, and the allotment of!land and the issue of a patta
thereof to the jagir<lar having regard to the remaining
provisions of the Chapter. Then comes s. 22, which
may be quoted in full-·
" ( l) A jagirdar shall be allotted all sir and khudkasht lands which he was cultivating personally for a
continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption.
"(2) A jagirdar whose jagir-lands have been
resumed under this Act-
( a) who is not allotted any sir or khudkasht land
under sub-section (1), or
State of V. P.
v.
M orad!iwaj Singh
Wanchoo ].
llO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
(b} who had been allotted any such land which is
less than the minimum area,
may ifhc applies in1this behalf, be allotted any other
sir or khudkasht land in his personal cultivation at
the date of resumption or where there is no such
land or sufficient area o~ such land any unoccupied
cultivable waste land in the jagir-land subject to
availability of such land, so that-
(i) in a case falling under cl. (a), the total area
allotted to him under this sub-section is equal to the
minimum area, and
(ii) in a case falling under cl. (b ), the area allotted
to him under this sub-section together with the area
allotted under sub-section (1) is equal to the minimum area.
Explanation-In this sub-section, the expression
'minimum ' means ten per cent. of the total cultivated land in the jagir-land at the date of resumption or 30 acres whichever is greater:
Provided that in no case the minimum area shall
exceed 250 acres."
Chapter V deals with rights of tenants, grove
holders and occupants in jagir-land and confers certoiin benefits on them. Chapter VI provides for the
machinery and the procedure for carrying out the
purposes of the Act.
The last section (42) gives power
to the State Government to make rules to carry out
the purposes of the Act.
The learned Judicial Commissioner has held that
s. 22(1) is a colourable piece of legislation. The scheme
of s. 22 is to give effect to s. 7(a) by which certain
lands were allowed to remain in the possession of the
jagirdar. Section 22(1) lays down that all sir and
khudlcasht lands which a jagirdar was cultivating personally for a continuous period of three years immediately preceding the date of resumption shall be
allotted to him by the Tahsildar:. Sub-section (2) provides for. those cases where there is no land which
can be allotted to a 'jagirdar under sub-s. (1) or where
the land, which can be allotted to him under sub-section ( 1) is less than the minimum area as defined in
the section. In such a case the jagirdar can be allotted
any other sir or khudkasht land in his personal culti.
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ui
vation at the date of resumption upto the minimum
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area. Where, however, the minimum is not reached
even after such allotment, the jagirdar can be allotted
State of v. P.
under sub-s. (2) any unoccupied cultivable waste land Moradh~~j Singh
in the jagir subject to availability of such land upto
that area. The minimum area means ten per cent. of
Wanchoo J.
the total cultivated area in the jagir at the date of
resumption or 30 acres whichever is greater subject to
the proviso that in no case the minimum area shall
exceed 250 acres. In other words, s. 22 (1) provides
that in the first instance 'the jagirdar will get all his
sir and khudkasht land which he had been cultivating
for three years continuously before the date of resumption. If, however, there is no such land or if the
land of this kind allotted to a jagirdar is less than the
minimum area he will be entitled to further allotment
out of the sir or khudkasht land in his possession for
less than three years to make up the minimum area.
Lastly if the minimum area is not made tip even by
allotment of such land which has been in the jagirdar's
possession for less than three years he will be entitled
to allotment of unoccupied cultivable waste · land
subject to availability of such land to make up the
minimum area ; but the provisions of sub-s. (2) are
subject to a minimum of 250 acres.
We have not
been able to understand how these provisions can be
called a piece of colourable legislation. The learned
Judicial Commissioner seems to be of the view that
as a period of three years' continuous cultivation is
made a condition of allotment under s. 22(1), there is '
discrimination between jagirdars and other occupants
of land in whose case s, 28(1) provides that every
person who is entered in the revenue record as an
occupant of any jagir-land at the date of resumption,
shall be deemed to be pattadar tenant in respect of
such land which shall be assessed at the village rate.
The learned Judicial Commissio:ier was not unconscious of the provisions of art. 31-A which lays down
that no such legislation would be struck down on the
ground of discrimination under art. 14. He however
thought that this was an extra condition which had
been imposed so that the jagirdar might be deprived
of as much sir and khudkasht land as possible subject
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
'96°
to the minimum and that this was done to create inst 1 1 v P
convenience to the jagirdars whom the legislature did
a'
0
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not like. He therefore thought that such legislation
Moradh:~j Singh was altogether outside the power of the legislature
and was invalid as a colourable piece of legislation.
Wanchoo J.
In the first place we cannot see how any discrimination can arise in circumstances like this, for the
jagirdars are obviously one class while the occupants
of lands other than jagirdars belong to another class.
Secondly, even if it could be held that jagirdars and
other occupants of land stood in the same class and
there was discrimination under s. 22(1) as compared to
s. 28(1), such discrimination could not be a ground" for
striking down s. 22(1) in view of the specific constitutional provision in art. 31-A. It was because of
this difficulty that the learned Judicial Commissioner
did not strike down s. 22(1) on the ground of discrimination but held that it was a colourable piece of legislation. What is a colourable piece of legislation has
been laid down by this Court in K. 0. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa (1). It was pointed
there that :-
"The question whether a law was a colourable
legislation and as such void did not depend on the
motive or bona jides of the legislature in passing the
law but upon the competency of the legislature to
pass that particularlaw, and what the courts have
to determine in such cases is whether though the
legislature has purported to act within the limits of
its powers, it has in substance and reality transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled
by what appears, on proper examination, to be a
mere pretence or disguise.
The whole doctrine of
colourable legislation is based upon the maxim that
you cannot do indirectly what you cannot do
directly."
Applying this principle it is obvious that the
Vindhya Pradesh legislature in this case had full competence to make this provision under Entry 18, List II
of the Seventh Schedule. There is no question here
of transgressing those powers and veiling the transgression under a pretence or disguise.
We do not
think it was proper for the Judicial Commissioner to
(1) [1954] s.c.R. (1)
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
113
ascribe motives to the legislature as he seems to have
I960
done by sayii;ig that the provision was ma~e for crea.tState of v. P.
ing inconvemence to a class whom the legislature did
not like. Nor do we think that there is any force in Moradh:~j Sint:h
the argument that art. 31-A has no application to
provisions dealing with allotment of land, for ss. 7 and
Wanchoo J.
22 of the Act work out the scheme of acquisition of
estates and are incidental provisions which are
equally protected under that Article along with the
main provisions contained in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act;
(see Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer (now Rajasthan) (1).
The provisions of s. 22 as a whole provide a
scheme for carrying out the intention of the legislature expressed in s. 7(a) of the Act and are in our
opinion perfectly constitutional.
We now turn to s. 37 of the Act. That section
appears in the procedural part of the Act and is as
follows:-
·
"(1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to
settle, decide or deal with any question which is, by
or under this Act, required to be settled, decided or
dealt with by the Tahsildar, the Deputy Commissioner, the Land, Reform Commissioner, or the
Board of Revenue.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this Act no
order of a Tahsildar, a Deputy Commissioner, the
Land Reform Commissioner, or the Board of
Revenue under this Act shall be called in question
in any court."
Sub-s. (1) thus takes away the jurisdiction of the
civil court to decide any matter which under the Act
is to be decided by the Tahsildar, the Deputy Commissioner, the Land Reform Commissioner or the
Board of Revenue. Sub-s. (2) provides that no order
passed by any of these authorities shall be called in
question in any court. The learned Judicial Commissioner has held this section in valid on the ground that
·it is repugnant to s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
inasmuch as it takes away the jurisdiction of the civil
court which it has under that section. Sec. 9 lays down
that the civil courts shall have jurisdiction to try all
suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
(1) (1959] Suppl. (t) S C.R. 478
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1960]
z960
·sec. 9 therefore gives jurisdiction to civil courts to try
all suits of a civil nature excepting . those which are
StateofV. P.
expressly or impliedly barred by any other law. The
M
dh v .. 5 .
h provision of 8. 37 is an express bar to the matters dealt
ora
w•J
ing with in the Act being agitated in civil courtH.
The
wanchoo J;
learned Judicial Commissioner seems to think that
s. 9 takes away the power of the legislature ofa Part C
State like Vindhya Pradesh to legislate with respect to
the jurisdiction of courts. The power to the legislature is given by Entry 3, List II and cannot be
affected by s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a
matter of fact s. 9 recognises that if a competent
legislature passes a law barring the jurisdiction of a
civil court, the jurisdiction of the civil court to take
cognizance of such suit, even though of a civil nature,
is ousted. It was in our opinion unnecessary to go
into s. 22 of the Government of Part C States Act,
No. XLIX of 1951 and compare it with art. 254 of
the Constitution in this connection. Sec. 37 does not
in any way affect s. 9.
All that it provides is that
civil courts shall ha.ve no jurisdiction to hear certain
matters of a civil nature ; and s. 9 expressly recognizes
that if such a provision is made by any Jaw, the
jurisdiction of the civil courts will disappear. There
is thus no question of any repugnancy between s. 9 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and s. 37 of the Act. The
legislature in this case h1td power to make a provision
like s. 37 and once it did so, the last part of s. 9 will
apply and the jurisdiction of the civil courts will
become barred by virtue of s. 9 read with s. 37 of the
Act. The decision of the Judicial Commissioner therefore that s. 37 is ultra vires the powers of the Vindhya
Pradesh legislature is not correct.
Lastly we come to cl. (4) (e) of the Schedule. The
Schedule provides for the method of computing compensation. Clause (3) lays down the manner in which
the gross income "of a jagirdar shall be arrived at.
Clause (4) lays down how net income will be arrived
at after making certain deductions. One of these
deductions is in sub-cl. (e) of this Clause, which is as
follows:-
" Where the jagirdar is allotted any sir or khudlcasht or other land or any grove under this Act an
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. 115
amount equal to the valuation of rent for such land
z960
or grove for the basic year at the current settlement
5
1 v P
rates (less the land revenue paid by him in respect
tate
0
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of such land and grove in the basic year to be Mo
dh:~. s· gh
ascertained in such manner as may be prescribed)."
ra
1
•n
This sub-clause is in fact a contra entry to sub-cl. (b) (i)
wanchoo J.
of cl. (3).
The inethod of calculation provided by
these two clauses is that the gross income is first
arrived at without taking into account the land which
remains with the jagirdar under s .. 7 (a).
Thereafter
in order to arrive at th!3 net income for the purpose
of compensation the· rent for sir and khudkasht land
which remains with the jagirdar is taken into account
and its value determined under cl. (3) (b) (i) minus
the revenue payable in respect thereof. This is then
deducted from the gross income, for the reason that
this land remains with the jagirdar. The learned
Judicial Commissioner thinks that the arithmetical
result of this provision is that so far as these ]ands
are concerned the landlord has lost his proprietary
interest and has to pay rent to the government,
but at the same time gets no compensation.
It
should however be noted that though the landlord
may have to pay rent in future for the land remaining
with him, he does not pay any revenue which was
payable by him so far with respect to such land. In
the circumstances, it c;annot be said that he has been
deprived of the proprietary interest without any compensation, for he is relieved of the charge of paying
land revenue which has also been taken into account
in arriving at the net assets for that purpose, and
that is all that he can expect considering that the
land remains in his possession for all other purposes.
We are therefore of opinion that there is nothing
uncont1titutional in cl. (4) (e) of the Schedule.
We therefore dismiss Appeal No. 110 but order
parties to bear their own costs. _We allow Appeals
Nos. 40 to 109 and hold that s. 22 {l), s. 37 and
cl. (4) (e) of the Schedule are valid and constitutional.
As the respondents in these appeals have not seriously
contested them we or!fer parties to bear their own costs.
Appeal No. 110 dismissed.
Appeals ljos. 40 to 109 allowedi.