# MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS

- **Citation:** [2018] 9 S.C.R. 164
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2018-03-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 9466-9468 of 2016
- **Bench:** Dipak Misra, A. M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/madiraju-venkata-ramana-raju-v-peddireddigari-ramachandra-reddy-ors-33805
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

Representation of People Act, 1951 - ss. 83 and 100(1)(a)
and (d)(i), 101 and 125A(i) - Appellant challenged the election of
respondent no.1 by filing election petition before the High Court
alleging that respondent no.1 had grossly violated several
instructions issued by the Election Commission and also the
provisions of the Representation of People Act - Respondent no.1,
in turn, filed two applications and sought to strike out paragraphs
2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition u/Or. VI, r.16 and to dismiss the
election petition in limine u/Or. VII, r.11, both of which were allowed
by the High Court - Propriety of - On appeal, held: Not proper -
The approach of the High Court in considering the two applications
was manifestly erroneous - It had ventured into the area of analysis
of the matter on merit - That was a prohibited area at that stage -
High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition
did not disclose any cause of action with or without paragraphs 2
& 9 to 11 of election petition - There was discernible pleading as to
what objections were taken before the Returning officer and as to
why he was in error in not rejecting the nomination of respondent
no.1 - The said paragraphs plainly disclosed the facts, which were
material facts for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election
of respondent no.1 as being void, because of improper acceptance
of his nomination form by the Returning officer - Averments made
in the concerned paragraphs of the election petition were not
frivolous and vexatious - The election petition would have to be
examined as a whole without subtracting any portion thereform -
Not possible to take a view that the same did not disclose any cause
of action - Thus, applications filed by the respondent No.1 in the
subject election petition rejected - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Or. VI, r.17 and Or. VII, r.11 - Election Laws.
[2018] 9 S.C.R. 164
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Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It is well settled that the election petition will
have to be read as a whole and cannot be dissected sentencewise or paragraph-wise to rule that the same does not disclose a
cause of action. Cause of action embodies a bundle of facts which
may be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in order to get a
relief from the Court. The reliefs claimed by the appellant are
founded on grounds inter alia ascribable to Section 100(1)(d)(i)
of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Further relief has
been claimed to declare the appellant as having been elected
under Section 101 of the 1951 Act. The cause of action for filing
the election petition, therefore, was perceptibly in reference to
the material facts depicting that the nomination form of respondent
No.1 was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer. [Para
21] [187-D-E]
2. The High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the
election petition did not disclose any cause of action with or
without paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. Indeed,
the pleadings of the election petition should be precise and clear
containing all the necessary details and particulars as required
by law. 'Material facts' would mean all the basic facts constituting
the ingredients of the grounds stated in the election petition in
the context of relief to declare the election to be void. It is well
established that in an election petition, whether a particular fact
is material or not and as such required to be pleaded, is a question
which depends on the nature of the grounds relied upon and the
special circumstances of the case. [Para 22] [187-G-H; 188-A-B]
3. The averments in the concerned paragraphs of the
election petition, by no standard can be said to be frivolous and
vexatious as such. The High Court committed manifest error in
entering into the tenability of the facts and grounds urged in
support thereof by the appellant on merit, as is evident from the
cogitation in paragraphs

## Text

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MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU
v.
PEDDIREDDIGARI RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 9466-9468 of 2016)
MARCH 21, 2018
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Representation of People Act, 1951 - ss. 83 and 100(1)(a)
and (d)(i), 101 and 125A(i) - Appellant challenged the election of
respondent no.1 by filing election petition before the High Court
alleging that respondent no.1 had grossly violated several
instructions issued by the Election Commission and also the
provisions of the Representation of People Act - Respondent no.1,
in turn, filed two applications and sought to strike out paragraphs
2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition u/Or. VI, r.16 and to dismiss the
election petition in limine u/Or. VII, r.11, both of which were allowed
by the High Court - Propriety of - On appeal, held: Not proper -
The approach of the High Court in considering the two applications
was manifestly erroneous - It had ventured into the area of analysis
of the matter on merit - That was a prohibited area at that stage -
High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition
did not disclose any cause of action with or without paragraphs 2
& 9 to 11 of election petition - There was discernible pleading as to
what objections were taken before the Returning officer and as to
why he was in error in not rejecting the nomination of respondent
no.1 - The said paragraphs plainly disclosed the facts, which were
material facts for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election
of respondent no.1 as being void, because of improper acceptance
of his nomination form by the Returning officer - Averments made
in the concerned paragraphs of the election petition were not
frivolous and vexatious - The election petition would have to be
examined as a whole without subtracting any portion thereform -
Not possible to take a view that the same did not disclose any cause
of action - Thus, applications filed by the respondent No.1 in the
subject election petition rejected - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Or. VI, r.17 and Or. VII, r.11 - Election Laws.
[2018] 9 S.C.R. 164
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165
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. It is well settled that the election petition will
have to be read as a whole and cannot be dissected sentencewise or paragraph-wise to rule that the same does not disclose a
cause of action. Cause of action embodies a bundle of facts which
may be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in order to get a
relief from the Court. The reliefs claimed by the appellant are
founded on grounds inter alia ascribable to Section 100(1)(d)(i)
of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Further relief has
been claimed to declare the appellant as having been elected
under Section 101 of the 1951 Act. The cause of action for filing
the election petition, therefore, was perceptibly in reference to
the material facts depicting that the nomination form of respondent
No.1 was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer. [Para
21] [187-D-E]
2. The High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the
election petition did not disclose any cause of action with or
without paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. Indeed,
the pleadings of the election petition should be precise and clear
containing all the necessary details and particulars as required
by law. 'Material facts' would mean all the basic facts constituting
the ingredients of the grounds stated in the election petition in
the context of relief to declare the election to be void. It is well
established that in an election petition, whether a particular fact
is material or not and as such required to be pleaded, is a question
which depends on the nature of the grounds relied upon and the
special circumstances of the case. [Para 22] [187-G-H; 188-A-B]
3. The averments in the concerned paragraphs of the
election petition, by no standard can be said to be frivolous and
vexatious as such. The High Court committed manifest error in
entering into the tenability of the facts and grounds urged in
support thereof by the appellant on merit, as is evident from the
cogitation in paragraphs 16 to 22 of the impugned judgment. [Para
29] [195-C-D]
4. The High Court has opined that the contents of
paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition did not furnish
"any" material facts but were only in the nature of fulminating
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS.
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and lampooning order of the Returning Officer for having unduly
rejected the objections taken by the appellant whilst accepting
the nomination form submitted by respondent No.1. The High
Court broadly referred to the contents of the concerned
paragraphs of the election petition, but the analysis of the High
Court in that behalf is not correct. Paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the
election petition plainly disclose the facts, which are material facts
for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election of
respondent No.1 as being void, because of improper acceptance
of his nomination form by the Returning Officer (respondent
No.8). [Para 30] [195-E-G]
5. The approach of the High Court in considering the two
applications is manifestly erroneous, if not perverse. For, it has
ventured into the arena of analysis of the matter on merit. That is
a prohibited area at this stage. Since the conclusion reached by
the High Court that the pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 of
the election petition are frivolous and vexatious is untenable, it
would necessarily follow that the election petition, as filed, will
have to be examined as a whole without subtracting any portion
therefrom. If so read, it is not possible to take a view that the
same does not disclose any cause of action at all. On this finding,
the application preferred by respondent no.1 for rejection of
election petition in limine under Order VII Rule 11, cannot be
countenanced and must also fail. [Para 33] [199-D-F]
6. In light of the above, both applications filed by respondent
No.1 in the subject election petition, deserve to be rejected.
Further, the Election Petition shall stand restored to the file of
the High Court to its original number for being proceeded further
in accordance with law. Similarly, the applications filed by the
appellant shall stand restored (except the application for early
hearing), to their original numbers to be decided by the High
Court in accordance with law. [Para 42] [203-A-B]
Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba (1994) 2 SCC 392 :
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 850; Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder
Singh (2005) 13 SCC 511 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 817
- relied on.
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Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 (Supp) SCC 315 :
[1986] SCR 782; Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal (2009)
10 SCC 541 : [2009] 14 SCR 836; Pendyala Venkata
Krishna Rao v. Pothula Rama Rao 2005 (3) ALD 47;
Hari Shanker jain v. Sonia Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233 :
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38; Nandiesha Reddy v. Kavitha
Mahesh (2011) 7 SCC 721 : [2011] 8 SCR 154; Pothula
Rama Rao v. Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao and Ors.
(2007) 11 SCC 1 : [2007] 8 SCR 982; Kisan Shankar
Kathore v. Arun Dattatray (2014) 14 SCC 162 : 2014
(7) SCR 258; Krishnamoorthy v. Siva Kumar and others
(2015) 3 SCC 467 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; Resurgence
India v. Election Commission of India (2014) 14 SCC
189 : [2013] 9 SCR 360; Duni Chand v. State of
Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 16 SCC 152; Kuldeep
Singh Pathania v. Bikram Singh Jaryal (2017) 5 SCC
345; D. Ramachandran v. RV Jankiraman & Ors. (1999)
3 SCC 267 : [1999] 1 SCR 983; Asharaf Kokkur v. KV
Abdul Khader & Ors. (2015) 1 SCC 129 : [2014]
7 SCR 1123; Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh &
Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 617 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 413;
Mohd. Akbar v. Ashok Sahu & Ors. (2015) 14 SCC
519; RK Roja v. US Rayudu & Anr. (2016) 14 SCC 725;
Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem Sharathchandra
Singh (2017) 2 SCC 487 : [2016] 9 SCR 687; Shri
Balwant Singh v. Sri Laxmi Narain AIR 1960 SC 770 :
[1960] SCR 91; Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. v. George
Fernandez & Ors. 1969 (3) SCC 238 : [1969] 3 SCR
603; L.R. Shivaramagowda & Ors. v. T.M.
Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (1999) 1 SCC
666 : [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 241; , Ram Sukh v. Dinesh
Aggarwal (2009) 10 SCC 541 : [2009] 14 SCR 836;
Mangani Lal Mandal v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari (2012) 3
SCC 314 : [2012] 1 SCR 527; Shambhu Prasad Sharma
v. Charandas Mahant & Ors. (2012) 11 SCC 390 :
[2012] 6 SCR 356; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit
Narain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 : [1974] 3 SCR 31;
K. Venkateswara Rao & Anr. v. Bekkam Narasimha
Reddi & Ors. [1969] 1 SCR 679; Harmohinder Singh
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Pradhan v. Ranjeet Singh Talwandi & Ors. (2005) 5
SCC 46 : [2005] 3 SCR 952; Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia
Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38;
Tek Chank v. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290 : [2001]
1 SCR 527; M. Kamalam v. V.A. Syed Mohammed (1978)
2 SCC 659 : [1978] 3 SCR 446; G.M. Siddeshwar v.
Prasanna Kumar
(2013) 4 SCC 776 : [2013]
4 SCR 1107; V. S. Achuthanandan v. P. J. Francis
(1999) 3 SCC 737 : [1999] 2 SCR 99; Ponnala
Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy (2012) 7 SCC
788 : [2012] 6 SCR 851; Samant N. Balkrishna v.
George Fernandez (1969) 3 SCC 238 : [1969] 3 SCR
603; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. v. Owners and Parties
Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC
100 : [2006] 1 SCR 860; Virendra Nath Gautam v.
Satpal Singh and Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 617 : [2006] 10
Suppl. SCR 413; People's Union for Civil Liberties v.
Union of India
(2003) 4 SCC 399 : [2003]
2 SCR 1136; Durai Muthuswami v. N. Nachiappan and
Ors. (1973) 2 SCC 45 : [1974] 1 SCR 40; Jagjit Singh
v. Dharam Pal Singh and Ors. (1995) Suppl (1) SCC
422; Vashist Narayan Sharma v. Dev Chandra & Ors.
[1955] 1 SCR 509 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1986] SCR 782
referred to
Para 3
[2009] 14 SCR 836
referred to
Para 3
2005 (3) ALD 47
referred to
Para 3
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38
referred to
Para 3
[2011] 8 SCR 154
referred to
Para 3
[2007] 8 SCR 982
referred to
Para 4
2014 (7) SCR 258
referred to
Para 4
[2015] 4 SCR 987
referred to
Para 4
[2013] 9 SCR 360
referred to
Para 4
(2014) 16 SCC 152
referred to
Para 7
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(2017) 5 SCC 345
referred to
Para 7
[1999] 1 SCR 983
referred to
Para 7
[2014] 7 SCR 1123
referred to
Para 7
[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 413
referred to
Para 7
[2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 817
relied on
Para 7
(2015) 14 SCC 519
referred to
Para 7
(2016) 14 SCC 725
referred to
Para 7
[2016] 9 SCR 687
referred to
Para 7
[1960] SCR 91
referred to
Para 7
[1969] 3 SCR 603
referred to
Para 9
[1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 241
referred to
Para 9
[2009] 14 SCR 836
referred to
Para 9
[2012] 1 SCR 527
referred to
Para 9
[2012] 6 SCR 356
referred to
Para 9
[1974] 3 SCR 31
referred to
Para 9
[1969] 1 SCR 679
referred to
Para 9
[2005] 3 SCR 952
referred to
Para 9
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38
referred to
Para 9
[2001] 1 SCR 527
referred to
Para 9
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 850
relied on
Para 22
[1978] 3 SCR 446
referred to
Para 24
[2013] 4 SCR 1107
referred to
Para 24
[1999] 2 SCR 99
referred to
Para 25
[2012] 6 SCR 851
referred to
Para 25
[1969] 3 SCR 603
referred to
Para 27
[2006] 1 SCR 860
referred to
Para 28
[2006] 10 Suppl.SCR 413
referred to
Para 28
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[2003] 2 SCR 1136
referred to
Para 31
[1974] 1SCR 40
referred to
Para 34
(1995) Supple (1) SCC 422
referred to
Para 35
[1955] 1 SCR 509
referred to
Para 35
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 94669468 of 2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh in E. P. No. 8 of 2014, E. A. No. 329 and 330 of 2015
and E. P. No. 8 of 2015
Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Anand, K. S. Mahadevan, Ms. Rajeshri
Nivuratirao Reddy, Advs. for the Appellant.
Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv., V. R. N. Prasanth, Sridhar Potaraju,
Prabhat Kumar, Ms. Sindoora VNL, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Guntur
Prabhakar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. The present appeals emanate
from the judgment and order dated 2nd August, 2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, striking
off paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition as also dismissing the
election petition, being Election Petition No.8 of 2014 filed by the appellant
challenging the election of respondent No.1.
2. The election in relation to Andhra Pradesh State Legislative
Assembly was held on 7th May, 2014. The appellant and respondent
No.1 contested the election from the Punganur Assembly Constituency.
The respondent No.1 was declared as an elected candidate. By way of
an election petition, the appellant challenged the election of respondent
No.1 on the ground that respondent No.1 had grossly violated several
instructions issued by the Election Commission as also the provisions of
The Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short, "the Act").
Respondent No.1, in turn, took out two applications seeking to strike out
paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the said election petition and to dismiss the
election petition in limine, both of which were ultimately allowed by the
High Court.
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3. The background to the present conflict is set out as under:
a. On 12th April, 2014, a notice of election was issued, inter alia
for a seat from the Punganur Assembly Constituency to the Andhra
Pradesh State Legislative Assembly;
b. Respondent No.1, a member of the Yuvajana Shramika Rythu
Congress Party (YSRCP) filed his initial nomination form for the
aforesaid elections on 12th April, 2014 along with two affidavits
and again, second nomination form on 17th April, 2014 with two
fresh affidavits. Appellant, a member of the Telugu Desham Party
(TDP), filed his nomination form on 17th April, 2014.
c. After scrutiny of the nomination forms, on 21st April, 2014, a
total of 8 (eight) candidates, including the appellant and respondent
No.1, were found eligible to contest the elections;
d. Appellant had filed objections on the same day i.e. 21st April,
2014, objecting to the acceptance of nomination forms of
respondent No.1 on the ground that he had failed to sign every
page of the affidavits in support of his nomination forms and had
also failed to fill up all the columns in his forms, contrary to the
rules prescribed in that regard. Respondent No.1 filed his counter
to the said objection petition;
e. The Returning Officer rejected the objection petition on the
ground that the said petition needed no consideration and was
hence over-ruled;
f. The elections were held on 7th May, 2014, and results were
declared on 16th May, 2014. Respondent No.1 was declared as
the elected candidate, having secured the highest number of valid
votes. Appellant finished second while the remaining 6 (six)
candidates lost their deposits;
g. Appellant then challenged the election of respondent No.1 by
way of an election petition dated 25th June, 2014, under Section
81 read with Sections 83, 100(1)(a) and (d)(i) of the Act before
the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. He also sought a
declaration that he was the duly elected member of the State
Legislative Assembly of the 284-Punganur Assembly constituency;
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
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h. Respondent No.1 then took out two applications in the said
petition viz. E.A. No. 329 of 2015 under Order VI Rule 16 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC") for striking out
the averments made in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election
petition as being frivolous and vexatious, followed by E.A. No.
330 of 2015 under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking to dismiss
the election petition for failing to disclose a cause of action;
i. Appellant also took out miscellaneous applications for permission
to file rejoinder affidavit, expediting the election petition and for
taking note of suppression of material facts by respondent No.1;
j. The High Court vide its judgment dated 2nd August, 2016,
("impugned judgment") allowed both the applications of
respondent No.1, eventually dismissing the election petition for
want of cause of action. The High Court broadly considered three
points. First, the sweep of the terms "material facts" and "cause
of action" in reference to an election petition; second, whether
material facts and cause of action have been pleaded in the subject
election petition necessitating a trial; and, third, whether the election
petition as filed deserved to be rejected in limine without
conducting a trial. While dealing with the first point, the High
Court first discussed about the inter-play between Sections 81,
83, 100 and 101 of the 1951 Act. It held that the mandate of these
provisions is that the election petition must contain a concise
statement of material facts on which the appellant relies and that
for the election petition to succeed, the appellant should establish
that the nomination of the returned candidate was improperly
accepted and further, due to such improper acceptance, the election
of the returned candidate has been materially affected. The High
Court relied upon the cases of Azhar Hussain vs. Rajiv Gandhi,1
Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggarwal,2 Pendyala Venkata Krishna
Rao Vs. Pothula Rama Rao,3 Hari Shanker jain Vs. Sonia
Gandhi,4 and Nandiesha Reddy Vs. Kavitha Mahesh5 and
culled out the principles as follows:-
1 1986 (1) (Supp) SCC 315
2 (2009) 10 SCC 541
3 2005 (3) ALD 47
4 (2001) 8 SCC 233
5 (2011) 7 SCC 721
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"15) So, on a compendious study of above precedential
jurisprudence we will understand:
 (i) The phrase material facts employed in Section 83(1)(a)
of R.P.Act has not been defined and its meaning is a contextual
one in a given election petition.
 (ii) Material facts or facta probanda are those basic,
elementary and prime facts which the election petitioner shall plead
and if traversed prove for the Court to afford a decree.
 (iii) Whereas material particulars or facta probantia are the
particulars in the form of evidence further vivify, refine and make
more clear the material facts.
 (iv) Material facts are the entire bundle of facts which
constitute a complete cause of action for the petitioner and total
defence for the respondent."
Having said this, the Court then analysed the averments in the election
petition in the following words:-
"16) POINT No.2: I have carefully scrutinized the contents of
the election petition to know whether the 1st respondent/election
petitioner had pleaded all the relevant material facts and they
constitute cause of action to proceed with trial. It is observed that
in his pleadings he has reproduced the five objections taken by
him before the 8th respondent/Returning Officer at the time of
scrutiny of nomination and reiterated that the Returning Officer
has rejected his objections contrary to the Conduct of the Election
Rules and guiding principles. He has given the table showing the
votes polled to each contesting candidate and pleaded that he
stood second highest in the tally. As rightly contended by the
petitioner except fulminating that the Returning Officer has
unduly rejected his objections, the 1st respondent has not
furnished the material facts in his pleadings as to how in
his perception and in the eye of law, the order of the
Returning Officer is impugnable. A mere scourging of the
order of the Returning Officer howsoever fiercely, it must
be said, will not constitute material facts and give rise to
cause of action unless the pleadings are balanced with the
factual and legal reasons projecting where and how the
MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARI
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impugned order suffered perversity and illegality. In the
instant case, in my considered view, unfortunately the
pleadings are totally bereft of such material facts. On
completion of reading of pleadings one fails to understand
how the order of the Returning Officer was at fault.
a) Paras-2, 9 to 11 are specifically attacked by the petitioner on
the ground that pleadings in those paras are not supported by any
material facts and hence they are liable to be struck out. In para2 the 1st respondent narrated the five objections taken by him. In
para-9 he expressed his grievance that 8th respondent has not
considered his objection and his order is contrary to the judgment
of the Apex Court in Resurgence Indias case (10 supra). He further
mentioned in that para that as per the aforesaid judgment, filing of
an affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory.
In para-10 he pleaded that in the light of the Apex Courts judgment
8th respondent ought to have rejected the improper nomination of
the instant petitioner. He also pleaded that instant petitioner
misrepresented the Election Commission as well as 8th respondent
as he has not added Rs.21 lakhs to the gross total of his assets
and showed the gross total of his assets and showed the gross
total as Rs.2,79,67,680/- instead of Rs.3,00,67,680/-. Whereas in
para-11 under the caption Grounds 1st respondent reiterated that
8th respondent has made improper acceptance of nomination. The
cumulative effect of paras-2, 9 to 11 is nothing but again
lampooning the order of 8th respondent as erroneous without
demonstrating as to how his order was factually and legally
perverse and wrong. Even the mentioning of the judgment
in Resurgence Indias case (10 supra) and the allegation
that the petitioner suppressed Rs.21 lakhs from the total
assets, we will presently see, will not constitute any material
facts so as to strengthen the allegations in paras-2, 9 to
11."
 (emphasis supplied)
4. Relying on the decision in Pothula Rama Rao Vs. Pendyala
Venkata Krishna Rao and Ors.,6 the High Court concluded that the
pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 were frivolous and vexatious and
6 (2007) 11 SCC 1
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not containing any material facts and cause of action, for which the
same were liable to be struck off. The High Court then proceeded to
examine the third point with an opening remark that the election petition
filed by the appellant was woefully silent about the material facts
constituting cause of action. It then proceeded to consider the argument
of the appellant as to how the order of the Returning Officer was factually
and legally incorrect. It first considered objection Nos.1 and 3 taken by
the appellant that respondent No.1 had not signed at the bottom of each
and every page of the affidavit in Form No.26, which was violative of
Rule 35 of Civil Rule of Practice and that mere signing the last page of
affidavit was not enough. After adverting to Rule 35 of Civil Rule of
Practice, the High Court concluded that the said Rule was inapplicable
to the Form of affidavit filed before the statutory authority such as the
Returning Officer. It then referred to the Hand-book for the Returning
Officer-2014 issued by the Election Commission of India prescribing
form of affidavit to be submitted by the contesting candidates. As per
the said instructions, the candidate is required to sign on the last page of
the affidavit. On this finding, the objection of the appellant was negatived.
While dealing with the objection No.2(a) taken by the appellant that in
Serial No.2 of Item No.4 in one of respondent No.1's affidavits, the
space under the heading of Total Income shown in IT returns relating to
wife of petitioner was left blank. Further, the candidate is not entitled to
file two affidavits in Form 26 in terms of Notification No.3/4/2012/SDR
dated 24th August, 2012, issued by the Election Commission of India.
Furthermore, respondent No.1 did not disclose the crucial information
relating to criminal background if any, assets, liabilities and educational
qualifications etc., which rendered the nomination form invalid as per
Kisan Shankar Kathore Vs. Arun Dattatray7. The High Court rejected
even this objection. While dealing with the instructions issued by the
Election Commission of India, the High Court opined that the candidates
were required to declare the information about the criminal background
if any, assets, liabilities, educational qualification etc. The amended Form
26 was a comprehensive form to include all the information that was
sought in the two separate affidavits. The revised form of Form 26 was
notified in the official gazette on 1st August, 2012, whereafter, the Election
Commission of India made it clear by its Notification dated 24th August,
2012, that the candidate shall file only one affidavit in the revised Form
7 (2014) 14 SCC 162
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26. At the same time, the High Court held that the Notification did not
put any embargo on the candidate to file multiple nomination papers
contrary to Section 33(6) of the 1951 Act. On this basis, the decision in
Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra) was distinguished. While dealing with
objection Nos.2(b) and 4 raised by the appellant, that in Item No.6 the
respondent No.1 did not strike-out the inapplicable words in the Form
and thus suppressed crucial facts relating to his involvement in offence,
if any, the High Court noted that mere failure to strike out the inapplicable
words would not lead to an inference that there was suppression of any
material facts. For, the respondent No.1 had placed on record the same
facts against columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) being not applicable. The
High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in the case of
Krishnamoorthy Vs. Siva Kumar and others8. In examining objection
No.2(c) regarding Item No.8(III) of Part-B of the affidavit under the
heading 'Approximate Current Market Price', which was left blank by
respondent No.1, the High Court accepted the plea of respondent No.1
that the said information was disclosed against the columns (a) and (b).
It held that the candidate is required to give the same particulars against
columns (a) and (b) and not against the heading. The decision of this
Court in the case of Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of
India9 was thus distinguished. While dealing with the fifth objection
regarding the proxy of the respondent No.1, namely, P. Dwarakanath
Reddy, regarding failure to put his signature on each and every page of
affidavit and Form 26 and later withdrawal of his nomination, the High
Court found that respondent No.1 has nothing to do with the nomination
of P. Dwarakanath Reddy. In other words, the High Court examined
each objection raised by the appellant before the Returning Officer and
reiterated in the election petition on its own merit to conclude as follows:-
"23) Thus, none of the objections raised by the 1st respondent
before the 8th respondent and repeated in his election petition merit
consideration. Apart from the above, the 1st respondent in para10 of the election petition has taken a new ground to the effect
that the petitioner has concealed Rs.21 lakhs worth of movable
assets of his wife and showed his gross total value as
Rs.2,79,67,680/- instead of Rs.3,00,67,680/-. It must be held that
this objection also does not hold water. In Item No.VII the petitioner
8 (2015) 3 SCC 467
9 (2014) 14 SCC 189
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has shown item wise moveable assets of his wife-G. Swarnalatha
and showed their gross total value as Rs.2,79,67,680/-. However,
the total value comes to Rs.3,00,67,680/-. It is only a mistake in
totaling the items of moveable properties. Since there is no
concealment of any item, the clerical error in totaling cannot be
taken as a felony.
24) Thus, on a conspectus, the election petition is liable to
be dismissed in limine without necessity of conducting trial
for two reasons - firstly, the petition is bereft of material
facts and cause of action and secondly, the objections raised
before the 8th respondent and repeated in the election
petition do not merit consideration, which can be and in
fact, have been, decided without necessity of conducting
trial. It is true that in Ashraf Kokkurs case (5 supra) cited by the
1st respondent the Apex Court held that when the facts disclose
material facts and cause of action though not complete cause of
action, the election petition need not be dismissed at the threshold.
However, in the instant case, as already observed supra,
the election petition totally lacks material facts except
repetition of the objections raised before the 8th respondent.
Therefore, election petition merits dismissal.
a) As already stated supra, the 1st respondent has raised some
new objections with regard to alleged suppression of assets of the
petitioner and his wife in his counter for the first time but not
pressed the said objection. Hence, the said objection is not taken
into consideration. So, at the outset, the two petitions filed by the
petitioner deserve to be allowed and consequently the election
petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.
 This point is answered accordingly."
 (emphasis supplied)
On this basis, the High Court allowed EA No. 329 of 2015 filed by
respondent No.1 for striking out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to
11 of the election petition being frivolous and vexatious and not containing
material facts and cause of action therein. The High Court also allowed
the second application filed by respondent No.1 being EA No.330 of
2015 and rejected the Election Petition No.8 of 2014 in limine.
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5. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior
counsel appearing for the contesting respondent.
6. The principal contention of the appellant is that whilst dismissing
his election petition, the High Court has overlooked the cause of action
stated in the election petition, which arose from the fact that two different
sets of nomination forms and affidavits were filed by respondent No.1
containing several material deficiencies and discrepancies and which
was fatal. In other words, the nomination form of respondent No.1 was
wrongly accepted and it materially affected the election results of the
appellant. According to the appellant, the affidavits filed by respondent
No.1 in support of his nomination forms admittedly contained blank
columns and did not contain his signature on every page, which was not
only in contravention of several judgments of this Court, but also violated
Section 125A(i) of the Act and additionally, was also against several
circulars issued by the Election Commission. Respondent No.1 also filed
two affidavits along with each one of his nomination forms, in direct
contravention of the mandate in the instructions issued by the Election
Commission permitting for only one affidavit to be filed. Further, perusal
of the said affidavits would reveal that respondent No.1 had suppressed
crucial information relating to movable and immovable assets owned by
him and his family members and in fact, filed a conflicting affidavit before
the Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly. In light of respondent
No.1's suppression of significant information, the matter in issue required
a full-fledged trial and the High Court committed manifest error in
dismissing the election petition in limine. The High Court also erred in
striking off paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition on the ground
that the averments contained therein were vexatious and frivolous, without
giving any legal justification for the same. The High Court also took into
account pleadings made in the counter/reply submitted by respondent
No.1 as opposed to only considering the averments made in the election
petition. Further, respondent No.1 had failed to specifically deny the
allegations/averments in the election petition.
7. Mr. Siddharth Luthra relies upon the judgments of this Court in
Resurgence India (supra), Krishna Murthy (supra), Duni Chand Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.10, Kuldeep Singh Pathania Vs.
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Bikram Singh Jaryal11, D. Ramachandran Vs. RV Jankiraman &
Ors.12, Asharaf Kokkur Vs. KV Abdul Khader & Ors.13, Virender
Nath Gautam Vs. Satpal Singh & Ors.14, Kishan Shankar Kathore
(supra), Harkirat Singh Vs. Amrinder Singh15, Mohd. Akbar Vs.
Ashok Sahu & Ors.16, RK Roja Vs. US Rayudu & Anr.17,
Mairembam Prithviraj Vs. Pukhrem Sharathchandra Singh18 and
Shri Balwant Singh Vs. Sri Laxmi Narain19.
8. Per contra, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel
appearing for respondent no.1, submits that the findings of the Returning
Officer, as regards the objections taken by the appellant to respondent
No.1's nomination form, were just and proper. He submits that every
election petition is not required to go for trial, merely for performing a
formal exercise. The present case was purely based on documents on
record and there was no requirement of leading evidence in that regard.
Even before the High Court, only technical pleas were argued, none of
which were borne out by the record. As per Section 36(4) of the Act,
respondent No.1's nomination paper could be rejected merely on technical
pleas. Since it is well settled that an election petition was a statutory
proceeding and not an action at law or a suit in equity, the determination
of such petition had to be in consonance with Section 36(4) of the Act.
Further, the sine qua non for declaring an election void under Section
100(1)(d) of the Act was to plead and also establish that improper
acceptance of nomination had materially affected the results of the
election, which, in the present case, appellant had failed to assert. No
such pleading of material fact had been made by appellant. Similarly, the
election petition, as filed, failed to disclose even the material particulars
of facts to establish a cause of action warranting a trial. Finally, appellant
had introduced fresh allegations into his petition, including suppression
of assets and fraud, by way of counter affidavits to the application filed
by respondent No.1. This clearly went against the established law that
new facts could not be introduced in an election petition beyond a period
11 (2017) 5 SCC 345
12 (1999) 3 SCC 267
13 (2015) 1 SCC 129
14 (2007) 3 SCC 617
15 (2005) 13 SCC 511
16 (2015) 14 SCC 519
17 (2016) 14 SCC 725
18 (2017) 2 SCC 487
19 AIR 1960 SC 770
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of 45 days after declaration of the result of the impugned election. For,
the election petition had been filed in June 2014, whereas the counter
affidavits were filed around a year later i.e. June 2015 and, therefore,
the averments contained therein could not be taken into consideration.
9. Mr. Ramachandran relied upon the following judgments:
Pothula Rama Rao (supra), Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. Vs. George
Fernandez & Ors.20, L.R. Shivaramagowda & Ors. Vs. T.M.
Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs & Ors.21, Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh
Aggarwal22, Mangani Lal Mandal Vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari23,
Shambhu Prasad Sharma Vs. Charandas Mahant & Ors.24,
Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra25, K.
Venkateswara Rao & Anr. Vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi & Ors.26,
Harmohinder Singh Pradhan Vs. Ranjeet Singh Talwandi & Ors.
27, Hari Shanker Jain Vs. Sonia Gandhi28 and Tek Chank Vs. Dile
Ram29.
10. The central issue in these appeals is: whether the contents of
the subject election petition disclose cause of action warranting a trial?
The High Court by a composite judgment allowed the two applications
filed by respondent No.1 (returned candidate) praying for striking out
paragraphs 2 & 9 to11 of the election petition, being frivolous and
vexatious and not containing any material facts and not disclosing any
cause of action; and the second application for rejecting the election
petition in limine for non-disclosure of cause of action.
11. Ordinarily, an application for rejection of election petition in
limine, purportedly under Order VII Rule 11 for non-disclosure of cause
of action, ought to proceed at the threshold. For, it has to be considered
only on the basis of institutional defects in the election petition in reference
to the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. Indeed, nondisclosure of cause of action is covered by clause (a) therein. Concededly,
20 1969 (3) SCC 238
21 (1999) 1 SCC 666
22 (2009) 10 SCC 541
23 (2012) 3 SCC 314
24 (2012) 11 SCC 390
25 (1974) 2 SCC 133
26 (1969) 1 SCR 679; AIR 1969 SC 872
27 (2005) 5 SCC 46
28 (2001) 8 SCC 233
29 (2001) 3 SCC 290
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Order VII of the CPC generally deals with the institution of a plaint. It
delineates the requirements regarding the particulars to be contained in
the plaint, relief to be specifically stated, for relief to be founded on
separate grounds, procedure on admitting plaint, and includes return of
plaint. The rejection of plaint follows the procedure on admitting plaint
or even before admitting the same, if the court on presentation of the
plaint is of the view that the same does not fulfill the statutory and
institutional requirements referred to in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. The
power bestowed in the court in terms of Rule 11 may also be exercised
by the court on a formal application moved by the defendant after being
served with the summons to appear before the Court. Be that as it may,
the application under Order VII Rule 11 deserves consideration at the
threshold.
12. On the other hand, the application for striking out pleadings in
terms of Order VI Rule 16 may be resorted to by the defendant(s)/
respondent(s) at any stage of the proceedings, as is predicated in the
said provision. The pleading(s) can be struck off by the Court on grounds
specified in clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 16.
13. Indeed, if the defendant moves two separate applications at
the same time, as in this case, it would be open to the court in a given
case to consider both the applications together or independent of each
other. If the court decides to hear the application under Order VII Rule
11 in the first instance, the court would be obliged to consider the plaint
as filed as a whole. But if the court decides to proceed with the application
under Order VI Rule 16 for striking out the pleadings before consideration
of the application under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint, on
allowing the former application after striking out the relevant pleadings
then the court must consider the remainder pleadings of the plaint in
reference to the postulates of Order VII Rule 11, for determining whether
the plaint (after striking out pleadings) deserves to be rejected in limine.
14. In the present case, the High Court has presumably adopted
the latter course. It first proceeded to examine the application for striking
out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition being
frivolous and vexatious and also because the same did not disclose any
cause of action. And having accepted that prayer, it proceeded to reject
the election petition on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of
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action. However, we find that the High Court has muddled the analysis
of the pleadings.