# MAGITI SASAMAL v. P ANDAB BISSO I

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 673
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/magiti-sasamal-v-p-andab-bisso-i-2468
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

673
Landlord and Tenant-Relationship in dispute-Civil Court
-1 urisdiction of-Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1918 (Act III
of 1948), s. 7(1).
The appellant filed in the Civil Court a suit for permanent injunction restraining the re5pondents from entering
the lands in suit on the allegation that the lands belonged w
him and were in his cultivatory possession for many years and
that the respondents had no right or title to them and had
never cultivated them.
The respondents contended that they
were tenants of portion:i of the said lands and were in cultivating possession of the same as tenants. The question which
arose for decision vvas whether having regard to the provisions
of s. 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948, the Ccvil
Court had jurisdicti,1n to entertain the suit which involved a
dispute as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties.
Held, that even on a liberal construction of s. 7(1) of
the Act it cannot be held that disputes a3: regards the existence
of the relationship of landlord and tenant fall to be determined by the Collector under that section. Disputes which are
entrusted to the Collector under s. 7(1) are the simple disputes
specified therein in the five categories and do not include a
serious dispute as to the relationship between the parties as
landlord and tenant.
In the present case the suit was theren
fore within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Secretary of State v. Ma•k & Co. (1940) L.R. 67 I.A.
222, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDWTION: Civil Appeal
No. 92 of 59.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
August 31, 1956, of the Orissa High Court in second
appeal No. 151 of 1951.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari
for the appellant.
'
M. 8. K. Sastri, for respondentE.
1961
September 20.
;9Cl
Magili S'"•"""l
v.
Pandab Bissoi
•
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961. September 20. Tho Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
C?AJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This is an appeal by
a. cort1ficate granted by the Hif!h Court of Orissa
and it raises a short question about the scopo and
effect of the provisions of s. i (I) of the Orissa
Tenants Protection Act, 1948 (Act III of 1948)
(hereafter called the Act).
The appellant Magiti
Sasamal Rued tho respondents Panclab Bissoi and
others in tho Court of the District MunRiff, Berhampur,
for a permanent
injunction
restraining
them from entering tho suit lands belonging to
tho appellant. The appellant's case was that the
suit lands bolon.'lcd to him and were in his pernonal
cultivation for many years. In the year of the suit
the appellant had cultivated the said lands as usual,
manured and raised padd.v crop then·on after
spending a large amount in that behalf. According
to the appellant the respondonta had no manner
of right or title to the said lands and bad never
cultivatod them.
From tho notice given by them
t-0 the appellant, however, it appeared that the
respondents wanted to enter npon tho lands forcibly
and to remove the standing crop therefrom. This
they deaired to do by setting up a false claim that
they were the tenants of the lands and as such were
entitled to the protection of the Act. Tho appellant alleged that the respondents were local rowdies
and were known for their high-handed action in the
neighbourhood. On these allegations tho appellant
claimed a permanent injunction a~ainst the respondents.
Tho respondents admitted tho titlo of the
appellant to the lands in suit but pleaded that they
were tho tenanls in respect of separate portions of
tho said lands. Their version. was that thev had
cultivated
their holdings and misccl the paddy
crop thereon in the year in queHtion.
According
to them they had been in cu\tiYatin1r possession
of thoir respective holdings as tenanta long before
September 1, 194 7, and so they were entitled to
remain in possession as such tenants under the
Act. It was also alleged by tho rospondents that
'
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'I.
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
they had filed petitions under the Act b

## Text

.... ..
' •
a s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
MAGITI SASAMAL
v.
P ANDAB BISSO I
( B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ. )
673
Landlord and Tenant-Relationship in dispute-Civil Court
-1 urisdiction of-Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1918 (Act III
of 1948), s. 7(1).
The appellant filed in the Civil Court a suit for permanent injunction restraining the re5pondents from entering
the lands in suit on the allegation that the lands belonged w
him and were in his cultivatory possession for many years and
that the respondents had no right or title to them and had
never cultivated them.
The respondents contended that they
were tenants of portion:i of the said lands and were in cultivating possession of the same as tenants. The question which
arose for decision vvas whether having regard to the provisions
of s. 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948, the Ccvil
Court had jurisdicti,1n to entertain the suit which involved a
dispute as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties.
Held, that even on a liberal construction of s. 7(1) of
the Act it cannot be held that disputes a3: regards the existence
of the relationship of landlord and tenant fall to be determined by the Collector under that section. Disputes which are
entrusted to the Collector under s. 7(1) are the simple disputes
specified therein in the five categories and do not include a
serious dispute as to the relationship between the parties as
landlord and tenant.
In the present case the suit was theren
fore within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Secretary of State v. Ma•k & Co. (1940) L.R. 67 I.A.
222, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDWTION: Civil Appeal
No. 92 of 59.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
August 31, 1956, of the Orissa High Court in second
appeal No. 151 of 1951.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari
for the appellant.
'
M. 8. K. Sastri, for respondentE.
1961
September 20.
;9Cl
Magili S'"•"""l
v.
Pandab Bissoi
•
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961. September 20. Tho Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
C?AJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This is an appeal by
a. cort1ficate granted by the Hif!h Court of Orissa
and it raises a short question about the scopo and
effect of the provisions of s. i (I) of the Orissa
Tenants Protection Act, 1948 (Act III of 1948)
(hereafter called the Act).
The appellant Magiti
Sasamal Rued tho respondents Panclab Bissoi and
others in tho Court of the District MunRiff, Berhampur,
for a permanent
injunction
restraining
them from entering tho suit lands belonging to
tho appellant. The appellant's case was that the
suit lands bolon.'lcd to him and were in his pernonal
cultivation for many years. In the year of the suit
the appellant had cultivated the said lands as usual,
manured and raised padd.v crop then·on after
spending a large amount in that behalf. According
to the appellant the respondonta had no manner
of right or title to the said lands and bad never
cultivatod them.
From tho notice given by them
t-0 the appellant, however, it appeared that the
respondents wanted to enter npon tho lands forcibly
and to remove the standing crop therefrom. This
they deaired to do by setting up a false claim that
they were the tenants of the lands and as such were
entitled to the protection of the Act. Tho appellant alleged that the respondents were local rowdies
and were known for their high-handed action in the
neighbourhood. On these allegations tho appellant
claimed a permanent injunction a~ainst the respondents.
Tho respondents admitted tho titlo of the
appellant to the lands in suit but pleaded that they
were tho tenanls in respect of separate portions of
tho said lands. Their version. was that thev had
cultivated
their holdings and misccl the paddy
crop thereon in the year in queHtion.
According
to them they had been in cu\tiYatin1r possession
of thoir respective holdings as tenanta long before
September 1, 194 7, and so they were entitled to
remain in possession as such tenants under the
Act. It was also alleged by tho rospondents that
'
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'I.
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
they had filed petitions under the Act before the
Sub-Collector, Berhampur, claiming appropriate relief
against the appellant. They urged that they were
ever ready and ·willing to pay the Rajabhag as provided by the Act and they contended that the suit
was not maintainable in a civil court.
On these pleadings the learned trial judge
framed appropriate issues. Three issues of law had
been framed by him on the pleas raised by the
respondents. These issues were, however, not pressed at the hearing, One of them, namely issue 5,
refers to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the
suit in view of the provisions of the Act. Thus, it
is
clear that the issue of · jurisdiction was not
pressed by the respondents at the trial. On the
merits the learned trial judge considered the evidence and held that though the appellant was the
owner of the property the respondents had proved
that they were the tenants in possession of their
" respective holdings and that their possession was
long before September I, 1947. On these findings
the learned judge came to the conclusion that the
appellant was not entitled to claim an injunction ·
against the respondents and so he dismissed his
suit.
The matter was then taken by the appellant
before the District Judge, Ganjam, Nayagarh. The
learned District Judge considered the evidence led
by the parties and reversed the conclusions of the
trial court. He held that the onus was on the respondents to prove their possession of their respective holdings as tenants on or before the specified
date, and according to him they had failed to dis·
charge that onus.
The question of jurisdiction
was not raised before the appellate court by the
respondents. Having held against the respondents
on the merits the· learned District Judge allowed the
appeal, set aside the decree passed by the trial
court and directed that an injunction should be
issued against the respondents as claimed by the
appellant.
1961
Ma1iti Sa1amai
v.
Pandab Bi1aqi
Gajendragadkaf' ].
'"'
MOfili s .. ..,.1
v.
PQJttiab Binot
6i6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l!l62J
The respondents then moved the High Court
by second appeal ; and tho main point which they
urged before the High Court was that the learned
trial judge ha.cl no jurisdiction to entertain tho
suit having regard to the provisions of R. i ( l) of
the Act.
The appellant pointed out to the High
Court that this question of jurisdiction had not
been proSBed before the trial court and had not
beon raised before the lower appellate court. Even
so the High Court allowed tho point to bo raised
and decided it in favour of the r<'sp0ndents.
As
a result of the finding that th<' civil court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit the second appeal
preferred by the respondents has been allowed
and the appellant's suit dismisserl with costs throughout. It is against this decree that the appellant
has come to this Court with the certificate grnnted by
the High Court; and the short. point which has been
raised before us on his behalf by l\lr. Yiswanatha
Sastri is that in holding that the present suit is
out.~ide the
jurisdiction of the civil court the
High Court has misconstrued the scope and effect
of the Provisions of s. i( l) of the Act.
Tho Act rcc~ived the assent of the Go·rnrnorGene:rnl on February 5, 1948 and was published on
Februaryl4, 1948. It is a temporary Act and bys.1(4}
it has been provided that it shall cease to have
cffv>ct on April 15, 1949 except '\S respects things
done or omitted to be <lone bcforr the cxpir11.t ion
thereof. It has been passed in order to provide
for temporary protection to c!'rtain classes of tenants in
thP.
Province of Orissa.
Legislatuni
thought that tho said tenants deserved protection
and so as a beneficent measure the Act has been
passed.
Section 2(c} of tho Act rlefines landlord
an<l s. 2(g} defines a tenant. The main operative
provision of
~he Act is con.tained
~n ,;. :1.
This
8cction provides that notw1thstandmg anythmg
contained in anv other law for the time boing in
force, or any expreBB or implied agreem,mt to the
contrary, but subject to the provisions of this Act,
-,..
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
a p3rson who, on the first day of September 1947,
was cultivating any land as a tenant shall continue to
have the right to cultivate such land and it shall not
be lawful for the landlord to evict the tenant from
the land or interfere in any way with the cultivation
of such land by the tenant. It would thus be seen
that the Act purports to provide protection to tenants who were in possession of lands on the appointed day which is September 1, 194 7.
The other subsections of s. 3 make material and subsidiary provisions in regard to the 8aid protection. Section
7(1) reads thm: "Any dispute between the tenant
and the landlord ad regards, (a) tenant's possession
of
the land
on
the
1st day of
Septem her,
194 7 and his right to the benefits under this Act. or (b) misuse of the land
by the tenant, or ( c) failure of the tenant to cultivate the land properly, or (d) failure of the tenant
to deliver to the landlord the rent accrued due
within two months from the date on which it becomes payable, or ( e) the quantity of the produce
payble to the landlord as rent, shall be decided by
the Collector on the application of either of the
parties".
The appellant contends that s. 7(1) covers
disputes between landlords and tenants which are
specified under els. (a) to (e) but it does not cover a
dispute between the parties a.s to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between them.
It is only where such a relationship is either admitted or established in a civil court that the specified
disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Collector on the other hand the respondents' case is
that the dispute as to the status of the tenant is
also included unders. 7(1). The High Court has upheld
the respondents' interpretation, and Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri contends that this interpretation is based on
a misconstruction of the section.
It is true that having regard to the beneficent
object which the Legislature had in view in passing
the Act its material provisions should be liberally
1961
Magiti Sasatn4l
v.
Pandab Bissei
Gajendro.:aJl"zr -J.
I
1961
Af4riti s.,amai
v.
ParuW Bis1oi
G•j1ndr.,adkar ].
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(I96ll]
construed. Tlie Legislature intends that the disputes contemplated by tho said material provisions
should bo tried not by ordinary civil courts but by
tribunals specially designated by it, and so in
dealing with tho scopo and effect of tho jurisdiction
of such tribunals tho relevant words used in the
section should receive not a narrow but a liberal
construction.
While bearing this principle in mind we must
have regard to another import.ant principle of
construction, and that is that if a statute purports
to exclude tho ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts
it mugt do so either by express terms or by the uso
of such termR as would necessarily lead to the inference of such exclusion.
As the Privy Council has
observed in
Secretary of State v . . Mask & Co.,(')
"it is
settled
law
that the exclusion of tho
jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily
inferred, but that such exclusion must either be
explicitly expressed or clearly implied".
There can
be no doubt that ordinarily a dispute in regard to
the relationship between the parties such as that
between a landlord and a tenant would bo a dispute
of a civil nature and would fall within the competence of tho civil court. If the respondents contend
that the jurisdiction of the civil court to deal with
such a civil dispute has been taken away by s. 7 (I)
wc must enquire whether s. 7( I) expressly takes
away the said jurisdiction or whether the material
wordR used in the section lead to such an inference
or the scheme of the Act inescapably establishes
auch an inference.
The relevance and materiality
of both these principles are not in dispute.
Let us then revert to s. 7. It would bo noticed that s. 7( I) has expressly and specifically provided for five cat-0gories of disputes which are within
the jurisdiction of the Collector and which must
therefore be t.akcn to be excluded from tho jurisdiction of the ciTil court. On a reasonablo conijtruction
of s. 7( I) a dispute apccified by s. 7( I )(a) would be a
dispute between a tenant and a landlord in regard
(I) ( 1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 222, 236.
• -
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
to the farmer's possession of the land on September
1, 1947. It is clear that the dispute to which s. 7(l}(a)
refers is a narrow dispute as to the possession of
the tenant on a specific date and his consequential
right to the benefits of the Act. The same is the
position with regard to the other categories of the
dispute specified by s. 7( 1). In none of the said
categories is a dispute contemplated as to the relationship of the parties itself. In other words s. 7(1)
postulates the relationship of tenant and landlord
between the parties and proceeds to provide for the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try the five
categories of disputes that may arise between the
landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are
the subject-matter of s. 7(1) must be in regard to
the five categories. That is the plain and obvious
construction of the words "any dispute as regards".
On this construction it would be unreasonable to
hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant
also falls within the purview of the said section.
The scheme of s. 7(1) is unambiguous and clear. It
refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it
contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even
on a liberal construction of s. 7(1) it would be
difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute
as regards the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the
Collector under s. 7( 1).
In this connection it would be relevant to take
into consideration the provisions of s. 7(2). This
clause provides that the Collector may, after making
such enquiries as he may deem necessary, order the
tenant, by a notice served in the prescribed manner
and specifying the grounds on which the order is
made, to cease to cultivate the land. It is significant
that the making of the enquiry and its mode are left
---..-
to the discretion of the Collector. If a serious dispute as to the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties had been covered by s. 7(1) it is difficult to imagine that the
1961
MagitiSasama
v.
Pandah Biaa~
Gajendragadkar .) ,
1961
Magftj StUamal
<.
Pandab Biasoi
Glljendrazadktff' J.
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
Legislature would have left the decision of such an
important issue to the Collector giving him full
freedom to mako such enquiries as ho may deem
necessary.
As is well known, a dispute as to the
exist-0nco of the relationship of landlord and tenant
raises serious questions of fact for decision, and if
such a serious dispute was intended to be tried by
the Collector the Legislature would have provided
for an appropriate enquiry in that behalf and would
have made the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicablo to such an enquiry. Section 7(2) can
be easily explained on tho basis that tho relationship between the parties is outside s. 7(1) and so the
disputes that are covered bys. 7( l) arc not of such
a nature as would justify a formal enquiry in that
behalf. The provisions of su b-ss. ( 3), (6) am! (7) also
indicate that the relationship betw<'en tho parties
is not, and cannot be, disputed before the Collector.
The parties arrayed before him are lamllord and
t-0nant or vice versa, and it is on the baRis of such
relationship between them that he proceeds to doal
with the disputes entrusted to him bys. 7(1 ).
It is true that wbon thP relationship of landlord
and tenant is proved or admitted the disputes falling within the five categories enumerated in s. 7(1)
will have to be tried bv the Collector.
Let us tako
tho pres('nt case itself· to illustrate hows. 7(1) will
operate. In the suit filed by the appellant against
the respondents the issue about the status of the
respondents wa.s framed and so it had to he tried by
the civil court. In such a suit if the civil courtholr:!s
that the relationship between tho landlord and tho
tenant h~d not beon established it may proceed to
deal with tho suit on the merits. If, however, it
holds that the said relationship is established then
the civil court cannot <lea! with the dispute between
the parties if it falls within any one of tho categorios
specified
by
s. 7( I). In such a case, having
made the finding a.bout the relationship between
tho parties tho civil court will either dismiss
the suit on the ground that it can give no rl'li<'f to
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
-- the lan:llord, or may, if it is permissible to do so,
ret'.irn the plaint for presentation to the Collector.
What course should be adopted in such a case it is
unnecessary for us to decide in the pres~n~ appo~l.
All that we wish to emphasise is that the 1mtml dis·
pute b<'tween the parties about the relationship
subsisting between them will st.ill continue to be
tried by the civil court and is outlide the purview
of s. 7( 1).
--
In support of the argument that a dispute as to
the existence of relationship as landlord and t~nant
should be taken to be included under s. 7( 1) rehance
is placed on the provisions of s. 8(1) of the Act.
Section 8( 1) provides that subject to the provisions
of s. 7 all disputes arising between lnndlord and
tenant shall be cognisable by the revenue cc,urt and
shall not be cognisable by the civil court. It must
be pointed out that we are really not concerned
with s. 8( I) in the present appeal Lecause even
according to the respondents the present dispute
between the parties attracted s. 7( l) and should ha,ve
been tried by the Collector and not by the civil
court. However, the questiorr about the construction of s. 8(1) has been incidentally raiBed before us.
In appreciating the scope and effect of s. 8( 1) it is
necessary to bear in mind the provisions ofs. 13 of
the Act. The said section provides that the Act
shall, as far as may be, be read and conskued as
forming part of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
or as the case may be, of the Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913.
Therefore, reading the provisions of s. 8(1) ands. 13
togother it follows that all that s. 8 ( 1) provides is
that except for the disputes covered by s. 7 (1) all
disputes arising between landlord and tenant shall
be
cognisable
by
the
revenue
court
and
to the trial of such disputes by the revenue court
the relevant provisions of the Orissa Tenancy Act,
1913 would apply. It is true that disputes to which
s. 8(1) applies are entrusted to the exolusive jurisdiction of the revenue courts and are excluded from ·
the jurisdiction of Civil courts, but the effect of this
provision will have to be considered in the light of
1961
M agiti Sasamal
v.
Pandab Bi8soi
Gajendragadkar J,
19~/
MDI/ti Sa6amal
v.
Pundnb Bi11ol
Gajend1a1adkar ].
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1062]
the other rolev11nt provisions of the parent Act of
which this temporary Act forms a part. Now, if wc
turn to some of the relevant provisions of the
parent Act it would be clear that when the revenue
courts aro given jurisdiction to try the dispulos tho
enquiry held by them purports to bo a formal
enquiry to which the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure may apply (Vide: s. 19~ of the Orissa
Tenancy Act, 19!a). Similarly, the provisions of
s. 20-!{l) which provides fur appeals contemplate
appeals to the District Court and the High Court
where questions of title are in,·olved. These provisions illustrate tho point that wh01e serious disputes about title are entrusted to special tribunals
usually the Legislature contemplates a formal onquiry and makes the provisions of the Codo of Civil
l'rocedure applicable to such an enquiry and provides for appropriate appeals. Now, in regard to the
order passed by the Collector under s. 7(1) the only
provision about appeals is that made by s. 11 which
provides that an appeal shall lie to tho prescribed
superior revenue authority whoso decision shall bo
fimil, and shall not be subject to any furthor appeal
or revision.
Departure made by the Lcgislaturn in
providing only one appeal and that too in every
case to tho prescribed superior revenue authority
clearly brings out that the disputes which are entrusted to the Collector under s. 7 ( 1) arc the sim pie
disputes specified in the five catogorios and do not
include a serious disputo like that of tho relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant.
If such a dispute had been intended to be tried by
the Collector tho Legislature would have provided
for a formal enquiry and would have proscribed
appropriate appeals on the lines of ss. 192 and 204
of the parent Act.
'
In this connection we may in passing refer to
the provisions of s. 126 of the parent Act. This
section deals with the jurisdiction of civil courts in
matters relating to rent. Section 126(3) provides
for the institution of suits in civil courts on the
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'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
grounde specified by els. (a) to (g). Clause (c) deals
with the ground that the relatiom;hip of landlord
and tenant does not exist. This clause shows that
if a dispute arose between the parties as to the
exist'3nce of the relationship of landlord and tenant
a suit in a civil court as contemplated is prescribed
bys. 126(3) (c). That also has some bearing on the
construction of s. 7( l); and it is for that limited
purpose that we hdve referred to it. Therefore, we
are s:itisfied that the High Court was in error in
holding that under s. 7(1) of the Act it was compe- ,
tent to the Collector to try the is:me between the
appellant and the respondents whether or not the
respondents were the tenants of thtJ appellant and
'"hat the ci vii court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the said dispute.
In the result, the appeal must be allowed, the
order passed by the High Court set aside and that
of the District Court restored with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
1P6I
.Maiiti Sasamal
v.
Pandab Bisaoi
GaJtndragadkar J.