# MAHANT DHARAM DAS ETC. ETC v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1975] 3 S.C.R. 160
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-01-14
- **Case number:** Civil Writ Nos. 514 of 1966
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, H. R. Khanna, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mahant-dharam-das-etc-etc-v-the-state-of-punjab-and-ors-6395
- **Pages:** 26

## Headnote

Siklz Gurudwaras Act (Pun.jab Act 8 of 1925) as amanded by Ac1 I of 1959
.11" 3, 7 and 8-.ff viola/Ive of Arts. 14, 19(1)(/) and 26 of the Constitution. ·
The Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925, enacted for providing control and management of Sikh Gurudwaras, was extended to the area known as PEPSU, by Punjab
Act I of 1959 with certain modificat:ons. The scheme of the Act is that places
of worship about which there was no doubt were placed in Schedule I.· Part
[[[ of the Act, which describes and regulates the manner of management could
be made applicable by speedy assertion of 'the claim made on behalf of the
shrines to properties, under ss. 3 to 6. Section 3 ( 4) makes tlie declaration in
the notification under s. 3 (2) that it is a Sikh Gurudwara conclusive and incapable of being cbitllenged. Whether any place not included in Schedule I should
or should not be placed under the provisions of Part III could be determined
in the manner provided for in ss. 7 to 11. An application for such a purpose
may b;~ made by 50 or more Sikh worshippers under s. 7. The State Government shall publish the petition and the list of properties claimed by the Gurudwara by notification under s. 7 (3) and s. 7 (5) makes the publication of a
notification conclusive proof that the provisiOns of sub-ss. (1) to (4) have
been complied with. Section 7 ( 4) provides for individual notice of the Gurudwara's claim to a right, title or interest included in the list, to the person in
possession of such right etc.
The Mahan! of a Shrine• included as a Sikh Gurudwara in Schedule J, the
Mahant of a Shrine declared to be a Sikh Gurudwara on an application under
" 7 (I) and the Mahant of a Shrine regarding ,which an application under s.
7(1) was pending, challenged the Constitutional validity of ss. 2(4) defining a
hereditary office holder, 3, 7 and 8 which provides for the_ procedure for a
declaration that a Gurudwara asserted to be a Sikh Gurudwara is not d Sikh
Gurudwara, on the ground of violation of Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 26. Rejecting
all the contentions,
HELD (Per A. N. Ray, CJ., P. Jaganmohan Reddy and P. K. Goswami.
JI) : I (a) As regards the Gurudwara included in Schedule I of the Act :it was
~lcclared to be a Sikh Gurudwara long prior to the coming into force of the
Constitution and was managed by the Interim Gurudwara Board constituted by
the Firman of the Maharaja which was the law of the PEPSU and has the force
of law even after coming into force of the Constitution by virtue of Ari. 372
and continues to be law till it was repealed and substituted by a law made: by a
competent legislature. The Mahant, therefore. had no manner of right during
the entire period from 1946, when the Firman was issued till long afkr the
amending Act, nor did he even assert his right thereto since then until the pre-
'ent proceedings. He cannot, therefore, be allowed now to challenge the factum
that the Gurudwara is a Sikh Gurudwara.
[174G-!75B]
(b) The respondent specifically raised the contention and asserted in the
plcadini;s that the Gurudwara was a Sikh Gurndwara and that its possession
and management ha<l vested in the Interim Gurudwara Board in PEPSU. !.l 75E:
li6A-BJ
(c) The entry relating to the last Jnmabandi for the year 1954-55 d0<~s not
show that the Gurudwara was a Udasi Gurudwara. It shows that the Mahan!
was working under the management of the Interim Gurudwara Board. Many
of the Sikh Gurudwaras were managed by Udasis and under the firmans,
the
Interim Gurudwara Board, which was in management of the Gurudwara, could
get the affairs of the Gurudwara looked after by others 1mder their supervision.
fl75F-Hl
(d) Therefore, the question whetl1er the Gutudwara was a Sikh Gurudwara
or was a Udassi Gurndwarn had been determined as early as 1946 by the firman
A
B
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D
[
F.
H
A
B
c
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F
DHARAM DAS v. PUNJAB (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
161
o.f the Maharaja.
The fact that the appellant alleged that he was in possession of the Gurudwara was of little moment because if the law vested

## Text

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160
MAHANT DHARAM DAS ETC. ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
January 14, 1974
[A. N. RAY, C.J., P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, H. R. KHANNA AND
P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]
Siklz Gurudwaras Act (Pun.jab Act 8 of 1925) as amanded by Ac1 I of 1959
.11" 3, 7 and 8-.ff viola/Ive of Arts. 14, 19(1)(/) and 26 of the Constitution. ·
The Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925, enacted for providing control and management of Sikh Gurudwaras, was extended to the area known as PEPSU, by Punjab
Act I of 1959 with certain modificat:ons. The scheme of the Act is that places
of worship about which there was no doubt were placed in Schedule I.· Part
[[[ of the Act, which describes and regulates the manner of management could
be made applicable by speedy assertion of 'the claim made on behalf of the
shrines to properties, under ss. 3 to 6. Section 3 ( 4) makes tlie declaration in
the notification under s. 3 (2) that it is a Sikh Gurudwara conclusive and incapable of being cbitllenged. Whether any place not included in Schedule I should
or should not be placed under the provisions of Part III could be determined
in the manner provided for in ss. 7 to 11. An application for such a purpose
may b;~ made by 50 or more Sikh worshippers under s. 7. The State Government shall publish the petition and the list of properties claimed by the Gurudwara by notification under s. 7 (3) and s. 7 (5) makes the publication of a
notification conclusive proof that the provisiOns of sub-ss. (1) to (4) have
been complied with. Section 7 ( 4) provides for individual notice of the Gurudwara's claim to a right, title or interest included in the list, to the person in
possession of such right etc.
The Mahan! of a Shrine• included as a Sikh Gurudwara in Schedule J, the
Mahant of a Shrine declared to be a Sikh Gurudwara on an application under
" 7 (I) and the Mahant of a Shrine regarding ,which an application under s.
7(1) was pending, challenged the Constitutional validity of ss. 2(4) defining a
hereditary office holder, 3, 7 and 8 which provides for the_ procedure for a
declaration that a Gurudwara asserted to be a Sikh Gurudwara is not d Sikh
Gurudwara, on the ground of violation of Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 26. Rejecting
all the contentions,
HELD (Per A. N. Ray, CJ., P. Jaganmohan Reddy and P. K. Goswami.
JI) : I (a) As regards the Gurudwara included in Schedule I of the Act :it was
~lcclared to be a Sikh Gurudwara long prior to the coming into force of the
Constitution and was managed by the Interim Gurudwara Board constituted by
the Firman of the Maharaja which was the law of the PEPSU and has the force
of law even after coming into force of the Constitution by virtue of Ari. 372
and continues to be law till it was repealed and substituted by a law made: by a
competent legislature. The Mahant, therefore. had no manner of right during
the entire period from 1946, when the Firman was issued till long afkr the
amending Act, nor did he even assert his right thereto since then until the pre-
'ent proceedings. He cannot, therefore, be allowed now to challenge the factum
that the Gurudwara is a Sikh Gurudwara.
[174G-!75B]
(b) The respondent specifically raised the contention and asserted in the
plcadini;s that the Gurudwara was a Sikh Gurndwara and that its possession
and management ha<l vested in the Interim Gurudwara Board in PEPSU. !.l 75E:
li6A-BJ
(c) The entry relating to the last Jnmabandi for the year 1954-55 d0<~s not
show that the Gurudwara was a Udasi Gurudwara. It shows that the Mahan!
was working under the management of the Interim Gurudwara Board. Many
of the Sikh Gurudwaras were managed by Udasis and under the firmans,
the
Interim Gurudwara Board, which was in management of the Gurudwara, could
get the affairs of the Gurudwara looked after by others 1mder their supervision.
fl75F-Hl
(d) Therefore, the question whetl1er the Gutudwara was a Sikh Gurudwara
or was a Udassi Gurndwarn had been determined as early as 1946 by the firman
A
B
c
D
[
F.
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
DHARAM DAS v. PUNJAB (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
161
o.f the Maharaja.
The fact that the appellant alleged that he was in possession of the Gurudwara was of little moment because if the law vested the
management in the Interim Gurudwara Board the possession of the appellant
would either be permiJsible or hostile. In either case the status of the Gurudwara as a Sikh Gurudwara had been determined before the Constitution and
since it wa"S a pre-constitutional law, which dedared it so, the appe!Jant cannot
challenge it on the ground of violation of his fundamental rights.
Even if the
appellant continued to be in possession he has not acquired a right of manage.
ment :ovhen once that right was vested in another body.
The· Firman of an
erstwhile ruler of a princely State was law and continued to be law till repealed
or substituted by a law of a competent legislature.
[176G-177B]
A111~cn11111issa Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum and Otht'rs
(1953)
S.C.R. 404 and State of Rajastlzan and Others v. 5111'1' Sajjanlal Panja•var nnd
others [1974] 1 S.C.R. at p. 511, followe'1.
(e) The firman vested the management and possession of the Gurudwara in
a body created by it, with a Constitution and membership, quorum etc.
Such
an .order could be an· administrative order only if the Gurudwaras in respect of
which the management was vested were already vested in the State. Therefore the
contention of the appellant that the firman was only an administrative order
not having the force of law would be fatal to the case of the appellant. The
very fact that pending a comprehensive law the Maharaja was issuing a firman
its~lf shows that it is a law.
[177B-D]
'
(f) The Maharaja envisaged a comprehemive law to replace his firmans
but by that time the State was merged and the law embodied in the firmans
which was continued to be the law after the merger was replaced by the Amend·
ing Act which provided for the Interim. Gurudwara Board b~ing in possession
and management during the transition period.
The Fundamental rights con·
ferred by- the Constitution are not retrospe.ctive in operation. Therefore, it could
not be contended by the appellant that the pre-constitutional law took away
rights only for ao· interim period and that th~ rights existed after the interim
period &nd were subject to the Constitution. [l 77E-H]
Sri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendrawami ~f Garimu/f v. ·commissioner of
Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad [1964] 8 S.C.R. 252 and
Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India A.T.R. 1955 S.C. 624, referred to.
(2) The whole object of the Act was to reduce the chances of protracted
litigation in a matter involving the religions sentiments of a large section of a
sensitive people proud of their heritage. The provision of law which shuts out
further inquiry and makes a notification in respect of certain preliminary steps
conclusive, does not involve the exercise of any judicial function.
[t78F-H]
(3) Sections 3(4) and 7(5) are statutory provisions;
The prescription of
rules of evidence by a legislature which is competent to provide for irrebuttable
and con~lush:e presumptions not only as mere rules o.f. evidence ~ut. e~en as. a
substantive pieces of law so long as the relevant prov1S1ons are withm its legislative competence and are not other"'.ise μnconstitutional, is valid. [1790-E]
Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raglmi·anc/ra
Kl'ipal and others A.I.R. 1966
S.C. 693 followed.
G
lzhar Ahmad Khan ant} others v. Union of India and others [l 962] SupJ7. ~
S.C.R. 234, referred to.
( 4) Section 3 (2) provides that on the receipt of a list "duly forwarded
under the provisions of sub-s. (I)" the State Government is expected to publish
a notification.
The pnblkation of such a notification is made conclu,ive proof
of certain facts by s. 3(4). The use of the expression "duly forwarded" shows
that the State Government is ·expected to satisfy itself before the issue of a
H
notification under s. 3(2), .that the application was a proper application under
sub-s. ( t) and has been duly forwarded, which implies, that the requirements
of s. 3 (I) have been fulfilled.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding:
that the provisions of s. 3(4) and s. 7(5) do not suffer from any comtitutional
or other legal impediment. [ 179F- l 80A]
12-L379Sup.Cl/75
162
SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 3 S.C.R.
(5) The notice to be served under s. 7(4) even though it was served subseA
quent to the notification under s. 7 ( 5) is determined by the rule of conclusive
proof. Once the provision of conclusive presumption under s. 7(5) is held to
be valid and constitutional that question could not be allowed to be agitated
Jr rebutted as that would militate against the conclusive nature of the statutory
presumption. Nor, having regard to the object of the Act, can that pmvision
be consi~ered t~ ~~. unrea~ona?le ~s these are only P!eliminary steps necessary
for holdmg an mquiry which mquiry forms an esscnual part to the determination of the /is, 1 o take advantage of prelimina.ry steps to protract litigation is
B
itself unreasonable.
The presumption that the authorities enjoined by the Act
to take ~ertain steps will do so is an irrebuttable presumption and if that does
not affect subst~ntial justice being done between the parties to the /is, no question
of unreasonableness will arise.
[180B-E]
(6) On the death of a Guru before he nominates his Chela or where a Guru
marries and is disqualified and another pe~son_ is appointed as a Mahant, it may
be that such a person may not have the nght to challenge the notification under
s. 7(3) because he is not a holder of a hereditary office.
But if a hereditary
C
office holder cannot be found then s. 8 provides for a challenge to the notification under s., 7 (3) by any 20 or more worshippers of the Gurudwara. Jf the
Bhekh of a Sampradaya is entitled to nominate a successor and a Mahant has
been so nominated it could be !Jresumed that the Bhekh will have more than
twenty worshippers and they could challenge the notification even if the Mahant
could not. [180E-181B]
(7) Besides, whether such a person is a hereditary office holder is a matter
for the Tribunal to determine having regard to well established rules of evidence
D
by which courts determine such matters.
The assumpti(ln that such a Mahant
may not be considered to be a hereditary office holder is purely hypotht!tical.
It is for the tribunal to apply the law for determining as to whether the person who challenges the notification L a hereditary office holder and has locus
standi to do so. [181B-Cl
(8) The period of 90 days prescribed under s. 8 is not unreasonable.
A
period of limitation is by its very nature to some extent arbitrary but it 1:ould
not be urged that 90 days is not sufficient time for 20 or more worshippers· to
E
get together to challenge the notification which is designed to declare the guru-
.:lwara in which they were worshipping to be a Sikh Gurudwara. [1810-:F]
Per Khanna, J. :
(I) In the notice issued under s. 3 (3) the appellant (the Mahant of Ciurudwara included in Schedult! I) was mentioned to be in possession of the property
in dispute.
Before the Tribunal when the appellant wanted to agitate the question that the property in dispute was a Udasi institution and not a Sikh GuruF
clwara he was not permitted to do so. Therefore, the appellant has /ocrts s1a11di
to file the petition before High Court under Art. 226. [185B-DJ
-(2) But the respondent has conceded that it is permissible to the ·appe.llant
to make a claim that the property mentioned in the notification relating to the
list of properties under s. 3 (~) in~luding the property described to be the. Gur~d
wara itself, in respect of fhe item m the first Schedule, belongs lo a Udas1 Jnslltution. If the above stand taken on behalf of the respondent were to be accepted
the basis of the grievance of the appellant that there is a denial of opportunitir to
G
him to establish his claim that the institution is a Udasi institution disappears,
and s. 3 ( 4) would not be violative of the appellant's right under Arts. 19(1 )( f)
and 26.
f182G-11!3B]
(3) There is a presumption of the constitutional validity of a statutory provision. If a provillion like s. 3 ( 4) of the Act of a !~al enactment .has been on
the statute book for about half a century ancl a parltcular construclton has been
placed uoon it by the Hid! Court of the State which sustains its Constitutional
H
validity this Court should le~n in favour of the .view ~ would sustain the validity
of the provision and not d1s~urb the ~onstruchon w~1~h has beer;i a=ceP.led for
such a lengthy lirne. None of the 1mpugfH'.d prov1s1ons has been shown to
violate the constitutional rights of the appellants. [184E-F; 185F]
A
B
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DHARAM DAS V, PUNJAB (Jaganmohan Reddy,!.)
163
Raj N11'lli11 P1111dey & Ors.
v.
Salli Prasad Tewari & Ors.
A.l.R.
1973
s.c. 291.
.
Civ1L
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeals
Nos.
354,
1222 and 1251/69.
From the judgment and order dated the 18th March/25th July
1968 of the Punjab &-Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 514
of 1966, 1935 of 1962 and 2310 of-1965 respectively.
C. K. Daphtary (In C.A. No. 354/69) V.M.J. Tarkunde, (In
· C.A. No. 1251/69). M. B. Bal, R, D. Mahant, N. S. Das, Behl and
P. K. Pai/Ii, for the appellants (In C.As. Nos. 354 & 1251/69).
Naunit Lal, Harbhajan Singh Kathuria and La/it Kohli, for the
appellant (In C.A. No. 1222/69).
D .. V. Patel (In C.A. No. 1251/69) Charan Singh and Harba11s
Singh, for respondent No. 3 (In all the appeals).
V: s. Desai, K. K. Chaw/a, On C.A. No. 353/69)
and o. P.
Sharma. for respondents Nos. 1-2 (In C. As. 354 and 1222/69
and responden1ts Nos. 1 & 4 (In C.As No. 1251/69).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy,
J. Khanna, J. gave a separate Opinion.
JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Civil Appeals Nos. 354 and 1251 of
1969 are by certificate against the judgmeat of the Full Bench of the
Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 514 of
1966,and 1935 of 1962 respectively in which by majority the provisions of s. 3 read with Sch. 1 and ss. 5, 7 and 8 of the Sikh
Gurdwaras Act, 1925, which were challenged, were held to be valid.
Following the Full Bench Judgment in the above two Civil Writ Petitions. Civil Writ Petition No. 2310 of 1965 was also disposed of
by a Division Bench of that !ligh Court.
Against that Judgment
Civil Appeal No. 1222 of 1969 ·is by certificate.
Jn all these appeals the places of worship to which the impugn~d
provisions have been made applicable were situated in the erstwhile
Patiala and· East Punjab States Union. After the States Reorganisation
Act, 1956 when the said territories were merged,. the
Sikh
Gurdwaras Act; 1925 (hereinafter called 'the Act') was made applicable
to the places of worship situated in the areas to which the Act was
made applicable by Punjab Act I of 1959 (hereinafter called
'the
Amending Act') .
'
The appellant Lachman Das in Civil Appeal No. 1251 of 1969 .
alleges that he is an Udasi Faquir belonging to the Udasi Sect founded by Sri Chand; that he was the Mahant of Gurdwara Sahib Pinjore
\for several vears and in that capacity was in possession and · contr.ol
. H
· of all the properties belonging fo. it; that the Mahantship of an
Ulasi Gurdwara devolves from Guru to Chella which is opposed. to
the belief of the Sikhs who believe only in ten Gurus ·and none else;
and that though the Gurdwara is an Udasi Gurdwara it has been
164
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
(1975} 3 S.C.R.
included in Sch. I of the Act the effect of which, read with sub-ss.
t2) & ( 4) of s. 3, makes the declaration in tl~e notification that it is
u Sikh Gurdwara conclusive and incapable of being challenged.
The appellant Dharam Das in Civil Appeal No. 354 of 1969 is
an Udasi Sadh and Mahant of Dera Udasi Sadhan. It is alleged that
the followers of this Sampradaya form a distinct religi~us de!1o~n~
tion, as such the notification dated February 17, 1961 mcludmg it m
Sch. I of the Act is obje~tionable. It -is further stated that not even
··the notice under s. 7 ( 4) of th~ Act was given to the appellant and he
was not allowed to contest that the applicants were neither Siikhs nor
worshippers of the institution in dispute, nor are the fifty or more
persons required for making an application under s. 7 ( 1) of the Act
and who made the application· re.sidents of the relevant Police Station,
nor could the allegations that the signatures were obtained by fraud
or that the applic?tion was not in time be enquired into. The notification was fur.ther
challe~1ged on the gr'aunds that there was no
authority which is required to satisfy itself that' the applicants were
alive or dead nor does the Act give a riglit to the Mahant, the person
seriously affected. to challenge the locus standi of the applicants.
The flrst appellant in C.A 1222 of 1969 claims that he was
appointed by the village Panchayat as the Mahant after removing
Gurcharan Singh who succeeded after the death of the last Mahant
Hari Singh who was the Guru, because Hari Singh had contracted
a marriaJ1,e. He alleged tfiat the Dera in dispute known as Gurdwara
Punjab Sahib was established by one Mahant Kesara Singh.
The
Dera has considerable properties moveable and immoveable which are
managed bv the village Panchayat which also appoints Mah:mt from
amongst the Chelas of the previous Mahants.
The successioa, according to these avermenlts, devolves from Guru to Chela, but if a Mahant
after he succeeds contracts a marriage he is liable to be removed by
the village Panchavat anld~ another is appointed by them who will not
be a hereditary Mahant within the meaning of the Act.
According
to the appellant on April 11, 1961 about 52 persons of Tehs:.t Barnala
District Sangrur. gave an application under sub. s ( 1) of s. 7 of th;
Ac~ to get the. Dera i~ question declarecj a Sikh Gurdwara which application was still oendmg on the date of the filing of the Writ petition
011 August 21, 1965 before the Singh Gurdwara Tribunal.
In Civil Aooeal No. 1251 of 1969 the High Court held that the
appellant Lachman Das claimed to be a Mahant of a different Gurd~ara than the one included in Sch. 1 of the Act. At p. 327 of the
· prmted paper book this is what is stated :-
"The petitioner has not claimed himself to be the ownfa
of the institution defined and described in item No. 249 of
the first Schedule, and has, therefore, no locus standi to
claim that the said institution should have been included in
~chedule TT.
The institution in which he claims to have
mterest "Gurdwara Sahib Pinjore" has not been listed in
A·
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c.
D
E
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G
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DHARAM DAS v. PUNJAB (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
165
Schedule 1.
Item No. 249 in the first Schedule relates to
an institution of "Padshahi Pahai!i'', and
the
petitioner
admits that he has nothing to do with institutions of Padshahi
Pahaili. There is, therefore, no force in any of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this case, and
Civil Writ 1935 of 1962 also, therefore, merits dismissal."
It is submitted before us that this finding of the High Court was
based on a misappreh.ension that the appellant 11ad claimed' to be a
Mahant of a different Gurdwara than that included in Sch. I of that
Act. · Apart from this, it is contended that sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the
Act clearly offencjs the guarantee of Art. 26 of the Constitution inasmuch as it provides that a Gurdwara by virtue of its inciusion in Sch. I
of the Act shall be treated as a Sikh Gurdwara and shall be managed
by Sikh representatives, that. the provision also violates the guarantee
under Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution as it affects the rights of the
appellant no~ only to claim the properties of the Gurdwara
as
a
Mahant thereof but also to the office of the Mahant of the. said Gurdwara, and that the declaration in the notification under sub-s. ( 4) of.
s. 3 of the Act which operated as conclusive proof that the Gurt.lwara
was a Sikh Gurdwara, was an unreasonable restriction on the appellant's fundamental rights both under Art. 26 and Art. 19 (1 ) ( f) . It
was further contended that the provisions in the earlier part of s. 3( 4)
providing that the declaration mentioned therein shall be conclusive
proof that the provision of sub-ss. (1), (2) and (3) of s. 3 have been
duly complied with are ( i) arbitrary and hence violative of Art. 14
of the Constitution and (ii) operate as an unreasonable restriction on
the appellant's Fundamental rights under Arts. 26 and 19 ( 1) (f).
In Civil Appeal No. 354 of 196<}· apart from the contentions raised
in Lachman Dass's ease the appellarlt Dharam Dass urged certain
additional grounds for invalidating the provisions of the Act. It is
submitted that the rule of succession followed for the past more than
200 years from Guru to Chela is inconsistent with the Gurdwara
being a Sikh Gurdwara, but notwithstanding this it has
been
so
declared by a notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 7 on an application
made under sub-s .. ( 1) of s. 7 of the Act claiming it to be a Sikh
Gurdwara.
The Privy Council had pointed out the es.sential differences between Udasis and Sikhs in Hem Singh & Ors v. Basant Das
& Anr.( 1) which criteria had not been kept in view before including
the appellant's Math in Sch. I of the Act. The appellant having come
to know of this notification under sub-s. ( 3) of s. 7 filed a petition
under s. 8 of the Act as a hereditary office holder claiming that the
Gurdwara or Dera in question is not a Sikh Gurdwara and its properties do not belong to a Sikh Gurdwara before the Tribunal constituted under the Act to which the dispute was referred. The appellant
filed an application before the Tribunal on January 6, 1966 requesting
it to examine and determine the locus standi of the persons who made
the petition under s. 7(1) of the Act on the basis, of which the notification was issued by the Government.
The Tribunal, however, dismissed the application on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to go
----· ---------·· ··-----·
( 1) L.R. 63 I.A. 180.
166
SUPREME COUIRT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
into the question by reason of fae provisions ol: sub-s. ( 4) of s. 7 of
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the Act. Inasmuch as the appellant is in possession of the D:~ra in
question and is sought to be dispossessed and deprived of his Mahant·
ship he has every right to challenge the notificatton but the provisions
of sub-s. (5J of s. 7 of the Act prohibit him from challenging the
validity of the petition on the basis, of which the notification under
sub·s. ( 3) olt s. 7 of the Act was founded.
As sub-s. ( 5) of s. 7
makes the publication of the notification conclusive proof that the
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prQvisions of sub-ss. (1), (2), (3) and (4J have been duly complied
with, although matters in sub-s. ( 4) may be subsequent to the publi·
cation it violates Art. 14 as it is arbitrary. It also violates Arts. 19(1)
( 1) ( f) and 26 because it places an unreasonable restriction on the
exercise of the appellant's fundamental rights as an Udasi Mahant.
The claim made by the appellant under s. 8 of the Act that h1! is a
hereditary office holder within the meaning of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 2 of the
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Act has been challenged by Sikh Gurdwar;i. Prabandhak Committee.
The appellant apprehends that the Tribunal will raise this as a preliminary issue and possibly depriv11 the appellant an opportunity to
.establish that the Gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara. The appellant
also apprehends that he may not be accepted as a hereditary Mahant
because according to the submissions made on his behalf the defini·
tion under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 2 rules out any Mahant who may be
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accepted· or recognised as a Mahant of the institution by the Udasi
Bekh. It ma1y sometimes happen that there may be a break in the
chain of. suc<:ession from. Guru to Chela such as where a Guru dies
before nominating his successor or there may be a dispute between
two Chelas as to who has been nominated.
In such cases it iis the
Bekh or the congregation which (ietermines the matter
and selects
a particular Chela as Mahant. · A single break in the chain, ac:cordE
in~ to the learned Advocate for the appellant, deprives a Mahant of
betng a hereditary office ·holder who may be prevented from maintainin~ a petition under s. 8 of the Act on the ground tha~ it does not
strictly comply with the definition of a Mahant. It is also submitted
that the definition of a Mahant in Sub-s. ( 4) of s. 2 is unfair and
violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as it makes in distinction
between Mahant as described in the definition and other · Mahants
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without any nexus with the object of the Act. Further s. 8 read with
s. 18 is viola,tive of .the aJ>Pellant's fundamental rights because: any
claim to a property which has been notified as a Sikh Gurdw~1ra is
defeated by the conclusive presumption under s. 18 arising from any
of tht: grounds mentioned in that section.
·
In Civil Appeal No. ·1222 of 1969 additional contentions urged
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were that a notice under s. 7 ( 4) of the Act was in fact issued to a
.dead person, namely, Hali Singh, The contention of_ the appellant
. l'that the notice to a dead person is void and is not a notice unde1r law
· was rejected by the High Court on the ground that since there \Vas
no change in the annual revenue record and the name of the dead
person was entered there in the column of ownershw the notice was
valid which finding is challenged as being erroneollS · in law. The
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contention that no notification was ever published along with the list
at the Headq~ters of the District and of the Teh~il under s. 7 (3)
of the Act was also rejected on the ground that under suh:-s. (5) of
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DHARAM DAS v. PU.NJAB (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
167
5.7 of the Act, some of the provisions of the said section have been
complied with are made conclusive and cannot. be challenged. As an
example, it is stated that 'the applicaticn presented by fifty or more
persons contains thumb marks of persons who are not in existence
and whose identity cannot be ascertained but notwithstanding this
the appellants are estopped under sub-s. (5) of s. 7 from proving
that the application ,is actually signed ·by less than 50 persons. · On
this ground also the validity of sub-s. ( 5) of s. 7 is assailed. It is,
therefore, submitted that sub-s. ( 5) of s. 7 ·is ultra vires the provisions
of the Constitution.
It is ·also submitted that appeals in which the
Punjab and Haryana High Court had held that a notice under subs. ( 4) of s. 7 of the Act sent to a dead person or notice sent after the
publication bf the notification under sub-s. (3) of s. 7 is bad in law,
are pending· in this Court. It has been further contended that there
is no intelligible differentia between a hereditarv office holder
as
defined in s.2<iv) oand (v) of the Act and a de-facto holder of office
as there is no: nexus between the two. Section 8 is also assailed as contravening Art. 14 because the Act ,provides for two_ different procedures for the same purpose under s. 8 and s. 38 of the Act. The
procedure under s. 8 is onerous and confers rights on a hereditary
office holder. It does not confer any such right on other office holders.
The section also prescribes a period of limitation of 90 days and sets
-out numerous defences open to a petitioner who wants to make an
application. As against this the procedure prescribed in s. 38 affords
to any person who claims to have an interest in the Dera the right to
appear and defend the suit and establish that the institution is not a
Sikh Gurdwara. The two different procedures for the same purpose
and object are discriminatory under Art. 14. In any case these are
unreasonable restrictions on the right of the appellants and violate
Art. 19(1 )(f).
.
On behalf of the respondents it is submitted that the appeliants
have not established or even prima facie satisfied the Court that the
institutions were established by the Udasis.
No
documents _,,were
pr_oduced not even a rejoinder of the denial of the respondents giving
details about the truth of the allegations was filed, nor oven a single
affidavit of a worshipper has .been filed.
The mere allegation that
Udasi Faquirs have been in charge from Guru to Chela and that
the appellants are Mahants is not sufficient to establish a right which
is essential for presenting an ,application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Several cases of this Court have been referred to in support of this proposition.
·
Even assuming without conceding that the institutions were Udasi
institutions, it is submitted that that -right having been lost even J)rior
to the constitution by virtue of the Firmans of the Maharaja of Patiala
no relief can be claimed nor the provisions of the Act can be challenged as being unconstitutional.
Several other
arguments
.,-..-ere
advanced which will be dealt with hereafter.
The main question in these appeals
is
whether
the
aF:·: ,.
!ants have the right to challenge the provisions of the Act by and Ui d'.
which a Gurdwara or an institution is declared or assumed to h,
Sikh Gurdwara. The full Bench of the Punjab & Harayana High c· u;
in its detailed judgment bas considered several aspects in the ligr.-
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168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 .s.c.R.
the contentions advanced before it which contentions have been
repeated before us. Before we examine the impugned provision:;, it is
necessary to state that in order to remedy a situ•ation arising out of
certain historical landmarks of Sikh struggle to retain their shrine~. which
had come int0 the possession of persons subscribing to non-Sikh faiths.
the Act was passed. Vfhe Sikhs believe in the ten Gurus--the last
of whom was Guru Gobind Singh. They further -believe that there is
no other Guru after Guru Gobind Singh who enjoined on his followers
1 that after him they,:should consider Guru Granth Sahib as the Guru.
They do nc.t subscribe to idol worship and polytheism, nor do
they have anY. Samadhi in their shri:nes. The teaching of Sikhs was
against asceticism.
They believe in Guru Granth Sabi~, which
is
a Rosary of sacred poems, exhor~ations, etc.
During the time of the
Sikh Gurus, the Gurdwaras were under their direct supervision and
control or under their Masends or missionary agents. After th1~ death
of Guru Gobind Singh the Pa11th is recognised as the corporalc representative or the Guru on earth and thereafter they were managetl by
the Panfo through their Granthis and other sewadars who wern under
direct supervision of the local Sangat or congregation. During Maharaja Ranjit Singh's time Sikhism became the religion of ' the . State
and large estates and J agirs were granted to the Gurdwaras, apart from
the Jagirs which had been earlier granted during the Mugal period.
The position of the Gurdwaras changed during British regime.
The
\
Mahants who were in charge of the Sikh Gurdwaras could either be a
Sikh Mahant or Udasi Mahant. It may here be stated that the Udasis
were not S.ikhs.
While the teachings of Sikhs were against asceticism
and were opposed to Hindu rites, the Udasis though "using the same
sacred writings as the Sikhs, kept up much more of the old Hindu
practices. followed asceticism, were given to the veneration of Samadhis or Tombs and continue the Hindu rites
concerning birth,
marriage and Shradh." (See Hem Sinl?h v. Basant Das( 1.)
Though
there was no reconciliation between the Sikhs and Udasis, it did not
matter if the Mahant of a Sikh Gurdwara was not a Sikh Mahant
because the Panth or Sangat exercised control over the Gurdwaras.
After the death of Maharaja ~anjit Singh when the power of the
Sikhs had waned and they were disorganised and dejected, the nonSikh Mahants asserted their control and denied to the Panth or the
Sangat rights over those Gurdwaras. After the Sikhs had H!covered
from their frustration caused by the defeat of the Sikh 1 Rajas they
began to assert their rights by filing suits and embarking on litigation
for the-recovery of their holy shrines.
The Shriomani
Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee-hereinafter
referred to as the S.G.P.C.-had come into existence some time
in
Janu;arv 1921 and was later registerel::I under the Societies Registration
Act m the same year.
After several attempts were made to arrive at
a settlement and after trying many drafts/bills the Government of the
time brought forward a meoasure which provided a Central Body called
the Board of Control. for the management and control of all the historical Gurdwaras. By then the S.G.P.C. had taken control of many
of the Gurdwaras from the Mahants who were either religious minded
(1) 63 I.A. 180, 201.
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l>HARAM DAS v. PUNJAB (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
16-9
or realising that their personal interests lay in their seeking the protec" _
tion of the S.G.P.C. which had been especiaHy formed for the purpose
of managing and maintaining the Gurdwaras on lines consistent with
the te•achings of the Gurus and the wishes of the community had voluntarily placed the Gurdwaras U'ader the control of the S.G.P.C.
In
order to provide for the control and management of these _Gurdwaras
and those Gurdwaras which were claimed by the Sikhs to be the Sikh -
Gurdwaras, a Bill which late;· .became the Act was presented in 1925,
the aims and objects of which were, inter-alia, stated as follows ;-
"1. The present Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill is an
effort to provide a legal procedure by which such Gurdwaras
and shrines as are, owing to their origin and habitual use,
~garded by Sikhs as essentially places of Sikh worship,
may be brought effectively and permanently under Sikh control and their administration reformed so as to make it consistent with the religious views of that community. The Sikh
Gurdwaras and Shrines Act, 1922, which is. to be replaced
by the present Bill, failed to satisfy the aspirations of the
Sikhs for various reasmis.
One, for instance, was that it
did not establish permanent committees of management for
Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines.
Nor did it provide for the
speedy confirmation by Judicial sanction of changes already
introduced by the reforming party in the
management of
places of worship over which it had
obtained
effective
CO'.ltroJ.
2. The present Bill provides a scheme of purely Sikh
management, secured by statutory and legal sanction, for
places of worship which are decided either by the Legislature or by an independent Tribunal set up for the pur-
·pose, or by an ordinary Court of law, to be in reality places
of Sikh worship which should be managed by Sikhs."
The scheme of the Act was that there were certain places
of
worship about which no substantial doubt existed and those places
were forthwith placed in Sch. I, Part III, which describes and regulates
the manner of management could be made applicable by the speedy.
assertion of the claim made on behalf of the shrines to the property
alleged to belong to it, which assertion was to be by petition to the
Local Government: (vide ss. 3 to 5). Secondly whether any place
not included in Sch. I should or should not be placed for management under the provisions of Part III could be determined
in the
manner provided for in ss. 7_ to 11. In respect ?f these Gurdwaras
under sub-s. ( 1) of s. 7 fifty or more Sikh worshippers of a gurdwara
each of whom is more than twenty-one years of age and was ·on the
commencement of the Act or, in the case of the extended territories
from the commencement of the Amending Act, a resident in the police
station area in which the Gurdwara is situated, may forward to the -
State Government, through the appropriate Secretary to Government
so as to reach the Secretary within one ye~r from the commencement
of the Act or within 180 days from
the commencement of the
Amending Act, praying to have the Gurdwara declared to be a Sikh
...,,
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975) 3 S.C.R.
Gurdwara. Cnder s. 8 twenty or more worshippers of the gurdwara,
each of whom is more than twenty-one years of age and was cm the·
commencement of the Act or, in th1~ case of the extended t·~rritories,
on the commencement of the Amending Act, as the case may be, a resid.;!nt of a police station area in which the gurdwara is situated may
forward to the State Govern!l1ent, so as to reach the Secretary within ninety days from the date of the publication of the notification, a
petition signed and verified by the petitioner, or petitioners, as
the
: ,,se may he, claiming that the gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara, and
may in such petition make' a further claim that the hereditary officeholder. or any person who would have succeeded to such officeholder under the system of management prevailing before the
first
day of January. 1920 or, in the case of the extended territories, befO!"' the l st day of November, 1956, as th-e case may be, may be
r<.~rcd to office on the grounds that such gurdwara is not a Sikh
Gurdwara and that such
offic~-holdcr ceased to be an office-holder
after that day. Section 9 deals with the effect of omission to present
a p~tition uncler s. 8. It provides that the publication of a notific~ation
under the provisions of sub-s. ( l) of s. 9 shall be conclusi\le proof
that the gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara and the provisions of Pai:t III
shall :ipply to the ~urdwarn with effect from the date of the publication of th.-: notification. Section I 0 provides for the filing of n peti-
. tion claiming a right, title 01· intc:rcst in any property included h1 the
list published under sub-s. (3) of s. 7, If no claim has been made
in respect of any of. the prop·~rties within the specified period the
State Government is empowered to publish a notification which was
to be conclusive proof of the fact that no such claim was made in
respect of any right, title or interest specified in the
notification.
Section 11 provides for compensation to a hereditary office-holdi~r of
gurdwara notified under s. 7 or his presumptive successor. Chapter
m of Part I Jlrovides for the constitution and procedure of tribunal
for purposes of the Act vide ss. 12 tc> 37. Part II s. 38 is concerned
with the application of the provisions of Part III to gurdwaras found
to be Sikh Gurdwaras by courts other than the Tribunal constituted
under the Act. Part III Chapter V, as already stated, deals with the
control of Sikh, Gurdwaras.
The Act, as we have stated earlier, was extended to the erstwhile
areas of Patiala and East Punjab States Union-known as PEPSU
by the Amending Act, consequently some of the provisions
have
been amended to provide for that situation. For instance in sub-s. ( 1)
of s. 3 the list to be forwarded to the State Government through the
appropriate Secretary to Government 'had to be forwarded
within
one hpndred and eighty days of the commencement .of ~c ~mending
Act. Ih' so far as Sch. I Gurdwaras .are concerned 1t
1s mcumbent
upon any Sikh or any holder of a Gur~wara on the date of the commencement of the Act or on the date of the Amending Act to forward to the State Government a list of all rights, titles and interests
in immovabl·e properties situated in Punjab inclusive of the gurdwara
and in all monetary, endowments yielding income or profit received
in Punjab which he claims to belerrg:-Within his knowledl!I.!, to the
Gurdwara and to furnish several details specified therein. On rec,eipt
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DHARAM DAS V, PUNJAB (Jaganmof1an Reddy, J,)
171.
of this list the State Government under sub-s. (2) is enjoined to pub.-
lish, as. soon as niay be, a notification declaring that the gurdwara to
which it relates is a. Sikh Gurdwara and, after the expiry of the period.
provided in sub-s. ( 1) for forwarding lists shall, as soon as may be,
publish by notification a consolidated list in which all rights, titles.
and interests in any such properties as are described in sub-s. ( 1)
which have been included in any list duly forwarded, shall be includ,.
ed, and shall also cause for consolidated list to be published, in such
manner as may be prescribed, at the headquarters of the district and
of th·~ tehsil where the gurdwara is situated.