# MAHARAJ SINGH • v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 1072
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-11-02
- **Bench:** H. R. Khanna, V. R. Krishna !Yer
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/maharaj-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-others-6892
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950-Section 117-Scope
of-State vests lands in Gaon Sabha-Suit for ejectment-Gaon Sabha did ••~t
appeal-State-If had locus standi.
Words & phrases-Vest-Person aggrie1·ed-Appurte11a11ce-Mea11i11g 'fl
By virtue of s. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act,
1950, the right, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate including hats, bazars and me/as stood terminated and vested absolutely in the State.
Section 9 provides that all wells, trees in abadi and all buildings situate within
the limits of an Estate, belonging to an intermediary, shall continue to belong
to or be held by such intermediary and the site of the buildings which is
appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government. Section 117 ( 1) empowers the State Government to
vest
lands
in
Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities. Under s. 117(6) the State
Government has power to resume from a Gaon Sabha the lands vested in it.
By a
notification under s. 117(1) the State Government vested the land in the village
in the Gaon Sabha.
On the estate in dispute, the defendant who was the quondam zamindar, had
been conducting a cattle fair.
The estate had on it, among others, a few structures. The plaintiffs' (the State and the Gaon Sabha) suit for ejectment of the
defendant from the estate was dismissed by the trial court.
Th~ Gaon Sabha,
however, did not appeal; but the State went in appeal to the High Court as 'a
person aggrieved'. The Rish Court negatived the defendant's contentions that
as a result of the notification under s. 117 ( 1) the land having vested in the
Gaon Sabha, the State Government had no locus standi and that it was not a
person aggrieved, but allowed the defendant to keep all the structures
and
a
space of 5 yards running round each building.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (1) The State has title to sustain the action in ejectment. The
Government, despite vesting the estates in Gaon Sabhas has, and continues to
have, a constant hold on these estates, when it chooses, to ta\ce away what it
had given possession of to a Gaon Sabha. This is plainly 'present legal interest'
in the Government and a sort of precarium
te11a11s in the Sabha. [1082 D;
1079 F-G]
(a) The Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari rights as part of land
reform. Instead of centralising management of all estates ~t State level, the
Act gives an enabling power to make over these states to Gaon Sabhas. Apart
from management, no power is expressly vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the
estates absolntely. If the State thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting
declaration or notification it can totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from
it, any estate. The vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting
in the
Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture
by
Government. Such a construction of vesting in two different senses in the· same
section is sound because the word 'vest' has many meanings. The sense of the
situation suggests that in s. 117 ( 1) 'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest in the Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as
it lasts.
To
postulate vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declaration under s. 117(1) is to stultify s. 117(6). [1081 A-C; F-G]
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MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTTAR PRADESH (Krishna Iyer, 1.)
1073
(b) The State is 'a person aggrieved'.
He, who has a
proprietary rii;ht,
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which has beei or is threatened by violation, is an 'aggrieved person'. The nght
to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or pcrsonall v
Jinked with the cause of ·action. The nexus between the /is and the plaintiff
need not necessarily be personal.
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## Text

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1072
MAHARAJ SINGH
•
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS
November 2, 1976
[H. R. KHANNA AND V. R. KRISHNA !YER, JJ.]
U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950-Section 117-Scope
of-State vests lands in Gaon Sabha-Suit for ejectment-Gaon Sabha did ••~t
appeal-State-If had locus standi.
Words & phrases-Vest-Person aggrie1·ed-Appurte11a11ce-Mea11i11g 'fl
By virtue of s. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act,
1950, the right, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate including hats, bazars and me/as stood terminated and vested absolutely in the State.
Section 9 provides that all wells, trees in abadi and all buildings situate within
the limits of an Estate, belonging to an intermediary, shall continue to belong
to or be held by such intermediary and the site of the buildings which is
appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government. Section 117 ( 1) empowers the State Government to
vest
lands
in
Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities. Under s. 117(6) the State
Government has power to resume from a Gaon Sabha the lands vested in it.
By a
notification under s. 117(1) the State Government vested the land in the village
in the Gaon Sabha.
On the estate in dispute, the defendant who was the quondam zamindar, had
been conducting a cattle fair.
The estate had on it, among others, a few structures. The plaintiffs' (the State and the Gaon Sabha) suit for ejectment of the
defendant from the estate was dismissed by the trial court.
Th~ Gaon Sabha,
however, did not appeal; but the State went in appeal to the High Court as 'a
person aggrieved'. The Rish Court negatived the defendant's contentions that
as a result of the notification under s. 117 ( 1) the land having vested in the
Gaon Sabha, the State Government had no locus standi and that it was not a
person aggrieved, but allowed the defendant to keep all the structures
and
a
space of 5 yards running round each building.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (1) The State has title to sustain the action in ejectment. The
Government, despite vesting the estates in Gaon Sabhas has, and continues to
have, a constant hold on these estates, when it chooses, to ta\ce away what it
had given possession of to a Gaon Sabha. This is plainly 'present legal interest'
in the Government and a sort of precarium
te11a11s in the Sabha. [1082 D;
1079 F-G]
(a) The Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari rights as part of land
reform. Instead of centralising management of all estates ~t State level, the
Act gives an enabling power to make over these states to Gaon Sabhas. Apart
from management, no power is expressly vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the
estates absolntely. If the State thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting
declaration or notification it can totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from
it, any estate. The vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting
in the
Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture
by
Government. Such a construction of vesting in two different senses in the· same
section is sound because the word 'vest' has many meanings. The sense of the
situation suggests that in s. 117 ( 1) 'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest in the Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as
it lasts.
To
postulate vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declaration under s. 117(1) is to stultify s. 117(6). [1081 A-C; F-G]
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MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTTAR PRADESH (Krishna Iyer, 1.)
1073
(b) The State is 'a person aggrieved'.
He, who has a
proprietary rii;ht,
A
which has beei or is threatened by violation, is an 'aggrieved person'. The nght
to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or pcrsonall v
Jinked with the cause of ·action. The nexus between the /is and the plaintiff
need not necessarily be personal.
A person aggrieved is an expression which has
expanded with the larger urgencies and felt necessities of our time. [1082 E-F]
(c) The amplitude of 'legal grievance' has broadened with social compulsions.
The State undertakes today activities whose beneficiaries may
be
the
genernl community even though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest
in the community.
The State starts welfare projects whose effective irnplementatio~ may call for collective action from the protected group or any member
of thei!t.
Test suits, class actions and representative litigation are the beginning
and the horizon is expanding with persons' and organisations
not personally
injured but vicariously concernecf oeing entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court for.-edressal of actual or imminent wrongs . .(1083 A-CJ
Dhabolkar [1976J 1 S.C.R. 306 followed.
'Locus standi' has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted,
individualistic jmisprudence of old. Therefore, the State, in the present case.
is entitled to appeal under s. 96 of the Ccxle of Civil Procedure. [I 084 DJ
·
(2) Where a wrong against community interest is done, 'no locus standi'
will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. In the instant case the Government is the 'aggrieved person'.
Its
right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised
in
public
interest will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested. The wholesome object of the
legislature of cautiously decentralised vesting of estates in loc~·l 5elf-governing
units will be frustrated, if the State is to be a helpless spectator of its purposeful
bounty being wasted or lost. [1083 H; 1084 A-BJ
(3 )(a) The touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the building on
what appertains to it for its use as a building.
Obviously the hat,
bazar,
or
me/a is not an appurtenance to the building.
Even if the buildings were used
and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela,
the land is not aopurtenant to the principal subject granted by s.
9,
namely,
buildings. [1085 GJ
(b) The larger objective of s. 9 is to settle with the former
only such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest
State for implementation of the agrarian reform policy. [1084 G]
intermediary
going to the
(c) The large open spaces cannot be regarded
as
appurtenant
to
the
terraces, stands and structures.
What a integral is not necessarily appurtrnant.
A position of subprdination, sometlting incidental or ancillary or dependent is
Implied in appurtenance.
Th3' much of space required for the
use
of the
structures as such has been excluded by the High Court itself.
Bevond
that
may or may not be gecessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of
the chabutras as such. [1085
B-Cl
( d) 'Appurtenance' in relation to a dwelling, includes all land occupied
therewith and used for the purroses thereof.
The word 'appurtenances' has a
distinct and definite meaning.
Prima facie it imports nothing more than what
is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant. What is
necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building,
such as easement, alone will be appurtenant. The word 'appurtenance<' include'
all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised .. such
as rights of wav, but does not include lands in addition to that granted. [1086
D-EJ
· (e) What the High Court has granted viz., 5 yards of surrounding space is
sound in law. [I 086 HJ
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1074
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1977] 1 s.c.R.
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CIVIL APPELLAT& JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1976 .
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Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
23-5-1975 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 392/
64.
Shanti Bhushan, V. P. Goel and Subodh Markendeya, for the
Appellant.
L. N. Sinha, Solicitor-General of India and 0. P. Rana, for
the
Respondent No. 1.
Bal Kishan Gaur and Amlan Ghosh, for Respondent No. 2. • •
Yogeshwar Prasad and Rani Arora, for Respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
•
KRISHNA IYER, J.-Two principal submissions, whose implications
perhaps are of profound moment and have public impact, have been,
at wide-ranging length, urged in this appeal by certificate, by Shri
Shanti Bhushan, for the appellant/defendant and, with effective brevity, controverted by the Solicitor General, for respondent/1st plaintiff.
The two focal points of the controversy are : (a) Is the appeal
to the High Court by the State/1st plaintiff at all competent, entitlement as a 'party aggrieved' being absent, having regard to the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
(U.P. Act 1 of 1951) (for short, the Act) ?; and (b) Is it sound to
conceptualise 'area appurtenant to buildings' in s. 9 of the Act so
narrowly as has been done by the High Court ? There were two
plaintiffs-the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Gaon Sabha of Bedpura
claiming common put alternative reliefs.
The suit was for injunction
or ejectment, on title, of the sole defendant who was the quondam
zamindar of the 'estate' which is the ·subject matter of the suit.
The
trial Court dismissed the suit whereupon the 2nd plaintiff dropped
out of the litigation, as it were, and the State alone pursued the matter
by way of appeal against the decree. The High Court partially allowed the appeal and the aggrieved defendant is the appellant before us.
An expose of the facts may now be given· to the extent necessary
for explaining the setting of the contention between the parties. 'J;he
State of Uttar Pradesh extinguished all zamindari estates by the Act
and implemented a scheme of settlement or lands with intermediaries,
tenants and others by first vesting all estates in the siate and empowering it to vest, divest and re-vest from time to time according to flexible
needs and ad hoc requirements, the same estate's in Gaon Sabhas or
other local authorities.
Settlement of trees,
buildings and other
specified items in the intermediaries was also part of the agrarian
reform.
A skeletal picture of the legislation may now be projected.
But, before that, a short sketch of the actual dispute may illumine the
further discussion.
The suit lands were part of an estate owned and possessed by the
defendant-zamindarini.
The statutory consequence of the abolition
of all zamindaris by force of s. 4 is spelt out in s. 6, to wit, the
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l\IAHARAJ SINGH v. UTTAR PRADESH (Krishna Iyer, J.)
1075
cesser of the ownership of the zamindar and vesting of title and possession in ihe State.
By a notification under s. 11 7 (1) of the Act the
area of lands was vested by the State in the 2nd plaintiff Gaon Sabha.
The legislative nullification notwithstanding, the defendant who had
been conducting a lucrative bi-weekly cattle fair, the best in the district, persisted in this profitable adventure strengthened by s. 9 of the
Act which settles in the intermediary all building's and area appurtenant
thereto. This resulted in possessory disputes between the Gaon Sabha
and the defendant-proceedings under s. 145 upholding the latter's
possession and the present suit for declaration of title· and con·sequential injunction or ejectment.
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Tfie estate, which is the· site of the rural cattle market, has a large
nullJ.ber of trees on it, a temple in one plot, a (veterinary ) clinic in
another and quite a number of cattle stands and other auxilliary structures which are facilities for the bovine display and transaction of
business.
Taking advantage of the provisions of the Act, the defendant successfully claimed before the High Court that the trees and
the two plots with the shrine and the oushadhalaya should be deemed
to have been settled with her. Her ambitious demand, based on some
provisions which we will presently Xcray more carefully, was that the
entire estate with all the buildings thereon wa·s enjoyed as a unum quid
and the vacant lands were as much necessary for the meaningful running of the cattle fair as the structures themselves.
To dissect and
detach the buildings from the vacant spaces was to destroy the func-
. tional wholeness of the service rendered.
In short, the large intervening areas surrounding the
ohabutras
and other edifices
were
essential adjuncts or appurtenant lands which, together in thejr original entirety, should be settled under s. 9 of the Act with the erstwhile
intermediary viz., the defendant. The High Court declined to go the
whole hog with the defendant but granted the plea to the limited
degree of giving all the structures and a space of 5 yards running
round each 'building'.
In the view of the Court hats, bazars, and
me/as could not be held by a private owner under the scheme of the
Act and reliance on the conduct of the cattle market as an indicator
of 'appurtenant' area was, therefore, impermissible.
The suit was
decreed pro tanto.
The Gaon Sabha, when defeated in the trial Court,
discreetly
stepped out of the risks•of an appeai but the Government, first plaintiff,. claiming to. be gravely aggrieved, challenged the dismissal of the
suit ahd was faced with the plea that the land having vested in the
Gaon Sabha, on the issue of the notification under s. 11 7 ( l) of the
Act, the State had no surviving interest in the property and', therefore,
forfeited the position of a 'person aggrieved', who alone could competently appeal against a decree.
This contention, negatived
by the
High Court, has been reiterated before us with resourceful embellishments and that, logically, is the first question of law falling for our
decision and is the piece de resistance,
if we may say so, in this
appeal. If the 1st plaintiff's entire interests, by subsequent plenary
vesting in the 2nd plaintiff, have perished, the former cannot, as of
right, appeal under s. 96 C.P.C. Survival after death is unknown to
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1076
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 s.c.R.
real property law and suits, without at \east apprehended miury, are
beyond the ken of the procedural law.
To put it in a nutsl!el;, has
the State current intere·st in the estate, sufficient to sustain an appeal ?
The anatomy of the Act, so far as this dispute is concerned, needs
to be· set out and alongside thereof, the exercises in statutory construction necessary to resolve the two legal dispute·s.
The Act had for its
primary object, as testified by its Preamble, the extinction of intermediary rights viz., zamindaris and the like.
The goal of the legislation must make its presence felt while the judicial choice of meanings
of words of ambiguous import or plurality of significations is made.
Section 4 is the foundational provision, the very title deed of the Sta~~
and it runs, to read :
"s. 4. Vesting of estates in the State.-
( 1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this
Act, the State Government may, by
notification,
declare
that, as from a date to be specified, all estate situate in the
Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified (herinafter called the date of
vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest
except as hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances.
(2) It shall be lawful for the State Government, if it so
considers necessary, to issue, from time to time, the notification referred to in sub-section ( 1) in respect only of such
area or areas as may be specified and all the provisions of
sub-section ( 1), shall be applicable to and in the case of
every such notification."
•
Section 6 sets out the legal consequences of such vesting more specifically.
We may extract the provision :
''6. Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State.-
When the notification under section 4 has been published ·
in the Gazet_te then, notwithstanding anything contained in
any contract or document or in any other law for the time
being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the begining of the date of vesting, ensue in the" area to which the
notification relates, namely-
•
(a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries-
(i) in every estate in such area including land ( cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests whether
within or
outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village
abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and melas
other than hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which
Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 apply,
and
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MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTTAR PRADESH· (Krishna Iyer, .T.)
1077
(i~) in all sub-soil in such estate's including rights, if any
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in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not;
shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free
from all ~ncumbrances;
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Reading the two sister sections together, certain clear conclusions
emerge.
Emphatically, three things happened on the coming into
force of the Act. By virtue of ·s. 4 the right, title and interest of all
in~ime<liaries in every estate, including lwts, bazars and me/as, stood
terminated. Secondly, this whole bundle of interests came to be vested
in the State, free from all encumbrances, the quality of the vesting
being •absolute.
Thirdly, one and only one species of property in
lzats, bazars and me/as was expressly exclu<led from the total vesting
of estates in the State, viz., such as had been held on lands to which
s. 18 (1) la) to ( c) applied.
Section 9, at this stage, needs to be
read since it is geared to the nationalisation of zamindaris by providing
for settlement, under the State, of some kinds of landed interests in
existing owners or occupiers.
Section 9 states :
"Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings to be settled
with the existing owners or occupiers thereof.-
All wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situate within
the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person, whether residing in the
village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such
intermediary, tenant or persons, as the case may be, and
the site· of the wells or the buildings which are appurtenant
thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State
Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed "
A close-up of this section is called for since the basic plank of the
defendant'& case is the claim to the whole set of plots as building and
appurtenant area of land statutorily settled ~ith her. If she is such a
settlee, the substantive nierit of the plaintiff's title fails.
We will
examine this aspect after tt survey of the sections relevant to the locus
standi of the State is done .
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So we shift to Chapter VII which relates to Gaon Sabhas vesting
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by the State of resumed estates in them and the limitations and other
conditions to which it is subject.
Attributed legal personality by
s.3, the Gaon Sabhas are bodies corporate which, under th~ various
provisions of Chapter VII, have been invested
with legal
viability
right to own and hold property, to transfer and otherwise deal with
movables and immovables and manage their landed assets through
the executive
agency of Land Management Committees. This
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comprehensive proprietary personality of the Sabha is indisputable
but unhelpful for our purpose.
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1078
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 s.c.R.
The controversy before us comes into focus when we read s. 11 7 ( 1),
(2) and (6), all the limbs being taken as belonging to•a legally
living corporate body. Section 117, els. (1) and (2), provide:
"117. Vesting of certain land:; etc., in Gaon Shabhas
and other local authorities.-
( 1) At any time after the publication of the notification·
referred to in Section 4, the State Government may, by
general or special order to be
published in. the manner
prescribed, declare that as from a date to be specified in
th:is behalf, all or any of the following things, namely- • •
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(v) hats, bazafS! and melas except hats, bazars, and
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melas held on land to which the provisions of clauses (a}
to (c) of sub-section (1) of ~ectirn1 18 apply or on sites and
areas referred to in section 9, and
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which had v~sted in the State under this Act shall vest in
the Gaon Sabhas or and other local authoritv established
tor the whole or part of the village in which the said things
are situate, or partly in one such local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) and partly in another:
Provided that it shall be lawful for the State Gov•.wnment to ;nake the declaration aforesaid
subject to such
exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notification.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or ·
in any other law for the time
being in force,
the State
Government may, by general or special order to
be published in the manner prescribed in the Gazette, declare that
as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or any of
the thmgs specified in clauses (i) to (vi) 0f mh-F.ection (1)
which alter their vesting in the State under this Act had
been vested in a Gaon Sabha or any ilther local authority,
either under this Act or under section 126 of the Uttar
Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 \(J.P. Act II
of 1959) shall vest in any other ·local authority (including a
Gaon Sabha) established for the whnle or part of the village
in which the said things are situated."
· · ·
Section 117 ( 6) injects a precarious does into the system of estates
vested in Gaon Sabhas by sub-s. ( 1) and goes on to state:
"117(6). The State Government may, at any time, by
general or special order to be. published
in the manner
prescribed, amend or cancel any declaration or notification
made in respect of any of the
things aforesaid,
whether
...
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MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTT AR PRADESH (Krishna Iyer, J.)
. I 0 79
generally or in the case of any Gaon Sabha or other local
auth~ity, and resume such thing and whenever the State
Government so resumes any such thing, the Gaon Sabha or
other· local authority, as the case may be, shall be entitled
to receive and be paid compensation on account only of the
development, if any, effected by it in or over that thing:
Provided that the State Government may, after
such
resumption, make a fresh declaration under sub-section ( 1)
or sub-section (2) vesting the thing resumed in the same
or any other local authority (including a
Gaon Sabha)
••and the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) as the
case may be, shall mutatis mutandis, apply to such decljration.
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Before moving further, we may glance at a group of sections
which have more than peripheral impact on the legal equation between Government and Sabha vis a vis estates vested in the latter by
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the former.
Section 119 carves out a power for the State Government to take away hats, bazars and melas vested in a Gaon Sabha
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and transfer them to a zilla parishad or other authority.
Sections
122A and 122B create and regulate the Land Management Committee which is to administer the estates vested in the Sabha
and
s. 126, quite importantly, gives the power to the State Government
to issue orders and directions to the Management Committee.
Pausing here for an instant, let us look back on the status
of
the State which, through its Executive branch, vests a resumed estate
in a Gaon Sabha, retaining power, at any time, and without conditions or even compensation (save for actual developmental work
done), to divest the land so vested and make it over to another like
local authority. , In such a situation where the State remains
the
legal master with absolute powers' of disposition over the land vested
pro tempore in a particular Gaon Sabha, can it be postulated that
it has no legal interest in the preservation of that over which it has
continuous power of operation, creation and deprivation?
Government, despite vesting estates in Gaon Sabhas
on the wholesome
political principle of decentralisation and local self-government, has
and continues to have a constant hold on these estates, may be like
a brooding: omnipotence descending, when it chooses, to take away
what it had giveb. possession of to a Sabha.
This is plainly present legal interest in Government and a sort of precarium tenans in
the Sabha, notwithstanding the illusory expression 'vesting' which may
mislead one· into the impression that an
absolute and permanent
ownership has been created.
An overview of these legal prescriptions
makes one
sceptical
about the statutory ideology of autonomous village self-government
since, so far as estates are concerned, these Sabhas have been handcuffed and thrown at the mercy or mood of the State Government.
The pragmatics of the Act has reduced Gaon Sabhas to obedient
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holders, for the nonce, of .the limited bounty of estates vested in them
-a formal, fickle, homage to Art. 40 of the Constitution !.
Shri Shanti Bhushan did draw our attention to certain cousin
statutes and other remotely related provisions but the soul of his submission does not suffer by their omission in the discussion.
We pass
on to the spinal issues agitated before us.
Locus standi
The .estates first vest in the State.
The fulfilment of th-: purpose of
the Act, the setting in which the corner-stone for the statutory edifice
is laid and the categorical language used, especially 'free fro!lf •an
encumbrances', leave no doubt in our minds, nor was it disputed
before us, that this initial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the
scheme of abolition.
The consequence of vesting articulated iry s. 6
only underscore this conclusion.
What next ensues, when the State Government, · acting under
s.117(1), notifies a further vesting in a Gaon Sabha is the cardinal
question.
Does the State retain a residuary legal interest, sufficient
to make it a 'person aggrieved', competent to challenge in appeal an
adverse decree?
And can the State canvas fpr the po'>ition that a
proprietary right persists in it albeit its act of vesting the same estate
earlier in a local authority?
Does the key word 'vest' connote and
denote divergent t11ings in ilie same section and Act vis a vis Government and the Gaon Sabha? Had drafting skills been better, ·this unlovely ambiguity could have been avoided.
But courts have
no
choice but to take the text as it is.
Zeroing in on the relevant provisions, we are inclined to concur with the High Court.
With certitude one may assert that the State has that minimal interest to follow
the proprietary fortunes of the estate so as to entitle it to take legal
action to interdict its getting into alien hands.
The legislative project and the legal engineering visualised
by
the Act are clear and ilie semantics of the words used in the provisions
must bend, if iliey can, to subserve tllem.
To he literal or be
blinkered by some rigid canon of construction may be to miss the
life of the law itself.
Strengili may be derived for this interpretative
stand from the observation in a recent jud~ent of this Court(l)
"A word can have many meanings.
To find J}ut the exact
connotation of a word in a, statute, we must look to the
context in which it is used.
The context would quite often
provide the key to meaning of the word and the sense it
should carry.
Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to the int<"ntion of the lecisfature in using it.
A word, as said by Holmes, is not a crystal,
transparent
and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary !!featlv in colour an<l content acconling to the circumstances and ilie time in which it is used."
(I) Thiru Manickaru & Co. v. The State of,Tamil Nadu.
[1977] l S.C.R. 950,
)
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MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTTAR PRADESH (Krishna Iyer, J.)
1081
In the instant case the Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari
rights ~s part of land reform.
However, instead of
centralising
management of all estates at State level, to stimulate local self-government, the Act gives an enabling power-not obligatory duty-to make
over these estates to Gaon Sabhas which, so long as they are
in
their hands
will look after them· through management committees
which will be under the statutory control of Gove~mnent tinder s.126.
Apart from management, no power is expressly vested in the Sabhas
to dispo~e of the estates absolutely.
The fact that as a bcdy' cor-
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porate it can own and sell property does not mean that the estates
vested in a Sabha can be finally sold away, iw the teeth of the provi:llons striking a contrary note.
For, unde~ s.117(6), if, for any
·reasons of better management or other, the State (Government is
but the operational arm of the State and cannot, as contended. be
delinked as a separate entity, in this context)-the State thinks fit to
:amend or cancel the earlier vesting declaration or notificatiq11, it c::m
totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any estate.
This
plenary power to emasculate or extinguish the Sabha's right to the
estate is tell-tale.
True, this cut-back on the amplitude of the vest-
:ing is not an incident of the estate created but is provided for by the
Act itself.
Even so, we; have to envision, in
terms of realty law,
what are the nature and incidents of the interest vested in the Sabha-
:full ownership divestible under no circumstances or partial estate with
the paramount interest stiU surviving in praesenti in the State?
It is reasonable to harmonii<:e the statutory provisions to reach a
solution which will be least incongruous with legal rights we
are
cognisant of in current jurisprudence. Novelty is not a favoured child of
the law.
So it 1s right to fix the estate created by s. 117 into familiar
moulds if any.
Such an approach lends to
the position that the
veJSting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was
limited to possession and management subject to divestiture
by
Government
Is sueh a construction of 'vesting' in two differ~nt
senses in the ~ame section, sound ? Yes. It is, because 'vesting' is a
word of slippery import and has many meanings.
The
context
controls the text and the purpose and scheme Project the particular
-semantic shade or nuance of meaning.
That is why even definition
clauses allow themselves to be modified by contextual compulsions.
·so the sense of the situation suggests that in s.117 ( 1) of the Act
'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest
jn the Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition ·confined to the
right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts.
Lexicographic support is forthcoming, for this meaning.
Black's Law DieA
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tionary gives as the sense of 'to vest' as 'to give an imrnedi~te fixed
right of present or future enjoyment, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an estate, to give seisin'.
Webster's
III International Dictionary gives the meaning as 'to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or furture enjoyment'.
The High Court has sought some Engilsh judicial
backing(!)
for taking liberties with strict and pedantic construction.
A ruling
of this Court(2) has been aptly pressed into service.
There is thus authority for the position that the expression 've~~
is of fluid or flexible content and can if the context so dictates, bear
the limited sense of being in possession and enjoyment.
Indeed, to
postulate vesting of absolute title in the G:j.on Sabha by virtuee of
the declaration under s.117 (1) of the Act is to stultify s.117 ( 6). Not
that the legislature cannot create a right to divest what has
been
completely vested but that an explanation of the term 'vesting' which
will rationalise and integrate the initial vesting and the subsequent
resumption is preferable, more plausible and better fulfils the purpose
of the Act.
We hold that the State has title to sustain he acion in
ejectment.
Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the view that the 1st
plaintiff is a person. aggrieved and has the competence to carry an
appeal against the dismissal of the suit.
Of course, he who has a
proprietary right, which has been or is threatened to be violated, is
surely an 'aggrieved person'.
A legal injury
creates
a remedial
right in the injured person.
But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protection of defence
or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation
for a civil wrong, even if they are .not proprietarily or personally
linked with the cause of action.
The nexus between the Us and the
plaintiff need not necessarily be personal although it has to be more
than a wayfarer's allergy to an unpalatable
episo<le.
'A person
aggrieved' is an expression which has expanded with the larger
urgencies and felt necessities of our times.
Processual jurisprudence is not too jejune to respond to societal changes and challenges:
"Law necessarily has to carry within it the impress of the
past traditions, the capacity to respond tt> the needs of the
present and enough resilience to cope with the d;mands of
. the future.
A code of law, especially in the social fields,
is not a document for fastidious dialectics; properly drafted
and rightly implemented it can be the means of the ordering of the life of a people."(3)
(I) Richardson ,v. Robertson (1862) 6 LR 75; & .Hiride v. Chorlton (1866) 2 CP
104, 116.
(2) Fruit & Vegetable Merchant's Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR
1957 SC 344.
(3) Address by-Khanna J. at the Birth Centenary of Sir Tei Bahaclur
Sapru d/16-10-76 at Allahabad.
/
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MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTT AR PRADESH (Krishna Iyer, !.)
I 0 83
The.classical concept of a 'person aggrieved'
is delineated in
Re : Sidebotham ex p. Sidebotham (1880 14 Ch.D. 258).
But
the amplitude of 'legal grievance' has broadened with social compulsions.
The State undertakes today activities whose benefioiaries
may bci the general community even though the legal right to
the
undertaking may not vest in the community.
The State starts welfare projects whose
effective implementation may call for collective
action from the protected group or any member of them.
New
movements like consumerism, new people's organs like harijan
or
mahila samajams or labour unions, new protective institutions like
!~~al aid societies operate on the socio-legal plane, not to beat 'their
golden wings in the void' but to intervene on behalf of the weaker
classis.
Such burgeoning of collective social action has, in turn,
generated gradual processual adaptations.
Test ~uits, class actions
and representative ~itigation · are the beginning 1nd the horizon
is
expending, with persons and organisations not personally injured but
vicariously concerned being entitled to invoke the jurisdiction
of
the court for redressal of actual or imminent wrongs.
In this wider perspective, who is a 'person aggrieved"?
Dhabolkar
( 1974 1 SCR 306) gives the updated answer :
"The test is whether the words 'perso_n aggrieved' include
'a person who has a genuine grievance because an order
has been made which prejudicially affects his interests'."
(p. 315)
"American · jurisprudence has recognised, fqr instance, the
expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer organisations to initiate
or intervene in actions,
although by the narrow rule of
'locu~ standi', such a course could not have been justified
(see p. 807-New York University Law Review, Vol. 46,
1971).
In fact, citizen organisations have recently been
compaigning for using legal actions for protection of community interest, broadening the scope of 'standing' in legal
proceedings (see p. 403-Boston University Law Review,
Vol.51, 1971).
In the well-known c~se of Attorney-General of the Gambia
v. Peirra Sarr N. 'lie 1961 A.C. 617), Lord Denning observed about th~ Attorney-General's standing thus :
" .... The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and
should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They
do not include, ofl course, a 11).ere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an
order) has
been made which
prejudicially
affects
his
interests." (p. 324-325)
Where a wrong against community interest is done
'no locus
standi' will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested' public body
chasing the wrong-doer in court.
In the case before us, GovernA
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ment, in the spacious
sens~ of 'person aggrieved' is comfortably
placed.
Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, mea9nt to be
exercised in public interest, will be seriously jeopardised if the estate
slips into the hands o~ a trespasser.
1'he estate belonged to the
State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the
Land Management
Committee and is liable to be divested without ado any time.
The
wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decentralised Yesting of estates in local self-governing units will be frustrated, if the
State, the watchdog of the whole project, is to be a helpless. spectator
of its purposeful bounty being wasted or lost.
It must act, out d
fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to salvage
public property for public use.
Long argument is otiose to make
out a legal grievance in such a situation of peril and, after all, • the
star of processual actions pro bona publico has to be on the ascendant in a society where supineness must be substituted by activism
if the dynamic rule of law is to fulfil itself.
'Locus standi' has a
larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted,
individualistic jurisprudence of old.
The legal dogmas of the quiet past
are no longer' adequate to assail the social injustices of the stormy
present.
Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled
to
appeal under s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Th~ second, and from a practical point of view equally potent
ground of defence, is that 'appurtenant' space envelops the whole
area around the buildings and the suit for
recovery of possession
deserves to be dismised in toto.
Let us examine this submission.
Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to
settle (indeed, it is
deemed to be settled) with the intermediary certain items in the
estate.
That provision has been set out earlier.
The short enquiry
is whether the entire land is 'appurtenant' to the buildings.
The
contention of the defendant flows along these lines.
The structures
accepted by the High Court as 'buildings' within the scope of s. 9
were part of a cattle fair complex.
Even the mandir and the
oushadalya fitted in to the hat total and the integrity of the whole
could not be broken up without violating the long years of common
enjoyment.
It would also be, a double injury: (a) to the defendant;
and (b) to the community.