# MAHARAJA PRAVIR CHANDRA BHANJ DEO I960 KAKATIYA November rB v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 501
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 198 of 1954
- **Bench:** J Afer Imam, J. L. Kapur, K. c. DAS GUPTA, RAGHUBAR DAYAL a.nd N. RAJAGOPALA AY7ANGAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/maharaja-pravir-chandra-bhanj-deo-i960-kakatiya-november-rb-v-the-state-of-1970
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

"Ruler"-Recognition by President-Whether ex-Ruler for
purposes outside the Constitution-Maufidar, Meaning of-Constitution of India, Art. 366(22)-Madliya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, z950 (M. P. I
of z95z), s. 2(m).
The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster which
was later integrated with the State of Madhya Pradesh. He was
recognised by the President as a Ruler under Art. 366(22) of the
Constitution. The respondent resumed certain lands belonging
.to the appellant under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950.
The appellant contended that he was still a Ruler and not an
ex-Ruler and as such did not come within the definition of "proprietor" given in the Act.
Held, that the appellant was an ex-Ruler for the purposes
of the Act and was within the class of persons who were by
name included in the definition of 'proprietor' and was within
the scope of the Act. Factually the appellant was an ex-Ruler.
He was a Ruler for the purposes of the privy purse guaranteed
to him.
There was nothing .in Art. 366(22) which required a
court to treat such a person as a Ruler for purposes outside the
Constitution. Further, the appellant was also a maufidar in
respect of the lands acquired which were exempt from the payment of rent or tax. The expression "maufidar" was not necessarily confined to a grantee from a State or a Ruler of a State;
he could be the holder of land which was exempted from payment of rent or tax.

## Text

I
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
MAHARAJA PRAVIR CHANDRA BHANJ DEO
I960
KAKATIYA
November rB.
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(J AFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. c. DAS GUPTA,
RAGHUBAR DAYAL a.nd
N. RAJAGOPALA AY7ANGAR, JJ.)
"Ruler"-Recognition by President-Whether ex-Ruler for
purposes outside the Constitution-Maufidar, Meaning of-Constitution of India, Art. 366(22)-Madliya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, z950 (M. P. I
of z95z), s. 2(m).
The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster which
was later integrated with the State of Madhya Pradesh. He was
recognised by the President as a Ruler under Art. 366(22) of the
Constitution. The respondent resumed certain lands belonging
.to the appellant under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950.
The appellant contended that he was still a Ruler and not an
ex-Ruler and as such did not come within the definition of "proprietor" given in the Act.
Held, that the appellant was an ex-Ruler for the purposes
of the Act and was within the class of persons who were by
name included in the definition of 'proprietor' and was within
the scope of the Act. Factually the appellant was an ex-Ruler.
He was a Ruler for the purposes of the privy purse guaranteed
to him.
There was nothing .in Art. 366(22) which required a
court to treat such a person as a Ruler for purposes outside the
Constitution. Further, the appellant was also a maufidar in
respect of the lands acquired which were exempt from the payment of rent or tax. The expression "maufidar" was not necessarily confined to a grantee from a State or a Ruler of a State;
he could be the holder of land which was exempted from payment of rent or tax.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
198 of 1954.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October
16, 1952, of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc.
Petn. No. 1231 of 1951.
M. S. K. Sastri, for the a.ppella.nt.
H. L. KhasMam, B. K. B. Naidu a.nd I. N. Shroff,
for the respondent.
-
64
502
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
1960. November 18.
The Judgment of the Court
Maha..aja Pravir was delivered by
Chandra Bhan)
IMAM, J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of
Deo Kakatiya the Nagpur High Court dismissing the appellant's
Th ;·
1
petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
Mad:ya'~'.:a:esh India. The High Court certified under Art. 132(1) of
·
_
the Constitution that the case involved a substantial
Imam J.
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Hence the present appeal.
The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster.
After the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947,
the appellant executed an Instrument of Accession to
the Dominion of India on August 14, 1947. Thereafter, he entered into an agreement with the Dominion of India popularly known as "The Stand Still
Agreement". On December 15, 1947, he entered into
an agreement with the Government of India whereby
he ceded the State of Baster to the Government of
India to be integrated with the Central Provinces and
Berar (now the State of Madhya Pradesh) in such
manner as the Government of India thought fit. Consequently the Governments in India came to have
exclusive and plenary authority, jurisdiction and powers over the Baster State with effect from January 1,
1948.
The Legislature of the State of Madhya Pradesh
passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary
Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950
(Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951), hereinafter referred
to as the Act, which received the assent of the President of India on January 22, 1951. The preamble of
the Act stated that it was one to provide for the
acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated lands in Madhya
Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters
connected therewith. Under s. 3 of the Act, vesting
of proprietary rights in the State Government takes
place on certain conditions, mentioned in that section,
being complied with. The definition of 'proprietor'
is stated in s. 2 cl. (m) and it is
"in relation to-
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
(i) the Central Provinces, includes an inferior
1960
proprietor, a protected thekailar or other thekai1ar, or
-.-
.
protected headman;
Mahara1a Prav~r
( .. ) h
d t
•t .
,£.3-
•
Chandra BhanJ
u t e merge
err1 ones, means a mauJ"TM"r inDea Kakatiya
eluding an ex-Ruler of an Indian State merged with
v.
1 Madhya Pradesh, a Zamindar, Ilaq_uedar, Khorposhdar
1"he stats of
or Jagirilar within the meaning of wajib-ul-arz, or any Madhya Pradesh
sana.d, deed or other instrument, and a gaontia or a
thekadar of a village in respect of which by or under
the provisions contained in the wajib-ul-arz applicable to such village the maufiilar, the gaontia, or the
thekadar, as the case may be, has a right to recover
rent or revenue from persons holding land in such
village;".
The definition of 'mahal' is stated in s. 2(j) and it is
" "ma.ha.I", in relation to merged territories, means
any area other than land in possession of a raiyat
which has been separately assessed to land revenue,
whether such land revenue be payable or has been
released, compounded for or redeemed in whole or in
part;".
·
Before the High Court the appellant contended that
he was still a Sovereign Ruler and absolute owner of
the villages specified in Schedules A and B of his petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. He
urged that his rights had been recognized and guaranteed under the agreements entered into by him with
the Government of India. The provisions of the Act,
therefore, did not apply to him. It was further contended that the provisions of the Act did not apply to
a Ruler or to the private property of a Ruler which
was not assessed to land revenue. He relied on Art. 6
of the Instrument of Accession and the first paragraph of Art. 3 of the Merger Agreement. The High
Court held that if the petitioner's rights under Art. 6
of the Instrument of Accession and Art. 3 of the
Merger Agreement had been infringed it was clear
from the provisions ·9£ Art. 363 of the Constitution
that interference by the courts was barred in disputes
arising out of these two instruments. The High Court
was also of the opinion that Art. 362 of the Constitution wa.s of no assistance to the a"{lpellant.
Imam].
504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
z96o
After referring to the definition of the word 'proM
-.
. prietor' in the Act, the High Court was of the opinion
ahara1a Prav" h
h
d ,
fid
.
Chandra Bhan· t at t e wor
man
ar' ms. 2(m) of the Act had not
Deo Kal•atiy~ been used in any narrow or technical sense. A 'maufiv.
dar' was not only a person to whom a grant of maufi
Th• s1a1e of lands had been made but was also one who held land
Madhya Prad,sh which was exempt from the payment of "rent or tax".
Im-;;;;;.f.
It accordingly rejected the contention on behalf of the
appellant that the word 'maufidar' is necessarily confined to a grantee from the State or Ruler and therefore a Ruler could not conceiva.bly be a maujidar. The
High Court also rejected the contention on behalf of
the appellant that as he was a "Ruler" within the
meaning of that expression in Art. 366(22) of the Constitution he did not come within the expression 'exRuler' as contained in the definition of the word 'proprietor' in the Act. The expression 'Ruler' as defined
in Art. 366(22) of the Constitution applied only for
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. The
expression 'ex-Ruler' given in the Act must therefore
be given the ordinary dictionary meaning. According
to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 'Ruler' means
"one who, or that which, exercises rule, especially of
a supreme or sovereign kind. One who has control,
management, or headship within some limited sphere".
The High Court accordingly took the view that '"1though the appellant did exercise such a rule in the
past he ceased to exercise it in his former Domain
after the agreements of accession and merger had
come into operation. Accordingly the appellant must
be regarded as an ex-Ruler and as he was also a
maujidar he fell within the definition of the word 'proprietor' in the Act.
The question whether the villages mentioned in
Schedules A and B of the petition under Arts. 226 and
227 of the Constitution fell in any of the categories,
"Estates, Maha.ls, Alienated lands", was also considered by the High Court. In its opinion they did not
fall within the category of Estates or Alienated lands
but they did fall within the category of Mahals.
According to the definition of 'Mahal' in s. 2(j) of the
Act the same must be separately assessed to land
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
revenue. .According to the appellant they had not
z96o
been assessed to land revenue but this was denied on 111 h -.-P
.
behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The High c~a:~;; B;::;r
Court was of the opinion that in these circumstances it Deo Kakatiya
was for the appellant to establish that the villages in
v.
question had never been assessed to lan,d revenue but
The State of
no evidence ·had been led to this effect. On the conMadhya Pradesh
trary, according to -the High Court, it would appear
from the documents on the re.cord that the villages
known as 'Bhandar villages' had been assessed to land
revenue. .As the rest of the villages in Schedule A and
the villages in Schedule B, upto the date of the High
Court iudgment, had not been recognized as the private property of the appellant by the Government of
India as required by the second and third paragraphs
of the Merger Agreement, the appellant could not
assert his ownership over them. The High Court,
accordingly, dismissed his petition under Arts. 226 and
227 of the Constitution;
Two questions in the main were urged before us (1)
whether the appellant is a proprietor within the meaning of that expression in the Act and (2) whether the
villages in question came within the definitiop. of the
word 'mahal' contained in the .Act. On behalf of the
appellant it had also been urged that the Act could
not defeat the rights of the appellant guaranteed
under .Art. 3 of the Merger .Agreement. It seems clear
to us, however, that in view of the provisions of .Art.
363(1) of the Constitution any dispute arising out of
the Merger .Agreement or the Instrument of .Accession
is beyond the competence of the courts to enquire into.
The High Court rightly decided this point against the
appellant.
With reference to the first point we would first consider whether the appellant is an ex-Ruler for the
purposes of the Act. That he is so factually cannot
be denied, since he ceded his State to the Government
of India to be integrated with the Cel)tral Provinces
and Berar (now the State of Madhya Pradesh)' in such
manner as the Government of India thought fit.
He
further ceded to the Government of India full and
exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers in relation
Ima"' ].
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
<96o
to the governance of his State when he agreed that
M h -:-P
. the administration of that State would be transferred
a ara;a
ravir
h G
f I d"
f
J
9
Chand•• Bhanj to t e
overnment o
n ia as rom anuary 1, 1 48.
Deo Kakatiya The question is whether bis recognition for the purv.
poses of the Constitution as Ruler by virtue of the
The State of
provisions of Art. 366(22) of the Constitution of India
Madhya PYOdesh continues his status as a Ruler for purposes other than
Im-;;;;; J.
the Constitution. Art. 366(22) states:
" "Ruler" in relation/to an Indian State means the
Prince, Chief or other person by whom any such
covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of
article 291 was entered into and who for the time being
is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the
State, and includes any person who for the time being
is recognised by the President as the successor of such
Ruler".
Article 291 refers to the privy purse payable to Rulers.
It states:
"Where under any covenant or agreement entered
into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commenc~ment of this Constitution, the payment of any
sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed or assured by
the Government of the Dominion of India to any
Ruler of such State as privy purse-
(a) such sums shall be charged on, and paid out
of, the Consolidated Fund of India; and
(b) the sums so paid to any Rulei: shall be exempt
from all taxes on income."
Article 291 refers to any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the
commencement of the Constitution. The covenant or
agreement referred to in this Article certainly includes
the Instrument of Accession and the Merger Agreement. The effect of the Merger Agreement is clearly
one by which factually a Ruler of an Indian State
ceases to be a Ruler but for the purposes of the Constitution and for the purposes of the privy purse
guaranteed, he is a Ruler as defined in Art. 366(22) of
the Constitution. There is nothing in the provisions of
Art. 366(22) which requires a court to recognise such
a person as a Ruler for purposes outside the Constitu.
tion. In our opinion, the High Court rightly held that
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
the appellant was an ex-Ruler and that Art. 366(22)
of the Constitution did not make him a Ruler for the Maharaja Pravir
purposes of the Act. As the appellant was an 'exChandra Bhanj
Ruler', he was within the class of persons who were
Deo Kaka"ya
by name specifically included in the definition of 'proT
;·
1
prietor' and therefore cleai'ly within the scop~ of the Ma!~ya'~;a~esh
Act.
That the appellant was not only an ex-Ruler but
a maufidar appears to us to be clear. The ordinary
dictionary meaning of maufi is "Released, . exempted,
exempt from the payment of rent or tax, rent free"
and maufidar is "A holder of rent-free land, a grantee". It was common ground in the High Court that
the villages in question were exempt from the payment of rent or tax. In our opinion, the High Court
rightly took the view that the expression• 'maufidar'
was not necessarily confined to a grantee from a State
or a Ruler of a State. A.maufidar could be· a perso1.1
who was the holder of land which was exempted from
the payment of rent or tax. In our opinion, the
appellant certainly came within the expression 'maufidar' besides being an 'ex-Ruler' of an Indian State
merged with Madhya Pradesh.
It is, however,. contended on behalf of the appellant that the most important part of the definition
was the conclu~ing portion where it was stated that
in the case of a maufidar he must be .a person who by
or under the provisions contained in the wajib-ul-arz
applicable to his village, had the right to recover rent
or revenue from persons holding land in such village.
It was contended that even if the appellant was a
maufidar, there was nothing to show that with reference to any village held by him it was entered in the
wajib-ul-arz, that he had a right to recover rent or
revenue from persons holding land in such vmage. In
the petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, filed by the appellant in the High Court, it was
nowhere asserted that even· if he was regarded as a
maufidar it was not entered in the wajib-ul-arz with
respect to any of his maufi villages that he had. a
right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding
land in such villages. From the judgment of the High
Imam].
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
'96°
Court it would appear that no such argument was
M h
. P
. advanced before it. In the application for a certificate
a araJa
ravir
d
A
f
.
.
Chand.a Bhanj un e~ . rt. 13~(1) o the Const1tut10n we can find no
Dea Kakatiya ment10n of this. In the statement of the case filed in
v.
this Court also there is no mentfon of this fact. There
The State oJ
is thus no material on the record to establish that the
Madhya Pradesh appellant as a maufidar had no right to recover rent
Im:;: J.
or revenue from persons holding land in his villages.
The burden was on the appellant to prove this fact
which he never attempted to discharge. It is impossible therefore to accept this contention on behalf of
the appellant raised for the first time 'before us in the
course of the submissions made on behalf of the
appellant.
Regarding the second point arising oμt of the definition of 'Mahal', the High Court definitely found that
the petitioner had given no evidence to establish that
the villages in question were not assessed to land
revenue. On the contrary, at least with reference to the
Bhandar villages documents on the record showed that
these villages had been assessed to land revenue.
Since it was a question of fact whether the villages
had been assessed to land revenue, which was denied
on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh, the High
Court rightly held that the contention of the appellant in this respect could not. be accepted. As for the
other villages, in Schedules A and B of the petition of
the appellant under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court, in our opinion, rightly held that
the petition was not maintainable as these villages
had not yet been recognised by the Government of
India as the private property of the appellant.
In our opinion, the appeal accordingly fails and is
dismissed with costs.
Appeal dism.issed.
I