# MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

- **Citation:** [2016] 4 S.C.R. 184
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2016
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 63 of2006
- **Bench:** Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph, Adarsh Kumar Goel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mahipal-singh-rana-advocate-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-31275
- **Pages:** 41

## Headnote

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s. 19 -Advocates Act, 1961
- ss. 24A, 38 - Contempt of court - Advocate intimidated and
threatened a civil judge on two dates - High Court found him guilty
of contempt of court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for
two months - Direction to State Bar Council to initiate appropriate
proceedings against the advocate for professional misconduct -
However, nothing done by Bar Council for few years - Interference
with the order passed by the High Court - Held: In view of the
inaction of the Bar Council, this Court has to exercise appellate
;urisdiction under the Advocates Act in view of proved misconduct
calling for disciplinary action - This Court can exercise suo motu
powers for punishing the contemnor for professional misconduct -
It is also permissible for High Court u/Art. 226 in appropriate cases
on failure of the Bar Council to take action after its attention is
invited to the misconduct - Further, section 24A which debars a
convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate on the
rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if convicted for
contempt - In addition thereto, unless a person purges himself of
contempt or is permitted by the Court, conviction results in debarring
an advocate from appearing in court even in absence of suspension
or termination of the licence to practice - Thus, the conviction of
the advocate is justified - However, sentence of imprisonment
awarded to the appellant is set aside in view of his advanced age -
Direction that the appellant would not be permitted to appear in
courts in District Etah until he purges himself of contempt is upheld
- Under s. 24A, the enrollment of the appellant would stand
suspended for two years from the date of this order -As a disciplinary
measure for proved misconduct, the licence of the advocate to remain
suspended for further five years - Constitution of India - Art. 226.
184
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH
Judicial notice - Urgent need to review - Provisions of the
Advocates Act dealing with regulatory mechanism for the legal
profession and other incidental issues - s. 24A which debars a
convicted person fro111 being enrolled applies to an advocate on the
rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if convicted for
conte111pt and that a person convicted of even a most heinous offence
is eligible to be enrolled as an advocate after expiry of two years
from expiry of his sentence - Need to make suitable a111endments -
In view thereof, the Law Com111issio11 of India to go into all relevant
aspects relating to regulation of legal profession in consultation
with all concerned - Government of India to take appropriate steps
in [i,;ht of_the report.
-
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The conviction of the appellant is justified and is
upheld. The sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant
is set aside in view of his advanced age but sentence of fine and
default sentence are upheld. Further direction that the appellant
would not be permitted to appear in courts in District Etah until
he purges himself of contempt is also upheld. Under Section 24A
of the Advocates Act, the enrollment of the appellant would stand
suspended for two years from the date of this order. As a
disciplinary measure for proved misconduct, the licence of the
appellant would remain suspended for further five years. [Para
49) [223-B-D]
2.1 The High Court did not commit any error while coming
to the conclusion that the appellant had committed contempt of
Court under the provisions of the Act. Upon perusal of the facts
found by the High Court and looking at the contents of the letters
written by the concerned judicial officers, there is no doubt about
the fact that the appellant did appear before the Court on those
two days and used the language which was contemptuous in nature.
[Paras 19, 20) [202-A-B]
2.2 So far as the allegations made by the appellant with
regard to the complaints made by him agains

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[2016]4S.C.R. 184
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 63 of2006)
JULYOS,2016
[ANIL R. DAVE, KURIAN JOSEPH AND
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s. 19 -Advocates Act, 1961
- ss. 24A, 38 - Contempt of court - Advocate intimidated and
threatened a civil judge on two dates - High Court found him guilty
of contempt of court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for
two months - Direction to State Bar Council to initiate appropriate
proceedings against the advocate for professional misconduct -
However, nothing done by Bar Council for few years - Interference
with the order passed by the High Court - Held: In view of the
inaction of the Bar Council, this Court has to exercise appellate
;urisdiction under the Advocates Act in view of proved misconduct
calling for disciplinary action - This Court can exercise suo motu
powers for punishing the contemnor for professional misconduct -
It is also permissible for High Court u/Art. 226 in appropriate cases
on failure of the Bar Council to take action after its attention is
invited to the misconduct - Further, section 24A which debars a
convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate on the
rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if convicted for
contempt - In addition thereto, unless a person purges himself of
contempt or is permitted by the Court, conviction results in debarring
an advocate from appearing in court even in absence of suspension
or termination of the licence to practice - Thus, the conviction of
the advocate is justified - However, sentence of imprisonment
awarded to the appellant is set aside in view of his advanced age -
Direction that the appellant would not be permitted to appear in
courts in District Etah until he purges himself of contempt is upheld
- Under s. 24A, the enrollment of the appellant would stand
suspended for two years from the date of this order -As a disciplinary
measure for proved misconduct, the licence of the advocate to remain
suspended for further five years - Constitution of India - Art. 226.
184
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH
Judicial notice - Urgent need to review - Provisions of the
Advocates Act dealing with regulatory mechanism for the legal
profession and other incidental issues - s. 24A which debars a
convicted person fro111 being enrolled applies to an advocate on the
rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if convicted for
conte111pt and that a person convicted of even a most heinous offence
is eligible to be enrolled as an advocate after expiry of two years
from expiry of his sentence - Need to make suitable a111endments -
In view thereof, the Law Com111issio11 of India to go into all relevant
aspects relating to regulation of legal profession in consultation
with all concerned - Government of India to take appropriate steps
in [i,;ht of_the report.
-
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The conviction of the appellant is justified and is
upheld. The sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant
is set aside in view of his advanced age but sentence of fine and
default sentence are upheld. Further direction that the appellant
would not be permitted to appear in courts in District Etah until
he purges himself of contempt is also upheld. Under Section 24A
of the Advocates Act, the enrollment of the appellant would stand
suspended for two years from the date of this order. As a
disciplinary measure for proved misconduct, the licence of the
appellant would remain suspended for further five years. [Para
49) [223-B-D]
2.1 The High Court did not commit any error while coming
to the conclusion that the appellant had committed contempt of
Court under the provisions of the Act. Upon perusal of the facts
found by the High Court and looking at the contents of the letters
written by the concerned judicial officers, there is no doubt about
the fact that the appellant did appear before the Court on those
two days and used the language which was contemptuous in nature.
[Paras 19, 20) [202-A-B]
2.2 So far as the allegations made by the appellant with
regard to the complaints made by him against the complainant
judge, after having held that the appellant had appeared before
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the Court and had made contemptuous statements, those
averments regarding the complaints are irrelevant. The
averments regarding the complaints cannot be a defence for the
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(2016] 4 S.C.R.
appellant. Even if the averments about the complaints are
assumed to be correct, then also, the appellant cannot use such
contemptuous language in the Court against the presiding Judge.
[Para 21] [202-C-DJ
2.3 There is no merit in the contention of the appellant that
there was delay on the part of the complainant Judge in sending
the reference and he could have tried the appellant under Section
228 of the Penal Code and the procedure prescribed under Code
of Criminal Procedure. It is for the Judge to decide as to whether
action should be taken under the Act or under any other law.
[Para 22] (202-E]
2.4 The High Court rightly convicted the appellant under
the Act after having come to a conclusion that denial of the
incidents and allegations of malafides against the complainant
Judge had been made by the appellant to save himself from the
consequences of contempt proceedings. The appellant had
refused to tender apology for his conduct. His affidavit in support
of stay vacation/modification and supplementary affidavit did not
show any remorse and he had justified himself again and again,
which also shows that he had no regards for the majesty of law.
[Para 23] [202-F-G]
2.5 In deciding whether contempt is serious enough to merit
imprisonment, the Court will take into account the likelihood of
interference with the administration of justice and the culpability
of the offender. The intention with which the act complained of is
done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a
given case, would be appropriate. [Para 24] [202-H; 203-AJ
2.6 While in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, this Court
cannot take over jurisdiction of disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council and it is for the Bar Council to punish the advocate by
debarring him from practice or suspending his licence as may be
warranted on the basis of his having been found guilty of
contempt, if the Bar Council fails to take action, this Court could
invoke its appellate power under Section 38 of the Advocates
Act. In a given case, this Court or the High Court can prevent
the contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts
till he purges himself of the contempt which is different from
suspending or revoking the licence or debarring him to
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH
practise.[Para 25] [203-D-E]
Bar
Council of India
v.
High
Court
of
Kera/a 2004(1) Suppl. SCR 649:2004 (6) SCC311; Re:
Sanjiv Dutta & Ors. 1995 (3) SCR 450: 1995 (3) SCC
619; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar
1976 (2) SCR 48:1976 (2) SCC 291; .laswant Singh v.
Virender Singh 1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 336:1995 (1)
Suppl. sec 384; Subrata Roy Sahara V. Union of India
(2014) 8 SCC 470; Amit Chanchal .Iha v. Registm; High
Court of Delhi (2015) 13 SCC 288; Union of India v.
Tulsiram Patel 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131 :1985 (3)
SCC 398; Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang 1995 (1)
SCR 456:1995 (2) SCC 513; Lily Thomas v. UOI 2013
(10) SCR 1130:2013(7) SCC 653; Mano} Nantla v.
UOI 2014 (9) SCR 965:2014 (9) SCCl; Election
Commission v. Venkata Rao 1953 AIR 210: 1953 SCR
1144; Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, 2001 (3) Suppl.
SCR 675 : 2001 (8) SCC 650 Ex-Captain Harish Uppal
v. Union of India, 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 186 : 2003 (2)
sec 45 - referred to.
2. 7 lnspite of the observations in C. vs Bar Cou11cil, no action
appears to have been taken at any level. The result is that a
person convicted of even a most heinous offence is eligible to be
enrolled as an advocate after expiry of two years from expiry of
his sentence. This aspect needs urgent attention of all concerned.
[Para 41] (221-F]
C. v. Bar Council (1982) 2 GLR 706 - referred to.
2.8 There is no reason to hold that the bar applicable at the
entry level is wiped out after the enrollment. Having regard to
the object of the provision, the said bar certainly operates post
enrollment also. However, till a suitable amendment is made,
the bar is operative only for two years in terms of the statutory
provision. In these circumstances, Section 24A which debars a
convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate on
the rolls of the Bar Council for a pel"iod of two years, if convicted
for contempt. In addition to the said disqualification, in view
judgment of this Court in R.K. Anmul's case, unless a person
purges himself of contempt or is permitted by the Court,
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conviction results in debarring an advocate from appearing in
court even in absence of suspension or termination of the licence
to practice. Therefore, the directions of the High Court to the
effect that the appellant shall not be permitted to appear in courts
of District Etah until he purges himself of contempt is upheld.
[Paras 42, 43, 44] [221-G-H; 222-A-B)
2.9 In the instant case, inspite of direction of the High Court
as long back as more than ten years, no action is shown to have
been taken by the Bar Council. Notice was issued by this Court
to the Bar Council of India on 27'h January, 2006 and after all the
facts having been brought to the notice of the Bar Council of
India, the said Bar Council has also failed to take any action. In
view of such failure of the statutory obligation of the Bar Council
of the State of Uttar Pradesh as well as the Bar Council of India,
this Court has to exercise appellate jurisdiction under the
Advocates Act in view of proved misconduct calling for
disciplinary action. This Court can exercise suo motu powers for
punishing the contemnor for professional misconduct. The
appellant has already been given sufficient opportunity in this
regard. [Para 45) [222-C-E)
2.10 What is permissible for this Court by virtue of statutory
appellate power under Section 38 of the Advocates Act is also
permissible to a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
in appropriate cases on failure of the Bar Council to take action
after its attention is invited to the misconduct. Thus, apart from
upholding the conviction and sentence awarded by the High Court
to the appellant, except for the imprisonment, the appellant would
suffer automatic consequence of his conviction under Section 24A
of the Advocates Act which is applicable at the post enrollment
stage also. Further, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act, it is directed that the licence of
the appellant would stand suspended for a further period of five
years. He would also remain debarred from appearing in any court
in District Etah even after five years unless he purges himself of
contempt in the manner laid down by this Court in Bar Council of
India's case and R.K. Anmul's case and as directed by the High
Court [Paras 46, 47, 48) [222-F-H; 223-A-B)
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India 1998
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF OTTAR
PRADESH
(2) SCR 795: 1998 (4) SCC 40; Bar Council of India
v. High Court of Kera/a 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 649:2004
(6) SCC 311; R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court
2009 (11) SCR1026:2009 (8) SCC 106- relied on.
3. Legal profession being the most important component
of justice delivery system, it must continue to perform its
significant role and regulatory mechanism and should not be seen
to be wanting in taking prompt action against any malpractice.
This Court has noticed the inaction of the Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh as well as the Bar Council of India inspite of direction in
the impugned order of the High Court and inspite of notice to
the Bar Council of India by this Court. It has also noticed the
failure of all concerned to advert to the observations made by
the Gujarat High Court 33 years ago. Thus there appears to be
urgent need to review the provisions of the Advocates Act dealing
with regulatory mechanism for the legal profession and other
incidental issues, in consultation with all concerned. In view
thereof, the Law Commission of India is requested to go into all
relevant aspects relating to regulation of legal profession in
consultation with all concerned at an early date. The Government
would take appropriate steps in the light of the report of the Law
Commission within six months thereafter. [Paras 50, 52) [223-FG; 224-C)
Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State
of MP. 2016 (7) SCC 353 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 675
referred to
Para 16
2002 (5) Suppl. SCR186
referred to
Para 16
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 649
relied on
Para 16
1995 (3) SCR 450
referred to
Para 31
1976 (2) SCR 48
referred to
Para 32
1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 336
referred to
Para33
(2914) 8 sec 470
referred to
Para 34
c2015) 13 sec 288
referred to
Para35
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131
referred to
Para 38
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[2016] 4 S.C.R.
A
1995 (1) SCR 456
referred to
Para 38
2013 (10) SCR 1130
referred to
Para38
2014 (9) SCR 965
referred to
Para38
1953 SCR1144
referred to
Para38
(1982) 2 GLR 706
referred to
Para 40
2009 (11) SCR1026
relied on
Para 44, 48
B
1998 (2) SCR 795
relied on
Para 45
2004(1) Suppl. SCR 649
relied on
Para 48
2016 P> sec 353
referred to
Para 51
C
CRIMIN AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
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63 of2006.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2005 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Contempt Petition No.16 of2004.
T. N. Singh, Vikas K. Singh, Ms. Rajshree Singh, Advocates for
the Appellant.
Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG, Ms. Kritika Sachdeva, Sridhar Mehra, Rishab,
Ajay Sharma, Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Ms. Taruna A. Prasad,
Nirmal Kumar Ambastha, A viral Shukla, Panshul Chandra, C. D. Singh,
Sudeep Kumar, Ms. Syloina Mohaptra, Ashok K. Srivastava, Mis S.
Narain & Co., Advocates for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ANIL R. DAVE, J. I. The present appeal is preferred under
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to
as "the Act") against the judgment and order dated 02 .12 .2005 delivered
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Contempt
Petition N:o. 16 of2004, whereby the High Court found the appellant
guilty of Criminal Contempt for intimidating and threatening a Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Etah in his Court on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 and
sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two months with a fine of Rs.
2,000/- and in default of payment of the fine, the appellant to undergo
further imprisonment of2 weeks. The High Court further directed the
Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to consider the facts contained in the
complaint of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, and earlier contempt
referred to in the judgement and to initiate appropriate proceedings against
the appellant for professional misconduct.
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
Reference to larger Bench and the Issue
2. On 27th January, 2006, this appeal was admitted by this Court
and that part of the impugned judgment, which imposed the sentence,
was stayed and the appellant was directed not to t'ntcr the Court premises
at Etah (U.P.). K:.:eping in view the importance of the question involved
while admitting the appeal on 27'h January, 2006, notice was directed to
be issued to the Supreme Court Bar Association as well as to the Bar
Council oflndia. The matter was referred to the larger Bench. Learned
Solicitor General oflndia was requested to assist the Court in the matter.
3. On 61h March, 2013 resti'iction on entry of the appellant into the
court premises as per order dated 271h January, 2006 was withdrawn.
Thereby, the appellant was permitted to enter the court premises. The
said restriction was, however, restored later. On 20'h August, 2015,
notice was issued to the Attorney General on the larger question whether
on conviction under the Contempt of Courts Act or any other offence
involving moral tufpitude an advocate could be permitted to practise.
4. Thus following questions arise for consideration:
(i)
Whether a case has been made out for interference with
the ,1rder passed by the High Court convicting the appellant
for criminal contempt and sentencing him to simple
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imprisonment for two months with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and
E
further imprisonment for two weeks in default and debarring
him from appearing in courts in judgeship at Etah; and
(ii)
Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant
can be allowed to practise.
The facts and the finding of the High Conrt
F
5. The facts of the present appeal discloses that the Civil Judge
(Senior Divisioa), Etah made a reference under Section 15 (2) of the
Act to the High Court through the learned District Judge, Etah (U .P.) on
7.6.2003 recording two separat<;: incidents dated 16.4.20J3 and 13.5.2003,
which had taken pl act L1 his Court in which the appellant had appeared
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before him and C·.mduC:ted l1i111self i11 a manner which constituted
"Criminal Conten;pt" under ~ectio112 (c) ufthc Act.
6. The said letter was received uy the High Court along with a
forwarding letter of the District Judge dated ·1.6.2003 and the letters
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[2016] 4 S.C.R.
were placed before the Administrative Judge on 7.7.2003, who forwarded
the matter to the Registrar General vide order dated 18.6.2004 for placing
the same before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court and on
11.7.2004, the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court referred the
matter to the Court concerned dealing with contempt cases and notice
was also issued to the appellant.
7. Facts denoting behaviour of the appellant, as recorded by the
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah, can be seen from the contents ofhis
letter addressed to the learned District Judge, Etah. The letter reads as
under:- .
"Sir,
It is hu111bly submitted that on 16.4.2003, while I was hearing
the 6-Ga-2 in Original Suit No.11412003 titled as "Yaduveer
Singh Chauhan vs. The Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation",
Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate appeared in the Court,
and, while using intemperate language, spoke in a loud voice:
"How did you pass an order against my client in the case
titled as "Kanchan Singh vs. Ratan Singh"? How did you
dare pass such an order against my client?
I tried to console him, but he started shouting in a state of
highly agitated mind:
"Kanchan Singh is my relative and how was this order
passed against my relative? No Judicial Officer has, ever,
dared pass an order against me. Then, how did you dare
do so? When any Judicial officer passes an order on my
file against my client, I set him right. I shall make a
complaint against you to Hon 'ble High Court", and he
threatened me: "l 11•ill not let you re111ain in Et ah in future, I
can do anything against you. I have relations ivith highly
notorious persons and I can get you harmed by -such
notorious persons to the extent I want to do, and I myself
am capable of doing any deed (misdeed) as I wish, and I
am not afraid of any one. In the Court compound, even my
shoes are worshipped and I was prosecuted in two murder
cases. And I have made murderous assaults on people and
about 15 to 20 cases are going on against me. If you, in
future, dare pass an order on the file against my client in
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
193
PRADESH [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
which I am a counsel, it will not be good for you".
A
Due to the above mentioned behaviour of Shri Mahipal Singh
Rana, Advocate, the judicial work was hindered and aforesaid
act of Shri Mahipal Singh falls within the ambit of committing
the contempt of Court.
In this very succession, on 13.5.2003, while I was hearing 6Ga-2 in the O.S. No. No. 4812003 titled as "Roshanlal v
Nauvat Ram", Shri Mahipal Singh Rana Advocate appeared
in the Court and spoke in a loud voice: "Why did you not get
the OS No. 29812001 title as 'Jag Mohan vs. Smt. Suman'
called out so far, whereas the aforesaid case is very important,
in as much as I am the plaintiff therein". 1 said to Shri Mahipal
Singh Rana, Advocate: "Hearing of a case is going 011.
Thereafter, your case will be called out for hearing",
thereupon he got enraged and spoke: "That- case will be
heard first which I desire to be heard first. Nothing is done as
per your desire. Even an advocate does not dare create a
hindrance in my case. I shall get the case decided which I
want and that case will never be decided, which I do not want.
You cannot decide any case against my wishes". Meanwhile
when the counsel for Smt. Suman in O.S. No. 29812001 titled
as "Jag Mohan vs. Smt. Suman" handed some papers over to
Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate for receiving the same,
he threw those papers away and misbehaved with the counsel
for Smt. Suman. Due to this act of Shri Mahipal Singh Rana,
the judicial work was hindered and his act falls within the
ambit of committing the contempt of Court.
Your good self is therefore requested that in order to initiate
proceedings relating to committing the contempt of Court
against Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate, my report may
kindly be sent to the Hon 'hie High Court by way of
REFERENCE".
With regards, "
8. On the same day, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) also
wrote another letter to the Registrar-General of the High Com1, giving
some more facts regarding contemptuous behaviour of the appellant
with a request to place the facts before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the
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High Court so that appropriate action under the Act may be taken against
the appellant. As the aforestated letters refer to the facts regarding
behaviour of the appellant, we do not think it necessary to reiterate the
same here.
9. Ultimately, in pursuance of the information given to the High
Court, proceedings under the Act had been initiated against the appellant.
10. Before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that it was not open to the Court to proceed against the appellant
under the provisions of the Act because ifthe behaviour of the appellant
was not proper or he had committed any professional misconduct, the
proper course was to take action against the appellant under the provisions
of the Advocates Act, 1961. It was also contended that summary
procedure under the Act could not have been followed by the Court for
the purpose of punishing the appellant. Moreover, it was also submitted
that the appellant was not at all present before the learned Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Etah on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003.
11. Ultimately, after hearing the parties concerned, the High Court
did not accept the defence of the appellant and after considering the
facts of the case, it delivered the impugned judgment whereby punishment
has been imposed upon the appellant. The High Court observed:
.. 22. Extraordinary siluations demand extraordinary remedies.
The subordinate courts in Uttar Pradesh are witnessing
disturbing period. In most of the subordinate courts, the
Advocates or their groups and Bar Associations have been
virtually taken over the administration of justice to ransom.
These Advocates even threaten and intimidate the Judges to
obtain favourable orders. The Judicial Officers often
belonging to different districts are not able to resist the
pressure and fall prey to these Advocates. This disturbs the
equilibrium between Bar and the Bench giving undue
advantage and premium to the Bm: In these extraordinary
situations the High Court can not abdicate its constitutional
duties to protect the judicial officers.
xxxxx
2./ . ............... The criminal history of the contemnor, the
acceptance of facts in which his actions were found
contumacious and he was discharged on submitting apologies
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
on two previous occ:asions, and the allegations against him
in which he was found to continue with intimidating the judicial
officers compelled us to issue interim orders restraining his
entry of the contemnor in the judgeship at Etah. The Bar
Council of Uttar Pradesh, is fully aware of his activities but
has chosen not to take any action in the matter. In fact the
Bar Council hardly takes cognizance of such matters at all.
The Court did not inte1fere with the statutory powers of the
Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to take appropriate proceedings
against the contemnor with regard to his right of practice,
and did not take m1•ay right of practice vested in him by virtue
of his registration with the Bar Council. He was not debarred
fi·om practice but was only restrained to appear in the
;udgeship al Etah in the cases he was engaged as an
Advocate. The repealed contumacious conduct, without any
respect to the Court co111111itted by him repeatedly by
intimidating and brow beating the judicial officers, called
for maintaining discipline, protecting the judicial officers and
for maintaining peace in the premises of judgeship at Etah.
25. Should the High Court allow such advocate to continue
to terrorise, brow beat and bully the judicial officers? It is
submitted that he has a large practice. We are not concerned
here whether the contemnor or such advocates are acquiring
large practice by intimidating judicial officers. These are
questions to be raised before the Bar Council. We, howeve1;
must pe1form our constitutional duty to protect our judicial
officers. This is one such case illustrated in para 78, of the
Supreme Court Bar Associations case (supra), in which the
occasion had arisen to prevent the contenmor to appear
before courts at Etah. The withdrawal of such privilege did
not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice
as an advocate in other courts or tribunal, drafting the
petitions and advising his clients. It only prevented him from
intimidating the judicial officers and from vitiating the
atmo~phere conducive for administration of justice in the
iudgeship at Etah.
31. The Supreme Court held that Section 20 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, has to be construed in a manner which would
avoid anomaly and hardships both as regards the litigant as
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also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to
punish for its contempt. In Pall av Seth the custodian received
information of the appellant having committed contempt of
taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to these
concerns and operating their accounts. fro111 a letter dated
5.5.1998, received fro111 the Income Tax Authorities. Soon
thereafter on 18.6.1998 a petition was filed for initiating action
in contempt and notices were issued by the Court on 9. 4. 1999.
The Supreme Court found that on beco111ing aware of the
forged applications the contempt proceedings were filed on
18.6.1998 well within the period of limitation prescribed by
Section 20 of the Act. The action taken by the special court
by its order dated 9../. 1999 directing the applications to be
treated as show cause notice, was thus valid and that the
contempt action was not barred by Section 20 of the Act.
32. In the present case the alleged contempt was committed in
the court of Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, Civil Judge (Senior
Division) Et ah on 16../.2003 and 13.5.2003. The officer
initiated the proceedings by making reference to the High
Court through the District Judge vide his letters dated
7.6.2003, separately in respect of the incidents. These letters
were received by the Court with the forwarding letter of the
District Judge dated 1.6.2003 and were placed before
Administrative Judge on 7. 7.2003, who returned the matter
to the Registrar General with his order dated 18.6.2004 to be
placed before Hon 'ble the Chief Justice and that by his order
dated JI. 7.2004, Hon 'ble the Chief Justice referred the matter
to court having contempt determination. Show cause notices
were issued by the court to the contenmor on 28. 10.2004. In
view of the law as explained in Pall av Seth (supra) the contempt
proceedings would be taken to be initiated on 7.6.2003 by
the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, which was well within
the period of one year from the date of the incidents prescribed
under Section 20 of the Act.
xxxxxx
36. We do not find that the contemnor Shri Mahipal Singh
Rana is sz!ffering from any mental imbalance. He is fully
conscious of his actions and take responsibility of the same.
H
He suffers from an inflated ago, and has a tremendous
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
superiority complex and claims himself to be a champion for
the cause of justice, and would not spare any effort, and
would go to the extent of intimidating the judges if he feels
the injustice has been done to his client. We found ourselves
unable to convince him that the law is above every one, and
that even if he is an able lawyer belonging to superior caste,
he could still abide by the dignity of court and the decency
required from an advocate appearing in any court of law.
3 7. The due administration of law is of vastly greater
importance than the success or failure of any individual, and
for that reason public policy as well as good morals require
that every Advocate should keep attention to his conduct. An
Advocate is an officer of the Court apart of machinery
employed for administration of justice, for meeting out to the
litigants the exact measure of their legal rights. He is guilty
of a crime if he knowingly sinks his official duty, in what may
seem to be his own or his clients temporary advantage.
38. We find that the denial of incidents and allegations of
malafides against Shri Onkar Singh Yadav, the then Civil
Judge (Senior Division) Etah have been made only to save
himself from the contumacious conduct.
39. Shri Mahipal Singh Rana, the contemnor has refused to
tender apologies for his conduct. His affidavit in support of
stay vacation/modification and supplementary affidavit do
not show any remorse. He has justified himself again and
again, in a loud and thundering voice.
40. We find that Shri Mahipal Rana the contemnor is guilty
of criminal contempt in intimidation and threatening Shri
Onkar Singh Yadav the then Civil Judge (Senior Division)
Etah in his court on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 and of using
loud and indecent language both in court and in his pleadings
in suit No. 51512002. He was discharged from proceeding of
contempt in Criminal Contempt Petition No. 2111998 and
Criminal Contempt No. 60 of 1998 on his tendering
unconditionally apology on 3.8.1999 and 11.11. 2002
respectively. He however did not mend himself and has rather
become more aggressive and disrespectful to the court. He
has virtually become nuisance and obstructioH to the
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administration of justice at the Judgeship at Etah. We are
satisfied that the repeated acts of criminal contempt co111111i1ted
by him are of such nature that these substantially interfere
with the due course a/justice. We thus punish him under
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts A..:t 1971, with two
months imprisonment and also impose fine of Rs. 20001- on
him. In case non-payment of fine he will undergo further a
period of imprisonment of two weeks. However, the
punishment so imposed shall be kept in abeyance for a period
of sixty days to enable the conlemner Shri Rana to approach
the Hon 'hie Supreme Court, if so advised.
41. We also direct the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to take
the facts constituted in the complaints of Shri Onkar Singh
Yadav, the then Civil Judge (Senior Division) Etah, the two
earlier contempts referred in this judgment, and to draw
proceedings against him for professional misconduct.
42. Under the Rules of this Court, the contemnor shall not be
permitted to appear in courts in the Judgeship at Etah, until
he purf{?_s the contempt.
43. The Registrar General shall draw the order and
communicate it to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and Bar
Council of India within a week. The cOntemnor shall be taken
into custody to serve the sentence immediately of the sixty
days if no restrain order is passed by the appellate court. "
Rival Contentions:
12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant before this
Court specifically denied the instances dated 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003
and further submitted that the appellant had not even gone to the Court
of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on the aforestated two
days and therefore, the entire case made out against the appellant was
false and frivolous. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the
High Court had committed an error by not going into the fact as to
whether the appellant had, in fact, attended the Court of the learned
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Etah on 16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003. The
learned counsel further submitted that the High Court ought to have
considered the fact that the appellant had filed several complaints against
the learned Judge who was the complainant and therefore, with an oblique
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
motive the entire contempt proceedings were initiated against the
appellant. The said complaints ought to have been considered by the
High Court. It was further submitted that contempt proceedings were
. barred by limitation. The incidents in question are dated 16'h April, 2003
and 13'h May, 2003 while notice was ordered to be issued on 28'h April,
2004.
13. The learned counsel, thus, submitted that the action initiated
against the appellant was not just and proper and the impugned judgment
awarding punishment to the appellant under the Act is bad in law and
therefore, deserved to be set aside. In the alternative, it is submitted that
the appellant was 84 years of age and keeping that in mind, the sentence
for imprisonment may be set aside and instead, the fine may be increased.
14. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State
of Uttar Pradesh submitted that the impugned judgment was just, legal
and proper and the same was delivered ·after due deliberation and careful
consideration of the relevant facts. He submitted that looking at the
facts of the case, the High Court rightly caine to the conclusion that the
appellant was not only present in the Court on those two days i.e. on
16.4.2003 and 13.5.2003, but the appellant had also misbehaved and
misconducted in such a manner that his conduct was contemptuous and
therefore, the proceedings under the Act had to be initiated against him .
. . The learned counsel also drew attention of the Court to the nature of the
allegations made by the appellant against the learned Judge and about
the contemptuous behaviour of the appellant. The learned counsel also
relied upon the report submitted to the learned. District Judge and
submitted that'fue impugned judgment is just, legal and proper. He also
submitted that the misbehaviour and contemptuous act of the appellant
was unpardonable and therefore, the High Court had rightly imposed
punishment upon the appellant.
15. In response to the notice issued by this Court on 20th August,
2015 in respect of the question framed, the learned counsel appearing
for the Bar Council oflndia submitted that Section 24A of the Advocates
Act, 1961 provides for a bar against admission of a person as an advocate
if he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, apart from
other situations in which such bar operates. The proviso however, provides
for the bar being lifted after two years ofrelease. However, the provision
did not expressly provide for removal of an advocate from the roll of the
advocates if conviction takes place after enrollment of a person as an
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advocate. Only other relevant provision under which action could be
taken is Section 35 for proved misconduct. It is further stated that though
the High Court directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to initiate
proceedings for professional misconduct on 2.12.2005, the consequential
action taken by the Bar Council of the State of Uttar Pradesh was not
known. It is further stated that the term moral turpitude has to be
understood having regard to the nature of the noble profession of law
which requires a person to possess higher level of integrity. Even a
minor offence could be termed as an offence involving moral turpitude
in the context of an advocate who is expected to be aware of the legal
position and the conduct expected from him as a citizen is higher than
others. It was further submitted that only the State Bar Council or Bar
Council oflndia posses the power to punish an advocate for "professional
misconduct" as per the provisions of Section 35 of the Advocates Act,
1961 and reiterated the law laid down by this Court in Supreme Court
Bar Associatio11 versus U11io11 of I11dia
1
• In addition, the counsel
submitted that a general direction to all the Courts be given to
communicate about conviction of an advocate for an offence involving
moral turpitude to the concerned State Bar Council or the Bar Council
ofindia immediately upon delivering the judgment of conviction so that
proceedings against such advocates can be initiated under the Advocates
Act, 1961.
16. The Learned Additional Solicitor General of India appearing
on behalf of Union of India, submitted that normally in case of all
professions, the apex body of the professionals takes action against the
erring professional and in case of legal profession, the Bar Council of
India takes disciplinary action and punishes the concerned advocate if
he is guilty of any misconduct etc. Reference was made to Architects
Act, 1972, Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, Company Secretaries
Act, 1980, Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015, Indian Medical Council
(Professional Conduct Etiquettes and Ethics) Regulations, 2002, National
Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, Cost and Works Accountants
Act, 1959, Actuaries Act, 2006, Gujarat Professional Civil Engineers
Act, 2006, Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, containing provisions
for disqualifying a person from continuing in a regulated profession upon
conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. Reference was
also made to Section 24A of the Advocates Act which provides for a bar
on enrolment as an advocate of a person who has committed any offence
' ( 1998) 4 sec 409
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA, ADVOCATE v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH [ANIL R. DAVE, J.]
involving moral turpitude. It was further submitted that if a person is
disqualified from enrolment, it could not bethe intention of the legislature
to permit a person already enrolled as an advocate to continue him in
practice if he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Bar
against enrolment should also be deemed to be bar against continuation.
It was further submitted that Article 145 of the Constitution empowers
the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating practice and procedure
including the persons practicing before this Court. Section 34 of the
Advocates Act empowers the High Courts to frame rules laying down
the conditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in
courts. Thus, there is no absolute right of an advocate to appear in
court. Appearance before Court is subject to such conditions as are laid
down by this Court or the High Court. An Advocate could be debarred
from appearing before the Court even ifthe disciplinary jurisdiction for
misconduct was vested with the Bar Council as laid down in Supreme
Court Bar Association (supra) and as fu11her clarified in Pravi11 C.
Shalt versus K.A. Moltd.