# MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL, HYDERABAD ETC. ETC v. B. KARUNAKAR AND ORS. ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1993] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 576
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1993-10-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3056 of 1991
- **Bench:** M.N. Venkatachaliah, P.B. Sawant, K. Ramaswamy, S. Mohan, B.P. Jeevan Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/managing-director-ecil-hyderabad-etc-etc-v-b-karunakar-and-ors-etc-etc-12203
- **Pages:** 69

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 311 (2)-First proviso (As amended
by Forty Second Amendment) Delinquent Employee-Inquiry-Inquiry OfC ficer not Disciplinary Authority-Right of Employee to receive copy of Inquiry
Officer's report before disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions as to
guilt or innocence of employee-Employee held entitled to report-Denial of
Report is denial of reasonable opportunity to employee to prove innocence-Rules denying report are against principles of natural justice-Report
D should be supplied even if rules do not pennit-Report should be given notwithstanding the nature of punishment-Failure of employee to ask for report
is not waiver.
Failure to supply Report-Effect of--Distinction should be made where
non-furnishing has caused prejudice to employee and where it has
E not-whether inf act prejudice has been caused depends on facts of each case.
Genesis of the law on the subject of furnishing the report of the Inquiry
officer/authority to the delinquent employee-Referred to-Effect of 42nd
Amendment explained.
F
Article 141-Supreme Court-Power to make the law laid down
prospective in operation-Doctrine of prospective overruling.
Law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case-Held applicable to all
employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government,
G public or private-Rule in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case is applicable prospectively-Only Exception is where the rules themselves provide for supply of copy
of report to employees-Grant of relief by Supreme Court to parties in
Ramzan Khan's case held per incuriam.
By an order dated 5th August, 1991 passed in Managing Director,
H Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar, J.T. 1992 (3) S.C. 605, a
576
l
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
577
three Judge Bench of this Court referred that matter for being placed A
before a larger bench, as the Bench found a conflict in the two decisions
of this Court, viz., Kai/ash Chander Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P and Ors
etc. etc., [1988] 3 S.C.C. 600 and Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan
Khan, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 588. Accordingly that matter along with other
connected matters were heard by the Constitution Bench on the question B
whether the Report of the Inquiry Officer/Authority who/which is appointed by the Disciplinary Authority to hold an inquiry into the charges
against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished to the
employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary
authority before such authority arrives at its finding with regard to the
guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, if any, to be C
awarded to him.
Disposing the matters, this Court
HELD : By the Court :
D
(i) When the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the
delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officer's
report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with
regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges
levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report the discipli·
nary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable E
opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the
principle of natural justice. [ 611-E-F]
(ii) Statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are
against the principles of natural justice and therefore, invalid. Employee is
entitled to report even if the rules do not permit the furnishing of the
report. [611-HJ
(iii) The delinquent employee has the right to receive the Inquiry
Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of punishment. [ 612-E]
F
G
(iv) Failure of the employee to ask for the report is not to be construed as waiver of his right. [612-F]
(v) Effect of non-furnishing of the enquiry report to delinquent
employee on the order of punishment and relief to be granted in such cases
depends on the prejudice caused to the employee. [613-D-F]
H
578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,993 of 181,565. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39993 for what follows._

A
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL, HYDERABAD ETC. ETC.
B
v.
B. KARUNAKAR AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
OCTOBER 1, 1993
[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, 0., AND P.B. SAWANT, K.
RAMASWAMY, S. MOHAN AND B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 311 (2)-First proviso (As amended
by Forty Second Amendment) Delinquent Employee-Inquiry-Inquiry OfC ficer not Disciplinary Authority-Right of Employee to receive copy of Inquiry
Officer's report before disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions as to
guilt or innocence of employee-Employee held entitled to report-Denial of
Report is denial of reasonable opportunity to employee to prove innocence-Rules denying report are against principles of natural justice-Report
D should be supplied even if rules do not pennit-Report should be given notwithstanding the nature of punishment-Failure of employee to ask for report
is not waiver.
Failure to supply Report-Effect of--Distinction should be made where
non-furnishing has caused prejudice to employee and where it has
E not-whether inf act prejudice has been caused depends on facts of each case.
Genesis of the law on the subject of furnishing the report of the Inquiry
officer/authority to the delinquent employee-Referred to-Effect of 42nd
Amendment explained.
F
Article 141-Supreme Court-Power to make the law laid down
prospective in operation-Doctrine of prospective overruling.
Law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case-Held applicable to all
employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government,
G public or private-Rule in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case is applicable prospectively-Only Exception is where the rules themselves provide for supply of copy
of report to employees-Grant of relief by Supreme Court to parties in
Ramzan Khan's case held per incuriam.
By an order dated 5th August, 1991 passed in Managing Director,
H Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar, J.T. 1992 (3) S.C. 605, a
576
l
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
577
three Judge Bench of this Court referred that matter for being placed A
before a larger bench, as the Bench found a conflict in the two decisions
of this Court, viz., Kai/ash Chander Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P and Ors
etc. etc., [1988] 3 S.C.C. 600 and Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan
Khan, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 588. Accordingly that matter along with other
connected matters were heard by the Constitution Bench on the question B
whether the Report of the Inquiry Officer/Authority who/which is appointed by the Disciplinary Authority to hold an inquiry into the charges
against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished to the
employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary
authority before such authority arrives at its finding with regard to the
guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, if any, to be C
awarded to him.
Disposing the matters, this Court
HELD : By the Court :
D
(i) When the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the
delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officer's
report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with
regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges
levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report the discipli·
nary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable E
opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the
principle of natural justice. [ 611-E-F]
(ii) Statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are
against the principles of natural justice and therefore, invalid. Employee is
entitled to report even if the rules do not permit the furnishing of the
report. [611-HJ
(iii) The delinquent employee has the right to receive the Inquiry
Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of punishment. [ 612-E]
F
G
(iv) Failure of the employee to ask for the report is not to be construed as waiver of his right. [612-F]
(v) Effect of non-furnishing of the enquiry report to delinquent
employee on the order of punishment and relief to be granted in such cases
depends on the prejudice caused to the employee. [613-D-F]
H
578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
Per Sawant, J. (For himself, CJ, S. Mohan and B.P. Jeevan Reddy,
J.J.).
1. Where the Inquiry Officer is other than the disciplinary authority,
the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends
when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of
B the evidence. Inquiry Officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply
to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to
impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority
decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings the second stage is not even
reached. [610-C-D]
c
2. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is
part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the
inquiry, viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the
findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed
belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered
D the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to
the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its
conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second
right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the
conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable
E at the second stage with was taken away by the 42nd Amendment.
[608-H, 609-A-B]
F
G
3. The reason why the right to receive the report of the Inquiry
Officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the
first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that findings recorded
by the Inquiry Officer form an important material before the disciplinary
authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it
to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent
the said findings including the punishment, if any, rec11mmended in the
report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported
by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by
the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the
employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert
it before he is condemned. Thus, it is the negation of the tenets of justice
H and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
579
recorded by a third party like the Inquiry Officer without giving the A
employee an opportunity to reply to it. [ 609-C-F]
3.1. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to
arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded 'in the
inquiry, it is also equally tru~ t)iat the disciplinary authority takes into B
consideration the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer along with the
evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the Inquiry
Officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary
authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the Inquiry Officer
were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary
authority, that would not constitute any additfonal material before the C
disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge.
However, when the Inquiry Officer goes further and records his findings.
which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary
to the same or in ignorance of its, such findings are an additional material
unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the discipliD
nary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the
reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its won conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to
the hiquiry Officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required
to consider the evidence, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the repreE
sentation of the employee against it. [609-F -H, 610-A-B]
4. The position in law can also be looked atfrom a slightly different
angle.Article ~1.1(2) says that the employee shal.I be given a 'reasonable
opportunity ~f being heard in respect of tbe charges against him'. The
findings on the charges given by a third person like the Inquiry Officer,
particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at
by overlooking the evidence of misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso to Article 311(2) in
effect accepts two successive stags of differing scope. Since the penalty is
F
to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect it to be carried out G
by the disciplinary authority (the Inquiry Officer being only his delegate
appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to
the Inquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the discipli·
nary. authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry.
[610-F, H, 611-A] H
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists
of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty
and of considering the reply to the notice an deciding upon the penalty.
What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the
penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the
B report of the Inquiry Officer. The latter right was always there. But before
the the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it
was to be exercised has stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage
of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the
C employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has
happened after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the
point of time at which the representation of the employee against the
inquiry Officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary
authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the
report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt of
D innocence of the charges. (611-A-D]
Kham Chand v. Union of India & Ors.,
(1958] S.C.R. 1080; A.N.
D'Silva v. Union of India, (1962] Supp.1S.C.R.968; Union of India v. H.C.
Goel, (1964] 4 S.C.R. 718; Avtar Singh, Police Constable v. Punjab, (1968)
E
S.L.R. 131; State of Gujarat v. R. G. Teredesai & Anr., (1970] 1 S.C.R. 251;
General Manager, Eastern Railway & Anr. v. Jawala Prasad Singh, (1970] 3
S.C.R. 271; Uttar Pradesh Government v. Sabir Hussain, (1975) Supp. S.C.R.
354; Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., (1985] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
131; Secretary, Central Board of Excise & Customs & Ors. v. K.S. MahalinF gam, [1986] 3 S.C.R. 35; Ram Chander v. Union of India & Ors., (1986] 3
S.C.R. 103; Union of India & Ors., v. E. Bashyan, [1988] 3 S.C.C. 209; A.K.
Kraipak & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., (1970] 1 S.C.R. 457; Chairman,
Board of Mining Examination & Anr. v. Ramjee, [1977) 2 S.C.R. 904;
In~titution of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna & Ors.,
A.l.R.(1987) S.C. 71; Charan Lal Sahu etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors.,
G
[1990] S.C.C. 613;. C.B. Gautam v. Union of India & Ors., (1993] 1 S.C.C.
78 and Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, J.T. (1992) 3 S.C. 605,
referred to.
R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India, L.R. (1936) 64 I.A. 55
H and Secretary of State for India v. l.M. Lall, (1945) F.C.R. 103, cited.
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARVNAKAR
581
K.C. Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P. & Ors. etc. etc. [1988] 3 S.C.C. A
600, disting0ished.
Union of India & Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 588,
affirmed.
5 Hence when the Inquiry Officer is not he disciplinary authority, B
the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the Inquiry
Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions
with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the
charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right
to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the C
Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision
on the charges, is a denial reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove
his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. [ 611-E-F]
5.1. Statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are
against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinD
quent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if
the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent
on the subject. [611-H; 612-A]
5.2. Article 311(2) cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or
prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, E
removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in
awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing
the employee. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants
and other are governed by their service rules. whenever, therefore, the
service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and F
when Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent
employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment. [612-C, El
5.3. Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend
himself effectively, and he would not know in advance whether the report is G
in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ,
ask for the report, as the waiver ·of his right. Whether, therefore, the
employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him.
[612-F]
5.4. The answer to the question as to what is the effect on the order H
582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP.2 S.C.R.
A
of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Office is not furnished to
the employee and what relief should be granted to him has to be relative
to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed
from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished
to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced
B him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the
ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the
employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a
mechanical ritual. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the
employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be
considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore,
C even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would
have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee
to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. [ 613-C-E]
5.4.1. Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not
D furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the
Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to
the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the
Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or
her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If afkr
hearing, the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the
E non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate
findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere
with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically
set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not
furnished. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the
F
report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should
set aside the order of punishment. [613-G-H, 614-A, 614-C]
5.4.2. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal
sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be
granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the
G authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee
under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing
him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled
to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the
date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to
H be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmina-
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
583
tion of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the A
employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated,
the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will
treat the period form the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to
what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The
reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure B
to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose
of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no
more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct
position in law. [614-C-F]
State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, [1976) 3 S.C.R. 160, C
referred to.
6. Till 20th November, 1990, i.e., the day on which Mohd. Ramzan
Khan's case was decided, the position of law on the subject was not settled
by this Court. It is for the first time in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case that D
this Court laid down the law and made it prospective in operation, i.e.,
applicable to the orders of punishment passed after 20th November, 1990.
Since the decision made the law expressly prospective in operation the law
laid down there will apply only to those orders of punishment which are
passed by the disciplinary authority after 20th November, 1990. This is so,
notwithstanding the ultimate relief which was granted there which was per E
incuriam. No order of punishment passed before that date would be
challengeable on the ground that there was a failure to furnish the inquiry
report to the delinquent employee. The proceedings pending in
courts/Tribunals in respect of orders of punishment passed prior to 20th
November, 1990 .will have to be decided according to the law that prevailed
prior to the said date which did not require the authority to supply a copy F
of the Inquiry Officer's report to the employee. The only exception to this
was where the service rules with regard to the disciplinary proceedings
themselves made it obligatory to supply a copy of the . report to the
employee. [615-G, 621-B·C, 616-A]
7. In view of the unsettled position of the law on the subject, the
authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the basis
that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer
G
to the delinquent employee and innumerable employees have been
punished without giving them the copies of the reports. In some of the H
584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other
cases are pending in courts at different stages. However, both administrative reality and public interests do not re11uire that the orders of punishment passed prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case without
furnishing the report of the Inquiry Officer should be disturbed and the
B
disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should be
reopened on that account. [621-D-E, G]
8. While Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case made the law laid down there
prospective in operation, while disposing of the cases which were before
the Court, the Court through inadvertence gave relief to the employees
C concerned in those cases by allowing tbeir appeals and setting aside the
disciplinary proceedings. The relief granted was obviously per incuriam.
The said relief has, therefor, to be confined only to the employees concerned in those appeals. The law which is expressly made prospective in
operation there, cannot be applied retrospectively on account of the said
]) error. [616-8-C]
9. The law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case should apply to
employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government,
public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing
the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they e.xpressly prohibit the
E furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever
the nature of punishment, further, when ever the rules require an inquiry
to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent
employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before
the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled
p
against him. [612-H, 613-A-B]
G
10. There is no contradiction between the view taken in Mohd.
Ramzan Khan's case and the view taken by this Court in the earlier cases,
and the reliance placed on K.C. Asthana's case to contend that a contrary
view was taken there is not well-merited. [620-G]
Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan's, [1991] 1 S.C.C. 588, affirmed.
K.C. Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1988] 3 S.C.C. 600,
H distinguished.
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
585
Union of India & Ors. v. E. Bashyan, [1988] 3 S.C.C. 209; S.P. A
Viswanathan (I) v. Union of India & Ors., (1991] Suppl. 2 S.C.C. 269; Union
of India & ·Ors. v. A.K. Chatterjee, [1993] 2 S.C.C. 191 and Managing
Director, Food Corporation of India & Ors. v. Narendra Kumar Jain, (1993]
2 S.C.C. 400, referred to.
R.K. Vashisht v. Union of India & Ors., [1993] Suppl. 1 S.C.C. 431, B
explained.
H.G. Patel v. Dr. (Mrs.) K.S. Parikh & Ors. (1985) 2 G.L.R. (XXVI)
1385 and Premnath K. Shanna v. Union of India & Ors. (1988) 2 A.S.L.J.
449,approved.
C:
11. The courts' can make the law laid down by them prospective in
operation to prevent unsettlement ·of the settled positions, to prevent
administrative chaos and· to meet the ends of justice. The doctrine of
Prospective Overruling has since been extended to the interpretation of
ordinary statutes as well. [616-D, 618-E]
D
J.C. Golak Nath & Ors. v.State of Punjab &Anr., [1967) 2 S.C.C. 762;
Waman Rao & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 1;
Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana & Ors., [1986] 2 S.C.C. 249; Orissa
Cement Ltd. etc. etc. v. State of Orissa & Ors. etc. etc., [1991] Suppl.1 S.C.C. E
430 and. Victor Linkletter v. Victor G. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed. 2d 601,
referred to
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo etc. v. Union of India, [1952] S.C.R.
89; Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965] 1 S.C.R. 933 and Great
Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil Ref Co., [1932] 287 U.S. 358, 77 L.Ed. F
360, cited.
Per Ramaswamy, 1. (Partly dissenting)
1. The supply of the copy of the enquiry report is an integral part of
the penultimate stage of the enquiry before the disciplinary authority G
considers the material and the report on th"e proof of the charge and the
nature of the .Punishment to be imposed. Non-compliance is denial of
reasonable opportunity, violating Article 311(2) and unfair, unjust and
illegal procedure offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the
principles of natural justice. [633-E]
H
586
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
2. The findings or recommended punishment by the enquiry officer
are likely to affect the mind of the disciplinary authority in his concluding
the guilt or penalty to be imposed. The delinquent is, therefore, entitled to
meet the reasoning, controvert the conclusions reached by the enquiry
officer or is entitled to explain the effect of the evidence recorded. Unless
B the copy of the report is supplied to him, to would be in dark to know the
findings, the reasons in support thereof the nature of the recommendation
on penalty. The supply of the copy of the report is neither an empty
formality, nor a ritual, but aims to '.tigress the direction of the disciplinary
authority from his derivative conclus;ons from the report to the palliative
part of fair consideration. [629-D-E, H, 630-A]
c
Khem Chand v. Union of India, [N:i71 S.C.R. 1080; Bachhittar Singh
v. State of Punjab, A.l.R. (1963) S.C. 395; Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Their
Workmen, [1964] S.C.R., 506; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, [1964] 3 S.C.R.
718; State of Maharashtra v.BA. Joshi, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 917, State of Gujarat
D v. R.G. Teredesai, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 251; State of U.P. v. Shabir Hussain,
[1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 354; State of Madras v.A.R. Srinivasan, A.I.R. (1966)
S.C. 1827; State of Assam v. Mohan Chandra Kalita, A.I.R. (1972) S.C. 2535;
A.N. Silva v. Union of India, [1962] Suppl.1 S.C.R. 968;Avtar Singh v. I.G.
of Police, Punjab, (1968) 2 S.L.R. 131.; The Calcutta Dock Labour Board v.
E Jaffar Imam, (1965) 2 L.LJ. 113; Union of India v. KR. Memon, [1969] 2
S.C.R. 343; Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1975] 2
S.C.R. 761; Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, [1977] 2
S.C.R. 198; P. Joseph John v. State of Travencore, Cochin, [1955] 1 S.C.R.
1011 and Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of India, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 380,
referred to.
F
3. The disciplinary authority by whatever name called, has power and
jurisdiction to enquire into the misconduct by himself or by his delegate
and to impose the penalty for proved misconduct of a delinquent. Doubtless that the enquiry officer is a delegate of the disciplinary authority, he
G conducts the enquiry into the misconduct and submits his report, but his
fmdings or conclusions on the proof of charges and his recommendations
on the penalty would create formidable impressions almost to be believed
and acceptable unless they are controverted vehemently by the delinquent
officer. Therefore, non-supply of the copy of the report to the delinquent
H 'Yould cause him grave prejudice. (624-B, 632-C)
'
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
587
Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kera/a, [1969) S.C.R. 317; Keshav A
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973) 3 S.C.R. 22; Shadi Lal Gupta v. State
of Punjab, [1973) 3 S.C.R. 637; Hiranath Misra v. Principal Rajendra Medical
College. Ranchi, A.I.R. (1973) S.C 1260; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India,
A.I.R. (1986) S.C. 555; Secretary, Central Board of Excise & Customs v. KS.
Mahalingam, [1986) 2 S.C.R. 742 and Union of India v. Tztlsi Ram Pate4
[1985) Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 131; held inapplicable.
4. The denial of the supply of the copy, therefore causes. to the
delinquent a grave prejudice and avoidable injustice which cannot.be ·cured
B
or mitigated in appeal or at the c~allelige under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 19 of the Tribunal Act or other relevant provisions. Ex C
post facto opportunity does not efface the past impression formed by the
disciplinary authority against the delinquent, however professedly to be
fair to the delinquent. The.lurking suspicion always lingers in the minds
of the delinquent that the disciplinary authority was not objective and he
was treated unfairly. To alleviate such an impression and to prevent D
injustice of miscarriage of justice at the threshold, the disciplinary
authority should supply the ~opy of the report, consider objectively the
records, the evidence, the report and the explanation offered by the delinquent and make up his mind of proof of the charge or the nature of the
penalty. The supply of the copy of the report is thus a sine qua non for a
valid, fair, just and proper procedure to defend the delinquent himself E
effectively and efficaciously. [630-A-D]
5. Principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No
decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an
opportunity or supplying the material/which is basis for the decision. The F
enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force
or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report
along with the final order is like. a post-mortem certificate with purifying
odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair
procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21and311(2) of the Constitution,
but also, the principles of natural justice. [631-C-D]
G
5.1. It is not correct to say that the report is not evidence adduced
during such enquiry envisaged under proviso to Article 311 (2). Evidence
Act has no application to the enquiry conducted during the disciplinary
proceedings. The evidence adduced is not in strict confirmity with Indian H
588
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
Evidence Act, though the essential principle of fair play envisaged in the
Evidence Act are applicable. What was meant by 'evidence' in the proviso
to Article 311 (2) is the totality of the material collected during the enquiry
including the report of the enquiry officer forming part of that material.
Therefore, when reliance is sought to be placed, by the disciplinary
B authority, on the report of the enquiry officer for proof of the charge or
for imposition of the penalty, then it is incumbent that the copy thereof
should be supplied before reaching any conclusion either on proof of the
charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed on the proved charge or
on both. [631-E-G]
C
6. Section 44 of the Forty Second Amendment Act has don away with
supply of the copy of the report in the proposed punishment but was not
intended to deny fair, just and reasonable opportunity to the delinquent,
but to be a reminder to the disciplinary authority that he is still not
absolved of his duty to consider the material on records, the evidence along
D with the report, but before he does so, he must equally accord to the
delinquent, a fair and reasonable opportunity of his say on the report when
the disciplinary authority seeks to rely thereon. [631-A-B]
7. The emerging effect of the holding that the delinquent is entitled
to the supply of the copy of the report would generate yearning for hearing
E before deciding on proof of charge or penalty which 42nd Amendment
Act had advisedly avoided. So while interpreting Article 311 (2) or relevant
rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back
track the opportunity of hearing. The attempt must be nailed squarely.
Prior to the 42nd Amendment Act the delinquent has no right of hearing
p
before disciplinary authority either on proof of charge or penalty. So after
42nd Amendment Act it would not be put no higher pedestal. However, the
disciplinary authority has an objectiYe duty and adjudicatory responsibility to
consider and impose proper penalty consistent with the
roagnitude or the gravity of the misconduct. Each case must be considered
in the light of its own scenario. In a given case if the penalty was
G proved to be disproportionate or there is no case even to find the charges
proved or the charges are based on no evidence, that would be for the
court/the tribunal to consider on merits, not as court of appeal, but within
its parameters of supervisory jurisdiction and to give appropriate relief.
But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideraH tioa by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge of on
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
589
imposition of the penalty. [633-F-H, 634-C-D]
A
8. Though by far the legislature must be responsible for the formulation of principles of conduct which are of general, and prospective applicability to a given community for an indeterminate number of situations,
administrators must apply such general and often specific principles
within the community ·even though administrative orders and regulations B
often have certain legislative aspects, and the courts must also apply the
prescriptions of legislators, or the generalised principles deduced from a
series of precedents to individual disputes. Such a separation of functions
is not confined to the democratic doctrine of separation of powers, it is
part of the essential structure of any developed legal system. [636-B]
C
8.1. In a democratic society, the process of administration, legislation and adjudication are more clearly distinct than in a totalitarian
society. The courts can act when indeed called upon to adjust the rights
and law in accordance with the changing tenets of public policy and needs
of the society. Equally discretion assumes freedom to choose among D
several lawful alternatives of which the judge is entitled to choose the one
that most appeals to him, not a choice between two decision, one of which
may be said to be almost certainly right and the other almost certainly
wrong, but a choice so nicely balanced that when once it is announced, a
new right and a new wrong will emerge in the announcement. [636-C-D]
9. When judicial discretion has been exercised to establish a new
norm, the question emerges whether it would be applied retrospectively to
the past transactions of prospectively to the transactions in future only.
This process is limited not only to common law traditions, but exists in all
the jurisdictions. [636-G]
Candler v. Crame Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164; Hedley Byrene
& Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Paltners Ltd., 1964 A.C. 465; Rook v. Bernard, [1964]
A.C. 465; Cfolter Handwoven Hanis Tweed Co. v. Veith, (1941) A.C. 435
and Milangas v. George Textiles Ltd., [1976] A.C. 443, referred to.
10. As a matter of constitutional law, retrospective operation of an
overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited by the Constitution
E
F
G
but is one of judicial attitude depending on the facts and circumstances in
each case, the nature and purpose of the particular overruling decision
seeks to serve. The court would look into the justifiable reliance on the H
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A overruled case by the administration, ability to effectuate the new rule
adopted in the overruling case without doing injustice; the likelihood of its
operation whether substantially burdens the administration of justice or
retard the purpose. All these factors are to be taken into acco·unt while
overruling the earlier decision of laying down a new principle. The benefit
B
of the decision must be given to the parties before the Court even though
applied to further cases form that date prospectively would not be extended to the parties whose adjudication either had become final or matters
are pending trial or in appeal. [642-D-F]
10.1 The crucial cut-off date for giving prospective operation is the
C date of the judgment and not the date of the case of action of a particular
litigation given rise to the principle culminated in the overruling decision.
There is no distinction between civil and criminal litigation. Equally no
distinction could be made between claims involving constitutional right,
statutory right or common law right. It also emerges that the new rule
would not be applied to ex post facto laws nor acceded to plea of denial
D of equality. This Court would adopt retroactive of non-retroactive effect of
a decision not as a matter of constitutional compulsion but as a matter of
judicial policy determined in each case after evaluating the merits and
demerits of the particular case by looking to the prior history of the rule
in question, its purpose and effect and whether retroactive operation will
E accelerate or retard its operation. The reliance on the old rule and the cost
of the burden of the administration are equally germane and taken into
account in deciding to give effect to prospective or retrospective operation.
[642-F-H, 643-A]
Birimingham City Co. v.West Midland Baptist (Trost) Ass., [1969] 3
F
All. E.R. 172; Jones v.5ecretary of States for Social Science, [1972) A.C. 944;
Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., [287) U.S. 358,
77 L.Ed. 360 [1932); Dollree Map v.Ohio, [367) U.S. 643, 12 L.Ed. 2nd 1081,
[1961]; Victor Linkletter v. Victor G. Walker, [381] U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed. 2nd
601, (1965); E1mesto A. Miranda v. State of Arizona, [384] U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.
2nd 694, [1966]; Danny Escobedo v. lllinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed. 2nd 977;
G Sylvester Johnson v. State of New Jersey,384 U.S. 719, 16 L.Ed. 2nd 882,
(1966); TA. Jenkins v. State of De/ware, 395 U.S. 213, 23 L.Ed. 2nd 253,
[1969]; P.B. Rodrique v.Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.S. 352, 23 L.Ed. 2nd 360
[1969]; Chevron Oil Co. v. Gaines Ted Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 30 L.Ed. 2nd
296; Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathan Pipeline Co., 458 U.S.
H SO, 73 L.Ed 2nd 598, [1982]; U.S. "·James Robert Peltier, 422 U.S. 51, 45
MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL v. KARUNAKAR
591
L.Ed. 2nd 374(1975]; Almeida Sahchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266 37 L.Ed. 2nd A
596, Bowen v. U.S. 422 U.S. 816, 45 L.Ed. 2nd 641; United States v. Raymond
Eugene Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 73 L.Ed. 2nd 202, (1982]; Rayton v. New
York, (1980] 445 U.S. 573, 63 L.Ed. 2nd 639; Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of
Punjab & Anr., (1967] 2 S.C.R. 762; Sankari Prasad v. Union of India,
(1952] S.C.R. 89 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965] 1 S.C.R. B
933, referred to.
Lord Devlin, 'iudges and Law Makers', 39 Mod. L.R.1 [1976]; W.
Friedmann, 'Limits of the Judicial lawmaking and Prospective Ovenuling', 29
Mod, L.R.593 (1966]; A. G.L. Nicol, Prospective Ovenuling: A new device for
English Courts, 39 Mod, L.R. 542 [1976], referred to.;
C
Blackstone, Commentaries of the laws of England, Lord LLyod of
Hampstead, Introduction to Jurisprndence, 4th Edn. 1979, Rupert Cross and
Harris, Precedent in English Law, Oxford 4d Edn. (1991) Lon L. fuller,
Anatomy of the Law, John Wigmore, Judicial Function; Justice Cordozo;
Selected Writings; Louis L. Jaffe, English and American Judges as Law D
Makers, 1969 Oxford Edn., P.S. Atiyah and R.S. Summers, Fann and
Substance in Anglo American Law, [1987] Oxford Ed.; Prof. Baker, Judicial
Discretion, [1993] Ed.; referred to.
·
11. Prospective overruling, therefore, limits to future situations and E
exclude application to situations which have arisen before the decision
was evolved. It is, therefore, for the court to decide, on a balance of all
relevant considerations, whether a decision overruling a previous principle
should be applied retrospectively or not. (637-H, 638-AJ
12. Mohd. Ramzan Khan's ratio giving the benefit to him and com· F
panion appellants was valid in law and not, therefore, per incuriam and
was legally given the reliefs. (643-G]
12.L It is not correct to says that the denial of Ramzan Khan's ratio to
the pending matters offend Article 14. Placing reliance on the existing law
till date of Ramzan Khan, the employers treated that under law they had no G
obligation to supply a copy of the enquiry report before imposing the
penalty. Reversing the orders and directing to proceed from that stage
would be a needless heavy burden on the administration and at times
encourage the delinquent to abuse the office till final orders are passed.
Accordingly the ratio in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case would apply prospec· H
592
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A tively from the date of the judgment only to the cases in which decisions are
taken and orders made that date and does not apply to all the matters which
either have become final of are pending decision at the appellate forum or
in the High court or the Tribunal or in this Court. [643-H, 644-A-B]
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.