# MANGI LAL v. K. R. PAWAR & ANR

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 822
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-05-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1229 of 1970
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, I. D. Dua, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mangi-lal-v-k-r-pawar-anr-5442
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), ss. 9A. 77 & 123Publication of statements relating to the personal character or conduct of
a candidate-When a corrupt practice-Contract between Company and
Government-Chairman of Board of Directors of Company-If deemed
to have entered into contract with Government.
The appellant challenged the election of the first respondent on the
grounds: (I) that during the election campaign statements were 'Oade at
a public meeting that the appellants had misappropriated money, that statements w~re published in a weekly referring to the appellant as a corrupt
candidat«, that the statements were made with the first respondent's approval, that the statements were false and the respondent either believed
them to be false or did not believe them to be true, and that by publishing the false statements in relation to the personal character or conduct of
the appellant the first respondent appellant was guilty of a corrupt practice
under s. 123 (4) of the Representation of the People 'Act, 1951. (2) That
the respondent purchased petrol worth about Rs. 2,000 and if that amount
was added to the admitted expenditure it would show that the respondent
had incurred election expenses in excess of the limit prescribed by s. 77
of the Act read with r. 90 of the Election Rules.
(3) That the respondent
was a Chairman of the Board of Directors of an Electric Supply Company
which generated and supplied electricity to the State Government under a
contract. and therefore he was disqualified on the ground that he had a
subsisting contract with the State within the meaning of s. 9(A) of the Act.
The election petition was dismissed by the High Court
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The appellant had himself admitted on oath as a witness
that a complaint was filed against him for embezzlement. The complaint
was pending in the criminal court at the time of the election.
A charge
was also framed in those !proceedings. The charge and complaint are relevant and there is no provision of law which makes the order framing the
charge or the complaint inadmissible in evidence.
there was thus enough material to show that the statements relating
to the appellant were not founded on mere suspicion or that they were
the result of a pure conjuncture or guess. Hence, the appellant had failed
to discharge the burden laid on him under s. 123(4) of the Act to prove
that the impugned statements were not only false but in addition that the
respondent and his agents published them either believing them to be false
or not believing them to be true. [827A]
Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 773, followed.
(2) The charge that he incurred election expenses beyond the prescrihed limit must fail for want of evidence connecting this item of expenditure
with the election.
MANOI LAL v. PA WAR (Dua, J.)
(3) Section 9A of the Act only covers contracts which have ocen entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business with t~e appropriate Government for the supply of goods to or for the execution of
any works undertaken by that Government. In the present case, the contract to supply electricity by the Electric Supply Company could by no
means be considered to be a contract entered into by the respondent in the
course of his trade or business merely because he was at the relevant time
a Chairman of the Board of Directors ·of the Company, because the business of a companY could not be described as a trade or business of the
Chairman of its Board of Directors. -[828B]

## Text

822
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MANGI LAL
v.
K. R. PAWAR & ANR.
May 7, 1971
[J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.J
Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), ss. 9A. 77 & 123Publication of statements relating to the personal character or conduct of
a candidate-When a corrupt practice-Contract between Company and
Government-Chairman of Board of Directors of Company-If deemed
to have entered into contract with Government.
The appellant challenged the election of the first respondent on the
grounds: (I) that during the election campaign statements were 'Oade at
a public meeting that the appellants had misappropriated money, that statements w~re published in a weekly referring to the appellant as a corrupt
candidat«, that the statements were made with the first respondent's approval, that the statements were false and the respondent either believed
them to be false or did not believe them to be true, and that by publishing the false statements in relation to the personal character or conduct of
the appellant the first respondent appellant was guilty of a corrupt practice
under s. 123 (4) of the Representation of the People 'Act, 1951. (2) That
the respondent purchased petrol worth about Rs. 2,000 and if that amount
was added to the admitted expenditure it would show that the respondent
had incurred election expenses in excess of the limit prescribed by s. 77
of the Act read with r. 90 of the Election Rules.
(3) That the respondent
was a Chairman of the Board of Directors of an Electric Supply Company
which generated and supplied electricity to the State Government under a
contract. and therefore he was disqualified on the ground that he had a
subsisting contract with the State within the meaning of s. 9(A) of the Act.
The election petition was dismissed by the High Court
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) The appellant had himself admitted on oath as a witness
that a complaint was filed against him for embezzlement. The complaint
was pending in the criminal court at the time of the election.
A charge
was also framed in those !proceedings. The charge and complaint are relevant and there is no provision of law which makes the order framing the
charge or the complaint inadmissible in evidence.
there was thus enough material to show that the statements relating
to the appellant were not founded on mere suspicion or that they were
the result of a pure conjuncture or guess. Hence, the appellant had failed
to discharge the burden laid on him under s. 123(4) of the Act to prove
that the impugned statements were not only false but in addition that the
respondent and his agents published them either believing them to be false
or not believing them to be true. [827A]
Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 773, followed.
(2) The charge that he incurred election expenses beyond the prescrihed limit must fail for want of evidence connecting this item of expenditure
with the election.
MANOI LAL v. PA WAR (Dua, J.)
(3) Section 9A of the Act only covers contracts which have ocen entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business with t~e appropriate Government for the supply of goods to or for the execution of
any works undertaken by that Government. In the present case, the contract to supply electricity by the Electric Supply Company could by no
means be considered to be a contract entered into by the respondent in the
course of his trade or business merely because he was at the relevant time
a Chairman of the Board of Directors ·of the Company, because the business of a companY could not be described as a trade or business of the
Chairman of its Board of Directors. -[828B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1229
of 1970.
·
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Appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People
C
Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated March 27, 1970
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Election
Petition No. 1 of 1968.
L. M. Sir.ghvi, U. N. Bachawat, Sobhagmal Jain and S. K.
Dhingra, for the appellant.
D
V. S. Desai, A. M. Mathur, Bhim Singh and S. K. Gambhir,
for respondent no. 1.
The Judgment of .the Court was delivered by
Dua, J.-Mangi Lal Joshi has appealed to this Court under
s. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act 43 of 1951
(hereinafter called 'the Act') from the judgment and. order of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) dismissing his election petition under s. 81 of the Act challenging the election of
respondent No. 1 Krishnaji Rao Pawar, an Ex-Ruler of the
erstwhile Dewas Senior State, to the Legislative Assembly
of
Madhya Pradesh from the General-Dewas Assembly Constituency
No. 256 in the 'bye-election held in June -1968.
This seat had
fallen vacant on account of the death of Shri Hattesing, the successful candidate from this constituency in the General Elections held
in February 1967. The appellant had contested the election on
the ticket of the Indian National Congress whereas respondent
No. I had contested it as an independent candidate. The charges
on which the appellant's learned counsel has concentrated before
us relate to : -
(il the alleged corrupt practice of publication of false statements relating- to the personal character and conduct
of the appellant;
(ii) the incurring of election expenses in excess of the prescribed limit ; and
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(iii) the alleged disqualifications of the respondent on
the
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ground that he had a subsisting contract with the State
within the contemplation of s. 9A of the Act.
The
charge of bribery pressed in the High Court was not reagitated in this appeal.
The first point canvassed before us relates to the
alleged
corrupt practice of publication of false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of the
appellant as
contemplated by s, 123 sub-s. (4) of the Act.
Arguments
on
this point were confined to sub-issues (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) &
(gi of Issue No. 5 and the relevant sub-issues of Issue
No. 6.
The aforesaid sub-issues of Issue No. 5 cover the plea contained
in para. 13(b)(i) of the election petition. It was averred in that
sub-para that at a public meeting held at about 8 P.M. on June
13, 1968, at Jawahar Chowk at which the returned candidate
was present, Abdul Rehman Talib of Dewas,
Kanhaiyasingh
Thakur of Dewas, Kr. Virendrasingh, Deputy Minister of Labour,
Government of Madhya Pradesh and Khasherao Ghorpade
of
Dewas, in the course of their speeches, made statements relating
to the personal character and conduct of the petitioner I appellant
which were false and which the speakers and the returned candirlate either believed to be false or did not believe to be true and
those statements were reasonably calculated to
prejudice
the
petitioner/appellant's prospects of election .• Abdul Rahman Talib
was alleged to have said :-
"No votes should be given
to
such Congress
Candidate who has misappropriated the money."
Kr. VirendrasiJ!gh was imputed the following statement : -·
"f have come from Labour Colony.
Water tank
is lying empty.
All the money of water subscription
has been misappropriated by Congress candi<Jate INTUC,
Mangilal Joshi. The workers will not vote for him."
Kanhaiyasingh Thakur was stated to have said : -
"'The workers subscription has been misappropriated
by INTUC Joshi. There is also a case pending against
him in Court."
Khasherao Ghorpade was alleged to have said : -
"No votes be given to the corrupt candidate of Congress who has misappropriated workers' subscription
money ........... . ..
The relevant parts of Issue No .. 6 cover the plea containe<l
in para J3(b)(ii) of the election petition. The controversy covered
by this issue which now survives is confined to the statements
I
MANOI LAL v. PA WAR (Dua,J.)
825
alleged to have been published in the issue of the weekly
A
'Ranchandi' dated June 16, 1968. From that issue the following
extracts published in connection with the election in question
~ere relied upon by the appellant in support of the allegations
of the corrupt practice : -
"Voters beware of Joshi misappropriator of the
workers' subscription."
B
.. Corrupt Congress candidate Mangilal Joshi."
"Appeal to remain careful of the misappropriator of
mill workers' subscription, corrupt candidate Mangilal
Joshi."
According to the written statement on behalf of the returned
candidate (Respondent No. 1 in this Court) all that the speakers
at the meeting on June 13, 1968 in Jawahar Chowk had pointed
out was that a prosecution was pending against Mangi
Lal
Joshi and that he was charged with embezzlement of the funds
of the Mazdoor Sangh and of the donations of the workers.
Though in the written statement the returned candidate denied
that he had continued to be present at the meeting, the Court
below held that he was present throughout a tit! this finding in
our view must' be accepted. He also denied that the statement
made by the speakers at the meeting had been made with his
consent but in the circumstances of the case we would assume
that he cannot disown those statements which were made in his
interest and, therefore, they were in all probability made with
his approval.
In regard to the publication in 'Ranchandi' the respondent
pleaded in the written statement that the Editor of the weekly
used to publish election material on his own responsibility and
that the respondent had no concern with the statements published
therein. The subject-matter published in the issue of June 16,
1968 was stated not to have been published with the respondent's
consent. He, however, proceeded, without prejudice, to add that
the statements of fact contained therein were not believed by
him to be either false or untru~.
It is not disputed that on the evening of June 13, 1968 at
about 8-00 P.M. an election meeting was actually held in Jawahar
Chowk, Dewas, and it was called in support of the respondent's
election and also that this meeting was addressed by Abdul Rehman.
Talib, Kr. Virendrasingh and Kanhaiyasingh Thakur. In regard
to Khasherao Ghorpade, however, the respondent did. not admit
that he had addres8ed the meeting. The High Court after considering the evidence on the record and the arguments addressed
before it came to the conclusion that Abdul Rehman Talib had,
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during the course of his addr~ss at that meeting, stated tlaat
Mangilal Joshi had misappropriated the amount of subscription
realised from the labourers and that a case was pending in Court
against him and no votes should be cast in his favour. In regard
to Kr. Vifendrasingb, the High Court came to the conclusi0n
that the speech attributed to him bad not been proved.
About
Kanhaiyasingh Thakur's speech also, the High Court accepted
the evidence of the appellant's witnesses to the effect that Kanhaiyasingh Thakur had said that Mangilal Joshi had embezzled the
amount realised by him as subscription from the labourers and
a case in this connection was also going on against him in Court.
The High Court too'c notice of the fact that Kanhaiyasingh Thakur
was called as witness by the returned candidate and he
was
actually present in Court on September 23, 1969 ·but was given
up. In regard to Khasherao Ghorpade, the High Court accepted
the appellant's case that he had addressed the meeting in which
he bad stated that the appellant had misappropriated the money
realised as subscription from the labourers.
The High
Court
then considered the offending publication in the issue of
'Ranchandi' da.ted June 16, 1968. That Court after considering
the material to which its attention was drawn observed that in
this case the word 'corrupt' had been used in the context that
Mangilal Joshi had mis-appropriated or embezzled the subscription amount of the labourers and that Mangilal Joshi's description as a corrupt person was intended to convey the fact that
he had embezzled or mis-appropriated the subscription realised
from the labourers. The use of word 'Bhrastachar' in this connection was held to connote a corrupt person. After considering
some decisions of this Court on the construction to be placed
on s. 123 sub-section (4) of the Act which were cited in the High
Court, that court came to the conclusion that the appellant had
failed to prove that the impugned statements were false or were
either believed to be false or not believed to be true by the
speakers and the returned candidate. This conclusion was arrived
at in the 'background/ of the fact that the criminal complaint had
been filed against the appellant by one Lal Singh, as far back
as July 1965. Lal Singh appeared as witness for the respondent
as R.W. 13 in the High Court and proved his complaint from
the original record of criminal case No. 52 of 1965 in the Court
of AdditiOnaJ,. Magistrate (Jud.), Dewas.
A certified copy of
that complaint Exhibit D. 1 was also placed on the record.
According to that complaint it was alleged that Mangilal Joshi
was the President of Dewas Mill Mazdoor Sangh and had held
that office for the preceding 9 years.
Several amounts relating
to membership fee were stated to have been collected from the
workers and the amount of several thousand rupees were neither
dei'osited with the Mazdoor Sangh office nor entered in
the
rel1tted registers. It was principally on the basis of the pendency
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MANG! LAL v. PA WAR (Dua, J.)
of this complaint that the High Court came to the conclusion
that the appellant had not discharged the onus of showing that tlie
offending statements of facts were false and were believed.
by
the returned candidate, the speakers at the meeting in question
and the Ediitor of 'Ranchand:i' to be false or were not believed
by them to be true.
The charge relating to disqualifications
of
the
returned
candidate was based on the averment that the returned candidate
was a Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Dewas Senior
Electric Supply Company Private Limited and that this Company
generated electricity and supplied· the same to the State Government under a contract. On this basis it was pleaded that under
s. 9A of the Act the returned candidate must be held to be
disqualified from seeking election to the Assembly.
The High
Court repelled this contention holding that the returned candidate
could not be held to have directly entered into any contract with
the Government merely by reason of the fact he was the Chairman
of the Board· of Directors of the Electric ' Supply Company.
Reliance for this view was placed on a decision of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court reported as Satya Prakash v. Bashir Ahmed
Qureshi(').
In regard to the allegations of the election expenses incurred
by the returned candidate being in excess of the prescribed limit
it was contended that petrol worth about Rs. 2,000 had been
purchased by respondent No. I between May 31, 1968 and June
l 5. 1968 and if the whole of this amount wa~ to be added to
the expenditure admitted by the returned candidate to have been
incurred then this would exceed the prescribed limit, thereby contravening s. 77 of the Act. This contravention according to the
appellant's learned counsel is a corrupt practice covered by
s. 123 sub-section (6) of the Act. The High Court did not agree
with this submission and held that the petrol and oil purchased
from May 30, J968 to June 15, 1968 inclμded petrol and oil for
various other requirements of the returned candidate and
the
whole of it was not proved to have been used for election purposes.
The whole of this amount, therefore, could not be included in
the election expenses. The election petition as. already observed
was dismissed by the High Court.
On appeal, Dr. Singhvi has re-agitated all these points.
We
may first dispose of the point of disqualification.
Section 9A
of the Act on which the entire argument rests, reads :-
Disqualification for Government contracts.
"A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long
as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the
(1) A. I. R. 1963 M. P. 316.
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course of his trade or business with the appropriate Gov·
ernment for the supply of goods to, or for the execution
of any works undertaken by, that Government."
It is unnecessary for the purpO£e of 1this case to reproduce the
explanation.
It is clear that this section only covers contracts
whi'ch have been entered into by· a person in the course of his
trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply
of goods to or for the execution of any works undertaken by
that Government.
Dr. Singhvi contended that the supply of
electricity would amount to the supply of goods. That perhaps
is so. But, in our opinion, the contract of supply of electricity
by the Electric Supply Company can by no means be
considered to be a contract entered into by respondent No. I
in the course of his trade or business by reason merely of the
fact that he was at the relevant time Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Company. It is not possible to describe the
business of the Company to be the trade or business of the
Chairman of the Board of Directors. A Company registered under
the Indian Companies Act, it is settled beyond dispute, is
a
separate entity distinct from its shareholders. The Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Company while functioning as such
cannot be said to be engaged in his trade or business as contemplated. by s. 9A of the Act. The legal position is so clear that
the appellant's learned counsel, after an unsuccessful attempt to
persuade us to the contrary view, felt constrained not to pursue
this point seriously.
Coming now to the charge of the alleged corrupt practice
covered by s. 123(4) of the Act, we do not consider it necessary
t<' go into the evidence in detail or to consider at length the
arguments addressed on the question of the impression conveyed
to the people who had heard the speeches or read the offending
publication in the newspaper 'Ranchandi'. We will accept the
position that the offending statements, both oral, made in
the
various speeches referred to earlier and those contained in print
as published. in the Ranchandi dated June 16, 1968 (Ext.
Pf8)
do prima facie offend s. 123 (4) of the Act if false and either
ibelieved to be so or not believed to be true.
Now it is
not
dispute<I that the criminal complaint dated July 27, 1965, under
ss. 403 and 406 I.P.C. was filed against Mangi Lal appellant and.
Kanahiyalal by one Lal Singh in the Court of the Magistrate,
!st Oass, Dewas. In that complaint it was alleged that the
accused had collected from the workers of Dewas Mill
the
following amounts :._
I. Membership fee
2. Wageboard Fund
Rs. 15,000/-
Rs.
1,5001·
MANG! LAL v. PA WAR (Dua, J.)
3. Gratuity Fund
Rs.
1,500/-
4. Mazdoor Sevadal
Rs.
900/-
5. Travelling Fund
Rs.
1,000/-
6. Water Tax
Rs.
1,000/-
Jt was also averred in the complaint that except for a sum of
Rs. S or 6 thousands the remaining amounts were
neither
deposited with the Mazdoor Sangh' s office nor were they entered
in the relevant registers. Mangi Lal was described in the complaint as the President of the Dewas Mill Mazdoor Sangh and
Kanahiyala,l accused ijo. 2 as the Secretary of the said Union.
The appellant Mangi Lal in his cross-examination as P.W. 32
admitted that this complaint dated, July 27, 1965, had been filed
against him which was pending at the time of the bye-election
i.n question and that a charge had also been framed in that case
on August 22, 1968 (Ext. P / 9).
He further admitted that Lal
Singh was a mill worker in the Dewas Standard M'tll and was
also a representative of the Indian National Trade Union Congress of Dewas.
Lal Singh appeared as R. W. 13 and proved
that complaint and also a part of his statement dated April 12,
1968 made in the Court of the Magistrate.
The
returned
candidate appearing as R. W. 17 stated that he knew of this
complaint. The High Court on appraisal of the entire material
on the record expressed its final conclusion on Issues S(f) and
6(a) to (h), which are the relevant issues, in these words :
"Assuming, though not admitting, that the petitioner;
has succeeded in proving the falsity of the_ impugned
statement, even then he is not out of the woods. As held
in Sheopa!singh v. Rampratap (A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 677)
even if the statement is false the candidate making it is
protected unless he makes it believing it to be false not
believing it to be true i.e., to say statements which are
not true but made bona fide are also outside the ambit
of the provisions of sec:Von 123(4) of the Act. We have
seen above that the criminal complaint against the petitioner for having committed criminal misappropriation
or criminal breacli of trust was filed in
the criminal
Court in the year 1965 when this bye-election was not
even in contemplation. It Js no body's case that either
the three speaker&, namely Shri Abdual Rehman Talib
(R,W, 2), Shri Kanhaiyasingh Thakur and Shri Khaserao
Ghorpade or the Edjtor Shri Rameshwar Sen (R.w, 5)
or the returned candidate Shri Krishnajirao 1>awar
(R.W. 17) were in any way instrumental in. getting the
said complaint filed against the said petitioner.
This
very complaint was pending at the . time of this byeelection in question and a number of witnesses examined
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by the petitioner and also examined by the returned
candidate have stated that such a complaint was filed in
criminal court against the petitioner and it was pending.
In other words, filing of such a complaint against the
petitioner was a notorious fact known to several persons
in Dewas and subsequently the charge was framed against
him on the same material thus, the impugned statement
was not founded on mere suspicion pure or simple nor
was it the result of pure conjecture or guess. It had positive basis and the basis subsequently proved to be prlma
facie correct, therefore, the impugned
statement falls
within the ambit of bona fide statement.
In conclusion, therefore, I hold that the petitioner
failed to prove that the impugned statement was false
and was either believed to be false or not believed to be
true. Accordingly, I decide these two issues as not proved
Hence it follows that the impugned statement does not
fall within the mischief of section 123(4) of the Act."
We are in full agreement with the approach and the final conclusion of the High Court.
The, essential basic facts seems to
lls to be incontrovertl"ble, and if that be so, then clearly there
is a very heavy burden on the petitioner I appellant to prove the
most vital ingredients prescribed in s. 123(4) of the Act, namely,
that the impugned statement of fact is not only false, but in
addition that the respondent returned candidate and his agents
publishing the impugned statements either believed the same to
be false or did not believe them to be true : See Dr. J ag;it Singh
v. Giani Kartar Singh and others.(')
On this point there
is
absolutely no material on the record.
This challenge by the
appellant also fails.
Dr, Singhvi, we may in fairness to him point out, took
considerable pains to persuade us to hold that the order of. the
criminal Court framing the charge is inadmissible in the proceedings.
It was also submitted that the charge having been
framed afterwards could not be taken into account for considering
whether the impugned statements could be 'believed to be true
at the time they were made.
Dr. Singhvi submitted that if the
order of the criminal Court> is ignored and if the appellant's
denial about embezzlement is taken into account then the statements made at the meeting and those published in 'Ranchandi'
must be held to be false and believed to be so or not believed
to be true, This argument is difficult to accept. To begin with,
the appellant has himself admitted on oath as a witness
that
the complaint was filed against him for embezzlement and a
(I) A. I. R. 1966 S. C.773.
MANG! LAL V. PAWAR (Dua,/.)
831
charge was also framed in those proceedings.
This admission
A
cannot be ignored.
We are also not inclined to agree with
Dr. Singhvi that the order framing the charge or the complaint are
inadmissible in evidence. Dr. Singhvi has not drawn our atten·
tion to any provision of law which would render them inadmissible
in the present proceedings.
The counsel then submitted that Lal 2ingh's statement in the
criminal Court is clearly inadmissible as evidence and the High
Court was wrong in taking that statement into consideration.
Here again, we think that the counsel in not quite correct.
The statement of Lal Singh would seem to us to be relevant
and
admissibfo
under several
provisions of the
Indian
Evidence Act. We need onlr refer to ss.,7, 8 and 11(2) of that
Act.
In this connection it 1s interesting to point out lhat Lal
Singh's statement in the Criminal Court was got proved in his
cross-examination at the instance of the election petitiouer I
appellant. It would, therefore, be a question for consideration
if the appellant can now be permitted to find fault· with what
he himself had elicited by cross-examining R.W. 13. However.
even excluding this cross-examination there is. in our opinion,
.ample material in support of the conclusions of the High Court.
This takes us to the charge of corrupt practi~..1 iir·S. 123(6)
of the Act. This charge relates to
the respOi\"clepf' 'returned
candidate's election expenses bein~ in excess of the limit pres··
cribed by s. 77 of the Act read with r. 90 of the Election Rules.
The only point in respect of this charge pressed before us is that
petrol worth Rs. 2,000 /. was purchased by the returned candidate
from Mis A. J. Khanuja & Sons, Bombay-Agra Road, Dewas.
If this amount is added
to the admitted expenditure of Rs.
6,576-78, then the expenses would exceed the prescribed limit and
the election must according to ,the appellant be set aside on this
ground. Dr. Singhvi addressed elaborate arguments on this point
with the object of showing that the entire petrol purchased from
the aforesaid firm must be held to have been purchased for the
purpose of the election in question.
We do not
consider it
necessary to deal with the arguments at length because the
charge must fail for want of evidence connecting this item of
expenditure with the election. The High Court has observed in
1his connection :
"The petitioner has not adduced any evidence on
this point except that of Daulatrao (P.W. !) who has also
filed extracts of accounts of petrol and oil etc. purchased
by the returned candidate from his master MI s A. J.
Khanuja and Sons, Dewas during the releV'ant period.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
832
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1971] SUPP. s.c.R.
Neither these extracts nor the evidence of this witness
establishes the additional expenditure of Rs. 2000 I· as
pleaded by the petitioner. The returned candidate Shri
Krishnajirao Pawar (R.W. 17) has deposed that at the
relevant time he owned two jeeps, five cars, one tractor
and one pick-up van and agricultural land of about 500
acres. He also deposed that during the period of this
bye-election he used only the jeeps for election propaganda but petrol was purchased not only for the jeeps
but for cars also which were used for house-hold purposes. He further deposed that Diesel was used for agricultural purposes. His testimony further shows that he had
instructed Mis A. J. Khanuja and Sons Dewas that petrol
and oil purchased for to the election purposes should be
marked distinctly and, therefore, he used to sent the
counter-foil for purchase of eetrol and oil which used to
be marked with latter 'g' to indicate that the same were
purchase for election purposes.
About marking, the
petitioner's witness, Daulatrao (P.W. I) says something.
The total costs of the marked items so called out from
the extracts (Ex. P. I and P. 2) have not been shown
to be an additional expenditure and not covered b)
the election expenses return filed by Shri Krishnaji Rao
Pawar (R.W. 17).
He is the ruler of Senior Dewas State, possessed
several vehicles at the relevant time and, therefore, undoubtedly needed petrol and oil for them, as also oil for
traietor and pick up van during the said period for
his domestic purposes and agricultural purposes besides election purposes.
The evidence of Daulatrao
(P. W. !) himself would show that in the month of
April 1968 when there was no hectic activity about
the election.
The cost of petrol and oil purchased
by him during that month amounted to Rs.
2604-12
Paise. That would indicate that he requires Jar3e quantity
of petrol and oil for his motor vehicles, oil engine etc.
used for domestic and agricultural purposes. It is tme
that the extracts of accounts (Ex. P. I and P. 2) show
that cost of petrol and oil purchased from 31-5-1968.
was about Rs. 2250 /- but it is impossible to believe that
the entire cost was incurred in connection with this election. I hold that the petitioner has failed to establish
that the returned candidate had incurred or authorised
additional expenditure of Rs. 2,000/- from 31-5-1968 to
15-6-1968 in connection with his election and I decide this.
issue as not proved."
MANOI LAL v. PAWAP, (Dua, J.)
833
The reasoning and approach of the High Court is unexcepA.
tionable and nothing urged by Dr. Singhvi has persuaded us to
disagree with the High Court's conclusions.
These were the only points urged at the bar in support of
the appeal. As we find all of them to be without substance, thl
appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
a
V.P.S.
App,eal dismisH«.
53-1 S. C. lndia/71