# MANGULAI, CHUNILAL v. MAMLAL MAGANLAL & ANR

- **Citation:** [1968] 2 S.C.R. 401
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1965
- **Bench:** S M. S!Kri. K. S. Hegde, J. M. Shelat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mangulai-chunilal-v-mamlal-maganlal-anr-4214
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Bo111ha_l Pn11·i11cial Af1111icipal Corporation Act, 1949 ss. 69 and 481--
Filing of Co111plaint. lrho can-"Take proceedj.11gs," n1ec.,ning of.
The appellant-licence inspector, filed a complaint against the resPondent.
The appellant had obtained permission to file the complaint
from the Deputy Health Officer, "{ho had been
delegated
the powers
under s. 69(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation .. Act,
1949, by the Municipal Commissioner.
The respondent was convicted.
but, the High Court in revision, set aside the conviction.
Jn appeal tO
this Court. the appellant contended that there was no limiting words in
the order delegating the power to the
Deputy Health Officer that he
should file a complaint himself and not authorise others; and that power
to take proceedings includes power to authorise others to institute pro~
ceedings in the context of the Act.
Dismissing the appeal.
HELD ;
Only the authorities mentioned in s. 48·1 read with s. 69
could launch proceedings. a_gainst persons chaTgcd with offt10ces under the
Act or the rule..". regulations or bye-laws made under it.
A person who
files a complaint under the Act must show that he has the authority to
file that con1plaint and that authority cannot be conferred upon bv an
erroneous interpretat~on long acquiesced. f406 D-Fl
The word<;. ··rake proceedings'' cannot be interpret~. to mean "order
proceedings to he taken" because the word "take'" is an E.ngfish \\-'Ord and
onlv a n1canin_g \\'hich it bears in the English language can be ascribed
to ·it.
[406 11-·CJ
Rallovda< Aearwalr. v. J. C. Chakravartv, [196@1 2 S.C.R. 739. T. P.
Thakur v. Rati/al Motilal Patel, [1968] I S.C.R. 455, followed.
S1a1e Y. Manila/ Jethalal. ( l 953) 55 B.L.R. 377, disapproved.

## Text

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MANGULAI, CHUNILAL
v.
MAMLAL MAGANLAL & ANR.
November 23. 1967
(S M. S!KRI. K. S. HEGDE AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.J
Bo111ha_l Pn11·i11cial Af1111icipal Corporation Act, 1949 ss. 69 and 481--
Filing of Co111plaint. lrho can-"Take proceedj.11gs," n1ec.,ning of.
The appellant-licence inspector, filed a complaint against the resPondent.
The appellant had obtained permission to file the complaint
from the Deputy Health Officer, "{ho had been
delegated
the powers
under s. 69(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation .. Act,
1949, by the Municipal Commissioner.
The respondent was convicted.
but, the High Court in revision, set aside the conviction.
Jn appeal tO
this Court. the appellant contended that there was no limiting words in
the order delegating the power to the
Deputy Health Officer that he
should file a complaint himself and not authorise others; and that power
to take proceedings includes power to authorise others to institute pro~
ceedings in the context of the Act.
Dismissing the appeal.
HELD ;
Only the authorities mentioned in s. 48·1 read with s. 69
could launch proceedings. a_gainst persons chaTgcd with offt10ces under the
Act or the rule..". regulations or bye-laws made under it.
A person who
files a complaint under the Act must show that he has the authority to
file that con1plaint and that authority cannot be conferred upon bv an
erroneous interpretat~on long acquiesced. f406 D-Fl
The word<;. ··rake proceedings'' cannot be interpret~. to mean "order
proceedings to he taken" because the word "take'" is an E.ngfish \\-'Ord and
onlv a n1canin_g \\'hich it bears in the English language can be ascribed
to ·it.
[406 11-·CJ
Rallovda< Aearwalr. v. J. C. Chakravartv, [196@1 2 S.C.R. 739. T. P.
Thakur v. Rati/al Motilal Patel, [1968] I S.C.R. 455, followed.
S1a1e Y. Manila/ Jethalal. ( l 953) 55 B.L.R. 377, disapproved.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
59 of 1965
Appeal from the judgment and order dated Novemqer 9, 1964
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of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Revision .Application No.
145 of l 964.
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8. R. Agarwala. for the appellant.
R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J.
This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court
of Gujarat is directed against the judgment and order of the said
High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 145 of 1964
-I 0 2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1%8] 2 S C.R.
whereby the High Court allowed the application and set aside the
conviction and sentence of Manila! Maganlal. one of the.respondents before us.
The only point involved in this appeal is whether the licence inspector, Mangulal Chunilal, was competent to
file the complaint under s. 376 (I) ( d) ( i). read with s. 392( 1 ) (a),
of the
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949,
hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The relevant facts are not now in dispute and are as follows :
On October J 0, 1963, Mangulal Chunilal, licence inspector, filed
a complaint against Manila! Maganlal, hereinafter referred to as
the accused. alleging that the accused .had carried on the work
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of blacksmith by manufacturing machinery, spare parts and safe
cupboards, without obtaining licence. At the end of the comp:aint'
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it was stated :
"l have obtained permission for filing this complaint
from the Medical Officer of Health by order no.
dated 1-10-63."
The licence inspector had applied to the Deputy Health Ofticer,
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. to accord permission to file
the complaint as offence under s. 392 (1) (a) of the Act had been
committed.
The Deputy Health Officer noted :
""Permission is granted under Section
481( 1 )(a)
of Chapter 30 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporation Act of
1949 to file complaint for
the
offence committed in breach of the provisions of law as
shown in the above report."
The Deputy Health Officer (including Deputy Health Officer.
Food and Licence Branch) had been delegated ·certain powers
under s. 69(1) of the Act by the Municipal Commissioner. The
powers delegated to the Deputy Health Officer include :
"Power to take proceedings against
any person who charged with
.•
Any offence
Sec. 481 (I)
(~)(i)(iii)
(i) Under section 392(i) and/or 392(2) of the
B.P.M.C. Act 1949 for breach of provisions
mentioned in section below :-
164, 184(1)(a). 233(1), 297, 376, 377(1),
381, 383, 384''.
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MANGULAL V. MANILAL ( Sikri, J.)
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It was contended before the High Court that the complaint
had been filed by the Licence Inspector whereas the delegation
under s. 69 of the Act was to the Deputy Health Officer to take
proceedings as provided in s. 481 of the Act.
It was contended
that the expression 'take proceedings" in s. 481 means instituting
a complaint and does noi mean causing a complaint to be filed.
Raju, J., who heard the revision, accepted this contention.
He
declined to follow the judgment of the Bombay High Court in
The State v. Manila/ Jethalal(') in which it had been held that
the words "take proceedings" meant "order proceedings to
be
taken."
The learned counsel for the appellant contends ( 1 ) that the
decision of the Bombay High Court in The State
v.
Mani/al
Jetha/al(') was binding on the learned Judge in view of the full
bench decision in State of Gujarat v.
Gordhandas Keshavji
Gandhi('); (2) that power to take proceedings includes power
to au'thorise others to institute proceedings in the context of the
Act and ( 3) that there were no limiting words in the order delegating the power to the Deputy Health Officer that he should file
a complaint himself and not authorise others.
The respondents ace unfortunately not represented before us.
This Court has already held in T. P. Thakur v. Rati/a/ Motilal
Patel(') that the judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High
Court in State of Gujarat v. Gordhandas Keshavji Gandhi(') was
binding on Raju, J.
Following that judgment we hold
that
Raju, J., was not entitled to. dissent from the judgment of the
Bombay High Court in The State v. Mani/al Jethalal(').
Before dealing with the main point raised before us it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act :
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"S. 69 (I). Subject to the provisions of sub-sections
1 2)
and ( 3), any of the powers, duties or functions
conferred or imposed upon or vested in the Commissioner
or the Transport Manager by or under any of
the
provisions of this Act may be exercised, performed or
discharged. under the control of the Commissioner or
the Transport Manager, as the. case may be and subject
to his revision and to such conditions and limitations.
if any, as may be prescribed by rules, or as he shall
think fit to prescribe in a manner not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act or rules, by any municipal
officer whom the Commissioner or the Transport
Manager generally or specially empowers by order
(I) (1953) 55 B.L.R. 377.
(2) (1962) 3 Guj. L.R. 269.
,Jij1968] I S.C.R.455.
404
St:PREME COURT REPORTS
in writinQ in this hchali; anJ
tt>
the
extent
to
which any municipal oflicer is "' empowered the word
"Commissioner" and the
words "Transport Manager"
occurring in any provision in this Act. shall he deemed
to include such officer.
S. 481. ( 1) The Commissioner may-
( a) take, or withdraw
from proccedinl!s
against
any person who is charged with-
( i) any offence against this Act or any rule. regulation or by-law;
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(ii) any offence which affects or is likely to affect
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any property or interest of the Corporation or the due
administration of this Act;
(iii) committing any nui>ance whatever;
I h) compound ariy offence against this Act or any
rule, regulation or by-law which under the law for the
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time being in force may legally be compounded;
( c) defend any election
petition
brouμht
under
section 16;
(d 1 defend.
:1dmit or compromise
anv
appeal
against a rateable value or tax brought und~r section
406;
(e) take, withdraw from or compromi;e. proceedings under sub-section ( 2) of section 402. sub-sections
( 3) and ( 4) of section 439 and sections 391 and 416
for the recovery of expenses or compensation claimed
to be due to the Corporation;
(f) withdraw or compromise any clainl for a sum
not exceeding five hundred rupees against any person
in respect of a penalty payable under a contract entered into with such person by the Commissioner, or.
with the approval of the Standing Committee. any such
claim for any sum exceeding five hundred rupees;
(g) defend any suit or other legal
proceedin)!s
brought al!ainst the Corporation or against the Commissioner or a municipal officer or servant in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done by them. respectively. in their official capacity;
(h) with the approval of the Standing Committee.
admit or compromise any claim. suit or legal proceeding brought against the Corporation or aμainst the ComE
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MANGCLAL v. MANILAL (Sikri, J.)
missioner or a municipal officer or servant, in respect
of anything done or omitted to be done as aforesaid;
(i) with the like approval, institute and prosecute
any suit or withdraw. from or compromise any suit or
any claim other than a claim of the description specified in clause (f), which has been instituted or made
in !he name of the Corporation or the Commissioner;."
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It is not disputed that s. 69 enables the Commissioner to dele-·
gate powers duties or functions conferred or imposed upon him'
or vested in him to a municipal officer.
The Commissioner havi;ig delegated his powers to the Deputy lJealth Officer, the, question arises whether it is the Deputy Health Officer or the .Licenc~
Inspector who. should take proceedings against ihe accused within
the meaning of s. 481 ( l )(a). It is not disputed that .under subcls. (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of s. 481(1), the various
actions contemplated in these sub-clauses would have to be taken
by the delegate himself.
In other words, he would have to institute a suit within sub-cl. ( i) and admit or compromise any claim,
suit or legal proceeding within sub-cl. (h), but it is said that the
word "take" has been deliberately used in sub-els. (a) and (e)
to enable the delegate fo entrust initiation of proceedings to another person because otherwise it would be impossible to carry
on the administration of the municipality.
It is said that thousands of complaints have to be filed and it would be casting undue
burden on the Deputy Health Officer to sign all the complaints.
We are not impressed by this argument. It is true that the word·
"take" has various meanings but no dictionary or authority has
been placed before us to show that the word can mean "cause
to be taken".
It seems to us that the word "take" was used be-·
cause. if the word "institute" had been used it may not have been
appropriate to cover all proceedings that can be taken under
s. 48l(l)(a).
Bavdakar, J., had observed in The State v. Manila/ Jethala/(1) :
"One can see easily why the words "take" are used.
It was desired to combine in one clause the two powers,
the power to launch proceedings and the power to withdraw proceedings, and if the words "withdraw from proceedings" were used, it was not easy to use the words
"order proceedings to be taken" in combination with
the words "withdraw proceedings."
We are unable to accept this as correct.
Bavdekar, J., further
observed:
(!) (1953) 55 ll.L.R. 177-1°9.
406
'l<l'RLME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 2 'CIC
"If the Legislature had in such a case .really wanted
that 1he complaint should actually be either
of
the
Commissioner or an officer empowered by him, i! would
have been perfectly easy to use 1he words which find
place in several
Acts,
for example, "except upon a
complaint in writing of the Commissioner or an officer
to whom he has delegated his powers."
It is true that if the language suggested by him had been u,ed
no dispute would have arisen.
But we are not free to interpret
the words "take proceedings" to mean "order proceedings to be
taken" because the word "take" is an English word and we can
only ascribe to it a meaning which it bears in the English languaj!e.
The learned counsel for the appellant says
that since
the
decisien of the Bombay High Court in
The State v.
Mani/al
Je1halal(1) no other decision has t ·ken any other view and we
should not disturb the view which has prevailed since that decision.
We are unable to accept this contention.
This is not a case where
a series of decisions have taken a particular view and that view
has been widely accepted and various right• have accrued :o parties acting on that view.
A person who tiles a complaint under
the Act must show that he has the au1hori1y 10 file that complaint
and that authoriy cannot be conferred upon him by an erroneous
intcrrre:aiion Jon~ acquiesced in. This Court held in /Ja/1.1;,Jm
A i?arwa/a v. J. C. Chakravarty (') that a complaint under
the
Calcutta Municip;il Act. I 923, could only be filed by the authorities mentioned therein and not by an ordinary citizen.
Similarly, here it seems to L" that only the authorities mentioned in
'- 481, read with s. 69. can launch proceedings against persons
charged with offences under the Act or the rules. regulations or
bye-laws made under it.
This Court noticed the decision of the
Bombay High Court in Manila/ lethalars ca.w•(1)
in Bnllal'flas
Aganvala v. J. C. Clrakravarty(') and observed:·
"Tlte decision proceeded. however, on a somewhat
wide meanin!! g;vcn to the words
'take
proceedings'
that part of the decision. as to the corrcctnes<; of which
we say nothing. docs not concern us here, because the
wwds used in s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act are
different."
We may mention that Hidayatullah, J., observed
at p. 76-l
in
Ra//avdar Agarwala's case(') :
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"An officer of the municipality must himself perform
his duties
created by statute or bye-law. He cann01
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delegate them to others, unless expressly authorised in
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MANGULAL V. MANILAL (Sikri, J.)
this behalf. The Act does not so empower the officers
to delegate their functions in their turn, and thus an
officer to whom the power is delegated by the Chairman
must perform them himself."
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We agree with the above observations of Hidayatullah. J.
On
this point there does not seem to have been any difference of
opinion between him ancl the majority; he differed only on the
question whether on th~ .acts in that case there was in fact
a
delegation or not.
For the aforesaid reasons we dismiss the appeal and maintain
the order passed by the High Court.
Y.P.
Appeal dismiueJ ..