# MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR AND ORS v. GOURANGA CHANDRA DEY AND ORS - **Citation:** [2004] 2 S.C.R. 742 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2004-02-26 - **Case number:** Civil Rule No. 466 of 1997 - **Bench:** Shivaraj V. Patil, D.M. Dharmadhikari - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/manik-lal-majumdar-and-ors-v-gouranga-chandra-dey-and-ors-19757 - **Pages:** 33 ## Headnote Rent Control and Eviction: Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 197 5; Ss. 12, 13 & 20 C and Rules thereunder: Sui/for eviction on grounds of bonafide requirement and default in payment of rent-Rent Control Court found tenants defaulters and directed them to handover possession of the premises to Landlord-Appeal dismissed by Civil Court holding that appeal filed without depositing arrears of rent, not D maintainable-Revision petition allowed by District Court-Case remanded to Appellate Court-Challenge to-High Court held that appeal is not maintainable under Section 20 of the Act unless mandatory requirements of depositing of rent, before filing of appeal, is complied with-On appeal, matter referred to larger Bench. E Held :-Per Sltivaraj V. Patil, J: Depositing of arrears of rent is a condition mandatory for preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the ActMandatory conditions could not be relaxed-Court could stop further proceeding in case tenant fails to deposit subsequent arrears of rent-Condition could rlot be diluted on the ground of hardship to tenant, more so, when he F was already given an opportunity before the Rent Control Court-Appellate Authority-Jurisdiction of-Does not possess all powers of Rent Control Court-Appellate Authority could neither relax condition nor it could pass an effective order staying further proceeding-Legislative intention-If plain grammatical interpretation of the provisions in a Statute gives rise to absurdity/ inconsistency, Court could disregard such interpretation and adopt the G interpretation which would give ·effect to the purpose of legislature-Since provisions as to mandatory requirement of deposit of arrears of rent before preferring an appeal are clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation required to determine intention of the legislature-Interpretation of Statutes. H Heid:-Per Dliarmadltikari, J: Appellate Authority has been conferred 742 - MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY 743 with all powers of Rent Control Court-Admitted arrears of rent/recurring A rent accrued/accumulated during eviction proceedings before preferring an appeal are required to be determined in accordance with the provisions of law on fixation of time/manner of deposit-Period of limitation for preferring an appeal not to be construed as period of deposit of arrears of rent as precondition for preferring an appeal-Legislature-Presumption-Assuming that B provisions under sub Section (4) a/Section 20 does not confer on the Appellate Authority full power of Rent Control Court-Provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 20 would be rendered otiose making the legislature redundantSuch construction must be avoided-Hence, a tenant may file an appeal within the prescribed period, provided he seeks an order from the Appellate Authority in accordance with Section 13(2) and make deposit of arrears of rent/future C rent as determined by the Authority-Interpretation of Statutes. Words and Phrases: 'no', 'unless', 'prefer', 'all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due '-Meaning of in the context of Tripura Rent Control Legislation. D The question that arose for consideration in this appeal was as to whether an appeal could be preferred under Section 20 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, without making payment or depositing of all arrears of rent as admitted by the tenant as per provisions under Section 13(1) of the Act. E It was contended for the appellant-tenant that the High Court was not correct in its findings that an appeal could not be preferred without depositing arrears of rent; that an opportunity should have been given by the Appellate Court for making payment of admitted rent due before an appeal is heard; and that as per provisions of law under Section 13 of the Act, an appeal F preferred even without depositing of arrears of rent due could not be dismissed. On behalf of the Respondent-landlord, it was submitted that Section 13(1) of the Act in clear and unambiguous terms ## Text _Characters 0–39,801 of 83,769. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39801 for what follows._ A MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR AND ORS. v. GOURANGA CHANDRA DEY AND ORS. FEBRUARY 26, 2004 B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.] Rent Control and Eviction: Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 197 5; Ss. 12, 13 & 20 C and Rules thereunder: Sui/for eviction on grounds of bonafide requirement and default in payment of rent-Rent Control Court found tenants defaulters and directed them to handover possession of the premises to Landlord-Appeal dismissed by Civil Court holding that appeal filed without depositing arrears of rent, not D maintainable-Revision petition allowed by District Court-Case remanded to Appellate Court-Challenge to-High Court held that appeal is not maintainable under Section 20 of the Act unless mandatory requirements of depositing of rent, before filing of appeal, is complied with-On appeal, matter referred to larger Bench. E Held :-Per Sltivaraj V. Patil, J: Depositing of arrears of rent is a condition mandatory for preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the ActMandatory conditions could not be relaxed-Court could stop further proceeding in case tenant fails to deposit subsequent arrears of rent-Condition could rlot be diluted on the ground of hardship to tenant, more so, when he F was already given an opportunity before the Rent Control Court-Appellate Authority-Jurisdiction of-Does not possess all powers of Rent Control Court-Appellate Authority could neither relax condition nor it could pass an effective order staying further proceeding-Legislative intention-If plain grammatical interpretation of the provisions in a Statute gives rise to absurdity/ inconsistency, Court could disregard such interpretation and adopt the G interpretation which would give ·effect to the purpose of legislature-Since provisions as to mandatory requirement of deposit of arrears of rent before preferring an appeal are clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation required to determine intention of the legislature-Interpretation of Statutes. H Heid:-Per Dliarmadltikari, J: Appellate Authority has been conferred 742 - MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY 743 with all powers of Rent Control Court-Admitted arrears of rent/recurring A rent accrued/accumulated during eviction proceedings before preferring an appeal are required to be determined in accordance with the provisions of law on fixation of time/manner of deposit-Period of limitation for preferring an appeal not to be construed as period of deposit of arrears of rent as precondition for preferring an appeal-Legislature-Presumption-Assuming that B provisions under sub Section (4) a/Section 20 does not confer on the Appellate Authority full power of Rent Control Court-Provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 20 would be rendered otiose making the legislature redundantSuch construction must be avoided-Hence, a tenant may file an appeal within the prescribed period, provided he seeks an order from the Appellate Authority in accordance with Section 13(2) and make deposit of arrears of rent/future C rent as determined by the Authority-Interpretation of Statutes. Words and Phrases: 'no', 'unless', 'prefer', 'all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due '-Meaning of in the context of Tripura Rent Control Legislation. D The question that arose for consideration in this appeal was as to whether an appeal could be preferred under Section 20 of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, without making payment or depositing of all arrears of rent as admitted by the tenant as per provisions under Section 13(1) of the Act. E It was contended for the appellant-tenant that the High Court was not correct in its findings that an appeal could not be preferred without depositing arrears of rent; that an opportunity should have been given by the Appellate Court for making payment of admitted rent due before an appeal is heard; and that as per provisions of law under Section 13 of the Act, an appeal F preferred even without depositing of arrears of rent due could not be dismissed. On behalf of the Respondent-landlord, it was submitted that Section 13(1) of the Act in clear and unambiguous terms states that no appeal could be preferred against any order of the Rent Control Court without depositing G of arrears of rent admitted. Referring the appeal to a larger Bench, the Court HELD: Per, Shivaraj V. Patil, J: H 744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] 2 S.C.R. A 1.1. From the plain language and clear terms of Section 13(1) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act it follows that payment or deposit of all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of the payment or deposit is a mandatory requirement for preferring an appeal under Section 20 oftheAct. (755-E-F) B 1.2. Unless an appeal is preferred after complying with the condition of the payment of arrears of rent or deposit of the admitted arrears of rent due, the question of either pendency of the appeals or stopping of further proceedings in the appeal does not arise. There are two separate aspects - one is that the compliance to be made before preferring an appeal and the C other is that the tenant has to continue to pay or deposit the rent, which may subsequently become due. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act would come into operation on the tenant failing to pay or deposit subsequent arrears of rent arising during the pendency of the appeal, so as to stop further proceedings in the appeal. But, it cannot relieve the statutory compulsion or the mandatory requirement of Section 13(1), that is, paying or depo~iting the D arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal and in this regard no discretion is left to the Authorities. No effective order of stay of further proceedings ca~ be passed by the appellate authority unless an appeal is preferred after payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent. This is also a - ' • ~ .. 1 • i ~ . factor to indicate that payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent is E essential before preferring an appeal. Remedy' of appeal is a creation of statute and it is open to the' legislature to provide for an appeal subject to certain conditions. Insistence of payment or depositing of arrears of rent admitted as stated in Section 13(1) of the Act cannot be diluted or d~feated mer_ely on the ground of hardship _to a tenant more so when tenant already _had one opportuni~y before the Rent Control.Court in regard to making payment or F depositing arrears of rent .. Perhaps it was considered unreasonable or unnecessary to again provide opportunity before Appellate Authority to a tenant that too to pay or deposit admitted arrears of rent. [756-E-F; 757-C-E) Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, [2003) 2 SCC 577, reHed on. G t.3. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act cannot render mandatory requirement under sub-section (1) of Section 13 ineffective or otiose. It is well settled principle of interpretation that every part of the prov~sio~ has to be given meaning and effect in the context of a statute. When there is express provision made in Section 13(1) of the Act in emphatic terms using negative H words indicating mandatory requirements of payment or deposit of arrears - MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY 745 of admitted rent before preferring an appeal under .Section 20, neither sub- A section (3) of Section 13 nor sub-Section (4) of Section 20 would be of any avail to. the tenants. (758-B-C) Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, [2003] 2 SCC 577; E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors., [2003] 1 SCC 123 and Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990) 1 B sec 277, relied on. 2. Intention of the legislature is primarily to be ascertained from the text of an enactment in question and if the strict grammatical interpretation ' gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the court could discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation, which will give effect to the C purpose of legislation. In the case on hand, no such anomaly, absurdity or inconsistency would arise even if plain and grammatical interpretation is given to Section 13(1) of the Act (760-B-C) Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama ofVedem Vasco De Gama, D (1990) 1 SCC 277 and Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd and Ors., [2003) 2 SCC 111, relied on. Chinnamma v. Gopalan and Ors., [1995) 6 SCC 491, distinguished. 3. The Division Bench 9f the High Court was right in holding that there E was no conflict in the judgments in cases of Chinnamma and Binapani Roy, meaning thereby payment or deposit of all arrears of rent admitted is mandatory before preferring an appeal by a tenant under Section 20 of the Act [762-B-C) Chinnamma v. Gopalan, (1995) 6 SCC 491 and Binapani Roy v. State of F Tripura, (1994) 1 GLR 98, distinguished. Per, Dharmadhikari J. 1.1. As has been rightly observed by Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Binapani Roy Section 13 of the Act has been inserted with the G intendment to avoid litigations for realiiatJon of arrears of rents which is likely to accumulate during the long period oflitigation and also to deter the tenant from resorting to unfair practice to use and occupy tenanted premises without payment of rent during the long period of protracted litigation. The decision in Binapani Roy does not directly deal with and answer the question posed H 746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R. A before this Court. In that case the interpretation of the words and expression "admitted by the tenant to be due" as used in sub-section (1) of Section·13 of the Act, came up for interpretation. To make the said provision workable it was held that the expression can not be given a literal meaning as conveying only the rent which has been admitted in the pleadings by the tenant. It was B held that in order to fulfil the object of the provision which is in the interest of the landlord the expression is to be understood reasonably to mean 'the rent which can be found to be due from the facts and materials on record. The Division Bench of the High Court rightly observed that the earlier decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Binapani Roy's case 'was on a different point, thus not required to be reconsidered by the larger Bench in · C the light of decision of the Supreme Court in Chinnamma 's case.The question, therefore, needs to be answered on a proper and reasonable interpretation of the provisions of Section 13 read with Section 20 of the Act. [766-G, H; 767-A-B; F,G] Binapani Roy v. State of Tripura, (1994) 1 GLR 98 and Chinnamma v. D Gopalan,. [1995] 6 sec 491, referred to. E 1.2. Sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the Act make express mention both of "Rent Control Court and appellate authority" for the application of those provisions to original proceedings as also to the appellate proceedings. Deposit of arrears of rent and future rent are two preconditions for the tenant to contest the original proceedings and avail remedy of appeal. In sub-section (2) of Section 13, there is only mention of Rent Control Court empowering it to fix time and manner of deposit of arrears and future rent. The omission of words "appellate authority" in sub-section (2) of Section 13 primdfaeie gives an impression that fixation of time and p · manner for two kinds of deposits of arrears and future rent are not required to be made by the appellate authority. The omission of the w-0rds "appellate authority" in sub-section (2) however, is made good by incorporating subsection (4) in Section 20. [768-F, G-H; 769-B) · 1.3. Section 20with its sub-sections creates forum for appeals, describes G nature of power of appellate authority and p·rescribes period of limitation for appeals, preferable either by the landlord or by the tenant, as the case may be, who feels aggrieved by the order of Rent Control Court. The legislative intent of conferring same power of Rent Control Court under sub-section (2) on the Appellate Authority is clear from incorporation of sub-section ( 4) in H Section 20 of the Act which regulates the power and procedure of appeal. - - , .. MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY 747 Since the appellate authority has been conferred with all powers of Rent A Control Court, non-mention in sub-section (2) of 'appellate authority' with 'Rent Control C::ourt' seems to be a deliberate omission. [769-B, D-E] 1.4. It is true that when a tenant prefers an appeal there may be a case where the arrears of rent due up to the date of order of the Rent Control Court are already quantified and the dispute of quantum and/or rate of rent B stands decided by the original order. That woulea enable the tenant to deposit the arrears at the time of filing of the appeal. [769-E, F] · 1.5. The Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Binapani Roy has reasonably construed the expression "all arrears of rent admitted by the C tenant to be due'', as has been used in Section 13(1) of the Act, that the expression as not merely conveying 'such rent as has been admitted by such tenant in his pleadings.' According to the Division Bench the expression has to be so construed as to fulfil the object of the Act to disable the tenant to withhold rent due pending eviction proceedings against him or appeal by him. The expression has been construed to mean 'the rent which is ascertainable D as admitted from the record of the case.' The legislature also intends that the so-called admitted arrears and recurring rent to be deposited or paid by the tenant during eviction proceedings or appeal preferred by him, are required to be judicially or quasi-judicially determined in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, with fixation of time and manner of its deposit or payment. Such an interpretation of the expression is necessary to meet various E kinds of situations in different cases. In such situations, it might be found necessary in original proceedings for the Rent Control Court to determine the rent which can be said to be admittedly due and similar determination might be required in appeal. [769-G, H; 770-A-C] Binapani Roy v. State of Tripura, (1994) 1 GLR 98, referred to. F 2.1. The period of limitation prescribed for preferring an appeal under clause (b) of sub-section 20 of the Act is not the period fixed for deposit of rent as a pre-condition for preferring an appeal by the tenant. However, subsection (1) of Section 13 lays down two pre-condmons for preferring an appeal. G Such requirements on the part of the tenant for preferring an appeal are clear . indications that 30 days' time fixed for appeal in sub-section (2) of Section 13, is not a period for deposit of arrears of rent due and future rent as a precondition for appeal. To enable a tenant to prefer an appeal by fulfilling both the conditions of deposit of arrears and future rent, it is necessary that as is the power given to the Rent Control Court, the appellate authority, on being H 748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R. A approached by the tenant, has to pass a judicial or quasi-judicial .order not C?nly for th~ purp~se of fixing the time and manner of two kinds of d~posits but a~o to determine, on the basis of record of the case, the rent which c;an be said to be admitted to be due by the tenant within the meaning of expression "all arrears of rent admitted by.the tenant to be due" as used.in sub-section (l) of Section 13. The use of the word "prefer" therefore, in sub"".section (1) B of Section 13. of the Act, ,in the.context of:the said provision and the other provisions in sub-sections (2) to (4) of the said Section has a meaning different from mere filing or presentation of an appeal. The word "prefer" in the context of Section 13(1), to enable the tenant to contest original proceedings, or prosecute appellate proceedings should reasonably mean that the tenant ~ without requisite deposit of arrears of rent and future rent, shall not be allowed to prosecute the appeal or be heard in the appeal against the order passed by D · the Rent Control Court (772-D-H; 773-A] Commissioner of Income Tax Act v. B.N Bhattacharjee, [19,79] ~ SCR 1133 and Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Aggarwal, (2003] 2 SCC 517, distinguishe.d. . · 2.2. The expression "all arrears of rent adihitted by the tenant to be due" as used in sub-section (1) of Section 13 requites adjudication to some · extent.'The right of tenant to prefer an appeal can not be denied to him until . such an. adjudication is made .. This condusion is reinforced by the language ·of sub-section (3) or'Section 13 which empowers expressly both the Rent E Control Court and the appellate autho'rity to stop all proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the leased premises, if there is ·a 'failure o'n the part of the tenant to make requisite deposits either of arrears and/or· future rent and only if he is unable to show any sufficient cause for nori-deposit or delay. Such a power with discretion both in the Rent Control F Court and the appellate authority to stop or refrain from stopping original or appellate proceedings, and evicting tenant in the event of default of deposit, also indicates that right of appeal to the tenant can be deprived to him only . ff there is .a <)efault on his part and he is unable to show .anr sufficient cause . for s~ch default. This also indicates that filing of an appeal within limitation and ~llowing the tenant to prosecute that appeal due to his failure to make G deposits. of arr~ars an.d future rent are two different stages or steps in both original pro~eedings and appellate proceedings. (773-E-H; 774.-A] i.3. ·u is settled rule of construction of statute that 'it has to be presumed that the legislature does not Wl?Ste its.words and say anything in vain'. If subsection (4)'of section 20 is not read· as conferring on the appellate authority H fUll p~wers of Rent Control Court including p~wer under sub-section (2) of - - MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY [PATIL. J.] 749 Section 13, sub-section (4) of section 20 would be rendered otiose or A superfluous. Such a construction which attributes redundancy to the Legislature has to be avoided. [774-B] Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, Chapter-II, Synopsis- ! Page 63, referred to. 3. A tenant can file or present a memo of appeal "'ithin the prescribed period of thirty days excluding the time for obtaining certified copy of the order in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 20 but until and unless he seeks an order from the appellate authority in accordance with sub-section B (2) of Section 13 and makes deposit of all arrears of rent and continues to pay future rent in the manner and within the time directed by the appellate C authority, he would not be entitled to prosecute the appeal and obtain any interim or final relief against the order of the Rent Control Court as is contemplated in sub-sections (2) & (3) respectively of Section 13 of the Act. [774-C, D] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7253 .of D 2002. From the Judgment and Order dated 21.6.2001 of the Gauhati High Court at Agartala Bench in Civil Rule No. 466 of 1997. A.K. Ganguli, Avijit Bhattacharjee and Atanu Saikia for the Appellants. E Rajiv Mehta for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J. Few facts, which are considered necessary F and relevant for disposal of this appeal, in short and substance, are the following: The respondent No. l filed a petition for eviction under Section 12 of · The Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 (for short 'the G Act') on the grounds of bona fide requirement and default in payment of rent. The Rent Control Court held that the claim of bona fide requirement was not proved. However, it found that the appellants were defaulters in payment of rent and directed the appellants to hand over the possession of the building in question to the respondent No. I. The appellants filed R.C.C. Appeal 4/ 1995 under Section 20 of the Act before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), H 750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R. A West Tripura against the said order of the Rent Control Court. The learned Civil Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal holding that the appellants failed to deposit the arrears ofrent as directed by the Rent Control Court and the appeal filed by them without making deposit of arrears of rent was not maintainable in view of Section 13(1) of the Act. Thereafter, the B appellants filed revision petition in the court of the District Judge, Tripura, assailing the order pass_ed by the learned Civil Judge in appeal. The learned District Judge allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of the Civil Judge in appeal and remanded the case to the appellate court for considering the petition for adducing additional evidence and fqr deciding the appeal afresh. The respondent No. 1, aggrieved by this order passed in the revision C petition, filed a petition as Civil R~le No. 466 of 1997 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court. A learned single Judge of the High Court, after hearing the parties, finding some conflict in the decisions of this Court in Chinnamma v. Gopalan and Ors. 1 and of Division Bench of the High Court in Binapani Roy and two Ors. v. State of Tripura and two Ors. 2, felt that the decision of the Division Bench of the D High Court in Binapani Roy case required reconsideration by a larger bench to decide the following question: - E F "Whether in view of Section 13 of the Act, 1975, the appellate Court is prohibited from entertaining an appeal unless the tenant has paid or pays to the landlord or deposit with the Rent Control Court or the appellant authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment of deposit and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be?" The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the parties, concluded that the judgment of the Division Bench in Binapani Roy case (aforementioned) did not require any reconsideration and no reference to a larger Bench was called for. It also held that no appeal against the order made under Section G 12 of the Act is competent and maintainable under Section 20 of the Act unless provision of Section 13( 1) of the Act is complied with; that fulfillment of the requirement of Section 13( 1) is a sine qua. non for preferring appeal under Section 20. Hence, aggrieved by the same, the appellant-tenants have i. [1995] 6 sec 491 . H 2. [1994] l GLR 98. -- - - - .. MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY [PATIL J.] 751 assailed the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in A this appeal. The learned Senior counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court was not right and justified in taking a technical view in the matter; as in the case of contesting the proceedings before the Rent Controller, opportunity could be given by the appellate court for making payment of B admitted rent due or depositing before the appeal is heard; saying that appeal itself could not be preferred without paying or depositing admitted arrears of rent may not be correct in view of Section 13(3) of the Act; if Section 13 is read as a whole, it will be clear that appeal preferred without payment or depositing of admitted arrears of rent, it could not be dismissed. On the other C hand, further proceedings in the appeal could be stopped in case admitted arrears of rent were not paid or deposited. He placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Chinnamma case (supra). Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents-landlord made submissions supporting the impugned judgment. It was urged that Section D 13(1) in clear and unambiguous terms states that no appeal can be preferred against any order of Rent Controller without paying or depositing of arrears of rent admitted. Before proceeding to deal with· the respective contentions urged on behalf of the parties it would be useful to reproduce the provisions of Sections E 12, 13 and 20 of the Act to the extent they are relevant for the immediate purpose: - "12. Eviction of tenants - (1) Not-withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted excepted in accordance with the provisions of this Act. F Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the State Government or the Central Government or any other public authority notified under this Act. Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the G landlord or claims right of permanent-tenancy the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bonafide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of' the tenant in a civil court and such court may pass a decree for ev1 ction on any of the grounds mentioned in this section, H \ 752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R. \ A ·notwithstanding that such court finds that such denial does not involve c D E F G forfeiture •of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. (2)(a) ·A landlord who see.ks to evict his tenant shall apply to the . Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf. (b) lfthe Rent Control Court, after giving the tenant a reasonable _ opportunity of showing cause. against the application, is satisfied that the tenant has not paid.or tendered the rent due by him in respe~t of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time. fixed in the agreement or tenancy with his .landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following ti)at for . '"Yhich the rent is payable and such default has <;:ontinued for three months within a period of twelve months, it shall make an . order directing the tenant to put the Ian.dlord in possession of.the build~ng, and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the application . thereof by him. Provided that an application under this sub-section shall be made · only ifthe landlord has sent a registered notice.to the tenant intimat!n~ the default and the tenant has failed to pay or tender the rent together with interest at six per cent per annum and postal charges incurred in .sending the notice within fifteen days of th.e receipt of th.e notice or of tile receipt of the notice or of the refusal thereof. · ( c) The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of ,one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits . th<;. arrears tllf rent with interl?st and cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such further period; as may be, it shall vacate that order." xxx xxx. xxx xxx "13. Payment or deposit of rent cturing the pendency of proceedings for eviction. - No tenant against whom an applic_ation for eviction 1>-as been .made by a landlord under section. l2_shall be entitled to .crJntest the application before the /?.ent Control Court under thatser-tion, or _to prefer .an appeal under section .20 against any order.made by the . Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposit with the Rent Control Court or t11ie appellate ·I ·: - - J MANIK LAL MAJUMDAR v. G. C. DEY [PATIL, J.) 753 _.,..__ authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the A tenant to be due in respect of the building upto the date of payment of deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the aepellate authority as the case may be. B. (2) The deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the Rent Control Court may frx and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4): -- < Provided that the time fixf