# MANJIT SINGH & ANR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR

- **Citation:** [2013] 11 S.C.R. 107
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2013-09-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2042 of 2010
- **Bench:** Dipak Misra, Vikramajit Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/manjit-singh-anr-v-state-of-punjab-anr-28673
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - s. 3021307 rlw s. 34 - Firing of
gunshots - Causing injuries to PW1 and death of his brother
A
B
- Five accused- Conviction of A-1 and A-2 i.e. the appellants
C
- Justification - Held: PWs-1 and 2, brother and father of the
deceased, deposed in a vivid manner about the culpability
of the accused persons in the crime - Non-examination of two
witnesses did not affect the trustworthiness of PltVs-1 and 2 -
Though there was some embellishment by Pl/1-1, the
D
informant, and the other witnesses but that did not make the
whole prosecution version untruthful - Non-seizure of bloodstained clothes and blood stains did not create dent in the
prosecution version - The autopsy surgeon, PllV-3, clearly
opined that deceased had died because of gunshot injuries
E
- The FSL report was clear - As per the FSL report. shots
were fired from the wec:pons sent to the laboratory - Cogent
evidence that the weapons belonged to accused-appellants
and licenses were issued in their favour - Thus, ocular
testimony of PWs-1 and 2 received clear corroboration from
F
the medical evidence as well as from the report of the FSL -
Conviction of the appellants accordingly affirmed.
Penal Code, 1860 -
s. 34 -
Common intention -
Existence of - When may be inferred - Death of PW1 's
brother and injuries caused to PW1 due to gun shots fired by G
the accused persons -
Conviction of the two accusedappellants (A-1 and A-2) uls.3021307 rlw s.34 - Plea that A-2
could not have been convicted with the aid of s.34 IPC- Held:
107
H
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 11 S.C.R.
A Not tenable - Scrutiny of the evidence made it clear that A-2
had accompanied A-1 and was present at the spot; that he
had carried a weapon; that it was established by the
prosecution that cartridges had been fired from his gun; and
that both the appellants were closely.related - Thus, the
8
cumulative facts clearly establish that A-2 shared the common
intention with A-1.
Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Case pertaining to
murder and attempt to murder - Five accused - A-4 and A5 acquitted by trial court - A-3 acquitted by High Court - Plea
C that High Court e"ed in affirming the acquittal recorded by
the trial Judge in respect of A-4 and A-5 and further erred in
acquitting A-3 - Held: Not tenable -
Jn the facts and
circumstances of the case, the view expressed by the trial
Judge in acquitting A-4 and A-5 and further the acquittal
D recorded by High Court acquitting A-3 was based on cogent
reasoning and was a plausible view - Once a plausible view
has been expressed and there has been proper appreciation
of the evidence on record, the acquittal does not warrant any
interference - Penal Code, 1860 - s.3021307 rlw s.34.
E
Evidence - Witness ·- Non-examination of - Effect -
Held: It is not the number and quantity of witnesses, but the
quality that is material - Duty of the Court to consider the
trustworthiness of evidence on record which inspires
confidence and the same has to be accepted and acted upon
F - In such a situation no adverse inference should be drawn
from the fact of non-examination of other witnesses - It is also
to be seen whether such non-examination of a witness would
carry the matter further so as to affect the evidence of other
witnesses and if the evidence of a witness is really not
G essential to the unfolding of the prosecution case, it cannot
be considered a material witness - Evidence Act, 1872 -
s.134.
Evidence - Appreciation and evaluation of - Concept of
H
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 109 ,
proof beyond reasonable doubt - Held: Cannot be made to
A
appear totally unrealistic.
Maxims - Maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus - Held:
Is not applicable in India - It is merely a rule of caution - All
that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may be
8
disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded - Unless the
entire case of the prosecution suffers from infirmities,
discrepancies and material contradictions and the
prosecution utterly fa

## Text

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[2013] 11 S.C.R. 107
MANJIT SINGH & ANR.
V.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2042 of 2010)
SEPTEMBER 13, 2013
[DIPAK MISRA AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 3021307 rlw s. 34 - Firing of
gunshots - Causing injuries to PW1 and death of his brother
A
B
- Five accused- Conviction of A-1 and A-2 i.e. the appellants
C
- Justification - Held: PWs-1 and 2, brother and father of the
deceased, deposed in a vivid manner about the culpability
of the accused persons in the crime - Non-examination of two
witnesses did not affect the trustworthiness of PltVs-1 and 2 -
Though there was some embellishment by Pl/1-1, the
D
informant, and the other witnesses but that did not make the
whole prosecution version untruthful - Non-seizure of bloodstained clothes and blood stains did not create dent in the
prosecution version - The autopsy surgeon, PllV-3, clearly
opined that deceased had died because of gunshot injuries
E
- The FSL report was clear - As per the FSL report. shots
were fired from the wec:pons sent to the laboratory - Cogent
evidence that the weapons belonged to accused-appellants
and licenses were issued in their favour - Thus, ocular
testimony of PWs-1 and 2 received clear corroboration from
F
the medical evidence as well as from the report of the FSL -
Conviction of the appellants accordingly affirmed.
Penal Code, 1860 -
s. 34 -
Common intention -
Existence of - When may be inferred - Death of PW1 's
brother and injuries caused to PW1 due to gun shots fired by G
the accused persons -
Conviction of the two accusedappellants (A-1 and A-2) uls.3021307 rlw s.34 - Plea that A-2
could not have been convicted with the aid of s.34 IPC- Held:
107
H
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 11 S.C.R.
A Not tenable - Scrutiny of the evidence made it clear that A-2
had accompanied A-1 and was present at the spot; that he
had carried a weapon; that it was established by the
prosecution that cartridges had been fired from his gun; and
that both the appellants were closely.related - Thus, the
8
cumulative facts clearly establish that A-2 shared the common
intention with A-1.
Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Case pertaining to
murder and attempt to murder - Five accused - A-4 and A5 acquitted by trial court - A-3 acquitted by High Court - Plea
C that High Court e"ed in affirming the acquittal recorded by
the trial Judge in respect of A-4 and A-5 and further erred in
acquitting A-3 - Held: Not tenable -
Jn the facts and
circumstances of the case, the view expressed by the trial
Judge in acquitting A-4 and A-5 and further the acquittal
D recorded by High Court acquitting A-3 was based on cogent
reasoning and was a plausible view - Once a plausible view
has been expressed and there has been proper appreciation
of the evidence on record, the acquittal does not warrant any
interference - Penal Code, 1860 - s.3021307 rlw s.34.
E
Evidence - Witness ·- Non-examination of - Effect -
Held: It is not the number and quantity of witnesses, but the
quality that is material - Duty of the Court to consider the
trustworthiness of evidence on record which inspires
confidence and the same has to be accepted and acted upon
F - In such a situation no adverse inference should be drawn
from the fact of non-examination of other witnesses - It is also
to be seen whether such non-examination of a witness would
carry the matter further so as to affect the evidence of other
witnesses and if the evidence of a witness is really not
G essential to the unfolding of the prosecution case, it cannot
be considered a material witness - Evidence Act, 1872 -
s.134.
Evidence - Appreciation and evaluation of - Concept of
H
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 109 ,
proof beyond reasonable doubt - Held: Cannot be made to
A
appear totally unrealistic.
Maxims - Maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus - Held:
Is not applicable in India - It is merely a rule of caution - All
that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may be
8
disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded - Unless the
entire case of the prosecution suffers from infirmities,
discrepancies and material contradictions and the
prosecution utterly fails to establish its case, acquittal of some
accused persons cannot be a relevant facet to determine the
C
guilt of other accused persons - Evidence - Discrepancies
in - Appreciation of.
The prosecution case was that while PW1 was sitting
on the left mudguard of the tractor driven by his brother,
they were stopped by a Maruti car driven by A-1, who
D
parked it on the road in front of the tractor; and that
thereafter the five accused persons alighted from the car,
armed with rifles and guns, and fired gunshots which
resulted in the death of PW1 's brother and injuries to
PW1. The incident allegedly occurred due to enmity 'of the
E
accused persons against the victims as their father, PW2,
had contested the village Sarpanch elections against the
accused persons.
F
The trial court convicted A-1, A-2, and A-3 under
Section 302/307 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced
them to undergo rigorous life imprisonment. A-3 was 'also
separately convicted under Section 307 IPC. A-4 and A-5
were however acquitted by the trial court. The High Court
affirmed the conviction of A-1 and A-2, but acquitted A-3
and therefore the present cross appeals by A-1 and A-2
G
on the one hand and the informant on the other.
A-1 and A-2 i.e. the appellants raisedthe following set
of contentions before this Court:
H
.A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 11 S.C.R.
(1)
That non-examination of two crucial
·witnesses, namely, 'O' (who had come to the
spot along with PW-2, and had arranged a car
to take the deceased and the injured to the
hospital and at his instance the site plan was
prepared) and 'M' (who had carried the
deceased and the injured to the hospital)
materially affected the trustworthiness of the
prosecution version.
(2)
That three persons, namely, A-3, A-4 and A-5
were falsely roped in by the prosecution which
showed the extent of falsehood that was taken
recourse to by the informant, PW-1, and other
witnesses and thus the testimonies of the socalled eye-witnesses could not be regarded as
cogent, reliable and trustworthy.
(3)
That the presence of two eye-witnesses,
namely, PWs-1 and 2, at the scene of
occurrence was gravely doubtful; the said two
witnesse$ could not have been present at the
spot as their statement that they had taken the
deceased to the hospital was belied by the
testimony of autopsy surgeon; their blood
stained clothes had not been seized; and PW1, who was sitting on the left mudguard of the
tractor, had not received any serious injury
despite the tractor had turned towards the left.
(4)
That the wounds indicated that the shots were
fired from a close range but the oral testimony
was contrary to the same, and;
(5)
That A-2 could not have been convicted with
the aid of Section 34 IPC since he had not
participated in the assault on the deceased.
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 111
•·
On the other hand, PW1, the informant, in support A
of the appeal preferred by him, contended that the High
Court fell into grave error by affirming the acquittal
recorded by the trial Judge in respect of A-4 and A-5 and
further committed serious illegality by acquitting A-3,
despite the irreproachable evidence against him.
B
Dismissing all the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. It is not the number and quantity of
witnesses, but the quality that is material. It is the duty
of the Court to consider the trustworthiness of evidence C
on record which inspires confidence and the same has
to be accepted and acted upon and in such a situation
no adverse inference should be drawn from the fact of
non-examination of other witnesses. That apart, it is also
to be seen whether such non-examination of a witness o
would carry the matter further so as to affect the
evidence of other witnesses and if the evidence of a
witness is really not essential to the unfolding of the
prosecution case, it cannot be considered. a material
witness. [Para 24] [128-A-C]
E
1.2. In the case at hand, the plea taken is that it was
'M', who had taken the deceased and injured to the
hospital and, therefore he is a material witness. The
question that is required to be put whether the evidence
of the said witness is essential to record a conviction or F
his non-examination would affect the trustworthiness of
PWs-1 and 2 and other witnesses. As perceived, it can
reasonably be stated that 'M' is not a material witness in
that sense. As far as 'D' is concerned, if the testimony
of other witness inspires confidence, his nonG
examination would not create a concavity in the case of
the prosecution. The acceptance of testimonies of PWs1 and 2, in the case at hand, would stand on their own
and would not depend upon the version that could have
come from 'D'. It is so as he is not the only competent
H
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 11 S.C.R. ·
A
witness who would have been fully capable of explaining
the factual situation correctly. Quite apart from the above,
during the cross-examination of investigating officer,
none of the accused persons had voiced their concerns
by raising any apprehension regarding non-examination
B of the material witnesses. On a studied scrutiny it is found
that, in fact, there is no cross-examination in that regard.
[Para 25] [128-D-H; 129-A]
Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202: 1964 SCR
C 133; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150:
2007 (3) SCR 939; Bipin Kumar Monda/ v. State of W.B.
(2010) 12 SCC 91: 2010 (8) SCR 1036; State of H.P. v. Gian
Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71: 2001 (3) SCR 247; Takhaji Hiraji
v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing (2001) 6 SCC 145;
Dahari v. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 256: 2012 (8) SCR
D 1219; Harivadan Babubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2013)
7 sec 45 and State of U.P. V. lftikhar Khan and others (1973)
1 sec 512: 1973 (3) SCR 328 - relied on.
·
2.1. It is well settled in law that unless the entire case
E of the prosecution suffers from infirmities, discrepancies
and material contradictions and the prosecution utterly
fails to establish its case, acquittal of some accused
persons cannot be a relevant facet to determine the guilt
of other accused persons. The maxim fa/sus in uno,
F
fa/sus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything)
has no application in India and has not .received general
acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the
status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that
it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may be
G disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. [Para
27] [129-D-G]
2.2. In the instant case, the trial Judge acquitted A-5
on the ground that she had not contested any election;
that she was not even residing in the village in whic~ the
H
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.113
elections were held. The allegation in the FIR that she had
A
given lalkara had not really got support from other
witnesses and, hence, her presence at the spot was
doubted. As far as A-4 is concerned, in the opinion of the
trial Judge he had no concern with the accused persons
or the deceased. The trial Judge, in essence, extended
B
benefit of doubt to him inasmuch as he had neither
participated in the occurrence nor had he shared the
common intention. The High Court acquitted A-3 on the
ground that he was not named in the FIR and further he
had not carried any weapon. The High Court opined that c
he had been implicated because he had filed a writ
petition against the police officers. If the evidence is
scrutinized in proper perspective, it is clear that there has
been some embellishment by the informant and other
witnesses but giving such embroidery to a story would
0
not make the whole prosecution version untruthful· one.
It can be treated to be an exaggeration by the
prosecution but the consequence cannot be regarded as
fatal. [Para 30) [131-C-H]
Da/bir Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 11 SCC 425:
2008 (8) SCR 1026; Krishna Mochi and Others v. State of
Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 81: 2002 (3) SCR 1; Yanob Sheikh alias
Gagu v. State of West Bengal (2013) 6 SCC 428: 2012 (13)
SCR 1150; Balraje alias Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra
(2010) 6 sec 673: 2010 (6) SCR 764 - rel!ed on.
E
F
3. The plea that 'M' had alone brought the deceased
and the injured to the hospital cannot be accepted to be
correct. PW-8, who had treated PW1, had clearly stated
that the deceased was brought dead to the hospital with
G
the alleged history of gunshot injuries. In the crossexamination, he has clearly deposed that the dead body
was brought to the hospital at 12.40 p.m. and PW1 came
to the hospital at 12.40 p.m. That apart, it can be said with
certitude that whether PW1 accompanied or not really
H
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 11 S.C.R.
A
does not affect the prosecution case. As far as nonseizure of the blood-stained clothes and blood stains
from the seat of the car are concerned, it does not create
a dent in the prosecution version. In the case at hand it
is perceptible that PWs-1 and 2, brother and father of the
s deceased, have deposed in a vivid manner about the
culpability of the accused persons in the crime. The
autopsy surgeon, PW-3, has clearly opined that the
deceased had died because of gunshot injuries. The FSL
report, Ext. P-AM/1, states with equal clarity that one
c cartridge was fired from left barrel of DBBL gun No.
56088, the other cartridge from its right barrel and three
cartridges were fired from the rifle No. AB 97/5473. It is
also brought out in the evidence the gun and the rifle
were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory in sealed
0
parcels. As per the report the shots were fired from the
weapons sent to the laboratory. It has been established
by cogent evidence that the weapons belonged to the
accused-appellants and licenses were issued in their
favour. Thus, the ocular testimony of PWs-1 and 2 has
received clear corroboration from the medical evidence
E
as well as from the report of the FSL. [Para 31) [132-C-F,
F
G-H; 133-A-C]
.
State of Rajasthan v. Arjun Singh and others (2011) 9
sec 115: 2011 (1 O) SCR 823 - relied on.
4. The appellants also submitted that wounds would
indicate that the shots were fired from a close range but
the oral testimony is contrary to the same; and further that
the person sitting on the left mudguard would have been
affected as the tractor turned towards the left and, more
G so, when the deceased had sustained injury on the right
cheek. However, these kind of discrepancies are bound
to occur when an occurrence of the present nature takes
place and one cannot expect the witnesses to state with
precision. On these counts the prosecution version
H cannot be held to be unbelievable and it cannot be held
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 115
that the prosecution has not been able to establish the
A
charges beyond reasonable doubt. It is because judicial
evaluation of the evidence has to be appropriate regard
being had to the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the case and not on scrutiny in isolation and further
the concept of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be
B
made to appear totally unrealistic. [Para 32] [133-D-G]
Jnder Singh and another v.
The State (Delhi
Administration) (1978) 4SCC 161: 1978 (3) SCR 393 -
relied on.
5.1. On a perusal of the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 it is
perceptible that A-2 was named in the FIR and he had
accompanied A-1, his son-in-law. There has been seizure
of .12 bore rifle which has been proven to have belonged
c
to A-2 and the cartridges that have been recovered from
D
the spot have been proven to have been fired from the
.12 bore rifle that belonged to A-2. There is clear evidence
that A-2 had fired from his .12 bore rifle but it had not hit
anyone. From the material brought on record it is vivid
that he had gone along with A-1 being armed with the
E
weapon. [Para 34] [134-F-G; 135-A-B]
5.2. The existence of a common intention can be
inferred from the attending circumstances of the case and
the C0!1duct of the parties. No direct evidence of common
intention is necessary. For the purpose of common
intention even the participation in the commission of the
offence need not be proved in all cases. To apply Section
F
34 IPC apart from the fact that there should be two or
more accused, two factors must be established: (i)
common intention, and (ii) participation of the accused in · G
the commission of an offence. If a common intention is
proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual
accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it
involves vicarious liability but if participation of the
accused in the crime is proved and a common intention
H
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 11 S.C.R.
A is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case,
it is not possible to have direct evidence of a common
intention. It has to be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of each case. [Para 38] [137-F-H; 138-A]
·
5.3. On a scrutiny of the evidence it is found that A-2
8 had accompanied A-1 and was present at the spot; that
he had carried a weapon; that it has been established by
the prosecution that the cartridges had been fired from
his gun; and that both the appellants are closely related.
Thus, the cumulative facts would clearly establish that AC 2 shared the common intention with A-1. The criticism
advanced that A- 2 could not have been convicted in aid
of Section 34 IPC, is not well founded. [Para 39 and 40]
[138-B-C, F]
D
Ramashish Yadav and others v. State of Bihar (1999) 8
SCC 555: 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 285 - distinguished. ·
Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli and another v. State
of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 287: 1955 SCR 1177; State of U.P.
v. lftikhar Khan and others (1973) 1 SCC 512: 1973 (3) SCR
E 328; Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad
(1955) 1 SCR 1083; Tukaram Ganpat Pandare v. State
Maharashtra AIR 1974 SC 514; Krishnan and another v. State
of Kera/a (1996) 10 SCC 508: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 405;
Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P. (2000) 4 SCC 110: 2000
F (2) SCR 515 - relied on.
Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor AIR 1945 PC 118 -
referred to.
G
6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the
view expressed by the trial Judge in acquitting A-4 and
A-5 and further the acquittal recorded by the High Court
acquitting A-3 is based on cogent reasoning and it is a
plausible view. Once a plausible view has been
H expressed and there has been proper appreciation of the
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 117
evidence on record, the acquittal does not warrant any
A
interference. [Para 41) [139-C-D]
Case Law Reference:
1964 SCR 133
relied on
Para 18
B
2007 (3) SCR 939
relied on
Para 19
2010 (8) SCR 1036
relied on
Para 20
2001 (3) SCR 247
relied on
Para 21
2001) 6 sec 145
relied on
Para 22
c
2012 (8) SCR 1219
relied on
Para 23
c2013) 1 sec 45
relied on
Para.23
1973 (3) SCR 328
relied on
Para 24
D
2008 (8) SCR 1026
relied on
Para 27
2002 (3) SCR 1
relied on
Para 27
2012 (13) SCR 1150
relied on
Para 28
E
2010 (6) SCR 764
relied on
Para 29
2011 (10) SCR 823
relied on
Para 31
1978 (3) SCR 393
relied on
Para 32
1955 SCR 1177
relied on
Para 34
F
AIR 1945 PC 118
referred to
Para 35
'
(1955) 1 SCR 1083
relied on
Para 35
AIR 1974 SC 514
relied on
Para 35
G
1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 405 relied on
Para 36
2000 (2) SCR 515
relied on
Para 37
' t·
1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 285 distinguished
Para 38
H
118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 11 S.C.R.
A
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 2042 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 12.05.2009 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 628 of
B 2001.
WITH
Crl.A.Nos. 2276-2278 of 2010.
C
U.U. Lalit, Jayant K. Sud, AAG, S. Wasim A. Qadri, Jasbir
Singh Malik, Varun Punia, Zaid Ali (for S.K. Sabharwal), S.C.
Paul, Roopa Paul, Ranjeeta Raj, Satyendra Kumar, Chirag
Khurana, Vishal Dabas, V. Kumar (for Kuldip Singh) J.P.
Dhanda, N.A. Uamani, Resham Singh, Ashok Kumar Yadav,
0
Satyendra Kumar for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. The two appellants, namely, Manjit
Singh and Paramjit Singh, were tried along with three others
E in ST No. 54 of 2001 before the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Kapurthala for the offences punishable under Sections
302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
· (IPC).
2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that on
F 8.11.1998 about 12:00 noon Amarjot Singh, the complainant,
PW-1, along with his younger brother, Jagmohan Singh, the
deceased, was going on a tractor towards Bholath for some
domestic work .. Jagmohan Singh was driving the tractor,
whereas Amarjot Singh was sitting on the left mudguard of the
G tractor. After they reached village Pandori Arayiyan, they were
stopped by a Maruti car bearing registration no. PB-10-X 7079,
driven by Accused No. 1, Manjit Singh, who parked it on the
road in front of the tractor. On seeing the car, Jagmohan Singh,
stopped the tractor in the middle of the road. Manjit .Singh,
H armed with a .315 bore rifle, Paramjit Singh, father-in-law of
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 119
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Manjit Singh, armed with .12 bore gun, Jaswinder kaur, sister
A
of Manjit Singh, and two unknown persons alighted from the car.
One of the unknown persons was also armed with a .12 bore
gun. After alighting from the car, Jaswinder Kaur raised "lalkara"
to eliminate both the sons of Rajinderpal Singh, PW-2, father
of the deceased, so that they would understand the
B
consequences of contesting the election· of Sarpanch against
them. Jagmohan Singh tried to turn the tractor towards. the left
side and at that juncture Manjit Singh fired a gunshot which hit
him on the right cheek as a result of which he fell down from
the tractor in the fields. Paramjit Singh armed with a .12 bore c
gun had also fired at the two brothers. Amarjot Singh jumped
from the tractor and received an injury on his right elbow. He
saved himself by taking shelter behind the back wheel of the
tractor. In the meantime, Rajinderpal Singh, PW-2, who was
present at his tube-well motor situate nearby and Didar Singh
0
s/o Joginder Singh, who was present in his field near the place
of occurrence reached the spot and witnessed the incident. All
the accused fled away from the scene of crime along with their
respective weapons. Jagmohan Singh and Amarjot Singh were
shifted to Civil Hospital, Bholath, in a car and in the hospital
Jagmohan Singh was declared dead.
3. As the prosecution story further unfurls, the hospital
authorities intimated about the death of Jagmohan Singh to the
concerned police station whereafter the police party headed by
E
SI, Swaran Singh, PW-5, arrived at the hospital and the SI
F
recorded the Statement of Amarjot Singh on the basis of which
a formal FIR was registered. The investigating agency got the
post mortem done, prepared the site plan, collected the blood
stained earth, the blood stained clothes of the deceased, three
empty cartridges of .315 bore rifle and two empty cartridges
G
of .12 bore from the spot and each item was put in separate
sealed parcels on the basis of separate memorandum
prepared and attested by the witnesses. After taking
appropr~ate steps, accused persons were apprehended and
the Maruti car, used in the commission of crime, was seized.
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[2013] 11 S.C.R.
A A-1, Manjit Singh, while in custody led to recovery of his
licenced rifle .315 bore along with the cartridges and the licence
in the iron box in the residential house of Jasbir Singh of Village
Umarpura, one of his relatives. Similarly Paramjit Singh, A-2,
made a disclosure that .12 bore licenced gun used by him had
r
B been taken by Sukhpal Singh of Kaki Pind. As per his
statement a bag containing the remaining cartridges were kept
concealed in the iron box under the clothes in his residential
house. On the basis of the said statement, recovery of the iron
box, the lock, the cartridges and the licence were recovered.
c On the basis of disclosure statement of Sukhpal Singh, A-3,
who had taken .12 bore gun from Paramjit Singh, A-2, led to
the place of discovery of the weapon hidden underneath the
heap of chaff in the Haveli of Manjit Singh, A-1. The seized
articles were sent to the FSL at Chandigarh. The investigating
D agency, after examining the witnesses and completing the other
formalities, placed the charge-sheet before the learned
Magistrate, who, in turn, committed the matter to the Court of
Session.
4. The accused persons pleaded innocence and false
E implication due to animosity and on that basis claimed to be
tried.
5. Be it noted, during the trial an application was moved
under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
F (for short "the CrPC") to summon Jaswinder Kaur as an
accused which was allowed, and during trial she availed the
same plea and claimed to be tried.
6. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charges
against the accused persons, examined 13 witnesses and got
G marked number of documents. The principal witnesses are
Amarjot Singh, PW-1, the informant, Rajinderpal Singh, PW-2,
father of the deceased, who was cited as an eye-witness, Dr.
J.N. Dutta, PW-3, who had conducted the post mortem, Swaran
Singh, PW-5, the Investigating Officer, and Dr. Narinderpal
H
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 121
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Singh, PW-7, who had examined Amarjot Singh. The rest of
A
the witnesses are formal witnesses.
7. In their statements under Section 313 of the CrPC the
plea of the accused Manjit Singh and Paramjit Singh was that
they were arrested from their house on 9.11.1998 and the rifle
8
and gun were also taken into police possession. In essence,
they pleaded innocence and false implication. As far as
Sukhpal Singh, A-3, is concerned, his version was that he had
filed a writ petition against S.S.P. Dinkar Gupta, D.S.P Harmail
Singh and S.I. Surjit Singh because he was illegally detained
C
by the police earlier and, therefore, the police had conducted
a raid in his house and falsely implicated him in the case. He
had also stated that Manjit Singh and other were not known to
him. The plea of Jaswinder Kaur was to the effect that after the
death of her husband in 1990, she was residing at Jalandhar
with her daughter and was suffering from heart ailments and
D
had also suffered a brain haemorrhage. She also took the plea
that on the date of occurrence she was away at Harnamdasspur
to attend the cremation of a relative. Her further plea was that
she had been falsely implicated on account of dispute relating
to Panchayat election which was contested by her sister-in-law,
E
wife of Manjit Singh.
F
8. On the basis of the ocular and documentary evidence
brought on record the trial court found that the prosecution had
been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt
against Manjit Singh, A-1, Paramjit Singh, A-2, and Sukhpal
Singh, A-3, for committing the murder of Jagmohan Singh on
8.11.1998. He also found them guilty of firing at Amarjot Singh
with the intention of committing murder and, accordingly,
recorded conviction under Section 302/307 read with Section
G
34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and senteneed each of them
to undergo rigorous life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Rs.5000/- with a default clause under Section 302 IPC and for
one year under Section 307 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/
- with the default clause. It may be noted that Sukhpal Singh
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1122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013] 11 S.C.R.
A was also separately convicted under Section 307 IPC. The trial
court acquitted all the accused persons of the charges under
Section 148 IPC. As far as Kamal Kumar, A-4 and Jaswinder
Kaur, A-5, are concerned, he recorded an acquittal in respect
of all the charges on the ground that the prosecution had not
B been able to bring home the charges against them.
9. Assailing the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order
of sentence Manjit Singh, Paramjit Singh and Sukhpal Singh
preferred Criminal Appeal No. 628-DB of 2001 and Sukhpal
C Singh challenged his individual conviction under Section 307
llPC in Criminal Appeal No. 621-DB of 2001. The acquittal of
the accused persons was challenged by the informant Amarjot
Singh in Criminal Revision No. 680 of 2002.
10. The High Court, by a common judgment and order
D dated 12.5.2009 which is impugned herein, affirmed the
conviction of Manjit Singh and Paramjit Singh. However, as far
as Sukhpal Singh is concerned, taking note of the material
brought on record, doubted his presence at the scene of
occurrence and, accordingly gave him the benefit of doubt. As
E he was acquitted in the main appeal, the appeal preferred by
him assailing the conviction under Section 307 IPC was treated
to have been rendered infructuous. In view of the decisions
rendered in the appeal the criminal revision, preferred by
Amarjot Singh, the brother of the deceased, stood dismissed.
F
11. Questioning the legal propriety of the said judgment
and order Manjit Singh and Paramjit Singh have preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 2042 of 2010 by special leave and the
informant has preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 2276-2278 of
2010 on obtaining permission to challenge the judgment of
G acquittal.
12. We have heard Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel
for the convicted appellants, Mr. Jayant K. Sud, learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Punjab, Mr. _s.c.
H Paul, learned counsel for the informant in his criminal appeals
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 123
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
and Mr. J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel for the respondent No.
A
5 in criminal appeal preferred by Amarjot Singh.
13. Criticizing the appreciation of evidence and the findings
recorded by the learned trial Judge as well as by the High Court
Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel, has contended that two crucial
8
witnesses, namely, Didar Singh, an independent eye witness,
who had not only witnessed the incident but had brought the
car in which the deceased was shifted to the hospital and the
site plan was prepared at his instructions, and Malkiat Singh,
who had brought the deceased to the hospital, have not been
C
examined and their non-examination creates a grave doubt
about the version set forth by the prosecution. His further
submission is that three others, namely, Kamal Kumar,
Jaswinder Kaur and Sukhpal Singh were falsely roped in and
that supports the plea advanced by the defence that there had
been false implication of the accused persons in the crime. It
D
is canvassed by him thatlhe presence of PWs-1 and 2 at the
place of occurrence is extremely doubtful, for according to the
prosecution, seven gunshots were fired but none had hit the
PW-1. That apart, PWs-1 and 2 claimed to have taken the
deceased to the hospital in a condition when the seats of the
E
car and their clothes were stained with blood, but the
Investigating Officer, PW-5, has categorically deposed that he
did not notice the clothes of PWs-1 and 2 to say that there were
any blood stains on their clothes.
14. The learned senior counsel would submit that their
carrying of the deceased to the hospital is also surrounded with
immense suspicion inasmuch as the doctor who had conducted
F
the post mortem has clearly stated that it was Malkiat Singh
who had brought the deceased to the hospital and no document
G
has been brought on record that PWs-1 and 2, who claimed to
be eye-witnesses, had brought the deceased to the hospital. It
is argued that the Investigating Officer did not find any pellets
marks on the tractor and he did not take into possession the
clothes and blood samples on the car seats for chemical
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2013) 11 S.C.R.
A
examination, which go a long way to create a dent in the
prosecution story. He has further emphatically put forth that when
· the tractor had turned towards left, it is difficult to discern that
the deceased sustained injury in the right cheek and the person
sitting on the left mudguard did not get affected. It is next
s submitted by him that there has been blackening of wounds
which would indicate that the injuries were caused from firing
from a close range but the oral testimonies of PWs-1 and 2
evinces that the accused Manjit Singh had fired from the
distance of one and half "karms". The last plank of argument
c of Mr. Lalit is that the appellant No. 2 could not have been
convicted in aid of Section 34 IPC since he had not
participated in the assault on the deceased, and further there
was no recovery of the alleged .12 bore rifle. ' ..
15. Mr. Jayant K. Sud, learned Additional Advocate
D General for the State of Punjab, supporting the judgment of the
High Court, has contended that the reappreciation of the
evidence by the High Court while exercising appellate
jurisdiction, cannot be faulted. The learned counsel would further
submit that the learned trial Judge as well as the Hign Court
E has correctly placed reliance on the testimonies of PWs-1 and
2 as they are unimpeachable. It is also urged by him that the
corroboration of injury by the medical evidence, the factum of
recovery of weapons and other circumstances clearly establish
the guilt of the accused and hence, the analysis made by the
F
High Court can really not be flawed.
16. Mr. J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel for the informant, in
support of the appeal preferred by him, contended that the High
Court has fallen into grave error by affirming the acquittal
recorded by the learned trial Judge in respect of two accused
G and has further committed serious illegality by acquitting
Sukhpal Singh, A-3, despite the irreproachable evidence
against him. It is submitted by him that the prosecution has
clearly and specifically brought the motive into the forefront and
despite definite roles being attributed to each of the accused
H
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 125
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
persons, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused persons,
A
namely, Kamal Kumar, A-4, and Jaswinder Kaur, A-5 and the
High Court totally erroneously gave the stamp of approval to
the same.
B
17. The first submission of Mr. U.U. Lalit is that the nonexamination of two crucial witnesses, namely, Didar Singh and
Malkiat Singh creates a great doubt in the prosecution version
which makes it absolutely incredible. On a perusal of the
material on record it is clear that Didar Singh had come to the
spot along with Rajinderpal Singh, PW-2, and had arranged a
C
car to take the deceased and the injured to the hospital and at
his instance the site plan was prepared. As far as Malkiat Singh
is concerned, the assertion is that he had carried the deceased
and the injured to the hospital but the evidence in this regard
is extremely sketchy. Be that as it may, thrust of the matter is
whether non-examination of these two witnesses materially
D
affects the trustworthiness of the prosecution version or put it
differently whether it really creates a dent in the testimony of
the other eye witnesses and the surrounding circumstances on
/Which the prosecution has placed reliance to bring home the
guilt of the accused.
18. In this context, a passage from Masalti v. State rF !J.P. 1
may fruitfully be reproduced:-
E
F
"In the present case, however, we are satisfied that there
is no substance in the contention which Mr Sawhney seeks
to raise before us. It is not unknown that where serious
offences like the present are committed and a large
number of accused persons are tried, attempts are made
either to terrorise or win over prosecution witnesses, and
if the prosecutor honestly and bona fide believes that some
G
of his witnesses have been won over, it would be
unreasonable to insist that he must tender such witnesses
before the court. It is undoubtedly the duty of the
1.
AIR 1965 SC 202.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2013] 11 S.C.R.
A
prosecution to lay before the court all material evidence
available to it which is necessary for unfolding its case; but
it would be unsound to lay down as a general rule that
every witness must be examined even though his evidence
may not be very material or even if it is known that he has
B
been won over or terrorised."
19. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, 2 it has been laid
down that neither the legislature (Section 134 of the Evidence
Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates that there must be
C particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction
against the accused. The legal system in this country has
always laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence
rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses.
20. In Bipin Kumar Monda/ v. State of W.B. 3 the Court
D reiterated the principle stating that it is not the quantity; but the
quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that
evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is
whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible,
trustworthy and reliable.
E
21. In State of H.P. v. Gian Chand4 it has been ruled that
non-examination of a material witness is again not a
mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the testimony
available on record howsoever natural, trustworthy and
F convincing it may be. The charge of withholding a material
witness from the court levelled against the prosecution should
be examined in the background of the facts and circumstances
of each case so as to find whether the witnesses are available
for being examined in the court and were yet withheld by the
prosecution.
G
22. In Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing5
2.
c2001) 14 sec 150.
3.
c2010) 12 sec 91.
4.
c2001) s sec 11.
H 5.
c2001i s sec 145.
MANJIT SINGH & ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 127
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the Court has opined that it is true that if a material witness,
who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part
of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore
otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution
case which could have been supplied or made good by
examining awitness who though available is not examined, the
prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency
and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the
court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by
holding that if the witness would have been examined it would
A
B
not have supported the prosecution case. On the other hand if c
already overwhelming evidence is available and examination
of other witnesses would only be a repetition or duplication of
the evidence already adduced, non-examination of such other
witnesses may not be material. In such a case the court ought
to scrutinise the worth of the evidence adduced. The court of 0
facts must ask itself-whether in the facts and circumstances
of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness,
and if so, whether such witness was available to be examined
and yet was being withheld from the court? If the answer be
positive then only a question of drawing an adverse inference
may arise. If the witnesses already examined are reliable and
the testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable the
court can safely act upon it, uninfluenced by the factum of nonexamination of other witnesses.
E
23. In Dahari v. State of U.P. 6 while discussing about the
F
non-examination of material witness, the Court has ruled that
when the witness was not the only competent witness who would
have been fully capable of explaining the factual situation
correctly, and the prosecution case stood fully corroborated by
the medical evidence and the testimony of other reliable
G
witnesses, no adverse inference could be drawn against the
prosecution. Similar principle has been reiterated in Harivadan
Babubhai Patel v. State of Gujrat. 7
6.
c2012) 10 sec 256.
1.
(2013) 1 sec 45.
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[2013] 11 S.C.R.
A
24. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite clear
that it is not the number and quantity, but the quality that is
material.