# MANJUSRI RAHA & ORS ETC v. B. L. GUl'TA & ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 944
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-02-09
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/manjusri-raha-ors-etc-v-b-l-gul-ta-ors-etc-7131
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Motor Vehicles Act 1939-Sec. 95(2)(d)--Sec. l IOA:..__Principles to determine compensation payable for death in a bus accident-Increments and pensionary benefits, whether to be taken into account.
Satindra Nath Raha and Uma Shankar Shastri were travelling by a bus
owned by Gupta of M. P. Speedways Company. They were travelling from
Bhind to Gwalior. On the' high way, a bus owned by Bhuta came from the
opposite direction. On account of negligence of drivers of both the buses. there
was a head-on collision of the two buses, as a consequence of which Raha and
Shastri sustained fatal injuries to which they succumbed on the same day in
the hospital. Widow of Rahal claimed a compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- under
s. llOA of the Motor Vehicles Act and Mrs. Shastri claimed a
sum
of
Rs. 1,20,000 /- as compensation.
The Claims Tribunal decreed the claim of
Mrs. Raha to the extent of Rs. 60,000/- and of Mrs. Shastri to the extent of
Rs. 40,000/-. The compensation awarded to Mrs. Raha is on the basis of the
salary _which Mr. Raha would have earned upto the age of 55
y~ars after
dednctmg half the salary. The quantum awarded by the Tribunal was upheld
by the High Conrt.
Gupta and Mrs. Raha field the present appeals in this
Court.
Gupta contended that the compensatim1
awarded -was
very excessive
and Mrs. Raha contended that the compensation granted was
grossly inadequate and should be enhanced.
Allowing the appeal filed by Mrs. Raha and dismissing the appeal filed by
Gupta,
HELD : l. The contention of Gupta that he should not be made liable to
pay the compensation since no negligence was alleged against the driver Ram
Swa.rup negatived. Although the plaint is loosely_ drafted but it clearly contains
the relief of compensation against Gupta and Ram Swamp, the driver.
Pleadings• have to be interpreted not with formalistic
rigour but with latitude or
awareness of low legal literacy of poor people. The Claims Tribunal a·nd the
High Court overlooked two important and vital considerations.
Firstly the increments which Mr. Raha would have earned while reaching the maximum of
his grade long before his retirement and secondly the pensionary benefits which
he would have obtained had he retired. It wonld be reasonable to expect that
if the deceased had not died due to the accident he would have lived at least
upto the age of 65 years. The Court, therefore, enhanced the compensation of
Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 1.00,000/-. [948 F, G, 949 A-B, 950 A-BJ
2. It is unfortunate that section: 95(2) (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act restricts the liability of the Insurance Companies to Rs. 2,000/- only in case of a
third party. The court suggested that the Legislature should increase the li:1hility of the Jnsnrance company. The court observed that it was anamolous that
if a passenger dies in a pl:>ne accident he gets the compensation of Rs. l lac
and a person who dies in the road accident should get only Rs. 2,000/-.
[946 D-E]
3. Expressing its concern for the need for creating no fa\Jlt liability by a
suitable legisl:>tion, the Conrt observed :
The time is ripe for serious consideration of creating no-fault liability.
Having regard to the directive princioles of State policy, the 1JOVerty of the
ordinary run of victims of automobile accidents, the compulsory nature .of
insurance of motor vehicles, the nationalisation of general insurance comparnes
and the expanding trend towards nationalisation of bus transport, the law of
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MANJUSHRI RAHA v. B. L. GUPTA (Fazal Ali, J.)
945
torts based on no-fault needs reforms. Where the social need of the hour re11.uires that precious human lives lost in motor accidents leaving a trial of
.economic disaster in the shape of their unprovided for families caU for special
attention of the law makers to meet this ·social need by providing for hea·vY
and adequate compensation particularly through Insurance Companies.
Our
country can ill-afford the loss of a precious life when we are building a progressive society and· if a-ny person en

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944
MANJUSRI RAHA & ORS ETC.
v.
B. L. GUl'TA & ORS. ETC.
February 9, 1977
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA ALI, JJ.]
Motor Vehicles Act 1939-Sec. 95(2)(d)--Sec. l IOA:..__Principles to determine compensation payable for death in a bus accident-Increments and pensionary benefits, whether to be taken into account.
Satindra Nath Raha and Uma Shankar Shastri were travelling by a bus
owned by Gupta of M. P. Speedways Company. They were travelling from
Bhind to Gwalior. On the' high way, a bus owned by Bhuta came from the
opposite direction. On account of negligence of drivers of both the buses. there
was a head-on collision of the two buses, as a consequence of which Raha and
Shastri sustained fatal injuries to which they succumbed on the same day in
the hospital. Widow of Rahal claimed a compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- under
s. llOA of the Motor Vehicles Act and Mrs. Shastri claimed a
sum
of
Rs. 1,20,000 /- as compensation.
The Claims Tribunal decreed the claim of
Mrs. Raha to the extent of Rs. 60,000/- and of Mrs. Shastri to the extent of
Rs. 40,000/-. The compensation awarded to Mrs. Raha is on the basis of the
salary _which Mr. Raha would have earned upto the age of 55
y~ars after
dednctmg half the salary. The quantum awarded by the Tribunal was upheld
by the High Conrt.
Gupta and Mrs. Raha field the present appeals in this
Court.
Gupta contended that the compensatim1
awarded -was
very excessive
and Mrs. Raha contended that the compensation granted was
grossly inadequate and should be enhanced.
Allowing the appeal filed by Mrs. Raha and dismissing the appeal filed by
Gupta,
HELD : l. The contention of Gupta that he should not be made liable to
pay the compensation since no negligence was alleged against the driver Ram
Swa.rup negatived. Although the plaint is loosely_ drafted but it clearly contains
the relief of compensation against Gupta and Ram Swamp, the driver.
Pleadings• have to be interpreted not with formalistic
rigour but with latitude or
awareness of low legal literacy of poor people. The Claims Tribunal a·nd the
High Court overlooked two important and vital considerations.
Firstly the increments which Mr. Raha would have earned while reaching the maximum of
his grade long before his retirement and secondly the pensionary benefits which
he would have obtained had he retired. It wonld be reasonable to expect that
if the deceased had not died due to the accident he would have lived at least
upto the age of 65 years. The Court, therefore, enhanced the compensation of
Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 1.00,000/-. [948 F, G, 949 A-B, 950 A-BJ
2. It is unfortunate that section: 95(2) (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act restricts the liability of the Insurance Companies to Rs. 2,000/- only in case of a
third party. The court suggested that the Legislature should increase the li:1hility of the Jnsnrance company. The court observed that it was anamolous that
if a passenger dies in a pl:>ne accident he gets the compensation of Rs. l lac
and a person who dies in the road accident should get only Rs. 2,000/-.
[946 D-E]
3. Expressing its concern for the need for creating no fa\Jlt liability by a
suitable legisl:>tion, the Conrt observed :
The time is ripe for serious consideration of creating no-fault liability.
Having regard to the directive princioles of State policy, the 1JOVerty of the
ordinary run of victims of automobile accidents, the compulsory nature .of
insurance of motor vehicles, the nationalisation of general insurance comparnes
and the expanding trend towards nationalisation of bus transport, the law of
•
r
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MANJUSHRI RAHA v. B. L. GUPTA (Fazal Ali, J.)
945
torts based on no-fault needs reforms. Where the social need of the hour re11.uires that precious human lives lost in motor accidents leaving a trial of
.economic disaster in the shape of their unprovided for families caU for special
attention of the law makers to meet this ·social need by providing for hea·vY
and adequate compensation particularly through Insurance Companies.
Our
country can ill-afford the loss of a precious life when we are building a progressive society and· if a-ny person engaged in industry, office, business or any
other occupation dies, a void is created which is bound to result in a serious
set back to the industry or occupation concerned. Apart from that the death
of a worker creates a serious economic problem for the family which he
leaves behind.
In these circumstances it is only just and fair tha-t the Legislature should make a suitable provision so as to pay adequate compensation
by property eva.Juating the precious life of a citizen in its true perspective
rather than devaluating human lives on the basis of an artificial mathematical
formula. [916 C-950 D-F]
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2310
&
1826 of 1968.
(From the Judgment and Decree dated the 30th August, 1967
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. First Appeals Nos. 219
and 220 of 1965) and
Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1969
- (From the Judgment and Decree dated the 30th August, 1967 of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. First Appeal No. 203 of
1965).
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G. L. Sanghi, Talat! Ansari, R. K. Sanghi and K. J. John.-Irn
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CAs. Nos. 132/69 & 1826168 for the Appellant in 132 & in 1826/
68.
G. S. Chatterjee & D. P. Mukherjee.-for Respondents 1-3.
I. N. Shroff & H. S. Parihar-for Respondent No. 8.
H. K. Puri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi.-for Respondent No. 6 for
Respondents 9 to 11.
· ·
G. S. Chatterjee & D. P. Mukherjee, in CA No. 2310 of 1968
:for the appellants. ·
G. S. Sanghi, Talat Ansari, R. K. Sanghi and K. J. Joh11 fur
respoμdent No. 1.
H. S. Parihar & I. N. Shroff for respondent No. 3.
H. K. Puri for respondent No. 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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. FAZAL ALI,
J.-'-~ith the emergence of an
ultra-modern
age
wh_1ch has led to stndes of progress in all spheres of iife; we have
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switched from fast to faster vehicular traffic which has come as a
boon to many, though some times in the case of some it has also
946
SUP}lEME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 s.c.R.
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proved to be a misfortune.
Such are the cases of the victims
of
motor accidents resulting from rash and negligent
driving
which
take away quite a number of precious lives of the people of our
country.
At a time when we are on the way to progress and prosperity, our country can ill-afford to lose so many precious lives every
year, for though the percentage of deaths cau·sed by motor accidents
in other countries is high, in our own country the ~ame is not by
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any means negligible, but is a factor to be reckor.ed with.
Our lawmakers being fully conscious of the expanding needs of our nation
have passed laws and statutes to minimise motor accidents and to
provide for adequate compensation to the familie·s who face serious
socio-economic problems if the main bread-earner los..s:s his life
in
the motor accident.
The time is ripe for serious consideration of
creating no-fault liability.
Having regard to the directive principles
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of State policy, the poverty of the ordinary run of victims of automobile accidents, the compulsory nature of insurance of motor vehicles, the nationalisation of general insurance companies and the ex-·
panding trend toward's nationalisation of bus transport, the law
of
torts based on no-fault needs reform.
While s. 110 of rhe Motor
Vehicles Act provides for the constitution of Claims Tribunals for
determining the compensation payable, s. 110-A· provides for
the
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procedure and circumstances under which the family of a victim of a·.
motor accident can get compensation and lays down the various
norms, though not as exhau'stively as it should have. The Courts,
however, have spelt out and enunciated valuable principles from time
to time which guide the determination of compensation in a particular situation.
Unfortunately, however, s. 95(2) (d) of the
Motor
Vehicles Act limits the compensation to be paid by an Insurance ComE
pany to Rs. 2,000/- only in respect of death to any third party and
this is one disconcerting aspect on which we shall have to say something in a later part of our judgment. ,
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With this little preface we now take up the facts in the appeals
by certificate filed by B. L. Gupta and Smt. Manjushri Raha in this
Court, and which after being consolidated have been disposed of by
one common judgment both by the Claims Tribunal as also by the
High Court.
Manjushri Raha, the main appellant in Civil Appeal
No. 2310 of 1968 will, in short, be referred to hereafter a·s "Raha",
whereas respondentS Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company
would be referred to as "Oriental Company" and the New India Insurance Company as "New India Company".
Smt. Manjula
Devi
Bhuta representing the owner of vehicle No. MPG-4515 will be referred to as "Bhuta", whereas B. L. Gupta the owner of vehicle No.
MPG-4307 belonging to the M. P. Speedways Company would be
referred to as "Gupta". Padmavati Shastri, the respondent in one
of the appeals, would be referred to as "Shastri". The appeals arise
in the following circumstances.
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Claim Case No. 6 of 1962 was filed by Raha along with her two
minor children against Bhuta, Sushil Kumar driver of vehicle No.
MPG-4615, Orienfal Company, New India Company, Gupta owner
of the M. P. Speedways Company and Ram Swaroop driver of vehicle
No. MPG-4307.
The applicant Raha claimed compen~ation for a
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MANJUSHRI RAHA v. B. L. GUPTA (Fazal Ali, J.)
947
sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- against the respondents under s. 110-A of the
Motor Vehicles Act.
Similarly Shastri filed Claim Case No. 5
of 1962 against the respondents mentioned
above
claiming
Rs.
1,20,0001- as ·compensation from the aforesaid respondents.
Both
these claims were consolidated and heard and decided by one common judgment by the Claims Tribunal, Gwalior.
Th·~ ~acts giving
rise to the claims of Raha and Shastri were that on Apnl 10, 19_62
Satyendra Nath Raha the hu·sband of Raha and Uma Shanker Shastri
the husband of Shastri were travelling in vehicle
No.
MPG-4307
(owned by Gupta of the M. P. Speedways Company) from Bhind to
Gwalior.
When the bus travelled a distance of about 26 miles on
the Bhind-Gwalior road another bus bearing No. MPG-4615 belonging to Bhuta was· seen coming from the opposite direction.
The
driver of the M.P. Speedways Company was Ram Swaroop while that
of the bus belonging to Bhuta was Sushi! Kumar.
When the
two
buses were approaching in opposite directions, both the driver's being
negligent and having failed to take the necessary precautions of keeping to theii; left led to a head-on collision of the two buses as a consequence of which the two persons, namely, Satyendra Nath Raha and
L'ma Shanker Shastri sustained fatal injuries to which they succumbed on the ·same day in the Gohad Hospital. _ The facts and circumstances under which the accident took place have not been disputed
by counsel for the parties, nor have the essential findings of fact given
by the Claims Tribunal and the High Cour! been challenged before
us.
The appeal, therefore, lies within a very narrow compass.
But before dealing with the appeals, it m_ay be necessary to indicate the reliefs granted by the Claims Tribunal to the parties concerned.
The Claims Tribunal decreed the claim of Raha to the
extent of R'§. 60,0001- only against all the respondents holding that
the drivers of both the buses were negligent.
The claim of Shastri
was decreed only to the extent of Rs. 40,000/- against Bhuta, Sushi!
Kumar driver and Oriental Company.
No decree was passed against
Ram Swaroop driver of the M.P. Speedways Company and New
India Company because there was no allegation of negligence against
these persons in the claim filed by Shastri.
Against the decision
of
the
Claims
Tribunal,
Gupta
field
Miscellaneous
First
Appeal No. 203 of 1965 against Bhuta, Raha and others which
was dismissed by the High Court.
Civil Appeals Nos. 1826 of 1968
and 132 of 1969 in this Court arise out of the aforesaid appeal before the High Court.
Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 219 of 1965
was filed by Bhuta against Raha, Gupta and others which was also
dismissed by the High Court, but Bhuta has not filed any appeal to
this Court against the decision of the Tribunal and the High Court in
that appeal. But Bhuta had filed an appeal in the High Court being
Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 220 of 1965 against Shastri which
was allowed by the High Court to this extent that the decree against
Gupta and Ram Swaroop was made joint and several along with the
appellant Bhuta.
Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 222 of 19'65 was
filed before the High Court by Oriental Company against Shastri but
that was also dismissed.
Similarly Miscellaneous First . .App€al No.
223 of 1965 was filed before the High Court by Oriental Company
against Raha which was also dismissed along with the cross objection
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 s.c.R.
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which was filed by Raha for enhancement of the compensation. The
High Court, however, held in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 223
of 1965 that Oriental Company was to pay a total compensation of
Rs. 20,000/- out of which Rs. 8,0001- was to be paid to Shastri and
Rs. 12,0001- to Raha.
The present appeals in this Court have been filed by Gupta and
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Raha.
Neither Shastri, nor Bhuta, nor any of the Insurance Companies have filed any appeal before this Court.
The short point raised by Mr. Sanghi appearing for Gupta was that in the c;ircumstances
the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal to Raha was too
high and at any rate the High Court ought not to h~ve made
the
appellant Gupta liable jointly and severally with others. In the
appeal filed by Raha it is claimed that the compensation granted by
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the Claims Tribunal was grossly inadequate and shoulq be enhanced.
It has been stated before us by Mr. Sanghi, though not admitted by
the other 'side, that Gupta and the Insurance Companies have paid a
total amount of Rs. 29,000/- (Rs. 15,0001- by Gupta and Rs. 14,000
by Insurance Companies) in full and final settlement of the claim
of Raha and, therefore, the appeal should be decreed in terms of the
compromise.
It was further contended that even if the amount
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awarded by the Claims Tribunal to Raha is enhanced that should be
payable by Bhuta alone and not by the appellant Gupta, who has
settled the claim with the appellant Raha.
There can be no doubt
that if really a settlement has been reached between Gupta and Raha
then no further decree can be passed as against Gupta. The appellant
further undertook to pay Rs. 10,000 /- to Shastri in fulfilment of her
claim.
As Rs. 10,000/- has already been paid to Shastri with the
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result that Bhuta has yet to pay Rs. 20,000 /- being her share to
Shastri.
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Ftnally, it was contended that as there was no allegation of negligence agains! Ram Swaroop the driver of the M. P. Speedways Company the High Court ought not to have decreed the claim of Raha
against the appellant Gupta.
We have perused the plaint before the
Claims Tribunal, which is rather loosely drafted, but it clearly contains the relief of compensation even against Gupta and Ram Swaroop
driver.
The High Court has pointed out that even though there is
no clear plea of negligence in the claim of Raha, the facts alleged
and proved in the case clearly show that Ram Swaroop the driver of
the M.P. Speedways Company was both rash and negligent. Pleadings
have to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour but with latitude or
awareness of low legal .literacy of poor people.
We fully agree with
the finding of the High Court and see no reason to disturb it.
We
also agree with the order of the High Court by which it makes Gupta
and Bhuta jointly and se'-:erally liable.
That was the only decree
which could have been pas'sed in the circumstances.
Coming now to the appeal filed by Raha, counsel for the appellant submitted that the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal
is grossly inadequate and certain important factors have not been
taken into consideration.
On a perusal of the judgment of the Claims
Tribunal it would appear that the only basis on which the compensation has been awarded is the total salary which the deceased Saty,en-
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MANJUSHRI RAHA v. B. L. GUPTA (Fazal Ali, !.)
949
<Ira Nath Raha would have got upto the age of 55 years which has
been taken at Rs. 1,20,000/- and after deducting half which would
normally have been spent, the actual income lost to the family was
Rs. 60,0001-. It seems to us, however, that in makiug the calculation,. the Claims Tribunal and the High Court overlooked two important and vital considerations.
In the first place, while tpe admitted
position was that the deceased Satyendra Nath Raha was workiRg
in the grade of Rs 590-30-830-35-900 and was getting a salary of
Rs. 620/- p.m. at the time of his death, the Courts below have not
taken into account the salary which he would have earned while reaching the maximum of his grade long before his retirement.
It is
admitted that the deceas\!d Satyendra Nath Raha was 37 years of
age at the time of the accident and at this rate he •.vould. have reached
the maximum of the grade of Rs. 900/- at the age of 46 years i.e. full
9 years before his superannulltion.
The claimant ha~ produced a
certificate Ext. P-4 from the office of
the
Accountaut
General,
Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior, which shows that from April 11.
1962
(i.e. the date next to the date of the death of Satyendn! Nath Raha)
to October 15, 1980 which would be the last working day of the
deceased Raha, the deceased Raha would have drawn Rs. 1,89,402/-
including the increments earned and the maximum
grade
drawn.
This figure may be rounded off to Rs. 1,88,000/-. Even if half of
this be deducted as being rightly taken to have been spent by the
deceased to cover day to day domestic expenses, payment of income..
tax· and other charges, the actual income lost to the family including
the value of the estate and the loss to the dependents would be
Rs. 94,000/-. This will be a fair estimate which does not take
into account the economic value of the deprivation to the wife of her ·
husband's company fon ever and the shock felt by the children.
It
was suggested by the High Court that as the deceased Raha was not
a permanent employ~, the amount taken into account by the· Compensation Tribunal was correct.
This is, however, not a consideration
which could have weighed with the Claims Tribunal in making the
assessment because it was purely contingent.
On the other hand with
the rise in price index it could well have been expected that there would
be several revisions in the grade by the time the deceased Raha had
attained the age of superannuation, which, if taken into account, would
further enhance the amount.
In these circumstances, therefore,
we
think that the amount of Rs. 90,000/-
would represent the correct
compensation so far as the salary part of the deceased Raha is concerned. .
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The Courts below have also not considered the effect of the pensionary benefits which the deceased Raha would u-ridoubtedly have
got ·after retirement, and in fact the Claims Tribunal has restricted the
span of the life of the deceased only to the age of 55 years i.e. the age
of superannuation, whereas in the present economic conditions the
life of an average Indian has increased more than two-fold. It is,
therefore, reasonable to expect that if the deceased had not died due
to accident, he would have lived up at least upto the age of 65 years,
if not more, so a's to earn the pensionary benefits for 10 years after
retirement. According to the certificate Ext. P-4 the dece·ased Raha
would have been entitled to a monthly pension of Rs. 337c50 which
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 s.c.R.
would mea~ about Rs. 4,050/- per year. There can be no doubt that
whole of this amount wouldi have to be spent, there being no other
source of income and, therefore, this amount cannot be said to be
lost to the estate. The certificate Ext. P-4 further shows that the
deceased Raha would have got death-cum-retirement gratuity to the
extent of Rs. 13,500/- calculated on the basis of the presumptive
average emoluments and presumptive last emoluments.
If the deceased had lived after superannuation, he might probably have got
this amount. After adding this amount of Rs. 13,500/- to Rs. 90,000
the total amount would come to Rs. 1,03,500/- which mav be rounded
off to roughly Rs. 1,00,000/-. In any view of the matter, therefore,
the appellant Raha was entitled to a compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-,
and the Courts below erred in completely overlooking these two important aspects which we hav~ discussed.
It appears that the appellants Raha as also Padmavati Shastri
could have got heavier compensation from the Insurance Companies,
but unfortunately the Motor Vehicles Act has
taken~ very narrew
view by limiting the liability of the Insurance Companies under s. 95
(2) ( d) to Rs. 2,000/- only in case of a third party.
While our Legislature has made laws to cover every possible
situation, yet it is well nigh impossible to make provisions for all kinds
of situations.
Nevertheless where the social need of the hour re-·
quires that precious human lives lost in motor accidents leaving a
trail of economic disaster in the shape of their unprovided for families
call for special attention of the law makers to meet this social need
by providing for heavy am! adequate compensation particularly
through Insurance Companies. It is true that while our law makers
are the best judges of the requirements of the society, yet it is indeed
surprising that such an important aspect of the matter has missed their
attention. Oui· country can ill-afford the loss of a precious life when
we are building a progressive society and if any person engaged in
industry, office, business or any othet occupation dies, a void is created
which is bound to result in a serious set back to the industry or occupation concerned. Apart from that the death of a worker creates a
serious economic problem for the family which he leaves behind. In
these circumstances it is only just and fair that the Legislature should
make a suitable provision so as to pay adequate compensation by
properly evaluating the previous life 0£ a citizen in its true perspective
rather than devaluing human lives on the basis of an artificial mathematical formula.
It is common knowledge that where a passenger
travelling by a plane: dies in an accident, he gets a compensation of
Rs. 1,00,000/- or like large sums, and yet when death comes to him
not through a plane but through a motor vehicle he is entitled only to
Rs. 2,000 /-. Does it indicate that the life of. a passenger travellin.g
by plane becomes more precious merely because he has chosen a particular conveyance and the value of his life is consi<lerably reduced if
he happens to choose a conveyance of a lesser value like a motor
vehicle ? Such an invidious distinction is absolutely shocking to any
judicial or social conscience - and yet S: .95(2) (d)
of the Motor
Vehicles Act seems to suggest such a d1stmctton. We hope and trust
that our law-makers will give serious attention to this aspect of the
matter and remove this serious lacuna in s. 95(2) (d) of the Motor
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MANJUSHRI RAHA v. B. L. GUPTA (Fazal Ali, J.)
9 51
Vehicles Act. We would also like to suggest that instead of limiting
the liability of the Insurance Companies to a specified sum of money
as representing the value of human life, the amount should be left to
be determined by a Court in the special circumstances of each case.
We further hope our suggestions will be duly implemented and the
observations of the highe_st Court of the country do not become a
mere pious wish.
In M/s. Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transponers Insurance Co. Ltd.('1) this Court has clearly held that an Insurance Company is not liable to pay any sum exceeding Rs. 2,000/-
upto a maximum of Rs. 20,000/- on the plain words of s. 95 (2) (d)
of the Motor Vehicles Act and the only remedy to provide for adequate compensation for a precious life of a human life is for the
Legislature to take a practical view of the loss of human life in motor
accidents.
In P. B.' Kader & Ors. v. Thatchamma and Ors.(2 ) a Division
Bench of the Kerala High Court, while dwelling on this aspect observed
as follows :
"It is sad that an; Indian life should be so devalued by an
Indian law as to cost only Rs. 2,000/-, apart from the fact
that the value of the Indian rupee has been eroded and Indian
life has become dearer since the time the statute was enacted,
and the consciousness of the comforts and amenities of life in
the Indian community has arisen, it would have been quite
appropriate to revise this fossil figure of
Rs. 2,000/- per
individual, involved in an accident, to make 'it more realistic
and humane, but that is a matter for the legislature; and the
observation that I have made is calculated to remind the lawmakers that humanism is the basis of law and justice."
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made
by the Kerala High Court in the aforesaid case and we would like to
remind the law-makers that the time has come to take a more humane
and practical view of things while passing statute like the Motor Vehicles
Act in regulating compensation payable by Insurance Companies to
victims of motor accidents.
We have not the slightest doubt that if
the attention of the Government is drawn, the lacuna will be covered
up in good time.
The result is that Civil Appeals Nos. 1826 of 1968 and 132 of
1969 are dismissed and Civil Appeal No. 2310 of 1968 is allowed to
this extent that the
claim preferred
by Raha is
enhanced
from
Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/-. As no authentic proof of any settlement between Gupta and Raha has been produced before us, the
decree passed by us will be jointly and severally recoverable from
Gupta and Bhuta after giving credit for the amounts received by Raha.
It will, however, be open to the executing court on proof of any full
and final settlement of the claims of Raha with Gupta or any other
Judgment debtor to adjust the claims accordingly under 0.23 r. 3
of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the circumstances of the case, the
parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
P.H.P.
C.A. 1826 of 1968 and 132 of 1969 dismissed.
(I) A.J.R. 1971 S.C. 1624.
(2) A.LR. 1970 Kera]a 241.
C.A. No. 2310 of 1968 allowed.
A
B
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H