# MANOHAR JOSHI v. NITIN BHAURAO PATIL AND ANR - **Citation:** [1995] Supp. 6 S.C.R. 421 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1995-12-11 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4973 of 1993 - **Bench:** J.S. Vbrma, N.P. Singh, K. Venkataswami - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/manohar-joshi-v-nitin-bhaurao-patil-and-anr-13642 - **Pages:** 50 ## Headnote B Election Laws : Representation of the people Act 1951.-Sections 81(1), 81(3), 82, 83, 86, 99, 100( 1) (b ), 177. Election petition-Allegation of corrnpt practice--l'roof of-Requirement at the trial is higher and confined to strict legal evidence. S 81(1), and S 81(3).-lnterpretation of c Consent-Nature of-Presumption that party leaders are agents of can- D didate not co"ect. Vicarious liability of candidate for practices adopted by party members-Arises when he consents. Non-compliance with S 81(3),~ffect of 'Hindutva'--Does not invariably mean Hindu religion, and the context and purpose of the use is to be considered in arriving at a decision. E The Appellant who was supported by the BJ.P.-Shiv Sena alliance, won the election from Dadar constituency of Bombay. The Respondent who F was the Congress candidate and lost the election to the Appellant, chal· lenged the election of the Appellant before the High Court at Bombay on the ground of corrupt practice under S 123(3) & (3A), of R.P. Act and relied on the speeches delivered on 24.2.90, at Shivaji Park both by the candidate as also the BJ.P/Shiv Sena Party leaders and on the audio and G video cassettes played during the election campaign. However the audio cassettes were not produced before the Trial Court and video cassettes were produced not with the petition but later during the trial. The Trial court allowed the election petition after rejecting the contention of the successful candidate that the petition was time-barred. H 421 422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A The election of the Appellant was therefore declared void on the ground under S lOO(l)(b) of R.P. Act. In appeal to this court, on behalf of the Appellant, illter alia, the following submissions were made. (1) The election petition ought to be B dismissed u/s 81 (l) of the R.P. Act, since the said Act was a self contained code and no provision outside the Act can be nsed to compute limitation. (2) The election petition and its copy should satisfy the requirements u/s 81(3) of the R.P. Act, and this was not met since neither the video cassettes nor the transcript thereof was supplied though reliance was placed on it in the petition. (3) There is deficiency in relying on video cassettes for C pleading corrupt practice and this is hit by 06 Rl6 CPC, leaving only the speeches as the basis of the allegation of corrupt practice. (4) No corrupt practice u/s 123(3) or (3A) of the R.P. Act is established by either the pleadings or the relevant and admissible evidence produced before the Trial Court. D Countering the arguments on behalf of the respondent it was submitted (1) The scheme of the R.P. Act and the legislative history of limitation show that S.10 of the General Clauses Act would apply for calculating the period of limitation. Reliace was placed on the maxim 'lex non Cojit ad impossibi/ia'. The petitioner has a right to present the petition E on the last day which was 14.4.90, and that being a holiday, the petition was presented on 16.4.90, which was the first working day thereafter, and hence the petition was within the lim1tat" .n. (2) Neither the video cassette" nor the transcript was filell with the petition 1nd therefore not sen l.1g the same with the copy of the petition on the Appellant did not amount to p non-compliance with S 81(3) of the R.P. Act. (3) Corrupt practice was properly pleaded in the petition and the fact that the Appellant had admitted to the existence and use of the video cassettes can be taken as proof of the pleadings. (4) The consent of the candidate to the speeches of acknowledged party leaders should be implied from the relationship of the candidate to these leaders through the party links. In fact the party leaders G are to be assumed to be the agents of the candidate. Therefore the speeches of the party leaders may be termed corrupt practice; then the ground u/s lOO(l)(b), of the R.P. Act would be available for setting aside the election. Unless this presumption is av ## Text _Characters 0–39,567 of 119,293. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39567 for what follows._ MANOHAR JOSHI A v. NITIN BHAURAO PATIL AND ANR. DECEMBER 11, 1995 [J.S. VBRMA, N.P. SINGH AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] B Election Laws : Representation of the people Act 1951.-Sections 81(1), 81(3), 82, 83, 86, 99, 100( 1) (b ), 177. Election petition-Allegation of corrnpt practice--l'roof of-Requirement at the trial is higher and confined to strict legal evidence. S 81(1), and S 81(3).-lnterpretation of c Consent-Nature of-Presumption that party leaders are agents of can- D didate not co"ect. Vicarious liability of candidate for practices adopted by party members-Arises when he consents. Non-compliance with S 81(3),~ffect of 'Hindutva'--Does not invariably mean Hindu religion, and the context and purpose of the use is to be considered in arriving at a decision. E The Appellant who was supported by the BJ.P.-Shiv Sena alliance, won the election from Dadar constituency of Bombay. The Respondent who F was the Congress candidate and lost the election to the Appellant, chal· lenged the election of the Appellant before the High Court at Bombay on the ground of corrupt practice under S 123(3) & (3A), of R.P. Act and relied on the speeches delivered on 24.2.90, at Shivaji Park both by the candidate as also the BJ.P/Shiv Sena Party leaders and on the audio and G video cassettes played during the election campaign. However the audio cassettes were not produced before the Trial Court and video cassettes were produced not with the petition but later during the trial. The Trial court allowed the election petition after rejecting the contention of the successful candidate that the petition was time-barred. H 421 422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A The election of the Appellant was therefore declared void on the ground under S lOO(l)(b) of R.P. Act. In appeal to this court, on behalf of the Appellant, illter alia, the following submissions were made. (1) The election petition ought to be B dismissed u/s 81 (l) of the R.P. Act, since the said Act was a self contained code and no provision outside the Act can be nsed to compute limitation. (2) The election petition and its copy should satisfy the requirements u/s 81(3) of the R.P. Act, and this was not met since neither the video cassettes nor the transcript thereof was supplied though reliance was placed on it in the petition. (3) There is deficiency in relying on video cassettes for C pleading corrupt practice and this is hit by 06 Rl6 CPC, leaving only the speeches as the basis of the allegation of corrupt practice. (4) No corrupt practice u/s 123(3) or (3A) of the R.P. Act is established by either the pleadings or the relevant and admissible evidence produced before the Trial Court. D Countering the arguments on behalf of the respondent it was submitted (1) The scheme of the R.P. Act and the legislative history of limitation show that S.10 of the General Clauses Act would apply for calculating the period of limitation. Reliace was placed on the maxim 'lex non Cojit ad impossibi/ia'. The petitioner has a right to present the petition E on the last day which was 14.4.90, and that being a holiday, the petition was presented on 16.4.90, which was the first working day thereafter, and hence the petition was within the lim1tat" .n. (2) Neither the video cassette" nor the transcript was filell with the petition 1nd therefore not sen l.1g the same with the copy of the petition on the Appellant did not amount to p non-compliance with S 81(3) of the R.P. Act. (3) Corrupt practice was properly pleaded in the petition and the fact that the Appellant had admitted to the existence and use of the video cassettes can be taken as proof of the pleadings. (4) The consent of the candidate to the speeches of acknowledged party leaders should be implied from the relationship of the candidate to these leaders through the party links. In fact the party leaders G are to be assumed to be the agents of the candidate. Therefore the speeches of the party leaders may be termed corrupt practice; then the ground u/s lOO(l)(b), of the R.P. Act would be available for setting aside the election. Unless this presumption is available the candidate would be able to take the benefit of speeches made on the ground of religion and this would H vitiate against the very essence of democracy and the object of the Act. ' MANOHARJOSHI v. N.B. PATIL 423 Allowing the Appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. The finding recorded by the High Court against the Appellant that charge of corrupt practices under sub-sections (3) & (3A) of S.123 of R.P. Act has been proved to declare his election to be void on the ground contained in S lOO(l)(b) of the R.P. Act, is contrary to law and is therefore set aside. The result is that no ground is made for declaring the Appellant's election to be void. [470-B-C] 1.2. The High Court misdirected itself by starting on a wrong premise in trying an allegation not in the pleading and then in admitting and relying on material which is not legal evidence for the proof of a corrupt practice. The error was aggravated by an incorrect appreciation of the legal principles and overlooking the meaning of certain terms. The significance of the trial of corrupt practice and the consequence of a finding thereon, appears to have been missed by the High Court. [ 469-H, 470-A] A B c 1.3. The High Court failed to appreciate that the only allegation of D corrupt practice in the election petition which raised a triable issue is in para 30 and the rest of the general averments deficient in requisite pleadings of all the constituent parts of the corrupt practice did not constitute a pleading of the full cause of action and therefore had to be ignored and struck out in accordance with 06 R16, CPC. [ 462-C] 1.4. There is nothing in S.98 to permit the High Court to decide the election petition piecemeal and to declare the election of any returned candidate to be void at an intermediate stage of the trial when any part of the trial remains to be concluded. It is amply clear that the order which can be made under clause (a) & (b) of S.99(1) is required to be made 'at the time of making an order under S.98'. An order u/s 98 can be made only at the conclusion of the trial. The requirement of S.99 is to be completed during the trial of the election petition and the final order has to be made in the decision of the High Court rendered u/s 98 at the conclusion of the trial of the election petition. [465-D] 1.5. Reliance in the election petition on the allegation of corrupt practices was for the ground u/s lOO(l)(b) & not S lOO(l)(d)(ii) under which the election has been dticlared void by the High Court. There was no attempt to plead or prove that the result of the election of the Appellant was materially affected for these reasons to make out a ground u/s lOO(l)(d)(ii) for declaring E F G the election of the returned candidate to be void. [459-D] H 424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP.6S.C.R. A 1.6. It i.J significant that neither the video cassettes and audio cassettes nor the transcript of their texts was produced in the election petitio or annexed to the election petition so that the contents thereof were not pleaded in either of the required modes. That apart, there is nothing in the pleading to indicate the names of the persons who are alleged to B have displayed the same or the dates on which they were displayed or in other words any other fact which would make the allegation clear and specific. The further requirement of consent of the returned candidate for those acts is not pleaded as required for the ground u/s lOO(l)(b) of the R.P. Act and in the definition of the corrnpt practice under Ss.123(3) & (3A) when this is an essential requirement for raising a triable issue to C bind the Appellant with the consequences of such corrnpt practice and to invalidate his election. This alone is sufficient to ignore the entire pleading relating to Bal Thackeray, Parmod Mahajan and any other leader as well as the display of video cassettes since none of those acts is attributed to the Appellant or his election agent. (460-F-G, 461-C] D E 1.7. No notice was given to Bal Thackeray, Pramod Mahajan or any other person against whom allegation was made, even though the High Court has held those corrupt practices to be proved for the purpose of declaring the Appellants' election void. (463-C] 1.8. No notice u/s 99 was given by the High Court before making the final order u/s 98 the R.P. Act declaring the election to be void. This is a fatal defect. (467-C] 2.1. There is no dispute that the election petition presented in the F present case on 16.4.90 was within limitation and there was no non-compliance of S.81(1) of the R.P. Act. (435-C] 2.2. It is a settled principle that the litigant has the right to avail limitation upto the last day and his only obligation is to explain his inability to present the suit/petition on the last day of the limitation and G each day theater till it is actually presented. This being the basic premise, it cannot be doubted that the election petitioner in the present case was entitled to avail the entire limitation of 45 days, i.e., upto 14.4.90 and he was required to explain the inability of not filing it only on 14.4.90 and 15.4.90 since the petition was actually presented in the High Court on H 16.4.90. [ 436-E-F] ..... MANOHARJOSHI v. N.B. PATIL 425 Ram/a/ Motila/ & Chhotela/ v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., [1962) 2 SCR 762, A relied on. 2.3. In view of the basic premise that election petitioner is entitled to avail the entire limitation of 45 days, it would require the election petitioner to perform an impossible task in a case like the present, to present the election petition on the last day of limitation on which date the High Conrt B as well as its office is closed. The underlying principle of the legal maxim 'lex non cojit ad impossibilia' suggests the informed decision on this point leading to the only conclusion that S.10 of the General Clauses Act applies to the computation of the limitation prescribed by S.81(1) of the R.P. Act for presentation of the election petition. [437-E·G] C 2.4. There is nothing to indicate that providing the period of limita· lion in S.81(1) itself by substitution of certain words by Act 27 of 1956 instead of prescribing the limitation by Rules, was with a view to exclude the applicability of S.10 of General Clauses Act. The change appears to have been made to provide for a fixed period in the Act itself instead of leaving D that exercise to be performed by the rule making authority. An express provision in R 2(6), of the 1951 Rules was required sfoce the General Clauses Act ipso facto would not apply to Rules framed under the Central Act, even though it would to the Act itself. The context supports the ap· plicability of S.10 of the General Clauses Act instead of indicating its E exclusion for the purpose of computing the limitation prescribed in S.81(1) for presentation of election petitions. [437-B-E) H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Kamai/ Singh, [1957) SCR 208; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. La/it Narain Mishra, [1974) 3 SCR 31; Hari Shankar Tripathi v. Shiv Harsh & Ors., [1976) 3 SCR 308 andSimhadri Satya F NarayanaRao v.M. BuddaPrasad&Ors., [1994) Suppl 1SCC449 = (1991) 1 SCJ 281, referred to. 3.1. There is no dispute that the election petition as presented in the court was accompanied by as many copies as there were respondents in G the election petition. The copy of the election petition served on the returned candidate with the notice of the election petition was identical with the election petition as it was presented in court. The requirement of the plain language of S.81(3) was, therefore fully met. The video cassettes were not even filed in the High Court with the election petition. This is, therefore not a case of non-supply of a copy of a document which was filed H 426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A along with the election petition. The contents of the video cassettes, except to the extent pleaded in paras 32 & 33 of the election petition, cannot be treated to be incorporated by reference in the election petition as a part of the pleadings. There was thus no non-compliance of S.81(3) of the R.P. Act. The election petition was, therefore not liable to be dismissed VIS B 86(1) even on the ground of non-compliance of S.81(3) of the R.P. Act. [439-F, 444-E-F, H, 445-A-B] 3.2. The compliance of Ss.81, 82 & 117 is to be seen with reference to the evident facts found in the election petition and the documents filed along with it at the time of presentation. This is a ministerial act. There C is no scope for any further inquiry for the purpose of S.86 to ascertain the deficiency, if any, in the election petition found with reference to the requirements of S.83 of the R.P. Act which is a judicial function. For this reason non-compliance of S.83, is not specified as a ground for dismissal of the election petition u/s 86, which being in the nature of a penal D provision, has to be construed strictly confined to its plain language. [440-C-F] 3.3. In a case where the document is incorporated by reference in the election petition without reproducing its contents in the body of the election petition, it forms an integral part of the petition and if a copy of that document is not furnished to the respondent with a copy of the E election petition the defect is fatal attracting dismissal of the Election Petition u/s 86(1) of the R.P. Act. On the other hand, when the contents of the document are fully incorporated in the body of the election petition and the document also is filed with the election petition, not furnishing a copy of the document with a copy of the election petition in which the F contents of the document are already incorporated, does not amount to non- compliance of S.81(3) to attract S.86(1) of the R.P. Act. [442-E-G] Sahodrabai Pai v. Ram Singh Aharwar, (1968] 3 SCR 13; A. Madan Mohan v. Kalavakunta Chandrasekhara, [1984] 2 SCC 288; M. Karnnanidhi Etc.v. Dr. H.V. Hande & Ors. Etc. Etc., [1983] 2 SCC 473 and U.S. SasidG haran v. K. Karnnakaran & Anr., (1989] 4 SCC 482, referred to. 4.1. The distinction between the act amounting to corrupt practice done by the candidate himself or his election agent and any other perso:. with his consent has to be kept in view. This has relevance also ro,- the H purpose of S.99 of the R.P. Act. [455-H] MANOHARJOSHI v. N.B. PATIL 427 4.2. In order to constitute corrupt practice, it must further be shown A that the act was done during the election campaign between 8.2.90 when the returned candidate became a 'candidate' and 27.2.90 the date of the poll, and that it was the act of the candidate or his agent or any other person with his consent. Unless all these constituent parts of the corrupt practice are pleaded to constitute the cause of action raising a triable issue and are then proved by evidence, the corrupt practice cannot be held to be pleaded and proved. [455-C-D] 43. If the act attributed is by the display of a.video cassette recorded some time earlier, the display being between the date the candidate became B a candidate and the date of the poll, in the constituency, a mere display of C the \ideo cassette does not prove all the constituent parts of the corrupt practice, inasmuch as it must also be pleaded and proved that such display was by the candidate or his agent or any other person with bis consent. Where the display of the cassette is attributed to any other person with the consent of the candidate, the liability of the candidate for commission of D the corrupt practice results vicariously form the act of the other person done with the consent of the candidate. [455-E-F) 5.1. The distinction between Clause (b) and clanse (d)(ii) S.100(1) is corrupt practice by a returned candidate or his agent or any other person significant. The ground in clause (b) provides that the commission of any E with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent by itself is sufficient to declare the election to be void. On the other hand, the commission of any corrupt practice in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent (without the further requirement of consent of a returned candidate or his election agent) is a F ground for declaring the election to be void only when it is further pleaded and proved that the result of the election in so far as it concerns a returned candidate bas been materially affected. This ground is further subjected to S.100(2) of which the onus is on the returned candidate. It is, therefore clear that if the corrupt practice is committed in the interests of the G returned candidate by any other person, even if be be an agent other than his election agent, without the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent, the law provides for the election to be declared void u/s lOO(l)(d)(ii) provided it is also pleaded and proved that the result of the election of the returned candidate was materially affected thereby. Law clearly provides that the returned candidate would not get the benefit of a H 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A corrupt practice committed in his interest by anyone if the resnlt of the election is shown to be materially affected thereby. [457-G-H, 458-A-D] 5.2. There is no occasion to read into the ground in S.lOO(l)(b) or the definition of 'corrupt practice' the implied consent of the candidate for any act done by a leader of that party to dispense with a clear pleading B and proof of the candidate's or his election agent's consent as a constituent part of the corrupt practice for the ground u/s lOO(l)(b) of the R.P. Act. But even if the acknowledged leaders of a party have committed any corrupt practice which results in benefit to the returned candidate then on proof of the benefit having materially affected the election result in favour C of the candidate, his election would be set aside on the gronnd u/s lOO(l)(d)(ii) of the R.P. Act. [458-F-G, E-F] 53. Whenever the requirement is of consent, it most be free consent given by the giver of the consent, of Ws own volition. Ordinarily, it also implies a subservient role of the person to whom consent is given and the D authority of the giver of consent to control the actions of the agent. It is difficult to ascribe to an acknowledged leader of the party a role subservient.to the candidate set op by that party. However, if even without giving his consent, the candidate has received the benefit from the leaders act in a manner that materially affects his election favourably, on pleading and E proof of such material effect on election, the election is liable to be set aside unless as provided in s.100(2) he further discharges the onns placed npon him that inspite of his opposition and taking doe precautions that act had been committed for which he cannot be responsible. [458-G-H, 459-A-B] F 5.4. The word 'Hindutva' by itself does not invariably mean Hindu religion and it is in this context and the manner ofits use which is material for deciding the meaning of the words 'Hindutva' in a particular text. The so called plank of the political party may at best be relevant only for appreciation of the context in which a speech was made by a leader of the G political party during the election campaign, but no more for the purpose of pleading corrupt practice in the election petition against a particnlar candidate. [ 459-F-G] Bal Thackeray v. Prabhakar K Kunte & Ors., [1995] Supp SCR, relied. H 6. It is amply clear that the order which can be made under c'.auses MANOHARJOSHI v. N.B.PATIL 429 (a) & (b) of S.99(1) is required to be made 'at the time of making an order A under S.98'. The requirement of S.99 is ttJ be completed during the trial of the election and the final order u/s 99 has to be made in the decision of the High Court rendered u/s 98 at the conclusion of the trial of the election petition. Clause (a) of S.99(1) provides for a situation 'where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at B the election. In that case, it requires that at the time of making an order u/s 98, the High Court shall also make an order recording a finding whether any corrupt practice has or bas not been proved to have been committed at the election and the nature of that corrupt practice, and the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been C guilty of any corrupt practice and the nature of that corrupt practice. Clause (b) further requires the fixing of the total amount of costs payable and specifying the person by and to whom costs shall be paid. It follows that the High Court cannot make an order u/s 98 recording a finding of proof of corrupt practice against the returned candidate alone and on that D basis declare the election of the returned candidate to be void and then proceed to comply with the requirement of S.99 in the manner stated therein with a view to decide at a later stage whether any other person also is guilty of the corrupt practice for the purpose of naming him u/s 99 of the R.P. Act. High Court has no option in the matter to decide whether it E will proceed u/s 99 against the other persons alleged to be guilty of that corrupt practice along with returned candidate in as much as the require· ment of S.99 is mandatory since the finding recorded by the High Court requires it to name all 'persons proved at the trial to have been guilty of the corrupt practice. The expression 'the name of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice' in S.99(1) (a) (ii) clearly provides for such proof being required 'at the trial' which means 'the trial of an election petition' mentioned in s.98, at the conclusion of which alone the order contemplated u/s 98 can be made. In a case where the liability is fastened on the candidate vicariously for the F act of another person, unless the act is found proved against the doer of G the act, the question of recording a finding on that basis against the returned candidate cannot arise. If the final verdict has already been rendered against the returned candidate in such a case, the opportunity contemplated by S.99 by an inquiry after notice to the other person is futile since the verdict has already been given. On the other hand, if the question H 430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A is treated as open, a conflicting verdict after inquiry U/S 99 in favour of the noticee would lead to an absurdity which could not be attributed to the Legislature. [465-B-H, 466-B-F, 467·A·B] 7. It needs hardly be mentioned that the requirement of proof of a corrupt practice at the trial of an election petition is higher and confined B to strict legal evidence, in comparison to the material on which the Tribunal can rely for its decision u/s 4 of the Unlawful Activities (Preven· lion) Act, 1967 to confirm the declaration by the Central Govt. of an association as unlawful. (469-F·G] C Jamaat-e-Islami Hind Etc. v. Union of India, [1995] 1 SCC, 428, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4973 of 1993. D From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.93 of the Bombay High Court in E.P. No. 24 of 1990. Ram Jethmalani, Jai Chinai, Ashok Desai, B.A. Desai, M.C. Bhadare, Arif Bookwala, Vilas Joshi, D.M. Nargolkar, Ms. Lala Krishnamurthy, Mukul Mudgal, Mukesh Vashi, Pallav Sisodia, Ashish Wad, Ms. E Sarita Krishnamurthy, Ms. Reema Bhandari, Ms. Kiran Jai and M.N.Shroff for the appearing parties The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F J.S. VERMA, J. : This is an appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short "the R.P. Act") against the judgment dated 26.4.1993 by S.N. Variava, J. of the Bombay High Court in Election Petition No. 24/90 whereby the election of the appellant Manohar Joshi to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from 32, Dadar Constituency of Greater Bombay held on 27.2.1990 has been declared to G be void on the ground under Section lOO(l)(b) of the R.P. Act. Manohar Joshi was the candidate of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance at that election while the original election petitioner Bhaurao Patil (now dead), was the candidate of the Congress (I) Party. Manohar Joshi secured H the highest number of votes i.e. 47, 737, while Bhaurao Patil secured 24, MANOHARJOSH! v. N.B.PATIL[J.S. VERMA,J.] 431 354 votes. Accordingly, Manohar Joshi was declared duly elected on A 1.3.1990. Admittedly, the last date for filing the election petition according to the limitation prescribed in sub-section 1 of Section 81 of the R.P. act was 14.4.1990 but the election petition was actually presented in the Bombay High Court on 16.4.1990. It is also admitted that 14.4.1990 was a Saturday B on which date the High Court as well as its office was closed on account of a public holiday and 15.4.1990 was a Sunday on which date also the High Court as well as its office was closed and, therefore, the election petition could not have been presented on either of these two dates. The first question which arises, relates to compliance of Section 81 of the R.P. Act, C the not1-compliance of which renders the election petition liable for dismissal under Section 86 of the R.P. Act. The election petition alleged the commission of corrupt practices under sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 123 of the R.P. Act and sought declaration of the election of Manohar Joshi to be void- on the ground D under Section lOO(l)(b) of the R.P. Act. The corrupt practices alleged were, in substance, speeches on 24.2.1990 at Shivaji Park by the returned candidate Manohar Joshi and leaders of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance, namely, Bal Thackeray, Chhagan Bhujbal and Pramod Nawalkar; and some audio and video cassettes played during the election campaign alleged to E contain material constituting these corrupt practices. Any further reference to the audio cassettes is unnecessary since none was either produced or relied on at the trial. The petition was supported only on the ground of the said speeches and video cassettes. Further details of the same would be given later at the appropriate stage. F The High Court rejected the contention that the election petition was time barred and, tljerefore, liable to be dismissed under Section 86 of the R.P. Act. The High Court has held that the corrupt practices alleged have been proved. Consequently, the election petition has been allowed and the election of the returned candidate Manohar Joshi has been declared to be G void on the ground under Section lOO(l)(b) of the R.P. Act. Hence this appeal. It would be appropriate to first deal with the contention of Shri Ram Jethmalani relating to non-compliance of Section 81 of the R.P. Act which, if correct, renders the election petition liable to be dismissed under Section H 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. A 86 thereof. The arguments of Shri Jethmalani in this respect have to be considered with reference to Sections 81, 83 and 86(1) which are as under: B c D E F "81. Presentation of petitions. (1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in *[sub-section (1)] of section 100 and section 101 to the **(High Court] by any candidate at such election or any elector ***(within forty-five days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.] Explanation. In this sub-section, 11elector 11 means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not. #[xx xx xx] ##[(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition### and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.] *Subs. by Act 27 of 1956, s.44, for "sub-sections (1) and (2)." **Subs. by Act 27of1966,s.39, for "Election commission" (w.e.f. 14.12.1966). ***Subs. by Act 27 of 1956, for certain words, i.e., 'in such form and within such time but not earlier than the date of publication of the names of the returned candidate or candidates at such election under Section 67, as may be prescribed." G #Sub-section (2) omitted by Act 47 of 1966, s.39 (w.e.f. 14.12.1966). ##Ins. by Act 40 of 1961, s.17 (w.e.f. 20.9.1961). ###Certain words omitted by Act 47 of 1966, s.39 (w.e.f. H 14.12.1966)." MANOHARJOSHI v. N.B. PATIL(J.S.VERMA,J.] 433 "83. Contents of petition - ( 1) An election petition - (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars ·of any corrupt practice that A the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of B the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and ( c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the C verification of pleadings : Pro'"