# Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors

- **Citation:** 2026 INSC 234
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2026-03-12
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 13860 of 2024
- **Bench:** J.K. Maheshwari, Atul S. Chandurkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/manohar-lal-v-commissioner-of-police-ors-39042
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Matter pertains to dismissal of police constable without conducting
departmental inquiry, holding that it was not reasonably practicable
to hold an inquiry.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India - Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) -
Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed
in civil capacities under the Union or a State - Exercise of the
power u/Art.311 - Registration of FIR against the appellantconstable posted in the Special Cell for the offence of robbery
and thereafter arrested and taken in custody - While he was
in custody the order of dismissal passed in exercise of the
power u/Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) holding that it
would not be 'reasonably practicable' to conduct a regular
departmental enquiry on account of reasonable belief of threat,
intimidation and inducement to the victim and thereby creating
the possibility of tampering of the vital evidence - Appellant
filed application seeking quashment of his dismissal order,
however rejected by the tribunal - Writ petition thereagainst
also dismissed by the High Court - Correctness:
Held: It is vivid from the analysis of the intent of Art.311(2) that
an employee holding a post in Union or State ought not to be
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by
which he was appointed - Person shall be dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank after an inquiry supplying the charges if any against
him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect
of those charges - Applicability of the said clause is restricted in
a situation wherein his conduct led to his conviction of criminal
* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
359
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
charges or where the authority empowered who dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank records reason in writing upon satisfaction that
it is not 'reasonably practicable' to hold an enquiry against him -
Where such power has been exercised by the President or the
Governor it may be in the interest of security of the State or if not
expedient to hold such an enquiry, then exceptional power under
clause (c) of second proviso to Art.311 ought to be exercised - In
case such a decision invoking the extraordinary power is taken by
the competent authority, the scope of judicial review is available
to the Constitutional Courts wherein the reasons as assigned for
satisfaction of the authority must be reasonable, valid, justified and in
writing - Satisfaction as recorded must be the objective satisfaction
on the basis of material brought on record which ordinarily the
disciplinary authority may take as a prudent person, otherwise,
dispensing with the enquiry not permissible in law - On facts, the
power exercised by the authority is completely without application
of mind, thus, the question of recording of satisfaction as affirmed
by the appellate authority, the CAT and the High Court does not
arise - Thus, the order dispensing with the regular procedure of
inquiry is arbitrary and consequently the order of dismissal of the
appellant to be quashed and the orders of the CAT and the High
Court affirming the said dismissal order stand set aside - Order
passed by the CAT and the High Court set aside and the order
of dismissal passed by the DCP and confirmed by the appellate
authority quashed - In consequence, the appellant to be reinstated
with continuity of service, being entitled for all consequential benefits
notionally - Since, the appellant found involved in a criminal case,
back wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement restricted
to 50%. [Paras 40-43]

## Text

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[2026] 3 S.C.R. 358 : 2026 INSC 234
Manohar Lal
v.
Commissioner of Police & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 13860 of 2024)
12 March 2026
[J.K. Maheshwari* and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to dismissal of police constable without conducting
departmental inquiry, holding that it was not reasonably practicable
to hold an inquiry.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India - Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) -
Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed
in civil capacities under the Union or a State - Exercise of the
power u/Art.311 - Registration of FIR against the appellantconstable posted in the Special Cell for the offence of robbery
and thereafter arrested and taken in custody - While he was
in custody the order of dismissal passed in exercise of the
power u/Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) holding that it
would not be 'reasonably practicable' to conduct a regular
departmental enquiry on account of reasonable belief of threat,
intimidation and inducement to the victim and thereby creating
the possibility of tampering of the vital evidence - Appellant
filed application seeking quashment of his dismissal order,
however rejected by the tribunal - Writ petition thereagainst
also dismissed by the High Court - Correctness:
Held: It is vivid from the analysis of the intent of Art.311(2) that
an employee holding a post in Union or State ought not to be
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by
which he was appointed - Person shall be dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank after an inquiry supplying the charges if any against
him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect
of those charges - Applicability of the said clause is restricted in
a situation wherein his conduct led to his conviction of criminal
* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
359
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
charges or where the authority empowered who dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank records reason in writing upon satisfaction that
it is not 'reasonably practicable' to hold an enquiry against him -
Where such power has been exercised by the President or the
Governor it may be in the interest of security of the State or if not
expedient to hold such an enquiry, then exceptional power under
clause (c) of second proviso to Art.311 ought to be exercised - In
case such a decision invoking the extraordinary power is taken by
the competent authority, the scope of judicial review is available
to the Constitutional Courts wherein the reasons as assigned for
satisfaction of the authority must be reasonable, valid, justified and in
writing - Satisfaction as recorded must be the objective satisfaction
on the basis of material brought on record which ordinarily the
disciplinary authority may take as a prudent person, otherwise,
dispensing with the enquiry not permissible in law - On facts, the
power exercised by the authority is completely without application
of mind, thus, the question of recording of satisfaction as affirmed
by the appellate authority, the CAT and the High Court does not
arise - Thus, the order dispensing with the regular procedure of
inquiry is arbitrary and consequently the order of dismissal of the
appellant to be quashed and the orders of the CAT and the High
Court affirming the said dismissal order stand set aside - Order
passed by the CAT and the High Court set aside and the order
of dismissal passed by the DCP and confirmed by the appellate
authority quashed - In consequence, the appellant to be reinstated
with continuity of service, being entitled for all consequential benefits
notionally - Since, the appellant found involved in a criminal case,
back wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement restricted
to 50%. [Paras 40-43]
Case Law Cited
Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel and Others [1985] Supp.
2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398 - relied on.
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. [1990] Supp. 3 SCR
354 : (1991) 1 SCC 362 - held applicable.
Ex. Const. Chhote Lal v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC
196; Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2005) 11 SCC
525; Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 581; State
of Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh [2007] 11 SCR 752 : (2007) 15
SCC 217; Reena Rani v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 215;
360
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Risal Singh v. State of Haryana [2014] 7 SCR 544 : (2014) 13
SCC 244; Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2005) 11
SCC 525 - referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1980; Delhi Police Act, 1978.
List of Keywords
Dismissal; Police constable; Without conducting departmental
inquiry; Not reasonably practicable to hold inquiry; Special Cell;
Reasonable belief of threat, intimidation and inducement to victim;
Tampering of the vital evidence; Quashment of dismissal order.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13860
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.02.2023 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 1309 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Sandeep Choudhary, Ram Niwas Buri,
Basudeb Biswas, Naresh Sharma, Ms. Sreepriya K, Praveen Jain.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Brijender Chahar, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Sanjay Kumar
Tyagi, Mili Baxi, Rajat Nair, Vibhu Shanker Mishra, Aaditya Vikram.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.K. Maheshwari, J.
1)
The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 02.02.2023
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter
'High Court') disposing of the writ petition filed by the appellant
questioning the order of dismissal from service dated 18.07.2017
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
361
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
passed by Deputy Commissioner of Police (hereinafter 'DCP'), New
Delhi, the Order of Appellate Authority dated 30.07.2018 and the
Order dated 29.11.2022 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal,
Principal Bench at New Delhi (hereinafter 'CAT') in OA No. 744 of
2020.
2)
The appellant was dismissed from service by the DCP, Delhi vide
order dated 18.07.2017, in exercise of the power under clause
(b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India
without conducting departmental inquiry. The reason assigned for
not resorting to the normal procedure prescribed under Delhi Police
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter '1980 Rules'),
was that Shri Govind Sharma, Assistant Commissioner of Police
(hereinafter 'ACP') in the preliminary enquiry found that it would
not be 'reasonably practicable' to conduct a regular departmental
enquiry on account of reasonable belief of threat, intimidation and
inducement to the victim and thereby creating the possibility of
tampering of the vital evidence.
3)
The appeal against the said order was dismissed by the Special
Commissioner of Police, Delhi vide order dated 30.07.2018 accepting
the reasons as indicated in the order of dismissal.
4)
Being dissatisfied, the appellant filed OA No. 744 of 2020 before
CAT seeking quashment of his dismissal order and the order of
the appellate authority. The CAT referred to the stand as taken in
the counter affidavit of the State, relied upon some judgments and
declined to interfere, dismissing the Original Application filed by
the appellant vide order dated 29.11.2022. Writ Petition (Civil) No.
1309 of 2023 filed before the High Court of Delhi by the appellant
was dismissed, accepting the same reasoning as taken by the DCP.
5)
Ms. V. Mohana, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of
the appellant, referring to Section 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978
(hereinafter '1978 Act') contends that the power of punishment
conferred upon the competent authority is not absolute; it is subject
to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the
1980 Rules referred above. Referring to Rule 6, she contended that
punishment mentioned at Serial Nos. (i) to (vii) of Rule 5 therein are
deemed to be 'major penalties' and the competent authority can award
the same after regular departmental inquiry. It is contended that as
per Rule 14(2), a punishment of major penalty ought to be awarded
362
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the appointing authority only after the regular departmental inquiry.
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India contemplates that if a person
is a member of a civil service of the Union or all India Service or
a Civil Service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or
a State, he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges
against him and has been afforded reasonable opportunity of being
heard. The first proviso contemplates that in case the penalty is
required to be imposed on the basis of evidence adduced during the
inquiry, it would not be necessary to afford an opportunity of making
representation on the proposed penalty. Clause (b) of second proviso
states that where the authority empowered to remove a person is
satisfied for some reason to be recorded in writing, to the effect that
holding an inquiry is not 'reasonably practicable', the orders can be
passed without adhering to the general principle contemplated by
Article 311(2).
6)
In reference to above, learned senior counsel submits that after
registration of FIR No. 390 of 2017 on 28.06.2017, the appellant
was taken into custody on 29.06.2017 and released on bail on
14.10.2017. In the meanwhile, the competent authority, vide order
dated 18.07.2017, in exercise of power under clause (b) of second
proviso of Article 311 (2), indicating that possibility of traumatizing
the witnesses may not be ruled out, dismissed him from service.
It is forcefully contended that while the appellant was in custody,
reason as assigned of intimidating or traumatizing the witnesses are
flimsy. In absence of any convincing material, exercise of such extraordinary power ignoring the procedure prescribed under the 1980
Rules is not permissible otherwise it would amount to misuse of the
power by the competent authority. In support of these contentions,
learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of this
Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel and Others1,
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors.2, Ex. Const. Chhote
Lal v. Union of India & Ors.3, Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana
1
(1985) 3 SCC 398
2
(1991) 1 SCC 362
3
(2000) 10 SCC 196
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
363
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
and Ors.4, Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab5, State of Punjab v.
Harbhajan Singh6, Reena Rani v. State of Haryana7, and Risal
Singh v. State of Haryana8.
7)
It is urged that the dismissal order passed by the competent authority
and confirmed by the appellate authority is not legally sustainable
and the CAT as well as the High Court have committed grave error
in refusing to entertain the Original Application and the Writ Petition
challenging the same. Therefore, the order of dismissal is liable to
be quashed and set-aside.
8)
Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Brijender Chahar,
representing the State, inter alia, relied upon the preliminary inquiry
of the ACP and the documents collected, DD entries of information
and proceedings and other relevant material in support of his
contentions. As per him, these documents reflect that the complainant
and witnesses could have been traumatized by the egregious act
of appellant and his associates who are in the police department.
Possibility of their association with criminals and to approach
the complainant or witnesses to intimidate or to induce them for
withdrawing from the case or to turn them hostile during trial cannot
be ruled out. In light of such apprehension, power exercised by the
competent authority for not proceeding with the normal procedure of
departmental inquiry is within the scope of its authority. It is contended
that the stand as taken by the Department has been accepted by
the CAT and the High Court; therefore, interference is not warranted.
9)
After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that since the
power of punishment of the competent authority has been conferred
upon it vide Section 21 and the procedure as prescribed under Section
22 of the 1978 Act, they are relevant, hence, reproduced as under :
"21. Powers of punishment.- (1) Subject to the
provisions of article 311 of the Constitution and the rules,
the Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner of
Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Additional Deputy
4
(2005) 11 SCC 525
5
(2006) 13 SCC 581
6
(2007) 15 SCC 217
7
(2012) 10 SCC 215
8
(2014) 13 SCC 244
364
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police Training
College or of the Police Training School or any other
officer of equivalent rank, may award to any police officer
of subordinate rank any of the following punishments,
namely:-
(a) dismissal;
(b) removal from service;
(c)
reduction in rank;
(d) forfeiture of approved service;
(e) reduction in pay;
(f)
withholding of increment; and
(g) fine not exceeding one month's pay.
(2) Subject to the rules-
(a) any police officer specified in sub-section (1) may
award the punishment of censure to any police officer of
subordinate rank;
(b) the Assistant Commissioner of Police may award the
punishment of censure to police officers of, or below, the
rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police;
(c) any police officer of, and above, the rank of Inspector
may award punishment drill not exceeding fifteen days
or fatigue duty or any other punitive duty to constables.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall affect
any police officer's liability for prosecution and punishment
for any offence committed by him.
(4) The Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner
of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Additional
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police
Training College or of the Police Training School,
Assistant Commissioner of Police, or any other police
officer of equivalent rank may suspend any police officer
of subordinate rank who is reasonably suspected to be
guilty of misconduct, pending an investigation or enquiry
into such misconduct.
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
365
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
(5) An Inspector of Police may suspend any police
officer below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police, who is
reasonably suspected to be guilty of misconduct, pending
an investigation or enquiry into such misconduct.
22. Procedure for awarding punishments.-When
any officer passes an order of awarding a punishment of
dismissal, removal from service, reduction in rank, forfeiture
of service, reduction in pay, withholding of increments or
fine, he shall record such order or cause the same to be
recorded together with the reasons therefor, in accordance
with the rules."
From perusal of above provisions, it is clear that subject to Article
311 of Constitution of India, Section 21 confers power upon the
authorities prescribed therein to impose various types of punishments
as specified in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) upon a police
officer of subordinate rank.
10) Further, Section 22 governs the procedure for awarding the
punishment of dismissal, removal and reduction of rank and casts
obligation upon the officer passing an order of punishment to record
the reasons for such order in accordance with the rules.
11) In this context, Rules 5 and 6 of 1980 Rules governing the procedure
as applicable to punishment orders, are reproduced as thus:-
"5. Authorised punishments - The Delhi Police Act, 1978
prescribed the following penalties :
(i) Dismissal, (ii) Removal from service, (iii) Reduction in
rank [for a specified period], (iv) Forfeiture of approved
service, (v) Reduction in pay, (vi) Withholding of increments,
(vii) Fine not exceeding one month's pay, (viii) Censure,
(ix) Punishment drill not exceeding 15 days or fatigue duty
or any other punishment duty to Constable only.
6. Classification of punishments and authorities
competent to award them - (i) Punishments mentioned
at Serial Nos. (i) to (vii) above shall be deemed 'major
punishment' and may be awarded by an officer not below
the rank of the appointing authority or above after a regular
departmental enquiry.
366
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(ii) Punishment mentioned at Serial No. (viii) shall be
called 'minor punishment' and may be awarded by the
authorities specified in sub-section (i) of Section 21 of the
Delhi Police Act, 1978 after serving a show cause notice
giving reasonable time to the defaulter and considering
his written reply as well as oral deposition, if any for which
opportunity shall be afforded on request.
Authority competent to
award
Rank to whom it can be
awarded
(i) Deputy Commissioner of
Police and above
Inspector and below
(ii) Assistant Commissioner
of Police
Constable to Sub-Inspector
(iii) The punishment mentioned at Serial No. (ix) above
may be called Orderly Room punishment and shall be
awarded after the defaulter has been marched and heard
in Orderly Room by the Officer of and above the rank of
Inspector as laid down in Section 21 (3) (c) of the Delhi
Police Act, 1978."
The present case relates to the punishment of dismissal. Therefore,
as per classification contained in Rule 6, it is a major penalty, which
can be inflicted after a regular departmental inquiry by a competent
authority as specified therein. The manner and procedure for
awarding the punishment is prescribed in Rule 14 and procedure
for such regular departmental inquiry that has to be observed for
awarding said punishment is contained in Rule 16. As such, in
absence of the applicability of clause (b) of second proviso to Article
311(2), the procedure contemplates that Sections 21 and 22 and
the rules aforementioned ought to be followed for dismissal of an
employee.
12) In the case at hand, since the order of dismissal of the appellant has
been passed in exercise of the power under clause (b) of second
proviso to Article 311(2) of Constitution of India, the said provision
is relevant to understand its ambit and scope, hence, reproduced
as under:
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
367
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
"311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of
persons employed in civil capacities under the Union
or a State -
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State
or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that
by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in
which he has been informed of the charges against him
and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges
[Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be
imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during
such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such
person any opportunity of making representation on the
penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply-
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced
in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the
State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon
of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such
person or to reduce him in rank shall be final."
368
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13) Upon perusal of the above, it is clear that as per Article 311(2) a
member of the civil service of the Union or a State may be dismissed
or removed or reduced in rank by the appointing authority after
a regular inquiry on charges which have been informed to him,
affording him a reasonable opportunity. As per first proviso thereto,
in case an inquiry is conducted for the purpose of imposing penalty,
it is not necessary to afford an opportunity to the appellant at the
stage of penalty.
14) Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) restricts the
applicability of Article 311(2) in a specific situation: (i) if the appointing
authority is satisfied that there should be deviation from mandate
of Article 311(2) because adherence to the same is not 'reasonably
practicable'; and (ii) such reasons are to be recorded in writing.
Similarly, when such power is to be exercised under clause (c) of
the second proviso by the President or the Governor, they may, in
the interest of security of the State or if it is not expedient to hold
such inquiry, deviate from the applicable procedure.
15) Be that as it may, the present case relates to clause (b) of the second
proviso to Article 311(2), therefore, we need to discuss in detail the
applicability of the said provision in the facts of this case.
16) It is trite law that the decision of the appointing authority on the
issue of recording reasons in writing on its satisfaction as to why
holding an inquiry is not reasonably practicable may be subject to
judicial review under Article 226 by High Court or under Article 32 by
the Supreme Court. This Court in the Constitution Bench judgment
rendered in the case of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) reiterated the legal
positions and explained the same. The High Court in the impugned
judgment has relied upon paragraph 101 of the said judgment.
Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended before us that
subsequent paragraphs, in particular, paragraphs 130, 133 and
138, which enunciates the law while interpreting Article 311(2) of
the Constitution of India, have not been considered. Therefore, for
ready reference, we reproduce all the aforesaid paragraphs as thus:
"101. Not only, therefore, can the principles of natural
justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can
even be excluded. There are well-defined exceptions
to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also to the audi
alteram partem rule. The nemo judex in causa sua rule
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
369
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
is subject to the doctrine of necessity and yields to it as
pointed out by this Court in J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State
of Orissa [(1984) 4 SCC 103 : (1985) 1 SCR 322, 334-5] .
So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both
in England and in India, it is well established that where
a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of
prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right
can also be excluded where the nature of the action to
be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the
relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor
can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing
it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative
process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency
of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Maneka
Gandhi case [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621, 676]
at p. 681. If legislation and the necessities of a situation
can exclude the principles of natural justice including the
audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can a provision of
the Constitution, for a constitutional provision has a far
greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory provision.
In the present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly
excluded by the opening words of the second proviso and
particularly its keywords "this clause shall not apply". As
pointed out above, clause (2) of Article 311 embodies in
express words the audi alteram partem rule. This principle
of natural justice having been expressly excluded by a
constitutional provision, namely, the second proviso to
clause (2) of Article 311, there is no scope for reintroducing
it by a side-door to provide once again the same inquiry
which the constitutional provision has expressly prohibited.
Where a clause of the second proviso is applied on an
extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the
situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so applying
it would be mala fide, and, therefore, void. In such a case
the invalidating factor may be referable to Article 14. This
is, however, the only scope which Article 14 can have in
relation to the second proviso, but to hold that once the
second proviso is properly applied and clause (2) of Article
311 excluded. Article 14 will step in to take the place of
370
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
clause (2) would be to nullify the effect of the opening
words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the intention
of the makers of the Constitution. The second proviso is
based on public policy and is in public interest and for
public good and the Constitution-makers who inserted it
in Article 311(2) were the best persons to decide whether
such an exclusionary provision should be there and the
situations in which this provision should apply.
130. The condition precedent for the application of clause
(b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is
not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated
by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that
the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not
"impracticable". According to the Oxford English Dictionary
"practicable" means "Capable of being put into practice,
carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done;
feasible". Webster's Third New International Dictionary
defines the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning
"possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished: feasible". Further, the
words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably
practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary
defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner:
to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable
to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context
of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is
not a total or absolute impracticability which is required
by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the
inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable
man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation.
It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it
would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry,
but some instances by way of illustration may, however,
be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold
an inquiry where the government servant, particularly
through or together with his associates, so terrorizes,
threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give
evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent
[2026] 3 S.C.R.
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Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
them from doing so or where the government servant
by himself or together with or through others threatens,
intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary
authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to
hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not
be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an
atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and
insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether
the concerned government servant is or is not a party to
bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we
must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while
an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of
holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made
by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on
the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the
disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause
(3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary
authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is
not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly
or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to
avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's
case against the government servant is weak and must
fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary
authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court
so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in
such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing
with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The
case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC
578 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 290 : (1984) 3 SCR 302] is an
instance in point. In that case, the appellant was working
as a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial
Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior
Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the appellant calling
upon him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve
charges of gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted
his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the
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appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing
and that another chance was being given to him to offer his
explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant
submitted his further explanation but on the very next day
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an
order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to
be retained in service. This Court struck down the order
holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the
conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial
Superintendent who was the disciplinary authority and
that if an inquiry were to be held, the principal witness
for the Department would have been the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in the same
person being the main accuser, the chief witness and also
the judge of the matter.
138. Where a government servant is dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an analogous
provision of the service rules and he approaches either
the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article
32, the court will interfere on grounds well established in
law for the exercise of power of judicial review in matters
where administrative discretion is exercised. It will consider
whether clause (b) or an analogous provision in the service
rules was properly applied or not. The finality given by
clause (3) of Article 311 to the disciplinary authority's
decision that it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry is not binding upon the court. The court will
also examine the charge of mala fides, if any, made in the
writ petition. In examining the relevancy of the reasons,
the court will consider the situation which according to
the disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.
If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the
recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority
would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b)
and would take the case out of the purview of that clause
and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated.
In considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the
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Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
disciplinary authority the court will not, however, sit in
judgment over them like a court of first appeal. In order
to decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b),
the court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary
authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation
a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have
done. The matter will have to be judged in the light of
the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary
authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry
should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached
atmosphere of a court-room, removed in time from the
situation in question. Where two views are possible, the
court will decline to interfere."
17) Upon perusal of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the
case of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it is luculent that the constitutional
provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory
provision, therefore, second proviso restricts application of Article
311(2) only in the circumstances as contemplated under Clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of the second proviso. This clause uses the word "this
clause shall not apply", therefore, Article 311(2) shall not apply in
the contingencies in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the second proviso.
The intention thereof has been expressed indicating that there is no
scope for reintroduction of principles contained in Article 311(2) by a
side door which the constitutional provision has expressly excluded.
It is further clarified in the said judgement that if the second proviso
is applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no relation
to the situation envisaged in that clause, the action of so applying
would be mala fide and therefore void. This Court indicated that in
such cases the invalidating factor may be referrable to the Article
14 distinguishing between a situation where the proviso has been
properly applied and one where it has been improperly applied.
Otherwise, if Article 14 is applied in a manner to take the place of
clause (2) that would mean to nullify the effect of opening words
of the second proviso and frustrate the intention of makers of the
Constitution. It is said that the second proviso is based on public
policy and is in public interest and for public good.
18) The wording as used in clause (b) of the second proviso indicates
the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority by using the word "it
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is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by
clause 2 of Article 311. The Court emphasised the meaning of "not
reasonably practicable" as juxtaposed against not "impracticable". It
is intended that the requirement to hold an inquiry is not practicable
in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of
the prevailing situation. The Court contemplated certain situations
therein and said that a common man must bear in mind that numbers
may coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable
practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be
made by the disciplinary authority holding the post and it is he who
must visualize what is happening at the ground-zero. The Court
clarified that the disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with
a departmental inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives
or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the
Department's case against the government servant is weak and
must fail. In this connection, referring Article 311(3), it is held that
the finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority is not
binding upon the Courts and the scope of judicial review is open to
strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order
imposing penalty.
19) Further, the Court emphasised the words used in clause (b) of second
proviso that the disciplinary authority should record its reasons in
writing for its satisfaction that holding an inquiry is not reasonably
practicable. In case such reason is not recorded in writing or not
valid and justifiable, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the
order of penalty flowing therefrom would be void and unconstitutional.
Emphasising the scope of judicial review, it is said that in the matters
where administrative discretion is exercised, it is open to assail
either under Article 226 before High Court or under Article 32 before
this Court. Referring clause 3 of Article 311 and reiterating that the
decision of disciplinary authority indicating why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry is not binding on Court and the scope
of judicial review is open. In the said contingency, the Court will
examine the charges of mala fides if any made in the Writ Petition. It
is emphasised that the Court, while exercising judicial review, would
not sit as an appellate court but it shall consider the situation due to
which, according to the disciplinary authority, it was not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry. While examining the relevance of the
reasoning, the Court ought to place itself as a disciplinary authority
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and consider whether in the prevailing situation, a reasonable man
acting in a reasonable way, would have taken the same decision as
taken by the disciplinary authority. If the Court finds that the reasons
are irrelevant, then satisfaction of the disciplinary authority may be
held to be an abuse of power. In that situation, it would be open
to the Court to take the case out of purview of that clause and the
order of penalty would stand invalidated.
20) In view of the foregoing conclusions of the Constitution bench in
Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it can be safely observed that despite the
use of the words "this clause shall not apply" in the second proviso,
it shall not make power of Article 311(2) inapplicable. In fact, second
proviso to Article 311 is an exception for dispensing with the inquiry
on satisfaction by recording the reasons in writing by such authority.
21) In view of the analysis of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in
Tulsiram Patel (Supra), we have examined the impugned judgement
passed by the High Court wherein in paragraph 19, while referring
to the judgment of Sudesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
(2005) 11 SCC 525 in respect of the principle of audi alteram partem
and also referring to paragraph 101 of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it has
been observed by the High Court that the appellate authority had
heard the appellant before affirming the decision of the disciplinary
authority, it appears that the judgment of Sudesh Kumar (Supra)
has not been appreciated in its true spirit by the High Court.
22) In our view, the reasoning as given by the High Court is completely
misplaced, in particular, when the Court is examining the scope and
applicability of clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2),
the reasoning assigned by the disciplinary authority ought to be
relevant for dispensing with an inquiry which is the issue involved
in the present case. Merely indicating that the reasons provided in
writing have already been held justified by the CAT would not be
sufficient in the context of law laid down by the judgment of Tulsiram
Patel (Supra) merely observing that opportunity of hearing has been
afforded by the appellate authority.
23) This case was heard on 04.02.2026. At the time of hearing, learned
ASG appearing on behalf of the State vociferously contended that the
reasoning to dispense with the inquiry finds its place in the preliminary
inquiry report of the ACP whereby it was found that the complainant/
witnesses have been traumatised, threatened or intimidated by the
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action of the criminals specially the police personnel involved therein
and due to the close association of the police personnel with the
hard-core criminals, there was every possibility that the appellant
may approach the complainant/witnesses through his associates to
threaten and intimidate them.
24) In this context, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant is that after lodging the FIR on 28.06.2017, the appellant
was sent to custody on 29.6.2017 and was released on bail on
14.10.2017.