# MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA

- **Citation:** [2014] 9 S.C.R. 965
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-08-27
- **Bench:** R.M. Lodha, Dipak Misra, Madan 8. Lokur, Kurian Joseph, S.A. Bobde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/manoj-narula-v-union-of-india-30235
- **Pages:** 98

## Headnote

A
B
Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 75 and 164 - Scope
and purpose of -Legality of person with criminal background C
and/or charged with offences involving moral turpitude being
appointed as Ministers in Central and State Governments -
Scope for framing of possible guidelines for appointment of
Ministers for the UOI as well as for the State - Legal position
discussed -
Representation of the People Act, 1951 -
D
Chapter Ill -Criminalisation of politics.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of implied limitation -
Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Principle of Constitutional silence/
E
abeyance - Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles -
Principle of Constitutional
implications - Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of Constitutional morality
F
- Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of good governance -
Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of Constitutional trust -
Discussed.
Disposing of the writ petition, the Court
965
G
H
966
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
Per Dipak Misra, J. [for himself, Lodha, CJI. And
Bobde, J.)
HELD:1. The Prime Minister has been regarded as
the repository of constitutional trust. The use of the
8 words "on the advice of the Prime Minister" in Article 75
of the Constitution cannot be all()wed to operate in a
vacuum to lose their significance. There can be no
scintilla of doubt that the Prime Minister's advice is
binding on the President for the appointment of a person
as a Minister to the Council of Ministers unless the said
C person is disqualified under the Constitution to contest
the election or under the Repr..esentation of the People
Act, 1951. That is in the realm of disqualification. But, a
pregnant one, the trust reposed in a high constitutional
functionary like the Prime Minister under the Constitution
D does not end there. That the Prime Minister would be
giving apposite advice to the President is a legitimate
constitutional expectation, for it is a paramount
constitutional concern. In a controlled Constitution like
ours, the Prime Minister is expected to act with
E constitutional responsibility as a consequence of which
the cherished values of democracy and established
norms of good governance get condignly fructified. The
framers of the Constitution left many a thing unwritten by
reposing immense trust in the Prime Minister. The
F scheme of the Constitution suggests that there has to be
an emergence of constitutional governance which would
gradually grow to give rise to constitutional renaissance.
[Para 85) [1031-C-G]
G
2. The Council of Ministers has the collective
responsibility to sustain the integrity and purity of the
constitutional structure. That is why the Prime Minister
enjoys a great magnitude of constitutional power.
Therefore, the responsibility is more, regard being had to
the instillation of trust, a constitutional one. It is also
H
•
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
967
expected that the Prime Minster should act in the interest
A
of the national polity of the nation-state. He has to bear
in mind that unwarranted elements or persons who are
facing charge in certain category of offences may thwart
or hinder the canons of constitutional morality or
principles of good governance and eventually diminish
B
the constitutional trust. The prohibition cannot be brought
in within the province of 'advice' but indubitably, the
concepts, especially the constitutional trust, can be
allowed to be perceived in the act of such advice. [Para
SSA] [1031-H; 1032-A-C]
C
3. While interpreting Article 75(1) of the Constitution,
definitely a disqualification cannot be added. However, it
can always be legitimately expected, regard being had to
ttie role of a Minister in the Council of Ministers and
keeping in view the sanctity of oath he takes, the Prime
D
Minister, while living up to the trust reposed in him, would
consider not choosing a person with criminal
antecedents against whom charges have been framed
for heinous or serious criminal offences or charges of
corruption to become a

## Text

_Characters 0–39,887 of 190,169. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39887 for what follows._

[2014] 9 S.C.R. 965
MANOJ NARULA
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 289 of 2005)
AUGUST 27, 2014
[R.M. LODHA, CJI, DIPAK MISRA, MADAN 8. LOKUR,
KURIAN JOSEPH AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]
A
B
Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 75 and 164 - Scope
and purpose of -Legality of person with criminal background C
and/or charged with offences involving moral turpitude being
appointed as Ministers in Central and State Governments -
Scope for framing of possible guidelines for appointment of
Ministers for the UOI as well as for the State - Legal position
discussed -
Representation of the People Act, 1951 -
D
Chapter Ill -Criminalisation of politics.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of implied limitation -
Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Principle of Constitutional silence/
E
abeyance - Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles -
Principle of Constitutional
implications - Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of Constitutional morality
F
- Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of good governance -
Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles - Doctrine of Constitutional trust -
Discussed.
Disposing of the writ petition, the Court
965
G
H
966
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
Per Dipak Misra, J. [for himself, Lodha, CJI. And
Bobde, J.)
HELD:1. The Prime Minister has been regarded as
the repository of constitutional trust. The use of the
8 words "on the advice of the Prime Minister" in Article 75
of the Constitution cannot be all()wed to operate in a
vacuum to lose their significance. There can be no
scintilla of doubt that the Prime Minister's advice is
binding on the President for the appointment of a person
as a Minister to the Council of Ministers unless the said
C person is disqualified under the Constitution to contest
the election or under the Repr..esentation of the People
Act, 1951. That is in the realm of disqualification. But, a
pregnant one, the trust reposed in a high constitutional
functionary like the Prime Minister under the Constitution
D does not end there. That the Prime Minister would be
giving apposite advice to the President is a legitimate
constitutional expectation, for it is a paramount
constitutional concern. In a controlled Constitution like
ours, the Prime Minister is expected to act with
E constitutional responsibility as a consequence of which
the cherished values of democracy and established
norms of good governance get condignly fructified. The
framers of the Constitution left many a thing unwritten by
reposing immense trust in the Prime Minister. The
F scheme of the Constitution suggests that there has to be
an emergence of constitutional governance which would
gradually grow to give rise to constitutional renaissance.
[Para 85) [1031-C-G]
G
2. The Council of Ministers has the collective
responsibility to sustain the integrity and purity of the
constitutional structure. That is why the Prime Minister
enjoys a great magnitude of constitutional power.
Therefore, the responsibility is more, regard being had to
the instillation of trust, a constitutional one. It is also
H
•
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
967
expected that the Prime Minster should act in the interest
A
of the national polity of the nation-state. He has to bear
in mind that unwarranted elements or persons who are
facing charge in certain category of offences may thwart
or hinder the canons of constitutional morality or
principles of good governance and eventually diminish
B
the constitutional trust. The prohibition cannot be brought
in within the province of 'advice' but indubitably, the
concepts, especially the constitutional trust, can be
allowed to be perceived in the act of such advice. [Para
SSA] [1031-H; 1032-A-C]
C
3. While interpreting Article 75(1) of the Constitution,
definitely a disqualification cannot be added. However, it
can always be legitimately expected, regard being had to
ttie role of a Minister in the Council of Ministers and
keeping in view the sanctity of oath he takes, the Prime
D
Minister, while living up to the trust reposed in him, would
consider not choosing a person with criminal
antecedents against whom charges have been framed
for heinous or serious criminal offences or charges of
corruption to become a Minister of the Council of E
Ministers. This is what the Constitution suggests and that
is the constitutional expectation from the Prime Minister.
Rest has to be left to the wisdom of the Prime Minister.
What has been said for the Prime Minister is wholly
applicable to the Chief Minister, regard being had to the
F
language employed in Article 164(1) of the Constitution
of India. [Paras 86, 87] [1032-D-G]
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299:
1976 SCR 347; T.N. Seshan, CEC of India v. Union of India
G
and ors. (1995) 4 sec 611: 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 106;
Ku/dip Nayar v. Union of India & Ors AIR 2006 SC 3127:
2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1; People's Union for Civil Liberties
and another v. Union of India and another (2013) 1 o sec 1:
2013 (12) SCR 283; Mohinder Singh Gill and another v.
H
968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others (1978)
1 sec 405: 1978 (2) SCR 272; Raghbir Singh Gill v. S.
Gurcharan Singh Tohra AIR 1980 SC 1362:
1980
SCR 1302; Union of India v. Association for Democratic
Reforms and another (2002) 5 SCC 294: 2002 (3) SCR
s 696; Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. and others v. Union of India and
others (1997) 4 SCC 306: 1997 (3) SCR 93; Anukul
Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court v. Union of India
and others (1997) 6 SCC 1: 1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 641; K.
Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan AIR 2005 SC 688: 2005 (1)
c
SCR 296; Niranjan Hemchandra Sashitta/ and another v.
State of Maharashtra (2013) 4 SCC 642: 2013 (4) SCR 767;
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation & Anr., 2014 AIR 2140; Lily Thomas v. Union of
India and others (2013) 7 SCC 653; His Holiness
0 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kera/a and
another (1973) 4 SCC 225: 1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1; Centre
for.PIL and another v. Union of India and another (2011) 4
SCC 1: 2011 (4) SCR 445; N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose
and others (2009) 7 SCC 1: 2009 (7) SCR 668; lnderpreet
E Singh Kah/on v. State of Punjab (2006) 11 SCC 356: 2006
(1) Suppl. SCR 772; Arun Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India
(2014) 2 SCC 609; State of Punjab v. Sa/ii Sabhlok and
others (2013) 5 SCC 1; Centre for Public Interest Litigation
and another v. Union of India and another (2005) 8 sec 202:
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 77; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab
F and another (1974) 2 sec 831: 1975 (1) SCR 814; B.R.
Kapur v. State of T.N. and another (2001) 7 SCC 231: 2001
(3) SOppl. SCR 191; M.P. Special Police Establishment v.
State of M.P. and others (2004) 8 SCC 788: 2004 (5) Suppl.
SCR 1020; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and another 1981
G Supp SCC 87: 1982 SCR 365; M. Nagaraj and others v.
H
Union of India and others (2006) 8 sec 212: 2006 (7) Suppl.
SCR 336; U.N.R. Rao v. Smt. Indira Gandhi (1971) 2 SCC
63: 1971 (0) Suppl. SCR 46; G. Narayanaswami v. G.
Pannerselvam and others (1972) 3 SCC 717: 1973 (1)
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
969
SCR 172; Shrikant v. Vasantrao and others (2006) 2 SCC
A
682: 2006 (1) SCR 496; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P.
(2004) 10 SCC 699: 2004 (3) SCR 1148; Ranjitsing
Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 5
SCC 294: 2005 (3) SCR 345; S. Ganesan v. Rama
Ranghuraman (2011) 2 SCC 83: 2011 (1) SCR 27 State of B
UP. v. Naresh (2011) 4 SCC 324: 2011 (4) SCR 1176;
Kai/ash Gour & ors. v. State of Assam (2012) 2 SCC 34:
2011 (16) SCR 318; Minerva Mills Ltd. And Others v. Union
of India and Others (1980) 3 sec 625: 1981 (1) SCR 206;
l.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2
C
SCC 1: 2007 (1) SCR 706; Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of
India AIR 1987 SC 232: 1987 (1) SCR 383; D.K. Basu v.
State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610: 1996 (10) Suppl.
SCR 284; Vishakha and others v. State of Rajasthan and
others (1997) 6 sec 241: 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404;
Bhanumati and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh through its
D
Principal Secretary and others (2010) 12 SCC 1: 2010 (7)
SCR 585; R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and another v.
State of T.N. and others (1994) 6 sec 632; Joginder Kumar
v. State of UP. and others AIR 1994 SC 1349: 1994 (4)
SCC 260; Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, AIR
E
1950 SC 124; A. Abdul Farook v. Municipal Council,
Perambalur and others (2009) 15 SCC 351 2009 (11)
SCR 727; Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav
Deshmukh and Ors. (2001) 3 SCC 594: 2001 (2) SCR 118;
M.J. Shivani and others v. State of Karnataka and others
F
(1995) 6 SCC 289; State of Maharashtra and others v.
Jalgaon Municipal Corporation and others (2003) 9 SCC
731: 2003 (1) SCR 1112; UP. Power Corporation Ltd. and
Anr. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2008 SC
693: 2007 (12) SCR 1160; Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur G
and others v. The State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549: 1955
SCR
225;
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association and another v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268:
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 and In re Art. 143, Constitution
H
970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) AIR 1951 SC 332 -
referred to.
Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1974) 74
CLR 31; Political Advertising Case (1992) 177 CLR 106;
Australian National Airways Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1945)
B 71 CLR 29; Lamshed v. Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132 and
Payroll Tax Case (1971) 122 CLR 353, 401 - referred to.
Constituent Assemby Debates, 1989: VII, 38; James
Madison as Publius, Federalist 51 and Laurance H. Tribe,
C The Invisible Constitution 29 (2008); H. M. Seervai,
Constitutional Law of India, vo.I. 2, 4th Ed. Pg. 2060;
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 2nd Ed. Pg 368370, David Polland, Neil Parpworth David Hughs;
Constitutional & Administrative Law 5th Edition, pg 297D 305, Hilaire Barnett; Nolan Report, Standards in Public
Life, Cm 2850-1, 1995, Lodon HMSO, Chapter 3, para 4;
and Constitutional Practice (Second Edition) (pg. 146148); The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status
(fourth edition) by K.C. Wheare; The Law and the
E Constitution by I. Jennings (5th Edition, ELBS: London,
1976) and Constitutional Law- A critical introduction {2nd
edition, Butterworths: London, 2000) by I. Lovehead -
referred to.
F
Per Madan 8. Lokur, J. [Concurring]
HELD:1. Two substantive reliefs have been claimed
in the writ petition. The first relief is for a declaration that
the appointment of Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 as Ministers
in the Government of India is unconstitutional. This is
G based, inter alia, on the averment that these respondents
have 'criminal antecedents' .As far as the first substantive
relief is concerned, the expressions 'criminal
background' and 'criminal antecedents' are extremely
vague. [Paras 3, 4] [1033-C-D, E]
H
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
971
2. The second substantive relief is for the framing of A
possible guidelines for the appointment of a Minister in
the Central or State Government. It is not clear who
should frame the possible guidelines, perhaps this court.
As far as this substantive relief is concerned, it is entirely
for the appropriate Legislature to decide whether
B
guidelines are necessary, as prayed for, and the frame of
such guidelines. No direction is required to be given on
this subject. [Paras 5, 6] [1033-F-H]
3. The offences and the sentence to be awarded for
the purpose of disqualifying a person from being elected
C
to a Legislature are matters that Parliament may like to
debate and consider, if at all it is felt necessary. Until then,
one must trust the watchful eye of the people of the
country that the elected representative of the people is
worthy of being a legislator. Thereafter the wisdom of the
D
Prime Minister and Parliament must be trusted that the
elected representative is worthy of being a Minister in the
Central Government. It is for the electorate to ensure that
suitable (not merely eligible) persons are elected to the
Legislature and it is for the Legislature to enact or not
E
enact a more restrictive law. The burden of appointing a
suitable person as a Minister in the Central Government
lies entirely on the shoulders of the Prime Minister and
may eminently be left to his or her good sense. This is
what our Constitution makers intended. [Paras 32, 34 and
F
38] [1050-F-G; 1053-G; 1055-D]
S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab, (2001) 7 SCC 126;
B. R. Kapur v. State of T.N. and another (2001) 7 SCC 231:
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 191; B.P. Singhal v. Union of India,
G
(2010) 6 SCC 331; State of Punjab v. Sa/ii Sabhlok and
others (2013) 5 SCC 1; Municipal Committee, Patiala. v.
Model Town Residents Association, (2007) 8 SCC 669; State
of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of a student of Medical
College, (1985) 3 SCC 169; V.K. Naswa v. Union of India,
H
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A (2012) 2 sec 542; Gainda Ram v. MCD, (2010) 10 sec 715
and Lily Thomas v. Union of India and others (2013) 7 sec
653 - referred to.
http :I/pa rl ia me ntofi n d ia. n ic .i n/lsldebatesl
B vol11 p11.htm;http:l/parliamentofindia.nic.inllsldebatesl
vol11p12.htm;and http:l/hansard.millbanksystems.coml
written_answe rsl1994/ja nl251m in isters-u ns u ita bi I ity-fo r
office#S6CV0236P0_ 19940125_CWA_ 172; Constituent
Assemby Debates, 1989: VII; Public Law 1994, Aut, 431C 4; and 244th report of the Law Commission of India on
"Electoral disqualifications" - referred to.
Per Kurian Joseph, J. [Concurring]
HELD: No doubt, it is not for the court to issue any
0 direction to the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister, as the
case may be, as to the manner in which they should
exercise their power while selecting the colleagues in the
Council of Ministers. That is the constitutional prerogative
of those functionaries who are called upon to preserve,
E protect and defend the Constitution. But it is the
prophetic duty of this Court to remind the key duty
holders about their role in working of the Constitution.
Hence, the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister ,of the
State, who themselves have taken oath to bear true faith
and allegiance to the Constitution of India and to
F discharge their duties faithfully and conscientiously, will
be well advised to consider avoiding any person in the
Council of Ministers, against whom charges have been
framed by a criminal court in respect of offences
involving moral turpitude and also offences specifically
G referred to in Chapter Ill of The Representation of the
People Act, 1951. [Para 12) [1062-E-G]
Oxford English Dictionary; Concise Oxford English
Dictionary; and Arthasastra, Chapter IX - The creation of
H Councillors and Priests - referred to.
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
973
Case Law Reference:
A
In the judgment of Di~ak Misra, J.
1976 SCR 347
referred to
Para 1
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 106 referred. to
Para 1
2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 1
B
2013 (12) SCR 283
referred to
Para 1
1978 (2) SCR 272
referred to
Para 3
1980 SCR 1302
referred to
Para 4
2002 (3) SCR 696
referred to
Para 5
c
1997 (3) SCR 93
referred to
Para 7
1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 641
referred to
Para 8
2005 (1) SCR 296
referred to
Para 8
2013 (4) SCR 767
referred to
Para 13
D
2014 AIR 2140
referred to
Para 14
(2013) 1 sec 653
referred to
Para 20
1973 (0) Suppl. SCR 1
referred to
Para 22
2011 (4) SCR445
referred to
Para 23
E
2009 (7) SCR 668
referred to
Para 23
2006 (1) Suppl. SCR 772 referred to
Para 23
(2014) 2 sec 609
referred to
Para 23
(2013) 5 sec 1
referred to
Para 23
F
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 77
referred to
Para 23
1975 (1) SCR 814
referred to
Para 24
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 191 referred to
Para 24
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020 referred to
Para 25
G
1982 SCR 365
referred to
Para 26
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR336 referred to
Para 26
1971 (0) Suppl. SCR 46
referred to
Para 33
1973 (1) SCR 172
referred to
Para 33
H
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
2006 (1) SCR496
referred to
Para 33
2004 (3) SCR 1148
referred to
Para 34
2005 (3) SCR 345
referred to
Para 34
2011 (1) SCR27
referred to
Para 34
B
2011 (4) SCR 1176
referred to
Para 34
2011 (16) SCR 318
referred to
Para 34
1981 (1) SCR 206
referred to
Para 49
2007 (1) SCR 706
referred to
Para 51
c
1987 (1) SCR 383
referred to
Para 54
1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 284referred to
Para 54
1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404 referred to
Para 54
2010 (7) SCR 585
referred to
Para 55
D
(1994) 6 sec 632
referred to
Para 58
1994 (4) sec 260
referred to
Para 58
1950 SCR 594
referred to
Para 58
(1974) 74 CLR 31
referred to
Para 59
E
(1992) 177 CLR 106
referred to
Para 59
(1945) 71 CLR 29
referred to
Para 60
(1958) 99 CLR 132
referred to
Para 60
(1971) 122 CLR 353
referred to
Para 60
F
2009 (11) SCR 727
referred to
Para 66
2001 (2) SCR 118
referred to
Para 67
(1995) 6 sec 289
referred to
Para 68
2003 (1) SCR1112
referred to
Para 68
G
2007 (12) SCR 1160
referred to
Para 68
1955 SCR 225
referred to
Para 71
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 659 referred to
Para 73
In the judgment of Madan B. Lokur1 J.
H
c2001) 1 sec 126
referred to
Para 12
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
975
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 191 referred to
Para 14
A
(201 O) 6 sec 331
referred to
Para 19
(2013) 5 sec 1
referred to
Para 20
(2001) 8 sec 669
referred to
Para 27
(1985) 3 sec 169
referred to
Para 27
B
(2012) 2 sec 542
referred to
Para 28
(2010) 10 SCC 715
referred to
Para 29
(2013) 7 SCC 653
referred to
Para 36
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
C
289 of 2005.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Paras Kuhad, R.K. Khanna, A.S.Gs., A. Mariarputham,
Rakesh Dwivedi (AC.), K. Parasaran (A.C.), T.R. Andhyarujina D
(A.C.), lrshad Ahmad, Manjit Singh, S.S. Shamshery,
Suryanaryana Singh, A.A.Gs, Preetika Dwivedi, Sansriti
Pathak, Ananya Pandey, Nikhil Sharma, Shridhar Pottaraju,
Zoheb Hoosein, Ashwin Kumar, D.S., C.S. Bharadwaj, Soumik
Ghosal, Anil Kumar Jha, Vijendra Mishra, Binay Kumar Das,
V.P. Singh, Y.S. Chauhan, Jitin Chaturvedi, T.A. Khan, Abhik
E
C., D.L. Chidananda, Swati Vijay wargiya, Pravita Shekar, B.K.
Prasad, Sunita Sharma, D.S. Mahra, R. Satish, Gopal Singh,
Ritu Raj Biswas, V.G. Pragasam, S.J. Aristotle, Prabu
Ramasubramanian, Raman Yadav, Abhist Kumar, Vaibhav
Yadav, Vivekta Singh, Nupur Chaudhary, Tarjit Singh Chikkara,
F
Vikas Sharma, Vinay Kuhar, Kamal Mohan Gupta, Gopal
Prasad, Anip Sachthey, Shagun Matta, Mohit Paul, Saakaar
Sardana, Mishra Saurabh, Vanshaja Shukla, Ankit Lal, S.S.
Banthia, Vartika Sahay Walia, (for Corporate Law Group),
Ranjan Mukherjee, C.D. Singh, Shweta Singh, Mohit Keswani,
G
Shreya Dubey, Anil Shrivastav, Rituraj Biswas, Gopal Singh,
Chandan Kumar, Aruna Mathur, Yusuf (for Arputham, Aruna &
Co.), Hemantika Wahi, Puja Singh, Sandeep Singh, Amit
Sharma, Harshvardhan Rather, A.P. Mayee, B.B. Singh,
H
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
Rachna Srivastava, Anitha Shenoy, G.V.S. Jagannadha Rao,
Vikas G., Mayank Kshirsagar, Prabhat, Ranjan, Balaji
Srinivasan, Shrishti, Govil, Vashali Dixit, K. Enatoli Serna, Amit
Kumar Singh, P.V. Dinesh, Balasubramanian, K.V.
Jagdishvaran, G. Indira, P.V. Yogeswaran, Kuldip Singh,
B
Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Khwairakpam Nobin Singh, B. Balaji,
R. Rakesh Sharma, Ranjan Mukherjee, Kamini Jaiswal, V.N.
Raghupathy, D. Mahesh Babu, Amit K. Nain, Suchitra
Hrangkhawl, Amjit Maqbool, Aditya Jain, B. Ramakrishna Rao,
T.V. Bhaskar Reddy, Pragati Neekhra for the Appearing
C parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dipak Misra, J.[for himself, R.M. Lodha, C.J., and
S.A. Bobde, J.]
A democratic polity, as understood in its quintessential
purity, is conceptually abhorrent to corruption and, especially
corruption at high places, and repulsive to the idea of
criminalization of politics as it corrodes the legitimacy of the
collective ethos, frustrates the hopes and aspirations of the
E
citizens and has the potentiality to obstruct, if not derail, the rule
of law. Democracy, which has been best defined as the
Government of the People, by the People and for the People,
expects prevalence of genuine orderliness, positive propriety,
dedicated discipline and sanguine sanctity by constant
F
affirmance of constitutional morality which is the pillar stone of
good governance. While dealing with the concept of
democracy, the majority in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain1,
stated that 'democracy' as an essential feature of the
Constitution is unassailable. The said principle was reiterated
G in T.N. Seshan, CEC of India v. Union of India and ors. 2 • and
Ku/dip Nayarv. Union of India & Ors3. It was pronounced with
1.
AIR 1975 SC 2299.
2.
(1995) 4 sec 611.
H
3.
AIR 2006 SC 3127.
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
977
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
asseveration that democracy is the basic and fundamental
structure of the Constitution. There is no shadow of doubt that
democracy in India is a product of the rule of law and aspires
to establish an egalitarian social order. It is not only a political
philosophy but also an embodiment of constitutional philosophy.
A
In People's Union for Civil Liberties and another v. Union of B
India and anofhf?r4, while holding the voters' rights not to vote
for any of the candidates, the Court observed that democracy
and free elections are a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution and~ thereafter, proceeded to lay down that
democracy being the basic feature of our constitutional set-up,
there can be no two opinions that free and fair elections would
alone guarantee the growth of a healthy democracy in the
country. The term "fair" denotes equal opportunity to all people.
Universal adult suffrage conferred on the citizens of India by the
Constitution has made it possible for millions of individual
0
voters to participat~ in the governance of our country. For
democracy to survive, it is fundamental that the best available
men should be chosen as the people's representatives for the
proper governance of the country and the same can be best
achieved through men of high moral and ethical values who win
c
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the elections on a positive vote. Emphasizing on a vibrant
democracy, the Court observed that the voter must be given
an opportunity to choose none of the above (NOT A) button,
which will indeed compel the political parties to nominate a
sound candidate. Accordingly, the principle of the dire need of
negative voting was emphasised. The significance of free and
fair election and the necessity of the electorate to have
candidates of high moral and ethical values was re-asserted.
In this regard, it may be stated that the health of democracy, a
cherished constitutional value, has to be protected, preserved
F
and sustained, and for that purpose, instilment of certain norms
G
in the marrows of the collective is absolutely necessitous.
. 4.
4. (2013) 10 sec 1.
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978
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A THE REFERENCE
2. We have commenced our judgment with the aforesaid
prologue as the present writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution was filed by the petitioner as pro bono pub/ico
B assailing the appointment of some of the original respondents
as Ministers to the Council of Ministers of Union of India despite
their involvement in serious and heinous crimes. On 24.3.2006,
when the matter was listed before the Bench presided by the
learned Chief Justice, the following order came to be passed:
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"A point of great public importance has been raised
in this petition. Broadly, the point is about the legality of
the person with criminal background and/or charged with
offences involving moral turpitude being appointed as
ministers in Central and State Governments.
We have heard in brief Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned
senior counsel who was appointed as amicus curiae to
assist the Court, as also the learned Solicitor General,
appearing for the Union of India, and Mr. Gopal
Subramaniam, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the Attorney General for India.
Having regard to the magnitude of the problem and its vital
importance, it is but proper that the petition is heard by a
Bench of five Judges.
We issue notice to Union of India. Formal notice
need not be issued since the Union of India is represented
by learned Solicitor General.
Notices shall also be issued to the Advocates
General of all the States. The notice shall state that the
State Governments and the Union of India may file their
affidavits along with relevant material within four weeks of
service of notice.
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
979
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
The Prime Minister and some of the Ministers in
A
Union Cabinet have been arrayed as party respondents 2
to 7. It is not necessary to implead individual ministers and/
or Prime Minister for deciding the question above-named.
Accordingly, respondent Nos. 2 to 7 are deleted from the
array of parties.
B
List the case after the Court reopens after the
summer vacation for directions as to fixing a date for its
being placed before the Constitution Bench."
In view of the aforesaid order and the subsequent orders,
C
the matter has been placed before us. Considering the
controversy raised, we are required to interpret the scope and
purpose of Articles 75 and 164 of the Constitution, regard being
had to the text, context, scheme and spirit of the Constitution.
D
THE PURITY OF ELECTION
3. In the beginning, we have emphasized on the concept
of democracy which is the corner stone of the Constitution.
There are certain features absence of which can erode the
fundamental values of democracy. One of them is holding of
E
free and fair election by adult franchise in a periodical manner
as has been held in Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief
Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others5, for it is the
heart and soul of the parliamentary system. In the said case,
Krishna Iyer, J. quoted with approval the statement of Sir
F
Winston Churchill which is as follows: -
"At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little
man, walking into a little booth, with a little pencil, making
a little cross on a little bit of paper - no amount of rhetoric
G
or voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the
overwhelming importance of the point."
5.
(1978) 1 sec 405.
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980
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
4. In Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra6 ,
the learned Judges, after referring to Mohinder Singh Gill's
case, stated that nothing can diminish the overwhelming
importance of the cross or preference indicated by the dumb
sealed lip voter. That is his right and the trust reposed by the
B Constitution in him is that he will act as a responsible citizen
choosing his masters for governing the country.
5. This Court has laid emphasis on the purity of elections
in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and
C another and, in that context, has observed that elections in this
country are fought with the help of money power which is
gathered from black sources and once elected to power, it
becomes easy to collect tons of black money which is used for
retaining power and for re-election. The Court further observed
that if on an affidavit a candidate is required to disclose the
D assets held by him at the time of election, the voter can decide
whether he should be re-elected. Thereafter, as regards the
purity of election, the Court observed that to maintain purity of
elections and, in particular, to bring transparency in the process
of election, the Commission can ask the candidates about the
E expenditure incurred by the political parties, and the voters
would have basic elementary right to know full particulars of a
candidate who is to represent them in Parliament where laws
to bind their liberty and property may be enacted because the
right to get information in a democracy is recognised all
F throughout and it is a natural right flowing from the concept of
democracy. Elaborating further, the Court opined that a voter
has c1 right to know the antecedents including the criminal past
of his candidate contesting election for MP or MLA as it is
fundamental and basic for the survival of democracy, for he may
G think over before making his choice of electing law-breakers
as law-makers. Eventually, the Court directed the Election
Commission to exercise_ its power under Article 324 of the
6.
AIR 1980 SC 1362.
H
7.
(2002) s sec 294.
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
981
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Constitution requiring the candidate to furnish information
A ·
pertaining to the fact whether the candidate has been convicted/
acquitted/discharged of any criminal offence in the past, if any,
and whether he has been punished with imprisonment or fine;
whether the candidate is accused in any pending case of any
offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more,
B
and in which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the
court of law; and certain other information.
6. From the aforesaid authorities, it is perceivable that
while giving emphasis on the sanctity of election, the Court has
C
expressed its concern with regard to various facets of the
candidates who contest the election and seek votes.
CRIMINALISATION OF POLITICS
7. Criminalisation of politics is an anathema to the
D
sacredness of democracy. Commenting on criminalization of
politics, the Court, in Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. and others v. Union
of India and others8, lamented the faults and imperfections
which have impeded the country in reaching the expectations
which heralded its conception. While identifying one of the
primary causes, the Court referred to the report of N.N. Vohra
Committee that was submitted on 5.10.1993. The Court noted
that the growth and spread of crime syndicates in Indian society
has been pervasive and the criminal elements have developed
an extensive network of contacts at many a sphere. The Court,
further referring to the report, found that the Report reveals
several alarming and deeply disturbing trends that are prevalent
E
F
in our present society. The Court further noticed that the nexus
between politicians, bureaucrats and criminal elements in our
society has been on the rise, the adverse effects of which are
increasingly being felt on various aspects of social life in India.
G
Indeed, the situation has worsened to such an extent that the
President of our country felt constrained to make references to
the phenomenon in his addresses to the Nation on the eve of
a.
(1997) 4 sec 306.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A
the Republic Day in 1996 as well as in 1997 and hence. jt
required to be handled with extreme care and circumspection.
8. In Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court
v. Union of India and others9 , the Court, in the context of the
8
provisions made in the election law, observed that they have
been made to exclude persons with criminal back!}round of the
kind specified therein from the election scene as candidates
and voters with the object to prevent criminalization of politics
and maintain propriety in elections. Thereafter, the three-Judge
C Bench opined that any provision enacted with a view to
promote the said object must be welcomed and upheld as
subserving the constitutional purpose. In K. Prabhakaran v. P.
Jayarajan10, in the context of enacting disqualification under
Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for
0
brevity "the 1951 Act"), it has been reiterated that persons with
criminal background pollute the process of election as they
have no reservation from indulging in criminality to gain
success at an election.
9. It is worth saying that systemic corruption and sponsored
E criminalization can corrode the fundamental core of elective
democracy and, consequently, the constitutional governance.
The agonized concern expressed by this Court on being moved
by the conscious citizens, as is perceptible from the authorities
referred to hereinabove, clearly shows that a democratic
F
republic polity hopes and aspires to be governed by a
Government which is run by the elected representatives who
do not have any involvement in serious criminal offences or
offences relating to corruption, casteism, societal problems,
affecting the sovereignty of the nation and many other offences.
G There are recommendations given by different committees
constituted by various Governments for electoral reforms. Some
of the reports that have been highlighted at the bar are (i)
Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990), (ii) Vohra
9.
(1997) a sec 1.
H
10.
AIR 2005 SC 688.
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
983
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Committee Report (1993), (iii) lndrajit Gupta Committee on
A
State Funding of Elections (1998), (iv) Law Commission Report
on Reforms of the Electoral Laws (1999), (v) National
Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001 ),
(vi) Election Commission of India -
Proposed Electoral
Reforms (2004), (vii) The Second Administrative Reforms
B
Commission (2008), (vii) Justice J.S. Verma Committee Report
on Amendments to Criminal Law (2013), and (ix) Law
Commission Report (2014).
10. Vohra Committee Report and other Reports have been
C
taken note of on various occasions by this Court. Justice J.S.
Verma Committee Report on Amendments to Criminal Law
has proposed insertion of Schedule 1 to the 1951 Act
enumerating offences under IPC befitting the category of
'heinous' offences. It recommended that Section 8(1) of the
1951 Act should be amended to cover, inter alia, the offences
D
listed in the proposed Schedule 1 and a provision should be
engrafted that a person in respect of whose acts or omissions
a court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance under
Section 190(1 )(a), (b) or (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
or who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction
E
with respect to the offences specified in the proposed
expanded list of offences under Section 8(1) shall be
disqualified from the date of taking cognizance or conviction,
as the case may be. It further proposed that disqualification in
case of conviction shall continue for a further period of six years
F
from the date of release upon conviction and in case of
acquittal, the disqualification shall operate from the date of
taking cognizance till the date of acquittal.
11. The Law Commission, in its 244th Report, 2014, has
G
suggested amendment to the 1951 Act by insertion of Section
88 after Section 8A, after having numerous consultations and
discussions, with the avowed purpose to prevent criminalization
of politics. It proposes to provide for electoral reforms. Though
it is a recommendation by the Law Commission, yet to
H
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A understand the existing scenario i'n which the criminalization of
politics has the effect potentiality to create a concavity in the
highly treasured values of democracy, we think it apt to
reproduce the relevant part of the proposed amendment. It
reads as follows: -
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"88. Disqualification on framing of charge for certain
offences. -.(1) A person against whom a charge has been
framed by a competent court for an offence punishable by
at least five years imprisonment shall be disqualified from
the date of framing the charge for a period of six years, or
till the date of quashing of charge or acquittal, whichever
is earlier.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, nothing
in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person:
(i)
Who holds office as a Member of Parliament, State
Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council at the ·
date of enactment of this provision, or
(ii)
Against whom a charge has been framed for an
offence punishable by at least five years
imprisonment;
(a)
Less than one year before the date of
scrutiny of nominations for an election under
Section 36, in relation to that election;
(b)
At a time when such person holds office as
a Member of Parliament, State Legislative
Assembly or Legislative Council, and has
been elected to such office after the
enactment of these provisions;
(3) For Members of Parliament, State Legislative
Assembly or Legislative Council covered by clause (ii) of
sub-section (2), they shall be disqualified at the expiry of
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
985
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
one year from the date of framing of charge or date of
A
election, whichever is later, unless they have been
acquitted in the said period or the relevant charge against
them has been quashed."
12. The aforesaid vividly exposits concern at all quarters
8
about the criminalisation of politics. Criminalisation of politics,
it can be said with certitude, creates a dent in the marrows of
the nation.
CORRUPTION IN THE PRESENT SCENARIO
13. Criminality and corruption go hand in hand. From the
date the Constitution was adopted, i.e.: 26th January, 1950, a
Red Letter Day in the history of India, the nation stood as a
silent witness to corruption at high places. Corruption erodes
c
the fundamental tenets of the rule of law. In Niranjan o
Hemchandra Sashittal and another v. State of Maharashtra11
the Court has observed: -
"It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that
corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption
mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress,
accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience,
jettisons the glory of the institutions., paralyses the
economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility
and mars the marrows of governance. It is worth noting that
immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the
people believing in honesty, and history records with agony
how they have suffered. The only redeeming fact is that
collective sensibility respects such suffering as it is in
consonance with the constitutional morality."
14. Recently, in Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director,
Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. 12, the Constitution
11.
(2013) 4 sec 642.
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12.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 1997 etc. pronounced on May 06, 2014.
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986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 9 S.C.R.
A Bench, speaking through R.M. Lodha,. C.J., while declaring
Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946, which was inserted by Act 45 of 2003, as
unconstitutional, has opined that:-
B
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"lt seems to us that classification which is made in Section
6-A on the basis of status in the Government service is not
permissible under Article 14 as it defeats the purpose of
finding prima facie truth into the allegations of graft, which ·
amount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. Can there
be sound differentiation between corrupt public servants
based on their status? Surely not, because irrespective of
their status or position, corrupt public servants are
corrupters of public power. The corrupt public servants,
whether high or low, are birds of the same feather and
must be confronted with the process of investigation and
inquiry equally. Based on the position or status in service,
no distinction can be made between public servants
against whom there are allegations amounting to an
offence under the PC Act, 1988."
·
E And thereafter, the larger Bench further said:-
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"Corruption is an enemy of the nation and tracking down
corrupt public servants and punishing such persons is a
necessary mandate of the PC Act, 1988. It is difficult to
justify the classification which has been made in Section
6-A because the goal of law in the PC Act, 1988 is to meet
corruption cases with a very strong hand and all public
servants are warned through such a legislative measure
that corrupt public servants have to face very serious
consequences."
And again:
"70. Office of public power cannot be the workshop of
personal gain. The probity in public life is of great
importance. How can two public servants against whom
MANOJ NARULA v. UNION OF INDIA
987
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
there are allegations of corruption of graft or bribe taking
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or criminal· misconduct under the PC Act, 1988 can be
made to be treated differently because one happens to be
a junior officer and the other, a senior decision maker.
71. Corruption is an enemy of nation and tracking down
8
corrupt public servant, howsoever high he may be, and
punishing such person is a necessary mandate under the
PC Act, 1988.