# March . /Y63 llati }.'1111:j11 v. Bc11'i Da1

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 203
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-07-30
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/march-y63-llati-1111-j11-v-bc11-i-da1-2840
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Supreme Oourt Practice-Revocation of Special Leave
granted earlier by Supreme Oaurt-Effect of inaccurate, untrue
and misleading statements in petition for Special Leave.
The respondent filed a suit for the ejectment of the
appellant. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The .
respondent filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional
Sessionsjudge,Jaipur City. The appeal was accepted and
the claim of respondent for ejectment
was allowed. The
appellant filed an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court but
that was dismissed. The High Court also refused to gr~nt a
certificate.°~ fitness to ~ppeal to this Court. The appellant
filed a petitmn for Special Leave to appeal to this Court and
the same was allowed.
1963
March .
/Y63
llati }.'1111:j11
v.
Bc11'i Da1
GajendratadMr J.
-
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964) VOL.
The re1pondent filed a petition in
this C'ourt with a
prayer that Special Leave granted to the appellant be revoked
on the
ground
that
the appellant ha·J made inaccurate,
untrue an<l misleading staten1ents in the petition for Special
Leave. This Court also fournl that the apeellant had mack
certain wholly untrue statements in the petition for Special
Leave.
lleld, that Special Leave
granted
to the appr.llant
ought to be revoked and the appeal dismissed. It was observed
that it \Vas of utmost iinportance that
in making material
statcn1cnts anrl setting forth grounds in applications ior special
leave, care must be taken not to m1ke anv staten1ents \\'hich
are inaccurat(", untrue and
n1isleading.
'In dealing
with
applications for special leave, this Conrt takes statement. of
fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face
value anct it would he unfair to betray the
confidence of this
Court hy making staterncnts \vhich arc untrue and misleading.
Cn·1L
APPELLAn:
JumsnICTIO~ : Civil
Appeal :\o. 14 of 196:1.
From the judgment and decree dated July 30,
1962, of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Regular
S. A. ;'\o. 223 of 1961.
JI. C. Setalvad, S. 1'. Desrii and Naunit Lal
for the appellant.
G. S. Pathak and S. N.
Andley, for the
respondent.
IIJ63.
March 4.
The Judgment of the court
was delivered by
GA.JF.NDRAGADKAR J.-It is not necessary to
deal with the merits of the points which the appellant wanted to raise before us in this appeal, because
we are satisfied that the respondent's prayer that the
special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked, is well-founded. The appellant is a tenant of
the premises in suit which are owned by the respondent. These premises were let out to the appellant
•
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
by the respondent under a rent-note executed on
December 8, 1953.
The appellant was permitted to
use the said premises for his Oil Mill.
The terms of
the lease provided that the appellant was to pay to
the respondent the agreed rent every month and in
case of default for three months, the respondent was
entitled to evict the appf llant before the expiry of
the stipulated period which was five years, and in
that case he was entitled also to claim the rent for
the remaining period.
On May 2, 1959, the respondent sued the
appellant for cjectment in the Court of Munsif, East
Jaipur City.
He alleged that he had received the
rent from the appellant up to October 31, 1957
and that thereafter the appellant had defaulted in the
payment of rent in spite of repeated demands, and
that even at the date of the suit he was in arrears of
rent and had failed to pay the house tax according to
the agreement.
His case was that the appellant's
tenancy had expired on December l, 1958 by effiux
of time, but the appellant nevertheless failed to deliver
over possession of the premises to the respondent.
He, however, purported to deposit a lump sum of
Rs. 1053/-
to cover the period from November J,
-
1957 to November 30, 1958 which was due from him.
The respondent pleaded that the appellant had committed more than three defaults in the payment
of rent of two months each during the period of 18
months and t

## Text

i
•
2 s.c.:R.
stri>:REM:E COURT REPORTS
203
1963
not otherwise. The rule-making authority pre- .
sumably
thought that
having regard to the StateofUttarPraaah
status of the gazetted government servants, it would
Jogend~~ Singh
be legitimate to give such an opinion to them.
Therefore,
we feel no difficulty in accepting the
Gajendragadkar J,
view taken by the High Court that rule 4(2) imposes
an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made
by the gazetted government servant that his case
should ho referred to the Tribunal under the Rules.
Such a request was admittedly made by the respon·
dent and has not been granted. Therefore, we are
satisfied that the High Court was right in quashing
the proceedings proposed to be · taken by the appe·
Hant against the respondent otherwise than by
referring his case to the Tribunal under the Rules.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
HARi NARAIN
v.
BADRI DAS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
and J. C. SHAH JJ.)
Supreme Oourt Practice-Revocation of Special Leave
granted earlier by Supreme Oaurt-Effect of inaccurate, untrue
and misleading statements in petition for Special Leave.
The respondent filed a suit for the ejectment of the
appellant. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The .
respondent filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional
Sessionsjudge,Jaipur City. The appeal was accepted and
the claim of respondent for ejectment
was allowed. The
appellant filed an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court but
that was dismissed. The High Court also refused to gr~nt a
certificate.°~ fitness to ~ppeal to this Court. The appellant
filed a petitmn for Special Leave to appeal to this Court and
the same was allowed.
1963
March .
/Y63
llati }.'1111:j11
v.
Bc11'i Da1
GajendratadMr J.
-
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964) VOL.
The re1pondent filed a petition in
this C'ourt with a
prayer that Special Leave granted to the appellant be revoked
on the
ground
that
the appellant ha·J made inaccurate,
untrue an<l misleading staten1ents in the petition for Special
Leave. This Court also fournl that the apeellant had mack
certain wholly untrue statements in the petition for Special
Leave.
lleld, that Special Leave
granted
to the appr.llant
ought to be revoked and the appeal dismissed. It was observed
that it \Vas of utmost iinportance that
in making material
statcn1cnts anrl setting forth grounds in applications ior special
leave, care must be taken not to m1ke anv staten1ents \\'hich
are inaccurat(", untrue and
n1isleading.
'In dealing
with
applications for special leave, this Conrt takes statement. of
fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face
value anct it would he unfair to betray the
confidence of this
Court hy making staterncnts \vhich arc untrue and misleading.
Cn·1L
APPELLAn:
JumsnICTIO~ : Civil
Appeal :\o. 14 of 196:1.
From the judgment and decree dated July 30,
1962, of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Regular
S. A. ;'\o. 223 of 1961.
JI. C. Setalvad, S. 1'. Desrii and Naunit Lal
for the appellant.
G. S. Pathak and S. N.
Andley, for the
respondent.
IIJ63.
March 4.
The Judgment of the court
was delivered by
GA.JF.NDRAGADKAR J.-It is not necessary to
deal with the merits of the points which the appellant wanted to raise before us in this appeal, because
we are satisfied that the respondent's prayer that the
special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked, is well-founded. The appellant is a tenant of
the premises in suit which are owned by the respondent. These premises were let out to the appellant
•
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
by the respondent under a rent-note executed on
December 8, 1953.
The appellant was permitted to
use the said premises for his Oil Mill.
The terms of
the lease provided that the appellant was to pay to
the respondent the agreed rent every month and in
case of default for three months, the respondent was
entitled to evict the appf llant before the expiry of
the stipulated period which was five years, and in
that case he was entitled also to claim the rent for
the remaining period.
On May 2, 1959, the respondent sued the
appellant for cjectment in the Court of Munsif, East
Jaipur City.
He alleged that he had received the
rent from the appellant up to October 31, 1957
and that thereafter the appellant had defaulted in the
payment of rent in spite of repeated demands, and
that even at the date of the suit he was in arrears of
rent and had failed to pay the house tax according to
the agreement.
His case was that the appellant's
tenancy had expired on December l, 1958 by effiux
of time, but the appellant nevertheless failed to deliver
over possession of the premises to the respondent.
He, however, purported to deposit a lump sum of
Rs. 1053/-
to cover the period from November J,
-
1957 to November 30, 1958 which was due from him.
The respondent pleaded that the appellant had committed more than three defaults in the payment
of rent of two months each during the period of 18
months and that even at the date of the suit, the rent
or mesne profits for 5 months and 2 days still remained to be paid. That is the basis on which a decree
for ejectment was claimed by the respondent against
the appellant.
-
The appellant denied the respondent's claim
...
and alleged that the respondent was not entitled to
claim ejcctment against him by virtue of the provisions of section l:l( t )(a) of the Rajasthan Premises
(Control of Rent and Ev~ction) Act, Hl50 (Act XVII
1963
Hari N)r~in
v.
Badri DfJs
GaJen1ragadkar J
1963
HMi JVarain
..
BWi Do.J
':lajttu/ra.(ad~ar J.
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act). He also pleaded that by virtue of the fact that the respondent had
accepted rent paid by the appellant, he had waived
his right to evict him.
In other words, he denied
that there was any default, and resisted the respondent's prayer for his ejectment.
At the date of
the first hearing of the suit in the trial Court, the
appellant deposited Rs. 618/- on account of rent due
up to the said date and the said payment was accept·
ed by the respondent without prejudice.
On these pleadings, the learned trial Judge
framed four issues, the principal issue being whether
the appellant had committed three defaults of two
months within the period of 18 months in the payment of rent ? The finding of the trial Court on the
said issue as well as on the other issues framed by it
was in favour of the appellant. In the result, the
respondent's suit was dismissed.
The respondent then preferred an appeal in
the Court of the Additional Sessions fudge, Jaipur
City. The appellate Court held that on the facts
proved by the respondent, the three defaults had been
committed by the appellant, and so, he was entitled
to a decree for ejectment. On these findings, the
decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and the
respondent's claim for ejectment was allowed.
The appellant challenged this decision by
preferring a second appeal before the Rajasthan
High Court.
This appeal was heard by a learned
single Judge of the said High Court and was dismissed.
The appellant's request for lea\'e to prefer an
appeal under Letters Patent was rejected by the
learned .Judge. It is agaimt the decision of the learned single Judge in seco!ld appea.l that the appellant applied for and obtamed special leave to app~al
to this Court.
•
-
-
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
207
The main point which the appellant wanted
to urge before this Court was in regard. to the construction of section 13 ( 1) (a) of the Act 1 ead with
section 13 (4), but as we have already indicated,
we do not reach the stage of dealing with the merits
of this point, because we are satisfied that the
material statements made by the appellant in his
application for special leave are inaccurate and
misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend
that the appellant may have obtained special leave
from this Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the
petition for special leave. In the said petition, the
appellant has taken six grounds of appeal against
the decision of the High Court. The last ground is
that the respondent had claimed eviction in the trial
Court on the basis of alleged non-payment and nontender of payment
of rent from
December 2,
1958, but the First Appellate Court and the High
Court set up a new case for the landlord by taking
into
consideration the alleged defaults prior to
December 2, 1958 and
not relied upon by the
landlord
himself. This ground was presumably
taken in support of the main argument that the
High Court had not correctly interpreted the provi -
sions of section 13 (I) (a) of the Act.
The respondent contends that this is a complete mis-statement
of the true position and in support of his argument
he has referred us to paragraph 3 in the plaint. It
appears that the rent due from the appellant for the .
period between November l, 1957 to November 30,
1958, which had fallen in default was deposited by
him by cheque on December 2, 1958. Paragraph
3 of the plaint specifically refers to these defaults
and in fact, takes into account the said defaults for
the purpose of setting up the respondent's case that
the appellant had committed more than three defaults
in the payment of rent of two months each during the period of 18 months.
Therefore, there is
no doubt that the unambiguous and categorical
1963
Hari N~rain
.•.
Badri Das
Gojendragadkar J.
1963
/fad
~·(J1a/n
v.
~<Jdri Das
:ajtndr11gadlar J.
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
statement made in the last ground of the appellant's
petition for spei:ial leave is wholly untrue.
Similarly, it appears that in another ground
taken in the special leave petition, the appel!ant has
made an equally inaccurate
statement. In this
ground the appellant represented that by reason of
the payments made by him towards rent <lue from
him to the respondent he had become a statutory
tenant and "admittedly <lid not make any default
after DecemLer l, 19;)8." This statement must be
read along with and in the light of the material
a verments contained in paragraph 6 of the petition
where the appellant has stated that on the first
hearing he deposited Rs. 648/ · on account of rent
due up to that date and the r.::spondent accepted it.
Both these statements omit to refer to the material
fact that the deposit made in Court was accepted
by the respondent without prejudice, and so, the
statement in the ground that the appellant admittedly did not make any default after December 1,
l!l58, is equally untrue.
Mr. Pathak for the respon·
dent urges that in view of these serious mis-statemwts
contained in the petition for special leave, his client
is justified in assuming that special leave may have
been granted to the appellant as a result of the
agreements urged by him on the strength of these misstatements, and so, he has pressed his petition that
the special leave granted to the appellant should
be revoked.
On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad contended
that he had appeared at the time when special leave
w~s granted and to the best of his recollection he had
not rcferre<l to these grounds, hut had merely urged
his contention that the High Court had mis construed
s. l:{ (I) (a) of the Act.
\\'e have no hesitation in
accepting i\fr. Sctalvad's statement ; bnt, in our
opinion, in dealing with the respondent's prayer
that special leave granted to the appellant should be
'
....
-
!i s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
209
revoked, what was actually urged before the Court
cannot be decisive of the matter and may not even
be very material. II is true that in the present case,
special leave was granted on September 26, 1962
and it is possible for Mr. Setalvad to recall what he
argued before the Court when special leave was
granted. But it is
nece~sary to bear in mind that
the appeal may come on for hearing long after
special leave is granted, that counsel appearing at
the stage of admission may not be same as at the
stage of final hearing, and the Bench that granted
special leave may not necessarily deal with the
appeal at the final stage. Therefore, it is no answer
to the respondent's contention
that though the
material statements in the special leave petition may
be substantially inaccurate,
though not wholly
untrue, those statements may not have influenced
the Court in granting special leave. Mr. Setalvad
has also invited our attention to the fact that the
impugned statements and grounds are substantially
copied from the averments made in the appeal b~fore
the High Court. That may be so, but the fact 11till
remains that two important statements which, if true,
may have been of considerable assistance to the
appellant in invoking the protection of s. 13 (1) (a)
even on the construction placed by the High Court
on that section are found to be untrue, and that, in
our opinion, is a very serious infirmity in the petition
itself. It is of utmost importance that in making
materia I statements and setting forth grounds in
applications for special leave, care must be taken not
to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue
or misleading. In dealing with applications
for
special leave, the Court naturally takes statements
of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions
at their face value and it would be unfair to betray
the confidence of the Court by making statements
which are untrue and mis-leading. That is why we
have come to the conclusion that in the present case,
special leave granted to the appellant ought to be
1963
Hari Narain
••
Badri l)os
Gajendragadkar J.
1963
HrAti Narain
v.
Bodri Da~
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
revoked.
Accordingly, special leave is revoked and
the appeal is dismissed.
The appellant will pay the
costs of the respondent.
Gaj,.irogadko, J,
Mr. Setalvad requested us tu give the appellant some time to vacate the. premises. He invited
our attention to the fact that the appellant has invested large amounts in setting up machinery of
the Oil Mill which he is running in the premises in
question.
Mr. Andley for the respondent has fairly
conceded
that on condition that the appellant
unconditionally undertakes to deliver possession of
the premises to the respondent within six months
from the date of this judgment he would not execute
the decree for ejeclment.
Mr. Setalvad offered an
unconditional undertaking on behalf of the appellant
as SUf!ge-skd by :Mr.
Andley. We acccordingly
direet tht!t on
the
appellant's undertaking, the
respondent should not execute the decree for six
months from today.
Special leave revoked.
Appeal dismissed.
----