# MARTIN BURN LTD v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 543
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-08-19
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/martin-burn-ltd-v-the-corporation-of-calcutta-3644
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

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543
MARTIN BURN LTD.
v.
THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA
August 19, 1965
·[A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923-Valuation of premises wrongly made
under s. 127(b) instead of s. 127(a)-/n appeal High Court remanding
care for valuation by lower court-If remand valid-Whether case one of
cancellation within s. 131 (2)(b) or of revision within ss. 147 & 164.
The annual value of certain premises occupied by the appellant was
ascertained by the methods prescribed in cl. (b) of s. 127 of the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1923, with a view to asses.. the municipal rates payable
in IllSpeCt of the premises. The appellant lodged objections under s. 139
claiming, Inter a/la, that the basis of valuation was wrong as it should
have been made by the method prescribed in cl. (a) of s. 127 and that the
valuation was in any event excessive. The Deputy Commissioner rejected
the objections, except that he reduced the valuation slightly; but an appeal
under s. 141 to the Court of Small Causes was allowed and that court
directed that a fresh Yaluation had to. be made under cl. (a) of s. 127
by the &eoutive Officer, starting from the proceeding mentioned under
s. 131(2) (b).
The respondent thereupon appealed to the High Court.
but the contentions raised by it were rejected; however, in view of the
fact that the time-limit for an assessment by the Executive Officer under
s. 131(2)(b) having expired he could no more make the valuation which
the Court of Small Causes directed him to make and to prevent the
Corporation being deprived of its rates as a result of such expiry of time.
the High Court made an order remanding the case to the Court of
Small Causes and directed it to make the valuation itself.
In the appeal to this Court it wa• contended on behalf of the appellant
that as the original valuation bad been cancelled because of an irregularity,
the present case fell within s. 131(2)(b), and the High COOrt bad no
power to remand the case for a vah,ration by the lower court; and that in
ony event the order of remand was unjustifiable because it converted the
appellant's appeal to the Court of Small Causes into a proceeding wholly
alien to what it was originally meant for, in that it went bevond the scope
of the objection made by the appellant under s. 139. On the other hand,
it was the respondent's contention that the present cit.se was one of revision
and alteration of a valuation contemplated in ss. 147 and 164 and not
one of cancellation of a valuation within the meaning of s. 131(2)(b).
HELD : (per Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal JI.)
The High Court's order remanding the case to the Court of Small
Causes with a direction to ascertain the annual value could not be sus~
tained.
The liability for rates is a statutory liability under the Act and for
such liability to arise the valuation bad to be made as provided in the
statute.
The Act. does not contemplate that rates may be fixed on the
basis of a valuation made by a court such a valuation would create no
statutory liability. It would be fruitless to direct the Court of Small Causes
to make a fresh -valuation. [548 C-EJ
.,
544
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
The direction of lhe High Court 10 the Court of Small Cause.< ""' A
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not to revise or <titer a Yaluation but 10 make a fresh valuation and ;1s
such the High ('curfs Order could not he upheld as directing a revision or
alteration of the valuation under s. 147 or 164 of 1he Act. (548 F, G]
Royal Asiatic Society of Bengu/ v. Corporation of Calcu11a, 58 C.W.N.
537; disappro,eJ.
Governor <..ieneral of JruJia in Council v. Corporution of Calcutta; 51
B
C.W.N. 517; North British &: Mercantile /nsura11cc Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcww (Calcutta High Court C.ase No. 6 of 1943, unreported):
Corporation of Ca/c111ta v. Chandoo Lal Bhai Chand Modi; 57 C.W.N. 882:
referred to.
(per Rama~\\.'ami J. dissentin,::)
(i) The High Court having remanded the case to the lo\\·er court \\'ith
a direction to

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543
MARTIN BURN LTD.
v.
THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA
August 19, 1965
·[A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923-Valuation of premises wrongly made
under s. 127(b) instead of s. 127(a)-/n appeal High Court remanding
care for valuation by lower court-If remand valid-Whether case one of
cancellation within s. 131 (2)(b) or of revision within ss. 147 & 164.
The annual value of certain premises occupied by the appellant was
ascertained by the methods prescribed in cl. (b) of s. 127 of the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1923, with a view to asses.. the municipal rates payable
in IllSpeCt of the premises. The appellant lodged objections under s. 139
claiming, Inter a/la, that the basis of valuation was wrong as it should
have been made by the method prescribed in cl. (a) of s. 127 and that the
valuation was in any event excessive. The Deputy Commissioner rejected
the objections, except that he reduced the valuation slightly; but an appeal
under s. 141 to the Court of Small Causes was allowed and that court
directed that a fresh Yaluation had to. be made under cl. (a) of s. 127
by the &eoutive Officer, starting from the proceeding mentioned under
s. 131(2) (b).
The respondent thereupon appealed to the High Court.
but the contentions raised by it were rejected; however, in view of the
fact that the time-limit for an assessment by the Executive Officer under
s. 131(2)(b) having expired he could no more make the valuation which
the Court of Small Causes directed him to make and to prevent the
Corporation being deprived of its rates as a result of such expiry of time.
the High Court made an order remanding the case to the Court of
Small Causes and directed it to make the valuation itself.
In the appeal to this Court it wa• contended on behalf of the appellant
that as the original valuation bad been cancelled because of an irregularity,
the present case fell within s. 131(2)(b), and the High COOrt bad no
power to remand the case for a vah,ration by the lower court; and that in
ony event the order of remand was unjustifiable because it converted the
appellant's appeal to the Court of Small Causes into a proceeding wholly
alien to what it was originally meant for, in that it went bevond the scope
of the objection made by the appellant under s. 139. On the other hand,
it was the respondent's contention that the present cit.se was one of revision
and alteration of a valuation contemplated in ss. 147 and 164 and not
one of cancellation of a valuation within the meaning of s. 131(2)(b).
HELD : (per Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal JI.)
The High Court's order remanding the case to the Court of Small
Causes with a direction to ascertain the annual value could not be sus~
tained.
The liability for rates is a statutory liability under the Act and for
such liability to arise the valuation bad to be made as provided in the
statute.
The Act. does not contemplate that rates may be fixed on the
basis of a valuation made by a court such a valuation would create no
statutory liability. It would be fruitless to direct the Court of Small Causes
to make a fresh -valuation. [548 C-EJ
.,
544
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
The direction of lhe High Court 10 the Court of Small Cause.< ""' A
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not to revise or <titer a Yaluation but 10 make a fresh valuation and ;1s
such the High ('curfs Order could not he upheld as directing a revision or
alteration of the valuation under s. 147 or 164 of 1he Act. (548 F, G]
Royal Asiatic Society of Bengu/ v. Corporation of Calcu11a, 58 C.W.N.
537; disappro,eJ.
Governor <..ieneral of JruJia in Council v. Corporution of Calcutta; 51
B
C.W.N. 517; North British &: Mercantile /nsura11cc Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcww (Calcutta High Court C.ase No. 6 of 1943, unreported):
Corporation of Ca/c111ta v. Chandoo Lal Bhai Chand Modi; 57 C.W.N. 882:
referred to.
(per Rama~\\.'ami J. dissentin,::)
(i) The High Court having remanded the case to the lo\\·er court \\'ith
a direction to ascertain the annual value under s. 127(a) after allowinf!,
the parties to give further evidcnl:e, the va]uation had not been finally
detennincd, hut was awaiting final adjudication.
It was not therefore
correct to say that there had been a cancellation of the valuation within
the meaning of s. 131(2)(b). The present case was one of the revision
of valuation and fell under the pur'\'iew of s. 147, so that the revised
valuation when finally determined would take effect retrospectively from
the point of lime mentioned in 1hat section. [557 H--558 BJ
(ii) Though the ohjection made by the appellant under s. 139 was
;!n objection to the valuation. \\'hatcver be the ground of objection. the
primary obiect of the appellant v.·as to get the valuation set aside.
It
could not therefore be said that the order of remand made by the High
Court was hev1,nd lhc scope of lhe appeal. [558 D, G]
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Civ1L APPFI.LATF. JuRISDtCTION:
Civil Appeal Nos. 247
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and 248 of 1963.
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated
the August 3. 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from
original order '\'os. 124 and 125 of 1956 .
. Viren De. Additional Solicitor-General. S. R. Banerjee and
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S. N. Mukherjee. for the appellant.
A. V. Vishwanatha Sas1ri and P. K. Muklrerjee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of Sarkar and Raghubar Dayal. JJ. was delivered by Sarkar J., Ramaswami J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
Sarkar J.
These two appeals arise out of procccding5 for
ascertainment of the annual value of premises No. 12, Mission Row,
Calcutta, occupied hy the appellant. The annual value was ascertained with a view to assess the municipal rates payable in respect
of the premises.
The appeals raise a common question of law
making it unnecessary to deal with them separately, that question
being whether the order of remand made by the High Court at
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MARTIN BURN V. CORPORATION (Sarkar, J.)
545
A Calcutta to the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta for ascertaining
the annual value was justified.
The annual value was ascertained under the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923. This Act was repealed and replaced by the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1951 as from May 1, 1952, but as the valuation
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repealed Act it is that Act by which the question that arises will
have to be determined.
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We may at this stage profitably refer to some of the sections
in Ch. X of the Act for giving an idea of its scheme regarding the
ascertainment of the annual value.
Section 124 provides that a
bonsolidated rate not exceeding twenty-three per cent on the
annual valuation determined under Ch. X of the Act may tie imposed by the Corporation upon al! lands and buildings in Calcutta.
Clauses (a) and (b) of s. 127 lay down two mutually exclusive
methods for ascertaining the annual value. The method prescribed
in cl. (a) is applicable where a building had been erected for letting
purposes or was ordinarily let and under it the valuation has to be
based on the rent which the land or building might reasonably
fetch.
Clause (b ), on the other hand, covers all other cases and
provides for the valuation being based on the cost of construction
of the building and the value of the land. Section 131(1) provides
that the valuation made under the preceding Municipal Acts shall
remain in force for the assessment of the consolidated rate under
the Act until such time as the Executive Officer makes a fresh valuation under the Act and that fresh valuation shall have effect for a
period of six years and may be revised thereafter at the termination of successive periods of six years. The Executive Officer mentioned is one of the officers of the Corporation appointed under
the Act.
Section 131(2) (b) states that "any land or building the
valuation of which has been cancelled on the ground of irregularity. . . . . . . . may be valued by the Executive Officer at any
time during the currency of the period prescribed ...... by subsection(]), and such valuation shall remain in force ...... for the
unexpired portion of such period." Sections 13 6 to 13 8 lay down
the procedure for the making of the valuation and of giving notices
in respect thereof to the rate-payers. Under s. 139 a rate-payer
dissatisfied with the valuation made by the Corporation may lodge
with the Corporation his objections to it. Section 140 provides for
an order being made by the Executive Officer on these objections
after investisation on notice to the rate-payer. Section 141 gives
the rate-payer dissatisfied with the order. made under s. 140 a right
to appeal against it to the Court of Small Causes. Under s. 142(3>
:546
SUPREME
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REPORTS
[1%6] I SC.R.
:an appeal lies to the High Court from the decision of the Court
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of Small Causes under s. 14 I. Section 14 7 is in these terms :
""When the valuation of any land or building is revised in conse-
-quence of an objection made under section 139 or section 146,
sub-section (2), or an appeal is preferred under section 141, the
revised valuation shall !alee effect from the quarter in which the
first-mentioned valuation would have talcen effect, and shall conB
tinue in force for the period for which the said first-mentioned
valuation was made, and no longer." Section 146 is not material
for our purposes. Section 164(1) states that "When an objection to
a valuation has been made under section 139, the consolidated rate
shall, pending the final determination of the objection, be paid on
the previous valuation." Under sub-s. (2) of this section "if, when
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the objection has been finally determined, the previous valuation is
altered", then any sum paid in excess shall be refunded or allowed
to be set off against any demand of the Corporation again-'t the
rate-payer and any deficiency shall be deemed to be an arrear of
rate and recoverable as such.
There are sections which provide
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how the rates are to be realised but no reference to them is necessary. It is enough to say that the rates duly assessed impose a
legal liability to pay them which can be enforced by distress or by
proceedings in a court of law.
Now in the present case the Corporation had assessed the
annual value of the premises at a certain figure by applying the
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method prescribed in cl. (b) of s. 127.
The appellant lodged
variou5 objections to it under s. 139. We are concerned only with
two of these objections which were (I), the valuation had been
made on a wrong basis as it should have been made by the method
prescribed in cl. (a) of s. 127 and (2), the valuation was in any
event unfair and excessive.
The Deputy Commissioner of the
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Corporation, being the officer under the new Act which had then
come into force who had replaced the Executive Officer under the
Old Act, rejected all these objections except that he reduced the
valuation slightly presumably on the ground of excessiveness. The
appellant then appealed against the Commissioner's decision to
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the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta under s. 141. The only point
that the appellant raised in that Court was that the valuation was
illegal as it had been made under cl. (b) of s. 127 while it should
have been made under cl. (a). It did not raise a contention that
the valuation as reduced was still excessive and should in any event
be further reduced.
The Corporation contended that the valua11
ti on had properly been made under cl. (b) of s. 127 and also that
the appeal was incompetent as necessary court-fees had not been
paid. The Court rejected both the points and allowed the appeal
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MARTIN BURN v. CORPORATION (Sarkar, J.)
547
A making the following order : "The appeal must, therefore, succeed; and tly: assessments as made by the respondent body have to·
be wholly set aside and fresh valuations have to be made in respect
of the premises in accordance with the mode prescribed under
clause (a) of section i27, starting from the proceedings prescribed
in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 131 of the Act."
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The Corporation then appealed to the High Court at Calcutta
under s. 142(3) of the Act against the judgment of the Court of
Small Causes and raised the same two points it had taken in that
Court. Both tbese points were rejected by the High Court also
and the order of tbe Court of Small Causes was maintained. These
c points no more survive because tbe Corporation has not taken any
proceeding to challenge the judgment of the High Court. We are
not, therefore, called upon to examine the merits of tbe decision
of the Courts below on the applicability of cl. (a) of s. 127 to
the present case or as regards the court-fees payable by the appellant.
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In view of its decision that the valuation should have been
made by tbe method laid down in cl. (b) of s. 127 the High Court
held that "the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court, Calcutta,
therefore, rightly cancelled the assessment". Having done this, it
observed that the order of the Court of Small Causes directing a
E revaluation by the Corporation was however infructuous. It is not
in dispute that the Corporation could only make a revaluation under
s. 131 ( 2 )( b) , as indeed the Court of Small Causes directed it to
do, and that the time limit for doing so prescribed by that section
had expired.
To prevent the Corporation being deprived of its
rates the High Court made an order remanding the case to the
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Court of Small Causes and directing it to make the valuation itself
thereby intending to avoid the difficulty arising out of the application of s. !31(2)(b). It also gave certain consequential directions
for the filing of a valuation before that Court by the Corporation
and of obje<:tions thereto by the apgellant and so on. It is this
order of remand that the appellant challenges in this Court.
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It is not contended that the High Court had any statutory power
to make the order of remand but it is said that the High Court had
an inherent power to do so.
Whether the High Court had the
inherent power in a case like this may well be doubted. Learned:
counsel for the appellant contended that in any case the order of
remand was unjustifiable as it converted the appellant's appeal to
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the Court of Small Causes into a proceeding wholly alien to what
it originally was meant for. It was said that the inherent power
of remand could be exercised only for deciding the disputes that
548
SU!'RUIE COURT
Rl:.PORTS
[1966] I S.C.ll..
arose in the case as it stood; it could not be exercised for the deciA
sion of a matter which the proceedings in the Courts below did
not raise, namely, the making of a new valuation on a wholly
different basis.
These contentions, in our view, deserve serious
consideration.
We think that there are oth~r more fundamental objections to
the order of remand. The order was made so that a legal liability
for rates assessed on the valuation made under it might fasten on
the appellant. Indeed the High Court cxpn .. -ssly stated that it was
making the order so that the Corporation might not be deprived
of its rates. The liability for rates is however a statutory liability
under the Act; it is not a liability to be imposed by order of Court.
So much is clear and not in dispute.
In order that the statutory
liability might arise, the valuation had to be made as provided in
the statute. Now the Act nowhere states that rates may be fixed
on the basis of a valuation made by a court; it docs not at all
contemplate a valuation made by a Court on its own.
Such a
valuation would be futile and would create no statutory liability.
Therefore, the High Court's order, sending the case "back to the
Small Causes Court, Calculla. with directions to that Court to
ascertain the annual value," if it was intended to allow the Court
to make an independent valuation itself, was useless; the valuation
made under it would give rise to no liability for rates fixed on the
basis of it. It would not be an order which can be sustained.
Though the Act does not empower a Court to make a valuation itself, it doe.s seem to contemplate in ss. 147 and 164 a valuation made by the Corporation being revised and a previous valua- .
tion altered, by a Court in :m appeal.
If, therefore, it could be
said that the valuation which the Court of Small Causes was to
make under the order of the High Court would be a revised valuation, that valuation would have been within the statute and the
order of the High Court would then have been an effective order.
We do not, however, think that that valuation can be said to be a
revised or altered valuation.
First, the High Court did not direct
the Court of Small Causes to revise a valuation or to alter a previous valuation; it directed that Court to make a fresh valuation
itself.
Secondly, it seems to us, irrespective of how the High
Court described the valuation to be made under its order. that
that valuation cannot by any stretch of imagination be called a
revised valuation or a previous valuation altered. What ha< happened here is that the previous valuation has been cancelled. That
valuation no longer exists.
The Court of Small Causes has now
to make a valuation of its own on a different b<is ~nd on different
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MARTIN BURN v. CORPORATION (Sarkar, J.)
549
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data. The valuation has now to be made on the basis of the letting
value of the premises instead of on the market value of the land
and the cost of construction of the building as had previously been
done by the Corporation. It would hardly be appropriate to call
such a process, the revising of a valuation or the altering of a valuation previously made. Nothing is here revised or altered; what is
done is to create a new thing from the start and this without any
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. reference whatsoever to any existing thing.
We should suppose
that a thing is revised or altered when it is retained with some modifications. Thus when the figures of rent, cost or value on which a
valuation is based are altered as excessive, or unfair or a larger
depreciation than given is allowed and the total is suitably altered,
that would be a case of revising or altering a valuation. The present is a wholly different case.
The valuation which the High
Court ordered to be made cannot hence be a revised or altered
valuation.
It is necessary now to refer to Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal
v. Corporation of Calcutta('). In that case, as in the case in hand,
the rate-payer had appealed to the Court of Small Causes contending that the valuation had been made by the Corporation by applying a wrong method, namely, cl. (a) of s. 127. The contention was
rejected by the lower Court but upheld by the High Court. The
High Court then remanded the case to the Court of Small Causes
E for a determination of the annual value in terms of cl. (b) of s .
127. The High Court took the view that in such an appeal the
Court of Small Causes had the right to make a revised valuation
as contemplated in s. 147.
Basing itself on that section and s.
164 it put its reasoning in this way at p. 544 : "the scheme of the
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Act is that where an assessee is aggrieved by a valuation made by
the Corporation and prefers an objection, till the objection is finally adjudicated upon, the consolidated rate has got to be paid on
the existing valuation and that after the objection is finally disposed
of in appeal, the final valuation fixed will determine the consolidated rate payable and will, in terms of section 147, remain in force
G for the period for which the first mentioned valuation was made."
With respect, we are unable to agree that this is the scheme of the
Act. Where the valuation is in fact revised, the observation quoted would no doubt be fully applicable. It would not apply to
other cases.
The fallacy of the reasoning lies in the assumptiou
that once there is an appeal, there must always be a revised valuaH
tion. There is no warrant for that assumption.
We have earlier
stated that there is no scope for making a revised valuation where
(I) 58 C.W.N. S37.
550
SUPREMB COU1T REPOllTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
the appeal seeks an annulment of the existing valuation.
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ther, neither s. 147 nor s. 164, on which the reasoning was based,
requires a valuation to be revised nor says when that is to be done.
They deal only with cases where a valuation has in fact been
revised and thereby indicate that there may be cases where the
valuation is not revised. In Governor-General of India in Council
v. Corporation of Calcutta(') the High Court upheld the order of
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the Court of Small Causes cancelling a valuation as having been
made under the wrong clause of s. 127 but did not direct the valuation to be made afresh by that Court. We may also observe here
that in the case in hand the High Court referred to the Royal
Asiatic Society's case( 2 ) only to support the proposition that it
bad a power of remand and for no other purpose. It did not say c
that in all appeals the Court must make a revised valuation.
lo considering the scheme of the Act, the Royal Asiatic Society's
case(') further overlooked tho fact that the Act required every
valuation to be made by the Corporation under ss. 131 and 136
to 138 and that it gave the rate-payer a chance of attacking that
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valuation under s. 139, before coming to a Court for ventilating
bis grievance. These provisions would be ignored if the Court of
Small Causes were to make the \'aluation itself.
They indicate
that the scheme of the Act was not as stated in that case. There
it was also observed that the ,·icw taken rccci\'ed support from the
observations of S. R. Das J. in the unreported judgment in North
British and Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta(•) mentioned in that case.
We think however that those
observations tend quite the other way for they were i11ter a/ia that,
"If, however, the Small Causes Court only set~ aside the valuation
made by the Corporation but does not itself fix the valuation, then
s. 147 does not apply ...... The matter must in such circumstances be left to be governed by s. l 31(2)(b)."
S. R. Das J.
clearly contemplated that the Court of Small Causes was not bound
to make a revised valuation in all cases.
In our opinion, it has
not the power to do so in all cases. The same view of the judgment of S. R. Das J. was taken in Corporation o.f Calcutta v.
Chandoo Lal Bhai Chand Modi(').
If it was intended by the Royal Asiatic Society's case(') to hold
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that it was the appellate court's power after cancelling a valuation
to revise it if it liked, that again would be a view to which we are
unable to subscribe.
Such a view indeed appears to have been
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(!) 51 C.W.N. 517.
(3) Case No. 6 of 1943, unreported.
(2) 58 C.W.N. 537.
(4) 57 C.W.N. 882.
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MARTIN BURN v. CORPORATION (Sarkar, J.)
551
taken by the High Court in the case in hand for it made the order
of remand only because the Corporation could not make a valuation
any more, the time limit prescribed for it under s. 131(2)(b) having
expired. If the Corporation could make the valuation, presumably
the High Court would not have made the order of remand. Now s.
131 (2)(b) provides that when a valuation is cancelled on the ground
of irregularity, a fresh valuation may be made by the Executive
Officer. It would be an unnatural construction of the Act to say
that the operation of this provision would depend on the discretion of the appellate court to proceed or not to proceed to make a
valuation itself after cancelling the valuation previously made by
the Corporation. We think that in view of this provision, once a
valuation is cancelled, a fresh valuation can only be made in
terms of it and not in any other way. That is what S. R. Das J.
said and with it we agree. That is another reason for saying that
when a valuation is cancelled, the Act does not contemplate a
fresh valuation being made by the court, for if it did so, s. 131 (2)(b)
D would have operation only when the Court decided it to have. We
are not prepared to accept as correct an interpretation of the Act
leading to such an unnatural result.
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While on s. 131 (2)(b) we observe that it was not contended
that a Court had no power to cancel a valuation; all that was said
was
that after cancellation the Court must or may proceed
to make a fresh valuation. This we have held to be an untenable
view.
A point was however made that s. 131 (2)(b) applied only
to a cancellation on the ground of irregularity, that is, a procedural
defect such as, absence of notice, omission to give a hearing etc.
There is however no reason to restrict the ordinary meaning of the
word "irregularity" and confine it to procedural defects only. None
has been advanced. Such a contention was rejected, and we think
rightly, in Corporation of Calcutta v. Chandoo Lal Bhai Chand
Modi('). That word clearly covers any case where a thing has
not been done in the manner laid down by the statute, irrespective
of what that manner might be. In principle there would be nothG ing to justify a special provision like s. 131 (2)(b) being made to
cover a case of procedural irregularity only.
We can now deal with the reasoning on which the High Court
in the present case justified its order of remand. It realised that by
making the order it was depriving the appellant of one of its
chances to object to the valuation, namely, the chance under s.
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139, but it felt that by upholding that right of the appellant it
would be depriving the Corporation of its rates wholly as the time
(I} 57 C.W.N. 882.
L7Sup./65-7
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REPORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
limit prescri~d by s. 131(2)(b) had expired. It thought that it
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was faced with two evils and that it would be choosing the lesser
of the two if it allowed the Corporation a chance to collect its
rates. Witllgreat rfspect, we find this line of reasoning altogether
unsupportable. A result flowip.g from a statutory provision is never
an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress rerulting from its operatjOlh<A statute B
must of course be given effect to wbether a court likes the result
or not.
When the High Court found that s. 131(2)(b) had been
attracted to the case, it had no power to set-that provision at nought.
It remains to deal with one other argument advanced for the
Corporation. It was said that the entire proceeding in connection
with the ascertairunent of the valuation was one and continuous
and its only object was to ascertain the valuation and, therefore,
the Court annulling a valuation made on a wrong basis, must
have power to make a new valuation itself on the correct basis. We
are not impressed by this contention.
The conclusion does not
follow from the premise.
The proceeding for making the valuation, whether it is continuous or not, must be in terms of the statute.
If the statute does not give the Court the power to make the valuation, it cannot be said to possess that power so that the supposed
object may be achieved. Further, the object is not to make a valuation anyhow but to make it only in terms of the Act.
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We think we have now considered all the different aspects of
the matter that were placed before us by learned counsel on either
side. Our conclusion for the reasons earlier stated is that, looked
from all points of view, the order of remand is not justifiable. in
law; it was not within the inherent power of the High Court to
remand the case for the doing of a thing which the Act did not F
countenance. The remand was futile. It offended the Act as it
deprived th~ appellant of one of its statutory rights. The order has
to be set aside.
Before concluding we may state that the Corporation had made
two valuations of the premises, one called a general valuation for
the entire six yearly period mentioned ins. 131(1) and the other
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an intermediate valuation made later but within that period to have
effect for the remainder of the period, on account of certain additional construction in the premises put up since the earlier assessment.
Obj~ctions had been taken by the appellant to both these
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valuations under s. 139 by independent proceedings and separate
appeals filed under s. 141 from 'the order made in each of the
proceedings. As earlier stated, the appeals raised the same point.
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553
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They ;wcr~, (h;;efore, dealt with in one judgment by both the
Courts below. Hence the two appeals before us.
In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment
of the High Court in so far as the orders for remand are concerned
and restore the judgment of the Court of Small Causes. The CorB
poration will pay the cost of tl1ese appeals.
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Ramaswami, J.
These two appeals are brought, by ~pecial
leave, against the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta dated
August 3, 1959 in appeals from Original Orders in F.M.A. 124 and
F.M.A. 125 of 1956. The appeals arise out of two valuations made
by the Corporation of Calcutta in respect of premises No. 12, Mission Row, Calcutta under the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal
Act, 1923 (Bengal Act III of l 923). At the general revaluation, the
disputed premises
were
assessed
to
an
annual value of
Rs. 1,45,354/-, to come into effect from the second quarter 194950, i.e., from July 1, 1949. The assessment was made under the
provision of s. 127(b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. The
assessee objected to the valuation, both in regard to the quantum
and the method of valuation and the Deputy Commissioner No. 1
of the respondent-Corporation, thougb affirming the method of
valuation, reduced the amount of assessment to Rs. 1,28,230/-.
Against this order the assessee preferred an appeal to the Presidency Small Cause Court, Calcutta under the provisions of s. 183
of the Calcutta Municipal Act, I 95 l which had in the meantime
come into operation.
This appeal was numbered as Municipal
Appeal No. 216 of 1954. The general revaluation of the premises
was followed by an intermediate valuation because certain new constructions had been made. At the stage of the intermediate valuation, the annual value was assessed at Rs. 1,46,992/- with effect
from the ,first quarter of 1951-52, i.e., from April l, 1951 again
following the method prescribed under s. l 27(b) of the Calcutta
Municipal Act, 1923.
Upon an objection made by the assessee
the valuation was reduced to Rs. 1,29,588/- by the Deputy Commissioner No. 1 of the Corporation. The assessee took the matter
in appeal to the Presidency Small Cause Court under s. 183 of the
Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951.
Thi~ appeal was numbered as
Municipal Appeal No. 217 of 1954.
Jn both these appeals the
Presidency Small Cause Court considered that the proper procedure
was to assess the premises under cl. (a) and not cl. (b) of s. 127 of
the Calcuttci Municipal Act, 1923. The Presidency Small Causes
Court accordingly set aside the assessments and directed fresh
assessments to be made in accordance with law. The Corporation
took the matter in appeal to the Calcutta High Court which, by its
554
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] l S.C.R.
judgment dated August 3, 1959, upheld the decision of the PresiA
dency Small Causes Court that the valuation should be fixed under
s. 127(a) and not under s. l 27(b) of the Calcutta Municipal Act,
1923 and that the valuation already made should be cancelled.
The High Court, however, modified the direction of the Presidency
Small Causes Court with regard to remand. The High Court ordered that the case should be remanded to the Presidency Small
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Causes Court for fixing the valuation itself under the provisions
of s. 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.
The question presented for determination in this case is whether
the High Court was right in sending back the case to the Presidency Small Causes Court and directing it to ascertain the annual c
value under s. 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act for the periods
in question.
It is necessary at this stage to set out the relevant provisions
of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.
Section 13 l deals
with
the assessment of the annual valuation and the duration of the
assessment. It reads :
"131 (I) ................ the Executive Officer may
make a fresh valuation of the lands and buildings
in each such ward under tills Act, and
the
annual value of such lands and buildings
1Il
each such ward shall. after such
assessment,
has been made by the Executive Otlicer, have
effect for a period of six years and may be revised thereafter by the Executive Officer at the
termination of successive periods of six years.
( 2) Notwithstanding anything contained
in
subsection (I) of the following
conditions shall
apply in the several cases hereinafter specified,
namely-
(a)
(b) any land or building the valuation of which
has been cancelled on the ground of i'rregularity, or which for any other reason has
no annual value assigned to it under this
Act, may be valued - by the
Executive
Officer, at any time during the currency
of the period prescribed in respect of such
land or building by sub-section ( 1) and
such valuation shall remain in force, and
the consolidated rate shall be levied
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MARTIN BURN v. CORPORATION (Sarkar, J.)
555
according to it, for the unexpired portion
of such period."
Sectiou 139 provides as follows :
"139( 1) Any person who is dissatisfied with a valuation
made under this chapter may deliver at
the
municipal office a written notice stating the
grounds of his objection to such valuation.
(2) Such notice shall be delivered within fifteen days
after the publication of the notice referred to
in s. 137, or after receipt of the notice referred
to in section 138, if such notice 1s
received
after the publication of the notice referred to in
section 13 7 :
Provided that the Executive Officer may, if
he thinks fit, extend the said period of fifteen
days to a period not exceeding one month."
Section 140 states :
"140.(1) All such objections shall be entered, in a register to be maintained for the purpose; and, on
receipt of any objection, notice shall be given to
the objector of a time and place at which his
objection will be investigated.
(2) At the said time and place the Executive Officer
or a Deputy Executive Officer shall hear the
objection, in the presence of the objector or his
agent if he appears, or may,
for
reasonable
cause, adjourn the investigation.
( 3) When the objection has been determined,
the
order passed shall be recorded in the said register, together with the date of such order."
Section 141 reads :
"141 (1) Any person dissatisfied with the order passed on
his objection may appeal to the Court of Small
Causes having jurisdiction in the place where
the land or building, to the valuation of which
the objection was made, is situated.
(2) Such appeal shall be presented to such Court
of Small Causes within thirty days from the date
of the order passed under section 140, and shall
556
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196(1] I S.C.R.
be accompanied by an extract from the register
of objections conlaining the order objected to.
(3) The provisions of Parts II and Ill of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908. rdating to appeals. shall
apply lo every appeal preferred under this section.
( 4) No appeal shall be ad,,;itlcd under thi, section
unless an objection has first been <klcrmined
under sect'on 140."
Section 142 states :
"142 (I) Every valuation made by the Executive Officer
under section 131 shal'. subject t•>
th~ provisions of sections 139, 140 and 141. be final.
(2) Every order passed by the Executive Officer or
Deputy Executive Officer under
section
140
shall, subject to the provi,ions of section 14 l, be
final.
( 3) An appeal from a decision made by the Court
of Small Causes under section 14 l shall lie to
the High Court."
Section 147 provides for the period for which the revised valuation is to continue in force.
It is to the following elTect :
"147. When the valuation of any land "r building
is revi!'Cd in consequence of an objecticn made under
section 139 or section 146. sub-secthm ( 2), or an appeal
is preferred under section 141. the reviS<:d
valuation
shall take clTcct from the quarter in which the
tirstmentioned valuation would have taken effect. and shall
continue in force for the pcrioJ for which the s::id firstmentioncd \'aluation \VJ.S
1nad.~. and no
!on~cr."'
Section 164 makes provisions for the payment of the consolidated
rate and how far the payment is alTcctcd by objections to valuation.
It states as follows :
"l 64( I ) When an objection to a valuation has hcen made
under sectinn 139. the consolidat~d rate shall.
pending the final determination of the
objecA
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(2) Ii. when the objection 11as been finally determined. the previous valuation is altered. then-
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MARTIN BURN v. CORPORATION (Sarkar, J.)
557
(a) any sum paid in excess shall tie refunded or
,allowed to be set off against any present or
future demand of the Corporation under
this Act, and
( b) any deficiency shall be deemed to be an
arrear of the consolidated rate and shall be
payable and recoverable as such :
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It is manifest from these statutory provisions that the
consequences of the revision of valuation and of cancellation of valuation are different Under s, 147 the revised valuation is to date
C back from the commencement of the period of valuation and is to
continue in force for the entire period of 6 years for which the
revaluation is to remain in force, but when a vaTuation is cancelled on the ground of an irregularity, the Executive Officer may,
at any time during the currency of the reriod of valuation, again
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value the premises under s. 131 (2) (b) and such valuation shall
be in force and the consolidated rate shall be levied according to
it only for the unexpired portion of such period.
On behalf of the appellant-company the Additional SolicitorGeneral put forward the argument that the pre;ent case £ell within the purview of s. 131 (2)(a) and as the period of revaluation
commencing from July 1, 1949 was already complete the authorities of the Calcutta Corporation have no power to make a fresh
revaluation under s. 131(2)(b) of the Act. The contrary view
was presented on behalf of the respondent-Corporation by Mr.
Viswanatha Sastri and it was contended that the present
case
falls within the purview of s. 147 of the Calcutta Municipal Act,
1923 and the revised valuation will relate back, under that section, to the commencement of the, period of valuation and will
take effect for the entire period of 6 years during which the valuation remained in force. In my opinion, the argument put fo1ward
on behalf of the respondents must be accepted as correct. ln the
present case the valuation has not been finally set aside either by
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the Presidency Small Causes Court or by the High Court in
appeal. the order of the High Court is that the valuation should
be set aside because it was not made on the basis of s. 127(a)
which was the pro;ier sub-section to be applied. The High Court
according1v set aside the valuation and has remanded the matter
h the Presidency Small Causes Court for ascertainment of the
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annual value under s. 127 (a) after allowing the parties to give
such further evidence as they choose. It is manifest that
the
valuation has not yet been finally determined; the matter is still
558
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
(1966] I S.C.R.
awanmg linal adjudication.
It is, therefore, not correct to say
that the~e has been a cancellation of the valuation within the
meaning of s. 131 (2)(b) of the Calcutta Municip;il Act, 1923.
I am on the contrary, of the opinion that the case falls under the
purview of s.