# MILLS CO., LTD v. THE STATE OF U'l'TAR PRADESH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 185
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 157 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUFTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mills-co-ltd-v-the-state-of-u-l-tar-pradesh-ors-1955
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Proposed dismissal of workmen-Pending
dispute-Permission not sought-Reference to adjudication-Validity of-U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (U. P. 28 of r947),
ss. 3 and 8-Government Order dated March IO, r948, els. 5(a), 23.
Under ss. 3 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, r947
the Governor issued an Order dated March 10, 1948, making
detailed provisions for the settlement of Industrial Disputes.
Clause 5(a) of the Government Order empowered, among others,
a recognised association of employers to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication to the Conciliation Board. Clause 23 provided that no employer shall discharge or dismiss any workman
during the pendency of an inquiry except with the written permission of ttie Regional Conciliation Officer, and cl. 26 provided
for penalties for contravention oi cl. 23. The appellant proposed
to dismiss certain workmen. Though at the time there was a
dispute pending inquiry, the appellant did not seek permission
under cl. 23 to dismiss the workmen; but the Employers' Association of Northern India made an application under cl. 5(a) to the
Board to adjudicate and give an award that the appellant was
entitled to dismi~s the workmen. The workmen contended that
the reference under cl. 5(a) was incompetent as the appellant had
not first taken proceedings under cl. 23.
Held, that the application under cl. 5(a) of the G. 0. was not
••
State of Kerala
and Ors.
v.
C. M. Francis
<>-Co.
Hidaj1atulla1' ].
1960
December xa.
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
maintainable, as the employer could not take advantage of
cl. 5(a) during the pendency of an inquiry when cl. 23 was appliTh• ]. 1'. Cotton cable. If els. 5(a) and 23 were held to apply at the same time
Spinning &
there would be disharmony as by resorting to cl. 5(a) when cl. ~3
Weaving Mills was applicable, the employers would be contravening cl. 23 and
Co., Ltd.
rendering themselves liable to the penalties under s. 26.
But
v.
there was complete harmony if it was held that cl. 5(a) applied
Th• State of
in all other cases of dismi•sal or discharge except where an
Utta' P>adesh
inquiry was pending within the meaning of cl. 23. Besides
& Ors.
cl. 23 was a special p.[OVision which prevailed over the general
provisicns in cl. 5(a).
Kanpur Mil! Mazdoor Union v. Employers' Association of
Northern India, (r952) r L.L.J. r95, approved.
De Winton v. Brecon, (r858) 28 L.J. Ch. 598, Churchill v.
Crease, (1828) 5 Bing. r77 and United States v. Chase, (1890) r35
U.'S. 255, referred to.

## Text

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
Act, both the remedies were open to the authorities,
and they could resort to any one of them at their
option.
The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the
High Court set aside. Though the respondents did
not appear, in the circumstances of the case we think
we should make an order that the costs shall be paid
by them both here and in the High Court.
Appeal allowe,d.
THE J. K. COTTON SPINNING & WEAVING
MILLS CO., LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF U'l'TAR PRADESH & ORS.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUFTA, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Proposed dismissal of workmen-Pending
dispute-Permission not sought-Reference to adjudication-Validity of-U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (U. P. 28 of r947),
ss. 3 and 8-Government Order dated March IO, r948, els. 5(a), 23.
Under ss. 3 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, r947
the Governor issued an Order dated March 10, 1948, making
detailed provisions for the settlement of Industrial Disputes.
Clause 5(a) of the Government Order empowered, among others,
a recognised association of employers to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication to the Conciliation Board. Clause 23 provided that no employer shall discharge or dismiss any workman
during the pendency of an inquiry except with the written permission of ttie Regional Conciliation Officer, and cl. 26 provided
for penalties for contravention oi cl. 23. The appellant proposed
to dismiss certain workmen. Though at the time there was a
dispute pending inquiry, the appellant did not seek permission
under cl. 23 to dismiss the workmen; but the Employers' Association of Northern India made an application under cl. 5(a) to the
Board to adjudicate and give an award that the appellant was
entitled to dismi~s the workmen. The workmen contended that
the reference under cl. 5(a) was incompetent as the appellant had
not first taken proceedings under cl. 23.
Held, that the application under cl. 5(a) of the G. 0. was not
••
State of Kerala
and Ors.
v.
C. M. Francis
<>-Co.
Hidaj1atulla1' ].
1960
December xa.
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
maintainable, as the employer could not take advantage of
cl. 5(a) during the pendency of an inquiry when cl. 23 was appliTh• ]. 1'. Cotton cable. If els. 5(a) and 23 were held to apply at the same time
Spinning &
there would be disharmony as by resorting to cl. 5(a) when cl. ~3
Weaving Mills was applicable, the employers would be contravening cl. 23 and
Co., Ltd.
rendering themselves liable to the penalties under s. 26.
But
v.
there was complete harmony if it was held that cl. 5(a) applied
Th• State of
in all other cases of dismi•sal or discharge except where an
Utta' P>adesh
inquiry was pending within the meaning of cl. 23. Besides
& Ors.
cl. 23 was a special p.[OVision which prevailed over the general
provisicns in cl. 5(a).
Kanpur Mil! Mazdoor Union v. Employers' Association of
Northern India, (r952) r L.L.J. r95, approved.
De Winton v. Brecon, (r858) 28 L.J. Ch. 598, Churchill v.
Crease, (1828) 5 Bing. r77 and United States v. Chase, (1890) r35
U.'S. 255, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
157 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 5, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court in Special
Appeal.No. 205 of 1954
and
Civil Appeal No. 158 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated January 15, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Allahabad, in Appeal No. Cal.
47of1951.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and G. C.
Mathur, for the appellant.
M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondent No. 5 (In C. A.
No. 157/1959) ..
C. P. Lal, fcir the State of U. P. and Respondents
Nos. 2 and 4 (lit C. A. No. 157/59).
0. P. Verma, for respondent No. 5 (in C. A. No.
158/59).
1960. December 12.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Das Gupta J.
DAS GUPTA, J.-These two appeals r.aise the question of the maintainability of au application made by
the Employers' Association of Northern India, Kanpur on behalf of the J. K. Cotton and Weaving Mills
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
Co., Ltd., a member of the Association in connection
1960
with the prol?osed termination of service of certain T.he f. ~-:Cotton
members of its Watch and Ward Staff. But before
Spinning &
we come to the consideration of this question it is
Weaving Mills
necessary to indicate in brief the long and tortuous
Co., Ltd.
path this matter has travelled before coming to us.
v,
The application of the Employers' Association pur- J,::,, ~:~~;{h
ported to be under clause 5{a) of the Government
& 0 ,,.
order dated March 10, 1948, as amended by a later
order of May 15, 1948.
This order was issued by the
Das Gupta J.
Governor of the United Provinces in exercise of
the powers conferred on him by cl. (b), (c), {d) and {g)
of section 3 and by s. 8 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The application after stating that a
number of thefts of Dhoties had taken place in the
Mill further stated that it was obvious to the management of the J. K. Cotton Spinning and W"eaving Mills
Co., Ltd., that this state of affairs could not exist and
continue if Watch and Ward staff were carrying out
their duties vigilantly, correctly and honestly.
It
stated further that the management having lost confidence in the honesty of the Watch and Ward Staff
had decided to terminate the services of all the persons of the Watch and Ward Staff and to recruit fresh
men from the employment exchange and that in lieu
of notice of termination of service the management
would pay to these persons 12 days' wages in accordance with Standing Order No. 17A. The prayer
made in the application was that "the Board be
pleas~d to record the award entitling the J. K. Cotton
and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd., to terminate the services
of all the members of the Watch and Ward Staff
whose names appear in Annexure A". During the
pendency of the application before the Board the
applicant withdrew its prayer as regards 5 of the
workmen.
As regards the remaining workmen, after
rejecting the preliminary objection raised on their
behalf that the Board had no jurisdiction to entertain
the application, the Board held that "it would not be
in the interests of either party or in the interest of
industry to allow the remaining 27 sepoys to continue
in the employment of the Mills" and the Board
188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
19oo
accordingly made the award permitting the appel·
-
lants to terminate the services of these 27 sepoys after
The].K. Cotton
; •
th
t"
tth
t
t
th "tSpinning 6
g1vm_g
emhcc·mdpensaf'~~
1
n a
e rda es se ou . y 1,,
weaving Mills sta.rtmg wit 15 ays w wages an compensat10n ior
Co., Ltd.
those with one vear of service with additional amount
v.
of compensation on a graduated scale for longer periods
The State 0!
of service. Against this order both the parties a.ppealUttar Pradesh
d
1 C
Th
d
'"" Ors.
ed to the In ustria
ourt.
at court agree with
Board's conclusion on the question of jurisdiction but
Das Gupta f. pointed out that the "procedure adopted by the employers association was defective inasmuch as the
mills did not apply to the Regional Conciliation Officer
to discharge the sepoys in question". On merits the
court held that the evidence justified the conclusion of
the Board that the management had lost confidence
in the members of the Watch and Ward Staff and
that having regard to the Standing Orders their ser.
vices should be terminated in accordance with the
Standing Orders. It accordingly directed in modifica.
tion of the order made by the Board "that the services of the 27 sepoys in question be terminated in
accordance with the Standing Orders and that they
would not be paid extra compensation as directed by
the Board."
The workmen then appealed to the
Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. The appellate
tribunal held relying on an earlier decision of its own
in Kanpur Mill Mazdoor Union v. Employers' Associa.
tion of Northern India (1) that the application under
cl. 5(a) of the Government Order was not maintain.
able. Accordingly it allowed the appeal and set aside
the award of the Board as well as the Industrial
Court.
J. K. Cotton and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd., thereupon filed an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari
calling for the records of the case from the Labour
Appellate Tribunal of India. and qua~hing the order
of the Tribunal which has· been mentioned above.
Mr. Justice Chaturvedi, before whom this application
came up for hearing held that the application under
(1) (1952) I L.L.J • 195.
3 B.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
cl. 5(a) was maintainable and the Appellate Tribu.
'960
nal had erred in holding otherwise. Bei.ng however Th• J. K. Cotto•
of opinion that there had been undue delay in making
spinning c;.
this application for a writ, he dismissed the petition Wca.ving Mills
on that ground. In the Letters Patent appeal preferco., L<d.
red by the company against this decision a prelimiv.
h U .
The Sfale of
nary objection was raised on behalf of t e
mon Ullar Pradosh
representing the workmen that the Allahabad High
.s. ors.
Court could not call for the records and quash tLe
order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India as Das Gupta J.
those records were in Calcutta and consequently
beyond the reach of the Court. The learned Judges
who hes.rd the appeal upheld this objection and dismissed the appeal. They however issued a certificate
under Art. 132(1) and Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitu.
tion. Thereafter the company also obtained special
leave from this Court to appeal directly against the
order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India.
These two appeals preferred-one on the certificate
granted by the High Court and the other on the
strength of the special leave granted by this Court,
have been heard together.
The main controversy, as already indicated, is on
the question of the maintainability of the application
under cl. 5(a) of the Government order. This order
issued by the Governor of the United Provinces in
exercise of the powers conferred on him by the U. P.
Industrial Disputes Act, Hl4 7 contains detailed provisions as regards the settlement of industrial disputes. The first clause provides for the constitution
of Conciliation Boards consisting of three members.
Clause 2 provides for the appointment of conciliation
officers for specified areas. Clause 5 contains the
important provisions as to commencement of proceedings before the Boards. It provides two ways of
starting these proceedings: one mentioned in cl. (b) is
by an order made in writing by"the Provincial Government for enquiring into a matter in respect of which
an industrial dispute has arisen or is likely to arise.
The other method is by means of an application by
an employee or recognised association of employers
or registered trade union of workers or where there is
190
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
' 960
no such registered trade union the representatives not
The J. K. Cotton more than five in .number duly elected by a majority
spinning s.
of the workmen in the industry. Any of these may
Weaving Mills by an application in writing move the Board to inCo., Lid.
quire into an industrial dispute. This provision is in
v.
cl. 5(a) which may be set out in full:-
The State of
uuar Pradesh
"5(a). Any employee or recognised association
s. ors.
of employers or registered Trade Union of workmen
or, where no registered trade union of workmen
Das Gupta J.
exists in any particular concern or industry, the representatives not more than five in number of the
workmen in such concern or industry duly elected
in this behalf by a majority of the workmen, in
such concern or industry as the case may be, at a
meeting held for the purpose, may by application
in writing move the Board to enquire into any
industrial dispute. The a pplica ti on shall clearly
state the industrial dispute or disputes which are to
be the subject of such inquiry."
Clause 10 provides for the constitution of industrial
courts for specified areas. Clause 12 provides for
appeals to this Court against the awards made by the
Board. The other clauses up to clause 22 deal with
the powers and procedure of the Board or the Industrial Court and with the duties of employers to permit
certain meetings to be held. Then comes cl. 23 which
is in these words:-
"Save with the written permission of the Regional Conciliation Officer or the Additional Regional
Conciliation Officer concerned,. irrespective of the
fa.ct w he th er an inquiry is pending before a Regio•
nal Conciliation Board or the Provincial ConciJia.
tion Board or an appeal is pending before the Indus·
trial Court, no employer, his agent or manager,
shall during the continuance of an inquiry or
appeal, discharge or .dismiss any workman."
Section 24 provides that every order made or direction
issued under the provisions of this Government order
shall be final and conclusive. Clause 26 provides for
penalties for contravention or an attempt to contravene any of the provisions of the order.
A consideration of the scheme of this legislation
3 S.C.R. StJPREME COURT REPORTS
191
makes it clear that while two modes are provided in
1960
clauses 5(a) and 5(b) for the commencement of proceed. Th 7c
ings fo: settlem.e':1t ~f indust:ial disputes gene~ally,
;j;~.i~g
0
~.
0
•
a special prov1s10n is made m clause 23 that if :er. weaving Mills
enquiry is proceeding before a Regional Conciliation
co .. Ltd.
Board or the Provincial Conciliation Board or an
v.
appeal is pending before the Industrial Court, no
Th• Stat• 01
b
Uttar Pradesh
workman shall e discharged except with the wrhteli
.,. o.s.
permission of the Regional Conciliation Officer or the
Additional Conciliation Officer concerned. The conE8·
Das Gupta J.
quence in cl. 26 is that if any workman is discharged
or dismissed during the continuance of such enquiry
or appeal without such permission the employer shall
be liable to fine or to imprisonment not exceedi11g
three years or both. The heavy punishment provided
for contravention of the order shows the importance
attached by the legislating authority to the ciirections
given by the Order.
In deciding whether an application uncier cl. 5(a)
was maintainable in the facts of the present case two
questions arise for consideration. The first is whr,ther
an industrial dispute comes into existence a.s soon as
an employer decides on the dismissal of some of the
workmen and proposes to give effect to such decision.
One view is that it is only the party aggrieved by the
proposed dismissal, in other words, the workmen, who
by objecting to the same can raise the dispute and
that the employer cannot by his own proposal to dismiss the workmen be heard to say that a dispute had
come into existence even before the workmen had a
chance to object to the dismissal. The contrary view
which has found favour with Mr. Justice Chaturvedi
of the High Court is that even at the stage the employer proposes to dismiss his workmen it is a case
of contemplated non-employment which will come
within the expression "industrial dispute". The other
question is whether the provisions of cl. 23 of the
order bar an application under cl. 5(a) during the continuance of any enquiry before the Regional Conciliation Board or the Additional Conciliation Board or
-during the pendency of the appeal before the Industrial Court. There is no dispute that on June 131
192
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1960
1950 when the application under clause 5(a) was made
Th• 1.-;:Cotton an inquiry was in fact pending before a Conciliation
spinning .,,.
Officer. It appears that on July 9, 1949 the GoverWeoving Mills nor of the United Provinces made an order directing
co., Ltd.
the Labour Commissioner of the United Provinces or
v.
a Conciliation Officer nominated by him in this behalf
Th• State of to re-start the adjudication proceedings between the
Uttar Ptadesh
c·Ors.
J. K. Cotton & Weaving Mills Co., and S. N. Shukla,
a dismissed employee of the concern. The AdjudicaDas G .. pta J. tor was directed to conclude the adjudication and
submit his award by August 15, 1949. The time wa.s
extended by subsequent orders-first to November 15,
1949 and then to March 31, 1950, again to June 30,
1950 and thereafter to September 30, 1950. It is true
that at the time these orders extending time for
submission of award were made the Governor had
no authority to make these orders and these orders
were invalid. They were validated by the provisions
of s. 3 of the U.P. Act XXIII of 1953. In view of
this position of the law the learned Attorney-General
has not disputed that on June 13, 1950 when the
application under cl. 5(a) was made an enquiry was
actually pending before a Conciliation Officer. Con-
~uently, before the management could make any
order discharging or dismissing any of its workmen it
was required by cl. 23 to obtain permission for the
same from the Regional Conciliation Officer. The
question is whether in spite of this provision in ol. 23
the employer could make and the Board entertain a.n
application under cl. 5(a) on this question of proposed
dismissal.
We propose to consider this question first and for
that purpose assume that an industrial dispute comes
into existence as soon as the employer decides to dismiss his workmen and proposes to do so and that
ordinarily he can make an application in such a dispute to the Boa.rd under the provisions of cl. 5(a). If
such application is decided against the employer and
no permission is given to make the proposed dismissal,
no difficulty arises. What however is the position .if
on such an application the Boa.rd makes an order
8ra.nting the employer the requisite permillsion to
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
193
dismiss his workmen? Under cl. 24 this order unless
x96o
modified iu appeal will be final and conclusive and Th
-;:-c
shall not be questioned by any party thereto. So far
;j;~.;~g o;:,
0
•
as the workmen are concerned they will not be able to weaving Mills
dispute the correctness of the order except in the
co., Ltd.
mode provided in the Government order itself. What
v.
however is the position of the employer if in pursuance
The State of
f
Uttar Pradesh
o 'the order made on his application under cl. 5(a)
&- Ors.
he discharges or dismisses his workmen? By doing so
he will have clearly contravened the provisions of Das Gupta J.
cl. 23, and will become liable to the severe penalty
provided in cl. 26-a penalty which might even
extend to imprisonment up to three years.
To remove this incongruity, says the learned
Attorney-General, apply the r:ile of harmonious construction and hold that cl. 23 of the order has no
application when an order is made on an application
under cl. 5(a). On the assumption that under cl. 5(a)
an employer can raise a dispute sought to be created
by his own proposed order of dismissal of workmen
there is clearly this disharmony as pointed out above
between two provisions, viz., cl. 5(a) and cl. 23; and
undoubtedly we have to apply the rule of harmonious
construction. In applying the rule however we have
to remember that to harmonise is not to destroy. In
the interpretation of statutes the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof
for a purpose and the legislative intention is that
every part of the statute should have effect. These
presumptions will have to be made in the case of rule
making authority also. On the construction suggested
by the learned Attorney-General it is obvious that by
merely making an application under cl. (5) on the
allegation that a. dispute has arisen a.bout the proposed action to dismiss workmen the employer can in
every case escape the requirements of cl. 23 and if for
one reason or other every employer when proposing a.
dismissal prefers to proceed under cl. 5(a) instead of
ma.king an application under cl. 23, cl. 23 will be a.
dead letter. A construction like this which defeats
the intention of the rule ma.king authority in cl. 23
must, if possible, be avoided.
•5
194
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1S61]
'960
It is hardly necessary to mention that. this rule in
ne J. K. Cotton cl. 23 was made with a definite purpose. The provispinning &-
sion here is very similar to d. 33 of the Industrial
Weaving Mills Disputes Act before its amendment, though there are
Co .• Ltd.
some differences. It is easy to see however that the
v.
rule making authority in making this rule was
The State of
Ut1ar Pradesh anxious to prevent as far as possible the recrudescense
&- Ors.
of fresh disputes between employers and workmen
when some dispute was already pending and that
Das Gupta J. purpose will be directly defeated if a fresh dispute is
allowed to be raised under cl. 5(a) in the very cases
where cl. 23 in terms applies.
There will be complete harmony however if we hold
instead that cl. 5(a) will apply in all other cases of
proposed dismissal or discharge except where an
inquiry is pending within the meaning of cl. 23. We
reach the· same result by applying another well known
rule of construction that general provisions yield to
special provisions. The learned Attorney-General
seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction
is applicable to resolve the conflict between the general
provision in one Act and the special provision in
another A?t, the rule cannot apply in resolving a conflict between general and special provisions in the
same legislative instrument. This suggestion does not
find support in either principle or authority. The rule
that general provisions should. yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers
and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person
gives two directions one covering a large number of
matters in general and another to only some of them
his intention is that these latter directions should
prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest
the earlier direction should have effect. In Pretty v.
So'tly (') (quoted in Craies on Statute Law at p .. 205,
5th Edition) Romilly, M.R. mentioned the rule thus:-
"The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and
the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense,
would overrule the former, the particular enactment
\.1) (1859) 26 Beav. 6o6, 610.
.. --.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
195
must be operative, and the general enactment must be
r96o
taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to Th 1
K c 11
which it may properly apply". The rule has been
;pi~ni~g ~on
applied as between different provisions of the same weaving Mills
statute in numerc!1s cases some of which ouly need be
Co., Ltd.
mentioned: De
Winton v. Brecon (1), Churchill v.
v.
Grease (2), United States v. Chase(') and Carroll v.
u~::, 5';:;;!,h
Greenwich Irie. Oo. (').
& 0 15•
Applying this rule of construction that in cases of
conflict between a specific provision and a general proDas Gupta J.
vision the specific provision prevails over the general
provision and the general provision applies only to
such cases which are not covered by the special provision, we must hold that cl. 5(a) has no application in
a case where the special provisions of cl. 23 are
applicable.
As in the present case an inquiry was in fact pending before a Conciliation Officer, cl. 23 a pp lied in
respect of any discharge or dismissal of a workman
and the employer could not take advantage of cl. 5(a)
of the Government Order and such an application
could not in law be entertained by the Board.
In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary for us
to consider the other question that was raised, viz.,
whether an industrial dispute within the meaning of
cl. 5(a) comes into existence as soon as an employer
decides on the dismissal of some of its workmen and
proposes to give effect to such a decision .
On the above conclusions we hold that the Labour
Appellate Tribunal of India rightly held that the
application under cl. 5(a) filed on June 13, 1950 was
not maintainable and rightly set aside the awards of
the Conciliation Board and the Industrial Court. The
appeal against the order of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal of India is therefore dismissed.
As we have already pointed out above the order
made by the appellate Bench of the High Court in
the writ petition was based on its acceptance of the
preliminary objection that the records of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal being in Calcutta could not be
(1) (1858) 28 L.J. Ch. 59 ..
(3) (1890):135 U.S. 255.
(2) (1828) 5 Bing. 177·
(4) (1905) 199 U.S. 401.
196
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
z96o
reached by any writ of the Allahabad High Court. In
-
view of our conclusion that the application under
Ths J. K. Cotton 1 5(. )
t
• t . bl
th
J]
t
spinnin
&
c. a was no mam ama e,
e appe an was on
Weaving ~ills merits not entitled to any writ and on that ground the
co., Ltd.
appeal against the High Court's order must also be
v.
dismissed.
The State 01
It is unnecessary to consider the question whether
Uttar Pt'adesh
& ors.
the High Court was right in its view as regards the
preliminary objection and we express no opinion on
Das Gupta J. the same.
December ra.
Both the appeals are accordingly dismissed with
costs to the contesting respondent, There will be one
set of hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.
RAM PRASAD VISHWAKARMA
v.
THE CHAIRMAN, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
(P. B. G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR, K. N. W .ANCHOO and
K. C. D.As GUPTA, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Dismissal of workman-Industrial Dispute raised by union-Representation of workman before TribunalIndustrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), ss. 2(k), 36.
On the termination of the appellant's services by his
employer an industrial dispute was raised by his union and
the question of his dismissal along with a number of other disputes was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. After several
adjournments of the case the management and the union filed
a joint petition of compromise settling all the points in dispute
out of Court. Prior to this the appellant filed an application
praying that he might be allowed to be represented by two of
his co-workers instead of the Secretary of the Union in whom
he had no faith and who had no authority to enter into the compromise on his behalf. This prayer was not allowed by the
Tribunal which made an award in terms of the compromise.
The appellant. thereupon, made an application to the High Court
praying for a writ quashing the order of the Tribunal disallowing him to be represented by a person of his own choice and