# MILLS LTD v. KUSHAL BHAN

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 227
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958-05-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 88 of 1959
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mills-ltd-v-kushal-bhan-1575
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Industrial, Dispute-Dismissal of employees by enquiry committee pending trial in Criminal Court-Subsequent acquittal of the
employee-Jurisdiction of Tribunal, to refuse approval of dismissalIndustrial Disputes Act, r947 (XIV of r947), s. 33(2), proviso.
The appellant company served a charge-sheet on the respondent who was one of its employees alleging that he had stolen
the cycle of the company's Head Clerk, A criminal case relating
March xo.
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r960
to the theft was pending against him then. He was asked to
sho\v cause \vhy he should not be dismissed for misconduct, and
Delhi Cloth &
as his explanation was unsatisfactory a certain date \Vas fixed for
General Mills Led. enquiry. The respondent appeared before the enquiry committee
v.
but refused to participate in the enquiry by answering questions
Kushal Bhan
put to him as he did not want to produce any defence till the
matter was decided by the Court. The company, however, after
completing the enquiry directed the dismissal of the respondent
on the ground that misconduct had been proved against him.
The company thereafter made an application under s. 33(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act to the Industrial Tribunal for approval
of the disciplinary action taken against the respondent.
In the
meantime the respondent was acquitted by the Criminal Court.
The judgment of the Criminal Court was produced before the
tribunal which refused to approve the order of dismissal of the
respondent. On appeal by the company by special leave :
Held, that the principles of natural justice do not require
that an employer must wait for the decision of the Criminal Trial
Court before taking disciplinary action against an employee.
Shri Bi1nal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs. N ewsrrian' s Printing
Works, (r956) L.A.C. r88, approved.
If a case is of a grave nature involving questions of fact and
law which are not simple it would be advisable for the employer
to await the decision of the Criminal Trial Court but in a simple
case like the present the tribunal erred in not granting approval
under s. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

## Text

-
...
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
cancel. the decree in regard to the properties covered
x960
by the certificate. Section 10 provides, inter alia, " 11
d
h
h
.
h 11
h
C JI
h
b
, e appagou a
t at w en it s a
appear to t e
o ector t at y ShankargoudaPatil
virtue of, or in execution of, a decree or order of any
v.
court any watan or any part thereof, or any of the
Basangouda
·
profits thereof, recorded as such in the revenue records Shiddangouda Patil
or registered under this Act, and assigned under s. 23 G .
-
as remuneration of an officiator has or have, after the aJendragadkar f .
. date of this Act coming into force, passed or may pass
without the sanction of the State Government into
the ownership or beneficial possession of any person
other than the officiator for the time being, the court
shall, on receipt of a certificate under the hand and
seal of the Collector, stating the particulars mentioned
in the section, cancel the decree or order complained
of so far as it concerns the said watan or any part
thereof. The only objection against the validity of
the certificate is that it has been addressed to a wrong
court. Since we have overruled that objection it
follows that that portion of the decree which concerns
the watan properties must be cancelled.
In the result the petition is allowed and the decree
in question in so far as it purports to operate on or
include any right to the office of Patilki and watan
lands attached thereto at Kirtgeri as enumerated in
the certificate is cancelled. Under the circumstances
of this case there will be no order as to costs.
Petition allowed.
THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL
MILLS LTD.
v.
KUSHAL BHAN
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Industrial, Dispute-Dismissal of employees by enquiry committee pending trial in Criminal Court-Subsequent acquittal of the
employee-Jurisdiction of Tribunal, to refuse approval of dismissalIndustrial Disputes Act, r947 (XIV of r947), s. 33(2), proviso.
The appellant company served a charge-sheet on the respondent who was one of its employees alleging that he had stolen
the cycle of the company's Head Clerk, A criminal case relating
March xo.
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r960
to the theft was pending against him then. He was asked to
sho\v cause \vhy he should not be dismissed for misconduct, and
Delhi Cloth &
as his explanation was unsatisfactory a certain date \Vas fixed for
General Mills Led. enquiry. The respondent appeared before the enquiry committee
v.
but refused to participate in the enquiry by answering questions
Kushal Bhan
put to him as he did not want to produce any defence till the
matter was decided by the Court. The company, however, after
completing the enquiry directed the dismissal of the respondent
on the ground that misconduct had been proved against him.
The company thereafter made an application under s. 33(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act to the Industrial Tribunal for approval
of the disciplinary action taken against the respondent.
In the
meantime the respondent was acquitted by the Criminal Court.
The judgment of the Criminal Court was produced before the
tribunal which refused to approve the order of dismissal of the
respondent. On appeal by the company by special leave :
Held, that the principles of natural justice do not require
that an employer must wait for the decision of the Criminal Trial
Court before taking disciplinary action against an employee.
Shri Bi1nal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs. N ewsrrian' s Printing
Works, (r956) L.A.C. r88, approved.
If a case is of a grave nature involving questions of fact and
law which are not simple it would be advisable for the employer
to await the decision of the Criminal Trial Court but in a simple
case like the present the tribunal erred in not granting approval
under s. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 88 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 6, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal,
Delhi, in 0. P. No. 54 of 1958.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, S. N.
Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and
P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.
Janardan Sharma, for the respondent.
1960. March 10. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Wanchoo J.
W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave in
an industrial matter. The appellant is a company
carrying on the manufacture of textiles. The respondent Kushal Bhan was in the employ of the company
as a peon. It appears tha.t the cycle of Ram Chandra,
Head Clerk of the Folding Department was stolen on
August 24, 1957. The matter was reported to the
police. Sometime later, the cycle was recovered from
the railway station cycle stand at the instance of the
respondent who took the police there and picked out
-
,.
-
·-I
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
the stolen cycle from among 50/60 cycles standing
z960
there. This matter was apparently brought to the
D lh' cz h
notice of the company in October 1957 and thereupon Gene:a/.u;~;s 'i.'ta.
a charge-sheet was served on the respondent to the
v.
effect that he had stolen the cycle of Ram Chandra,
Kushal Bhan
Head Clerk, that it had been recovered at his instance
and that a criminal case was pending against him with
Wanchoo J.
the police.
He was asked to show cause why he
should not be dismissed for misconduct. The respondent submitted his explanation on October 13, 1957.
As his explanation was unsatisfactory, November 14,
1957, was fixed for enquiry. The respondent appeared
before the enquiry committee but stated that as the
case was pending against him, he did not want to
produce any defence till the matter was decided by
the court. He further stated that he did not want to
take part in the enquiry and was not prepared to give
any answers to questions put to him. When questions
were put to him at the enquiry he refused to answer
them and eventually he left the place. The company,
however, completed the enquiry and directed the
dismissal of the respondent on the ground that the
misconduct had been proved against him. Thereafter
·an application was made under s. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947, by the company to
t.he tribunal for approval of the action taken against
the respondent. The matter came before the tribunal
on May 6, 1958. In the meantime, the respondent
had been acquitted by the criminal court on April 8,
1958, on the ground that the case against him was
not free from doubt. The copy of the judgme_nt of
the criminal court was produced before the tribunal
and it refused to approve the order of dismissal. The
company thereupon applied for special leave to this
Court resulting in the present appeal.
The main contention on behalf of the appellantcompany is that the company was not bound to wait
for the result of the trial in the criminal court and
that it could, and did, hold a fair enquiry against the
respondent, and if the respondent refused to partici·
pate in it and left the place where the enquiry was
being held, the company could do no more th~n to
complete it and come to such conclusion as was
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
z960
possible on the evidence before it. Learned counsel
-. -
for the respondent, on the other hand, urges that
Dell" Cfo;h 'f: d principles of natural justice require that an employer
General Mil' ' • should wait at least for the decision of the criminal
v.
Ku,hal Bhan
trial court before taking disciplinary action, and that
inasmuch as the employer did not do so in this case
Wanchoo J.
the employee was justified in not taking part in the
disciplinary proceedings which dealt with the very
same matter which was the subject-matter of trial in
the criminal court.
It is true that very often employers stay enquiries
pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and
that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of
natural justice require that an employer must wait
for the decision at least of the criminal trial court
before taking action against an employee. In Shri
Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs. Newsman's Printing Works('), this was the view taken by the Labour
Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if
the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of
fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the
trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the
criminal case may not be prejudiced.
The present,
however, is a case of a very simple nature and so the
employer cannot be blamed for the course adopted by
him. In the circumstances, there was in our opinion
no failure of natural justice. in this case and if the
respondent did not choose to take part in the enquiry
no fault can be found with that enquiry. We are of
opinion that this was a case in which the tribunal
patently erred in not granting approval under s. 33(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act. Besides it is apparent
that in making the order under appeal, the tribunal
has completely lost sight of the limits of its jurisdiction under s. 33(2).
We therefore allow the appeal
and setting aside the order of the tribunal grant
approval to the order of the appellant dismissing the
respondent. In the circumstances we pass no order
as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
\1) \1956) L.A.C. 188.