# MINERVA MILLS· I:.TD. & ORS v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS - **Citation:** [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1980-07-31 - **Bench:** Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. Bhagwati, A. c. GUPTA, N. Luntwalia, P. S. Kailasam - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/minerva-mills-i-td-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-8080 - **Pages:** 137 ## Headnote Constttution of India Forty Second Amendment Act, Sections 4 and 55Whether the Sections are beyond' t/ie amending· power of' the· Parliament under· Article 368 of the Constitution and· therefore void-Whether the Directive Pri11ciples of State policy contai11ed in Part iv· of the ConJtitutio11 ca11 have primacy over the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Co11stitution-Consti- · tutio11 of India A.rtlcles 14, 19, 31C, 38 and 368: Minerva Mills Ltd. is a limited company dealing in textiles. On August 20, 1970 the Central Government appointed a committee under section 15 0rthe Industries (Development Regufation) Act, 1951' to make a fiill and complete-- investigation of the affairs of the Minerva Mills Ltd. as it was of the opinion that there had been or was likely to be substantial' fall' in the ·volume of pro-- duction·. The said Committee submitted its report to the Central Goverament in January 1971, on the basis of which the Central Government passed an order dated October 19, 1971 under section 18A of the 1951' Act, authorising_c the National Textile Corporation Ltd., to take over the management of the Mills on the ground that its affairs are being managed iii a· manner highly detrimental to public interest. This undertaking was nationalised and taken over by the Central Government under the provisions of the Sfck Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974'. The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the· Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974 and o,f the· order dated O~tober 19, 1971, the constitutionality-- of the Constitution (Thirty Ninth Amen~ment) Act which inserted the impugned Nationalisation Act as Entry 105 in. the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, the validity of Article 31B of the Constitution and finally the constitutionality-- of sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976. on the ratio of the majority judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's case, namely, though by Article 368 of the Constitution Parliament is given the power to· amend the Constitution, that power cannot be exercised SQ as to damage the .. basic features of the Constitution or so as to destroy its basic structure. Opining that sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act are void and beyond the amending power of the Parliament the· Court by majority (Per Chandrachud. C.J .. on behalf of himself, A. C. Gupta. N. L. Untwalia & P. S. Kailasam, JJ.)· · HELD: (1) The newly introduced clause 5 of' Article 368 transgresses" , the limitations on the amending power of Parliament and· is hence unconstitu- ·~ tional. It demolishes the very pillars on which the preamble rests by ~mpowering the Parliament to exercise its constituent power without any "limitation what-- ever". No constituent power can conceivably go higher than the sky-high power conferred by clause (5), for it even empowers the Parliament to "repeal" the provisions of this Constitution", t!iat' is· to· say, to' abrogate· the democracr .1 MINERVA MILLS LTD. V. UNION 207 ·,and substitute for it a totally antithetical form of Government. That can most A ·vhich the petitioners are aggrievetl. [248C, E·G] / A B c D E F G H \ 208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] l S.C.R;. Besides, there .is no constitutional or statutory inhiliition against the deci-- sion of questions before they actually arise for consideration. Here, in view· of the importance of the question raised and in view of the fact that the question has been raised in many a petition, it is e~pedient in the interest of Justice to settle the true position. Secondly, what the· court is dealing with is not· an ordinary law which may or may not be· pas!ICd so that it could be said' that the court's jurisdiction i~ being invoked on the hypothetical consideration that a law may be passed in future which will injure the rights of the petitioners. What the court is dealing with is a constitutional amendment which. has been brought into operation and which, of its own force, permits the violaiion of certain freedoms through laws passed .for ·certain purposes. (2480, 249A·- B] Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrew w,· Mellon, 67 Lawyers' Edi·· tion, 1078, 1084; George Ashwander .v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 80 Lawyers' Edition, 688, 71 I, quoted With approval.. · (4) The answer to the question whether in view of the majority decision in Kesavl(Jnanda Bharati it is permissibl~ to the Parliament to so amend the Con-· stitution as to give a position of precedence to directive principles over tho fundamental rights, must necessarily depend upon whether Articles 14 and 19, which must now give way to laws passed in order to effectuate the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles of Directive· Policy, are essential features of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is only if thorights conferred by these two articles are not a part of the basic structure of· the Constitution that they can be allowed to be abrogated by a constitutional amendment. Jf they are a part of the basic structure; they cannot be obliterated' out of existence in relation to a category of laws described in Article 31C or, for the matter of that, in relation to laws of any description whatsoever, passed in order to achieve any object or policy whatsoever. This will serve to bring out the point that a \otal emasculation of the essential features oflthe Constitution is, by the ratio in Keshavananda Bharati, not permissible to-' the Parliament. [249E-Hi:J (5) The importance of Directive Principles in the scheme of our Constitution cannot ever be over-emphasized. Those principles project the high ideal which the Constitution aims to achieve. In fact Dire.ctive· Principles of· State Policy are fundamental in governance of the country and there is no· sphere of public life where delay can defeat justice with more telling effect than the one in which the common man seeks the realisation of his aspirations. But to destroy the guarantees given by Part III in order purportedly to achieve the goals of Part IV is plainly to subvert the Constitution by destroying its basic structure. Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the Jive~· of civilized societies and have been variously described as "transcendental"; "inalienable" and "primordial" and as said in Kesavananda Bharati they con·- stitute the ark of the Constitution. [250B-C, 254H, 255AJ The significance; of the perception that Parts III and IV together consti-- tute the core of commitment to social revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution is to be traced to a deep understanding of the· scheme of the Indian Constitution. Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no Jess important than the other. Snap one and the other will' Jose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for achieving the social revo-- lution, which is the ideal which the visionary founders of the Constitution set r l MINERVA MILLS LTD. v. UNION / 209 before tl)emselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution i~ founded on the A bed-rock of the balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. [255B-D] The edifice of Indian Constituti0n is built upon the concepts crystallized in the Preamble. Having resolved to constitute ourselves into a Socialist State which carried with it the obligation to secure to our. people justice-social, economic and political, Part IV has been put into our Constitution containing. directive principles of State Policy which specify the socialistic goal to be achieved. Having promised the people a democratic polity which carries with it the obligation of securing to the people liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, equality of status and of opportunity and the assurance that the dignity of the individual will :it all costs be prese.rved, Part III has been put in our Constitution conferring those rights on the people. Those rights are not an end in themselves but are the means to an end. The end is specified in Part IV. Therefore, the rights conferred by Part III are subject to reasonable restrictions and the Constitution provides that enforcement of some of them may, in stated uncommon circumstances, be suspended. But just as the rights conferred by Part III would be without a radar and a compass if they were not geared to an ideal, in the same manner the attainment of the ideals set out in Part IV would become a pretence for tyranny if the ·price to be paid for achieving that ideal is human freedoms. One of the faiths of our founding fathers was the purity of means. The goals set out in Part IV have, therefore, to be achieved Without the abrogation Of the means' provided for ·by Part III. It is in this sense that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution · and cmnbine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic structure of our Constitution. [253D-H, 256A-B] {SA) On any reasonable interpretation, there can be no doubt that by the amendment introduced by section 4 of the Forty Second Amendment, Articles, 14 and 19 stand abrogated at least in regard to the category of laws described in Article 3JC. The startling consequence Which the amendment has produced is that even if a law is in total defiance of the mandate of Article 13 read with Articles 14 and 19, its validity will not be open to question so long as its object is to secure a directive principle of State Policy. [256D-E] (6) No doubt, it is possible to concejve of laws which will not attract Article 3 lC, since they may not bear direct and reasonable nexus with the provisions of Part IV. However, a large majority of laws, the bulk of them, can at any rate be easily justified as having been passed for the purpose of givin.g effect to the policy of the State towards securing some ptinciple or the B c D E F other laid down in Part IV. In respect of all such laws, which will cover an G extensive gamut of the relevant legislative activity, the protection of Articles 14 and 19 will stand wholly withdrawn. It is then no answer to say, while dete~mining whether the basic structure of the Constitution is altered, that at least some laws will fall outside the scope of Article 31C. [2S6E-H] (7) A total deprivation of fundamental rights, even in a limited area, can amount to abrogation of a fundamental right just as partial deprivation in every area can. The fact, therefore that some laws may fall outside the scope of H Article 31.C is no answer to the contention that the withdrawal of protection of Articles 14 and 19 .from a large number of laws destroys ihe basic structure of the Constitution. · [2S6H, 257 A-B] · 210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981} 1 S.C.R. A (8) Article 38 provides that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order i.n which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life. It is not correct that a]] the Directive .Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV eventually verge upon Article 38. Article 38 undoubtedly contains a broad guideline, but the other Directive Principles are not mere illustrations of the principle contained in Article 38. Secondly, B if it be true that no law passed for the· purpose of giving effect to the Directive Principle in Article 38 can damage or destroy the basic structure of the Con- 1 stitution, there was no necessity and more so the justification, for providing by a Constitutional amendment that no law which is passed for giving effect. to the policy of the State towards securing any principle laid down in Patt IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes c D E F G H away or abridges the rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19. [257C-F] The object and purpose of the amendment of Article 31C is really to save Jaws which cannot be saved under Article 19(2) to (6). Laws which fall under those provisions are in the nature of reasonable restrictions o~ the fundamental rights in public interest and therefore they abridge but do not abrogate the fundamental rights. It was in order to deal with laws which do not get the protection of Article 19(2) to (6) that Article 31C was amended to say that the provisions of Article 19, inter alia cannot be invoked for voiding the laws of the description mentioned in Article 31C. [257F-G] (9) Articles 14 and 19 do not confer any fanciful rights. They confer rights which are elementary for the proper and effectivo functioning of a demo· cracy, They are universally so regarded, as is evident from the Universal Declaration of Human Right~. If Articles 14 and 19 are put out of operation in regard to the bulk of laws which the legislatures are empowered to pass Article 32 will be drained of its life-blood. [257G·H, 258A] Section 4 of the Forty Second Amendment found an easy way to circum· vent Article 32(4) by withdrawing totally the protection of Articles 14 and 19 in respect of a large category of laws, so that there will be no violation to complain of in regard to which redress can be sought under Article 32. The power to take away the protection of Article 14 is the power to discriminate without a valid basis for classification. By a long series of decisions the Supreme Court has held that Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid classification. The purpose of withdrawing the protection of Article 14, therefore, can only be to acquire the power to enact c.lass legislation. Then again, regional chauvinism will have a field day if Article 19(1)(d) is not avail· able to the citizens. Already, there are distnrbing trends on a part of the Indian horizon. Those trends will receive strength and encouragement if laws can be passed with immunity, preventing the citizens from exercising their right to move freely throughout the territory of India. The nature and quality of the amendment introduced by section 4 of the Forty Second Amendment is, therefore, such that it virtually tears away the heart of basic fundamental freedoms. [258B·E] Article 3 IC speaks of laws giving effect to the policy of the "State". Article 12 which governs the interpretation of Article 31C provides that the word "State" in Part III includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other t MINERVA MILLS LTD, v. UNION 211 -authorities within the territory of India or under the control cf the Governnnent of India. Wide as the language of Article 31C is, the definition of the ·word "State" in Article 12 gives to Article 31C an operation of the widest camplitude. Even if a State Legislature passes a law for the purpose of giving -effect to the policy by a local authority towards securing a directive principle, ·the Jaw wilf enjoy immunity frqm the provisions of Articles 14 and 19. The State Legislatures are thus given an almost unfettered discretion to deprive the ult is that even if an amendment is purported to have been made without complying with the procedure prescribed in sub-clause· (2) including its proviso, and is therefore unconstitutional, it would still be immune from challenge. [284E-F] As per Kesavananda Bharati's case' any amendment of the Constitution D which did not conform to the procedure prescribed by sub-clause (2) and its proviso was no amendment at all. and a court would declare it invalid. Thus if an amendment was passed by a simple majority in the House of the People and the Council of States and the President assented to the amendment, it would, in law, be no amendment at all because the requitement of clause (2) is that it should be passed by a majority of each of the Houses separately and by not less than two-third of the Members present and voting. But if clause £ (4) was valid it would become difficult to challenge the validity of such an amendment and it would prevail though made in defiance of a mandatory constitutional requirement. Clause (2) including its proviso would be rendered completely superfluous and meaningless · and its prescription would become merely a paper requirement. Moreover, apart from nullifying the require· J ments of clause (2) and its proviso, clause (4) has also the effect of rendering an amendment immune from challenge even if it damages or destroys the basic -F structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, outside the amending power of Parliament. So long as clause (4) stands, an amendment of the Constitution, though unconstitutional and void as transgressing the limitation on the amend· ing power of Parliament as laid down in Kesavananda Bharati'~ case, would be unchallengeable in a court of law. The consequence of this exclusion of the power of judicial review would be that, in effect and substance, the limita· tion on the amending power of Parliament would, from .a practical point of -G view, become non-existent and it would not be incorrect to say, for covertly and indirectly by the exclusion of judicial review the amending power of Parlia· ment ·would stand enlarged contrary to the decision of this Court in Kesavananda B/zaratts case. This would, undoubtedly, damage the basic structure of the Constitution because there .are two essential features of the basic structure which would b~ violated, namely, the limited amending power of the Parliament and the power of judicial review with a view to examining wh'ether any :H authority under the Constitution has exceeded the limits d its powers. [284F-H, 285A-D] Our Constitution is a controlled constitution which confers powers on the various authorities created and recognised by it and defines the limits of those ~ .. MINERVA MILLS LTD. v. UNION Zli powers. The Constitution is suprema lex, the paramount law of the land and there is no authority, no department or branch of the State which is above or beyond the Constitution or has powers unfettered and unrestricted by the Constitution. The Constitution has devised a structure of power relationship which checks and balances and limits are placed on the powers of every authority of instrument<1lity under the Constitution. Every organ of the State, be it the Executive or the Legislature or the Judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act within the limits of such authority. Parliament too is a creature of the Constitution and. it can only have such powers as are given to it under the Constitution. It has no inherent power of amendment of the Constitution and being an authority created by the Constitution, it cannot have such inherent power but the power of amendment is conferred upon it by the Constitution and it is a limited power which is so conferred. Parlia· ment cannot in exercise of this power so amend the Constitution as to alter its basic structure or to change its identity. Now, if by constitutional amend· ment, Parliament was granted unlimited power of amendment, it would cease to be an authority under the Constitution, but w·ould become supreme over it. because it would have power to alter the entire Constitution including its basic structure and even to put an end to it by totally changing its identity. Therefore, the limited amending power of Parliament is itself an essential feature of the c·onstitution, a part of its basic structure, for if the limited power of amendment was enlarged into an unlimited power the entire character of the Constitution would be changed. It must follow as a necessary corollary that any amendment of the Constitution which seeks, directly or indirectly, to enlarge the amending power of Parliament by freeing .it from the limitation of unamendability of the basic structure would be violative of the basic structure and, lience, outside the amendatory power of Parliament. [285E-H, 286A-C] lt is a fundamental principle of our Constitution that every organ of the State, every authority under the Constitution derives its powers from the Constitution and has to act within the limits of such power. The three main departments of the State amongst which the powers of Government are devided are: the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. Under our Constitution there is no rigid separation of powers but there is a broad demarcation though, having regard to the complex nature of governmental functions, certain degre~ of overlapping is inevitable. The Constitution has created an independent machinery, namely, the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed by the Legislature. lt is a solemn duty of the judiciary under the Constitution to keep the different organs of the State, such as the Executive and the Legislature, within the limits of the power conferred upon them by the Constitution. This power of judicial review is conferred on the judiciary by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. [286D,, E, 287B-C]. It is a cardinal principle of our Constitution that no· one, howsoever highly placed and no authority. however lofty, can claim to be the sole judge of its power under the Constitution or whether its actions are within the confines of such power laid down by the ConstitutiOn. The judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitdtion and the judiciary is assigned the delicate task to determine what is the power conferred on each branch of Government, whether it is limited, and If so, what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits. It is for the judiciary to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional limitations. That is the essence of the. rule of law, which inter alia requires that "the exercise of powers by E 21'6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R. ,J\ the Government whether it be the legislature or the executive or any other authority, be conditioned by the Constitution and the law". The power of .the judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government of Lavrs and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. If there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and tlie rule of law, it is the power of judicial re- :.0 view and it is unquestionably a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. However, effective· alternative institutional mechanism arrangements for judicial ~ review cannot be made by Parliament. Judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. If by a constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is, provided that the validity of any law made by the legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground,