# Mis. Barai/ly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd v. Workmen

- **Citation:** [1972] 2 S.C.R. 218
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-04-20
- **Bench:** A. Vaidialingam, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, K. K. Mathew
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mis-barai-ly-electricity-supply-co-ltd-v-workmen-5637
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

I>
I
.
('ii·il Servt1n1-£uq11ir\'-Reliu11c1• on staten1e1Jt.'i o
1vitne.'ises
criniinal cll.\"t! u·ithou1 ,·o/Jing
u·itnP.\l'f!.\'-~-./f per11iis.'iihl".
iu
11
Svope of enquiry-Jn1erferenc·e hy ·High Court 011 findings.
Punishnient irnvosed nn hasis that al/ char.r:es proved-Finding hy
Court that only so111P charges are proc:e~·d-lnterferenc<' lVith p11nishna·nr
in1posed-Propriety,
Civil Ser,:ire.t Con duct Rules. r. 13 ( 5 )-'Likely to have offecial dt•a/-
ings'. ,t('O!'t' of.
After the respondent \a section officer in the Ministry of lndustry
and Commerce) was acquitted in a criminal cas<.:. aQ enquiry under r. 15
of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Co::lrul and Appeal) RulOli,
A
8
c
1957, was held against him on the basis of thr~:.: charges. Statements or
D
the witnesses in the criminal case were tenderel in evidence iri the enquiry without calling the witnesses.
The Inquiring Officer rejected those
statements and found that only the thirQ charge was pro~ed and not the
first two.
The third charge was that he borrowed a sum of money wilh·
out obtaining previous sanction Of the Govemmc:it and placed him:-;cli
under pecuniary obligation to the lender
and
thereby
conl;;Jvcncd
r.
13(5) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955.
The· lendc'
was the representative of a firm which was an applicant for Jicences, itnd
E
though the application was made to a section in which the respondent
was not working, it would in due course have to be dealt with by· th~
section in which the respondent was working. The Disciplinary Authority
found that all the charges had been proved and passed an order compulsorily retiring the respondent from service.
A Single Judge of the High Court quashed the order and the letter.
patent appeal filed by the State was dismissed.
f
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that the statements rcjectetl
by the Inquiring Officer should have been admitted, that all the thre<
charges should have been held to be proved and that the order of con1pulsory retirement was justified.
HELD : (I) Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the
conduct of the inquiries, that is, no material can be relied upon to estaG
blish a contested fact unless spoken to by a witness who is subjected to
cross-examination.
In the present case, the persons whose statements
were sought to be relied on were in station, but \\o'ete not produced for
cross--ex.amination by the respondent.
They should have been recalled,
and tendered for cross-examination by the
respondent.
The
Inquiring
Officer \Vas therefore justified in refusing to receive
the
statements
as
evide/'. f2,23 A-DJ
H
Mis. Barai/ly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.
v.
Workmen,
[1971]
2
$.C.R. 1il7 at 629 and Stale of.Mysore v. S.S. Makap11r, [19631 2 S.C.R.
943, 9~2. followed.
·
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
UNION v. SARDAR RAHADUR (Malhew, J.)
219
(2) But the interlerenoo by the High Court with respect to the third
charge was not justified. (225 F-G]
The second part of r. 13(5) of the Civil Services Conduct Rules forbids a civil servant from borrowing money from a person with whom he
is likely to have official dealings.
The words 'likely to have official dealings' take within their ambit the possibility of future dealings between
the officer concerned and the person from whom he borrowed the money.
In the present case, even if the applications were dealt with at the initial
stage by another section the respondent shoulJ have known, that in due
course, the section in which he was working would have to deal with
them.
Therefore, when he borrowed money a few days earlier the res~
pondent contravened the rule.
[225 A-C]
(3) A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and therefore the
standard of proof requi-red is that of prepondercnce of probability and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that the lender was
a person likely to have official dealings. with the respondent
was
one
which a reasonahle person would draw from the proved facts of the casei
the

## Text

'!!$
UNION OF INDIA
'"
SARDAR BAHADUR
October 29. 1971
[C, A. VAIDIALINGAM,
P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY AND
K. K. MATHEW, JJ.J
I>
I
.
('ii·il Servt1n1-£uq11ir\'-Reliu11c1• on staten1e1Jt.'i o
1vitne.'ises
criniinal cll.\"t! u·ithou1 ,·o/Jing
u·itnP.\l'f!.\'-~-./f per11iis.'iihl".
iu
11
Svope of enquiry-Jn1erferenc·e hy ·High Court 011 findings.
Punishnient irnvosed nn hasis that al/ char.r:es proved-Finding hy
Court that only so111P charges are proc:e~·d-lnterferenc<' lVith p11nishna·nr
in1posed-Propriety,
Civil Ser,:ire.t Con duct Rules. r. 13 ( 5 )-'Likely to have offecial dt•a/-
ings'. ,t('O!'t' of.
After the respondent \a section officer in the Ministry of lndustry
and Commerce) was acquitted in a criminal cas<.:. aQ enquiry under r. 15
of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Co::lrul and Appeal) RulOli,
A
8
c
1957, was held against him on the basis of thr~:.: charges. Statements or
D
the witnesses in the criminal case were tenderel in evidence iri the enquiry without calling the witnesses.
The Inquiring Officer rejected those
statements and found that only the thirQ charge was pro~ed and not the
first two.
The third charge was that he borrowed a sum of money wilh·
out obtaining previous sanction Of the Govemmc:it and placed him:-;cli
under pecuniary obligation to the lender
and
thereby
conl;;Jvcncd
r.
13(5) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955.
The· lendc'
was the representative of a firm which was an applicant for Jicences, itnd
E
though the application was made to a section in which the respondent
was not working, it would in due course have to be dealt with by· th~
section in which the respondent was working. The Disciplinary Authority
found that all the charges had been proved and passed an order compulsorily retiring the respondent from service.
A Single Judge of the High Court quashed the order and the letter.
patent appeal filed by the State was dismissed.
f
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that the statements rcjectetl
by the Inquiring Officer should have been admitted, that all the thre<
charges should have been held to be proved and that the order of con1pulsory retirement was justified.
HELD : (I) Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the
conduct of the inquiries, that is, no material can be relied upon to estaG
blish a contested fact unless spoken to by a witness who is subjected to
cross-examination.
In the present case, the persons whose statements
were sought to be relied on were in station, but \\o'ete not produced for
cross--ex.amination by the respondent.
They should have been recalled,
and tendered for cross-examination by the
respondent.
The
Inquiring
Officer \Vas therefore justified in refusing to receive
the
statements
as
evide/'. f2,23 A-DJ
H
Mis. Barai/ly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.
v.
Workmen,
[1971]
2
$.C.R. 1il7 at 629 and Stale of.Mysore v. S.S. Makap11r, [19631 2 S.C.R.
943, 9~2. followed.
·
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
UNION v. SARDAR RAHADUR (Malhew, J.)
219
(2) But the interlerenoo by the High Court with respect to the third
charge was not justified. (225 F-G]
The second part of r. 13(5) of the Civil Services Conduct Rules forbids a civil servant from borrowing money from a person with whom he
is likely to have official dealings.
The words 'likely to have official dealings' take within their ambit the possibility of future dealings between
the officer concerned and the person from whom he borrowed the money.
In the present case, even if the applications were dealt with at the initial
stage by another section the respondent shoulJ have known, that in due
course, the section in which he was working would have to deal with
them.
Therefore, when he borrowed money a few days earlier the res~
pondent contravened the rule.
[225 A-C]
(3) A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and therefore the
standard of proof requi-red is that of prepondercnce of probability and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that the lender was
a person likely to have official dealings. with the respondent
was
one
which a reasonahle person would draw from the proved facts of the casei
the High Coutt was wrong in sitting as a court of appeal over a decision
based upon it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same power of dealing
with all quesHons, either of fact or of law arising in the appeal, as the
Single Judge of the High Court.
If the enquiry was properly held the
questio':'l of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed
before the High Court. A finding cannot be characte·rised as perverse or
unsupp0rted by any relevant materials, if it was a reasonable inference
from J>TOVed tacts. 1225 D-G l
State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sr<'e R(una R(lo, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 25.
33, followed.
Jug'tlf Kishore Bhadu11i v. Union of India,
A.LR.
1965
Pat.
196,
apptoved.
( 4) If the or<lcr of the punishing authority could be supporteu on
any. finding as to sub~tant1al n:i1s~emeanour for
which
the
particular
punishment could be imposed 1t 1s not for the court to consider whether
the. charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in im-
~os1ng t~e punishment.
~erefore, the punishment of compulsory re.
hrement imposed was not liable te be quashed even though the first two
charges had not been proved.
[226 G-H; 227 A-CJ
State of Orissa v. Bidvahhushan Mahapatra (1963] Supp 1 SC' R
648. 666, followed.
·
'
·
' · ·
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No 1758 of
1970.
.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 20, 1970 of the
Delhi High Court in Letters Patent Appeal
No. 75-D of 1966.
R. H. Dhebar, P. H. Parekh, S. P. Nayar and Urmila Karoor
for the appellant.
'
Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
.Matl1ew, ~· This is a~ appeal by Special Leave filed by the
Umon of India from the judgment in appeal under clause 10 of
'.!20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1972] 2 S.C.R.
Letters Patent of the Delhi High Court conlirming the decision of
a learned Single Judge allowing Civil Writ No. 716-D of 1964
filed by the Respondent by quashing the order made by the
President on 23rd April, 1963 compulsorily retiring the Respondent from service.
The Respondent, Shri Sardar Bahadur, was employed as a
Sec!Jou Officer in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the
Steel & Cement Section (B) which along with other sections like
Jod11.5tries Act and Industrial Policy etc. was under the control
of Shri P. S. Sundaram, Deputy Secretary in thar Ministry at that
time.
In April, 195 6, the Ministry il!Vited applications for grant of
licences to set up sted re-rolling mills.
On June 14, 1956, one Shri-Nand Kumar representing Messrs
Ram Sarup Mam Cham.I and Messrs Mam Chand and Company
of Calcutta applied for five licences to set up steel
re-rolling
mills. He also handed over on June 25, 1956 to the respondent
a cheque for Rs. 2,500/- drawn on the Punjab Co-operative Bank
Limited in favour of 'Shri P. S.
Sundaram. The cheque was
certified by the bank as good for payment upto September 24,
1956.
At the back of the cheque, there was a signature which
purported to be that of Shri P. S. Sundaram. It may be noted
at this stage that Shri P. S. Sundaram, the Deputy Secretary had
denied the signature to be his.
Above the signature the respondent wrote the words :-
"Please pay to Shri Sardar Bahadur.'
Lower down the respondent wrote the followinp; words :-
"Please
collect and credit the
amount into my
account.
First payee's endorsement may kindly be
guaranteed on my behalf and risk."
This cheque was duly cent to the account of the respondent
"nd the amount of Rs. 2,500/- was credited to his account in
the State Bank of India, New Delhi.
The respondent was prosecuted by the Special Police Establishment on the allegations
that the amount covered by
the
cheque was taken by him as illegal gratification for using his official position illegally and in a corrupt manner in order to procure
licences for Messrs Ram Sarup Mam Chand of Calcutta who had
filed applications in that behalf and that tile signature of
Shri
1'. S. Sundaram had been forged by him.
The respondent
wa~
charged with offences punishable under Section 5 (2) read with
Section 5(i) (d) of the Preveotion of Corruption Act. 1947 and
A
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UNION \'. SARIJAR llAHADUR (Mathew, 1.)
221
Section 161, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent was acquitted of all the charges on .lnne 20, 1960. Thereafter, It was proposed to hold an mquiry against him under Rule
15 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1957 on the basis of the foliowing charges :--
1. "That he failed to inforn1 Shri P. S. Sundararn
Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
New Delhi, that a cheque for Rs. 2,500/- in the name
of Shri Sundaram had been issued by Shri Nand Kumar
of Messrs Ram Sarup Mam Chand and Messrs Mam
Chand & Company of Galcutta, whose applications for
grant of licences for establishing steel-re-rolling mills
were pending in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
as security in connection with the said
applications
when he knew that no such deposit was to be made;
2. That he failed to inform Shri P. S.
Sundaram
that the said Shri N and Kumar had given him a cheque
bearing Shri Sundaram's signature and had asked him
to deposit it in his account which he had done after
asking the bank (instead of showing the cheque first to
Shri Sundaram himself) to guarantee the said signature
of Shri Sundaram; and
3. That he borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,500/- (the
amount covered by the cheque referred to above) from
the said Shri Nand Kumar, without obtaining previous
sanction of the Government and placed himself under
pecuniary obligations to the extent of Rs. 2,500/- and
thereby also contrave.ned rule 13 ( 5) of the Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955."
The enquiry was held and the Inquiry Officer found that thi:
first two charges were not proved as the identity of P. S. Sundaram
the payee of the cheque, had not been established with Shri P. S.
Sundaram, Deputy Secretary. But the Inquiring Officer
found
that the third charge has been proved.
The findings of the Inquiring Officer on the first two charges
were not agreed to by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, exercising the powers of the President. He found
that all the charges had been proved.
The President after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission passed
an
order on April 22, 1968 holding that the charge of gross
misconduct and failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion
to duty as a Government servant had been substantially proved
against the respondent and imposing the penalty of compulsory
retirement on him.
The respondent was directed to be retired
from service with immediate effect.
l
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 2 S.C.R.
It was this order which was quashed by the Single Judge in
the writ petition filed by the respondent. The Letters Patent
Appeal against the order filed by the Union of India before the
Division Bench was dismissed.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the Inquiry
Officer went wrong in finding that charges Nos. 1 & 2 had not
been proved and that the President was nght in holding that these
charges had been proved and therefore the t!igh Court should
ha~:e found that charges Nos. 1 & 2 were proved, as there was
evidence to support the charges. It was contended that the Inqrtiring Officer wrongly rejected the copies of the statements of
the witnesses examined in the original trial, which
statements
if admitted, would have fully established the first two charges
against the res2ondent.
Counsel for the appellant argued that
the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable to disciplinary proceedings and therefore the statements of the witnesses in
the criminal trial ought to have been admitted and relied on for
establishing the guilt of the respondent on the first two charges.
Counsel relied on the following observations of Venkatarama Iyer,
J. in Union of India v. Varma(') :-
"Now it is no doubt true that the evidence of the
Respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the
_mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has
no application to enquiries conducted .by Tribunal even
though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do
so their decision is not liable to be impeached on the
ground the procedure followed was not in accordance
with that which obtains in a Court of law."
fo M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen
and Others. ( 2 ) the scope of the above observation was considered
and this is what Jaganmohan Reddy, J. said:-
"But the application of principle of natural justice
does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted
upon.
On the other hand what it means is that no
materials can be relied upon to establish a
contested
fact which are not spoken to by persons who are cc-mpetent to speak about them and are subjected to crossexamination by the party against whom they are sought
to be nsed. When a document is produced in a Court
or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise is, is it a
genuine document, what are its contents and are the state·
ments contained therein true."
!1}•[1958] S.C.R. 499.
(2) [1971] (2) S.C.C. 617 at 6L9
A
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UNION v. SARDAR BAHADUR (Mathew, !.)
223
We do not think that the statements should have been rei;eived
in evidence as the appellant had taken no step to produce the
persons who made the statements for cross-examination of the
respondent. It was the duty of the appellant to have produced
the persons whose statements were sought to be proved for the
crosf.-examination of the respondent. In State of Mysore
v.
S.S. Makapur( 1), this Court said that the purpose of an examination in the presence of a party ag~inst whom an enquiry is made,
is sufficiently achieved, when a witness who has given a prior
statement is recaUed, that statement is put to him, and made
known to the opposite party, and the witness is tendered for crossexamination by that party.
As the persons
whose statements
were sought to be relied on were in Delhi and as they were not
produced and tendered for cross-examination by the respondent,
we think that the Inquiring Officer was right in refusing to act
upon the statements relied on by the appellant.
As there was
no matreial before the Inquiring Officer to show that P. S. Sundaram mentioned in the cheque is P. S. Sundaram, the Deputy Secretary, we think the High Court was justifieu in holdinl); that these
charges had not been proved.
Coming to charge No. 3 the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench said that although there was great deal of suspicion
on the bona fides of the transaction in the respondent borrowing
money from Nand Kumar, suspicion cannot take the place of
proof. They, therfeore, held that the charge has not been proved.
The third charge, as already stated, was that the respondent
borrowed Rs. 2,500/- from Nand Kumar without obtaining the
previous permission of the Government and placed himself under
a pecuniary obligation to the extent of the amount and thus contravened the provisions of Rule 13 ( 5) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955 which reads:-
"(5) No Government servant shall, save in the
ordinary course of business with a bank or a firm of
standing, borrow money from or otherwise place himself under pecuniary obligation to any person within
the local limits of his authority, or any other person with
whom he is likely to have official dealing.i, nor shall he
p:rmit any .member of his family, except with the previous sanction of the Government to enter into any
such transactions :
'
Provided that a Government servant may accept a
purely temporary loan of small amount, free of interest,
from a personal friend or a relative or operate a credit
account with a bona. fide tradesmen."
(3) 1963(2)S.C.R. 943 at 952.
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
The Inquiring Officer found that the respondent had borrowA
ed Rs. 2,500/- from Nand Kumar without obtaining the previous
permission as required by Rule 13 ( 5) and thereby contravened
the provisions of the sub-rule.
The learned Single Judge held
that although it was proved that the money was borrowed and
the respondent placed himself under pecuniary obligation to Nand
Kumar, there was no evidence nor had it been found either by
the Inquiring Officer or by the President that Nand Kumar was 8
a person with whom the respondent was likely to have official
dealings.
He further said that the evidence of Shri N. S. Satureman was quite clear that application for licence of M/s Ram
Sarup Mam Chand was received in the Industries Act Section
which was called I.A. (I) Section whereas the petitioner
was
working in the Steel & Section where the copies cf these appliC
catwns started coming only in July 1956 and so in June 1956
when the cheque was issued it was not possible to see how in the
absence of any other evidence the petitioner could be regarded
as being in a position where Nand Kumar was likely to
have
any official dealings with him in tbe matter of the grant of the
licences.
The Division Bench accepted this finding.
D
It may be noted that the first part of sub-rule 13(5) of the
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 19 5 5 says that no Government servant shall borrow money from or otherwise place
himself under a pecuniary obligation to any person within
the
local limits of his authority, save in the ordinary course of business with a bank or a firm of standing. The second part of tbe E
sub-rule forbids him from borrowing money from any other person witb whom he is likely to have official dealings. The appellant at no time had a case that the resoondent contravened the
first part of the sub-rule in borrowing the amount from
Nand
Kumar.
So, neither the learned Single Judge_ nor the Division
Bench had occasion to consider the ayplication of the first part of F
the sub-rule to the facts of the case. Even in _the Special Leave
Petition tbe appellant did not rely on the first part of the sub:
rule.
We do not, therefore, think it necessary to consider the
scope of the first part of the sub-rule or its application to the case
here.
A finding cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported
by any relevant materials if it is a reasonable inference from pro- G
ved facts.
Now what are the proved facts : Nand Kumar as representative of M/s Ram Sarup Mam Chand and M/s Mam
Chand and Company of Calcutta filed five applications for licences
to set up steel re-rolling mills on 14-6-1956.
On 25-6-56,
a
cheque drawn in favour of P. S. Sundaram was given to the respondent by Nand Kumar for Rs. 2,500/-; the cheque was en- H
dorsed and the amount credited in tbe account of the respondent.
When the respondent borrowed the amount in question
from
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UNION v. SARDAR BAHADUR (Mathew, J.)
225
Nand Kumar, he was not working in the Industries Act Section.
Nand Kumar knew that the respondent was working in the Steel
& Cement Section of the Ministry and the applications for
the
grant of licences for setting up the steel plant re-rollin)! mills
would go to that Section.
Even if'the applications were to
be
dealt wit!'. at the initial stage by the Industries Act Section
the
respondent at least was expected to know that in due course the
section in which- he was working had to deal with the same. This
is borne out by the fact that in July 1958 copies of the applications
were actually sent to the Steel & Cement Section where the respondent was working. If he, therefore, borrowed money from
Nand Kumar a few days earlier it seems rather clear that he placed
himself under pecuniary o)lligation to a person who was likely to
have official dealings with him.
The words "likely to have official
dealings" take within- their ambit the possibility of future dealings
between the officer concerned and the person from whom he borrowed money .. A disciplinary preceeding is not a criminal trial.
The standard proof required is that of preponderance of prob1bility and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
If the inference
that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings
with the resoondent was one which
reasonable person
would
draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit
as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are
some relevant materials which the authority has accepted
and
which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the
officer is guilty, it is not the function of .the High Court exercising
its jurisdiction under Art.
226 to review the materials and to
arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquirv
has been properly held the question of adequecv or reliability of
the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court (See
State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sreo Rama Rao( 1). No doubt ther~
was no separate findinl! on the question whether Nand Kumat'
was a oerson likely to have official dealings with the resoondent
by the Inquiring Officer or the President. But we think that such
a finding was implied when they said that charge No. 3 h.as been
proved.
The only question was whether the proved facts of the
case would warrant such an inference.
Tested in the light of
the standard of oroof necessary to enter a finding of this nature.
we are satisfied t·hat on the material facts oroved the inference
1nd the imolied finding that Nand Kumar was a oerson like'v to
have official dealings with the respondent were reasonable.
The Division Bench said that the conclusion of the
Single
Judge that there was no evid~nce h•fore the. Tnouinn<> Offker that
Nand Kumar was likelv to have official dealings with th?. •e<no'1dent was not wholly un-warranted, and as there are limits
to
(1) [1964] ~ S,C.R. 2~ ~t 33.
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
the powers exercised by a Single Judge under Article 226 of
the Constitution, there ue limits to the powers of a Division Bench
while sitting in appeal over the judgment of a Single Judge. If
the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official
dealings with the respondent was in the circumstances of the proved facts in the case a reasonable one, we do not think there was
anything which prevented the Division Bench from interfering
with the order of the Single Judge. In Jugal Kishore Bhadani v.
Union of !ndia( 1), the Court oe!served :-
"It is well estab!ished principle of law that unless
the statute o· herwise proyides an appellate Coun has
the same power of dealing with all questions, either of
fact or of law, arising in the appeal before it, as that of
the Court whose judgment is the subject of scrutiny in
the appeal."
The respondent contended that he did not borrow Rs. 2,500/-
from Nand Kumar.
His case was that Nand Kumar owed him
Rs. 500/- and that when he gave the cheque to the respondent it
was on the understanding that Rs. 2,000/- would be repaid to
him and that was done immediately.
The respondont produced
a receipt executed by Nand Kumar for having received Rs. 2,000/-,
but Nand Kumar was not examined to prove the genuineness of the receipt. The Inquiring Officer has considered the
question at length in his report and he came to the conclusion
that the.case of the respondent that he did not borrow Rs. 2,500/-
from Nand Kumar cannot be accepted.
The learned Single
Judge found that the petitioner had borrowed
the
amount of
Rs. 2,500/- from Nand Kumar. That finding was endorsed by the
Division Bench. As it was a reasonable inference from materials
before the Inquiring Officer that Nand Kumar was a person likely
to have official dealings with. the resnondent and since the respondent borrowed money from such a person without the pennission of Government. the finding of the Inquirin~ Officer and the
President that the respondent had contravened Rule 13(5) of
the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 should not have
been interfered with by the High Court.
It may l:~ recalled that the punishmeint of compulsorily retireA
B
c
D
E
F
G
ment was imposed upon the respondent on the basis that all the
•
three charges had been proved against him.
Now, it is found
that only the third charge has been proved.
The question then
is whether the punishment of compulsorily retirement imposed
by the President can be sustaintd even though the first two charges
H
have not been proved.
(I) A.T.R. 1965 Patna 196.
A
B
c
UNION v. SARDAR BAHADUR (Mathew, J.)
227
Now it is settled by the
decision of this Court in State o;
Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra( 1) that if the order of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as to substantial
misdemeanour for which the punishment can be imposed, it is
not for the Court to consider whether the charge proved alone
would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment.
The Court is not concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate
having regard to the misdemtanour established.
·
We reverse the judgment under appeal and hold that order of
the President imposing the punishment of compulsorily retirement
was not liable to be quashed.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. but in the circumstances,
there will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal a/loll'ed.
(I) [1963] Supp. l S.C.R. 648 at 666.