# MIS. ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. AND ANR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2005] 1 S.C.R. 913
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-02-02
- **Bench:** N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava, B.P. Sinc. H, rl..K. SEMA, B S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mis-zee-tele-films-ltd-and-anr-v-union-of-india-and-ors-20475
- **Pages:** 106

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 32, 136, 141 226
and 298; Entry Nos. 45 and 97 of Union list, 33 of State list and 25 of C
Concurrent List:
Grant of right to telecast cricket matches for certain period inf avour of
appellant by Board of Cricket Control in /ndia-Cancellation---Challenge to--
Held by the Court: Board is not an authority/other authority-Hence, writ
against it not maintainable.
Held, per majority : An authority must be created by statute having
powers to make laws/rules/regulations could only be called as other authority
in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution-However, Supreme Court could
assign the term 'authority' a wider meaning by judicial interpretation to prevent
D
the Government from by-passing its constitutional obligations-Merely because E
a non-governmental body performing some public duty that by itself would not
suffice to make such a body other authority-Board is not financially!
administratively/functionally under the effective control of the Government -
Since Board has not been performing its functions as an authorized
representative of the State, it cannot be called as an instrumentality of the
State-Moreover, Central Government's control over certain activities of the F
Board is regulatory in nature and, thus, cannot be termed as pervasive contra/-
Hence, the Board is not an authority.
Held, per minority :
Constitution is an ongoing document and thus should be interpreted G
liberally-Article 12 of the Constitution must receive a purposive
interpretation-Board has been allowed by the Government of India to exercise
enormous powers to control the game of cricket and even to trespass across
the jimdamental rights of citizens-Any activity having direct influence on the
913
II
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
A citi=ens could be idenlifled as an aclivity of Stale, and thus p11h/icfi111clionsPresence!ahsence of a pariicular eleme1111101 determi11a1ive ofcharacreristics
of an aulhority, if on overall consideration it salisfies ingredients of Article 12
of the Co11stitulio11-Si11ce Board regulates and exercise comrol over the
competitive crickel/members and represent a sovereign counllJ'. India, while
participating in national/internaliona/ events, it is an aulhority/state-Since
B the Board is performing regulatory fimctions, it could be compelled by the
Court of Law to abide by rule of law-Writ jurisdiction of Supreme Court!
High Court could be invoked against it.
Article 141-Law laid down by the Supreme Court-Applicability of
C
Stalutory Authority vis-a-vis public authority-Distinction between.
Functioning of a body-Judicial Review-Scope of-Discussed
The question which arose for consideration was as to whether the
Board of Cricket Control in India falls within the definition of 'the State'
D as contemplated by Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
It was contended for the petitioners that the Board enjoys extensive
powers in terms of the Memorandum and Articles of the Association, in
selecting players for the Indian National Team, representing India in
E
cricket matches domestically and internationally; that the Board enjoys
disciplinary power over the players/umpires and other officials involved
in the game; that the Board exercises Governmental functions in the game
of Cricket; that since playing cricket is a profession, the Board controls
the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(l)(g) of the
Constitution; and that since Union of India has pervasive control over the'
F activities of the Board, it could appropriately be termed as "other
authority" in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution.
It was contended by Respondent No.2 - Board that a petition under
Article 12 of the Constitution is not maintainable against it since it is not
"State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; tha1t
G it is not created by any statute but registered under the Societies
Registration Act; that it is an autonomous body, administration of which
i

## Text

_Characters 0–39,993 of 254,976. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39993 for what follows._

MIS. ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. AND ANR.
A
V.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
FEBRUARY 2, 2005
[N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIAVA, B.P. SINC. H, rl..K. SEMA AND B
S.B. SINHA, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 32, 136, 141 226
and 298; Entry Nos. 45 and 97 of Union list, 33 of State list and 25 of C
Concurrent List:
Grant of right to telecast cricket matches for certain period inf avour of
appellant by Board of Cricket Control in /ndia-Cancellation---Challenge to--
Held by the Court: Board is not an authority/other authority-Hence, writ
against it not maintainable.
Held, per majority : An authority must be created by statute having
powers to make laws/rules/regulations could only be called as other authority
in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution-However, Supreme Court could
assign the term 'authority' a wider meaning by judicial interpretation to prevent
D
the Government from by-passing its constitutional obligations-Merely because E
a non-governmental body performing some public duty that by itself would not
suffice to make such a body other authority-Board is not financially!
administratively/functionally under the effective control of the Government -
Since Board has not been performing its functions as an authorized
representative of the State, it cannot be called as an instrumentality of the
State-Moreover, Central Government's control over certain activities of the F
Board is regulatory in nature and, thus, cannot be termed as pervasive contra/-
Hence, the Board is not an authority.
Held, per minority :
Constitution is an ongoing document and thus should be interpreted G
liberally-Article 12 of the Constitution must receive a purposive
interpretation-Board has been allowed by the Government of India to exercise
enormous powers to control the game of cricket and even to trespass across
the jimdamental rights of citizens-Any activity having direct influence on the
913
II
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
A citi=ens could be idenlifled as an aclivity of Stale, and thus p11h/icfi111clionsPresence!ahsence of a pariicular eleme1111101 determi11a1ive ofcharacreristics
of an aulhority, if on overall consideration it salisfies ingredients of Article 12
of the Co11stitulio11-Si11ce Board regulates and exercise comrol over the
competitive crickel/members and represent a sovereign counllJ'. India, while
participating in national/internaliona/ events, it is an aulhority/state-Since
B the Board is performing regulatory fimctions, it could be compelled by the
Court of Law to abide by rule of law-Writ jurisdiction of Supreme Court!
High Court could be invoked against it.
Article 141-Law laid down by the Supreme Court-Applicability of
C
Stalutory Authority vis-a-vis public authority-Distinction between.
Functioning of a body-Judicial Review-Scope of-Discussed
The question which arose for consideration was as to whether the
Board of Cricket Control in India falls within the definition of 'the State'
D as contemplated by Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
It was contended for the petitioners that the Board enjoys extensive
powers in terms of the Memorandum and Articles of the Association, in
selecting players for the Indian National Team, representing India in
E
cricket matches domestically and internationally; that the Board enjoys
disciplinary power over the players/umpires and other officials involved
in the game; that the Board exercises Governmental functions in the game
of Cricket; that since playing cricket is a profession, the Board controls
the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 19(l)(g) of the
Constitution; and that since Union of India has pervasive control over the'
F activities of the Board, it could appropriately be termed as "other
authority" in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution.
It was contended by Respondent No.2 - Board that a petition under
Article 12 of the Constitution is not maintainable against it since it is not
"State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; tha1t
G it is not created by any statute but registered under the Societies
Registration Act; that it is an autonomous body, administration of which
is not controlled by any other authority including Union of India; that it
does not take any financial assistance from the Government nor is it
subjected to any financial control by the Government nor its accounts are
H subject to the scrutiny of the Government; that it is not conferred with
+
..
.../
,,
t
}.
ZEE TELE flLMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
915
monopoly status in the game of cricket by any statute or by any order of A
the Government; that there is no law which prohibits th:; coming into
existence of any other parallel organization; that as per the parameters
laid down by the Seven Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Fradeep
Kumar &nms v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors. the Board
cannot be construed as State for the purpose of Article 12 of the
Constitution.
Dismissing the writ petition, the Court
HELD: Per Majority (N. Santosh Hegde, J. for himself, B.P. Singh and
H.K. Sema, JJ.) :
B
c
I. I. The intention of the Constitution framers in incorporating
Article 12 was to treat such authority which has been created by law and
which has got certain powers to make laws, to make rules and regulations
to be included in the term "other authorities" as found presently in Article
12 of the Constitution. Because of the change in the socio-economic policies
of the Government this Court considered it necessary by judicial D
interpretation to give a wider meaning to the term "other authorities .. in
Article 12 so as to include such bodies which were created by Act of
Legislature. This judicial expansion of the term "other authorities" came
about primarily with a view to prevent the Government from by-passing
its constitutional obligations by creating companies, corporations etc. to E
perform its duties. (935-D; 937-A-B(
The University of Madras v. Shantha Bai and Anr., AIR (1954) Madras,
67 and B. W. Devadas v. The Selection Commitlee for Admission of Students
to the Karnalak Engineering College and Ors .. AIR (1964) Mysore 6,
referred to.
F
1.2. Applying the principles laid down by seven Judge Bench in the
case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas to the facts and circumstances of the present
case, it would be clear that the facts established do not cumulatively show
that the Board is financially, functionally or administratively dominated
by or is under the control of the Government. The little control which the G
Government may be said to have on the Board is also not pervasive in
nature. Besides, such limited control is purely regulatory control and
nothing more. Though some of the functions being performed by the Board
do partake the nature of public duties or State actions but they being in
a very limited area of the activities of the Board. Even otherwise assuming H
916
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f2005] 1 S.C.R.
A that there is some clement of public duty involved in the discharge of the
Board's functions even then that by itself would not suffice for bringing
the Board within the net of "other authorities" for the purpose of Article
12 of the Constitution. (942-B-C-DI
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors.,
B 120021ssec111, followed.
2.1. There is no doubt that Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution
guarantees to all citizens the fundamental right to practise any profession
or to carry on any trade, occupation or business and that such a right
can only be regulated by the State by virtue of Article 19(6). Hence, it
C follows as a logical corollary that any violation of this right will have to
be claimed only against the State and unlike the rights under Articles 17
or 21 which can be claimed against non state actors including individuals,
the right under Article 19(l)(g) cannot be claimed against an individual
or a non State entity. Thus, to argue that every entity, which validly or
D invalidly arrogates to itself the right to regulate or for that matter even
starts regulating the fundamental right of the citizen under Article
19(1)(g), is a State within the meaning of Article 12 is to put the cart before
the horse. If such logic were to be applied every employer who regulates
the manner in which his employee works would also have to be treated as
State. 1943-A-B-CJ
E
2.2. The pre-requisite for invoking the enforcement of a fundamental
right under Article 32 is that the violator of that right should be a State
first. The petitioner has failed to establish that the Board is State within
the meaning of Article 12. Assuming there is violation of any fundamental
right by the Board that will not make the Board a "State" for the purpose
F of Article 12. (943-D-EI
3.1. It should be borne in mind that the State/Union has not chosen
the Board to perform the duties being performed by it nor has it legally
authorized the Board to carry out these functions under any law or
G agreement. It has chosen to leave the activities of cricket to be controlled
by private bodies out of such bodies' own volition. In such circumstances
when the actions of the Board are not actions as an authorized
representative of the State, it can not be said that the Board is discharging
State functions. 1943-H; 944-AI
H
3.2. It is true that the Union of India has been exercising certain
+
ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
917
control over the activities of the Board in regard to organizing cricket A
matches and travel of the Indian team abroad as also granting of
permission to allow foreign teams to come to India. But this control over
the activities of the Board cannot be construed as an administrative
control. At best it could be termed as purely regulatory control and the
same is not a factor indicating a pervasive State control of the Board.
B
1944-D-E)
4.1. If the Board which controls the game of Cricket is to be held to
be a State for the purpose of Article 12, there is absolutely no reason why
other similarly placed bodies should not be treated as State. The fact that
the game of Cricket is very popular in India also cannot be a ground to C
differentiate these bodies from the Board. Any such differentiation
dependent upon popularity, finances and public opinion of the body
concerned would definitely violate Article 14 of the Constitution, as any
discrimination to be valid must be based on hard facts and not mere
surmises. Therefore neither the Board could be singly identified as "other
authority" nor the State/other federations/bodies could be considered as a D
A--
"State" for the purpose of Article 12. Thus, none of the other federations
or bodies including the Board can be considered as a "State" for the
._.
purpose of Article 12. (946-A-B-C)
State of Kera/av. T.P. Roshana, [197911 SCC 572, relied on.
4.2. The term "other authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution
was introduced at the time of framing of the Constitution with a limited
objective of granting judicial review of actions of such authorities which
E
are created under the Statute and which discharge State functions.
However, because of the need of the day and keeping in view the socio- F
economic policy of the country, this Court in the cases of Rajasthan State
Electricity Board and Sukhdev Singh thought it fit to expand the definition
of the term "other authorities" to include bodies other than statutory
bodies. This development of law by judicial interpretation culminated in
the judgment of the 7-Judge Bench in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas.
In the meantime the socio-economic policy of the Government of India G
has changed and the State is today distancing itself from commercial
activities and concentrating on governance rather than on business.
Therefore, the situation prevailing earlier is not in existence at least for
the time being, hence, there seems to be no need to further expand the
scope of "other authorities" in Article 12 by judicial interpretation at least H
918
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[20051 I S.C.R.
A for the time being. It should also be borne in mind that in a democracy
there is a dividing line between a State enterprise and a non-State
enterprise, which is distinct and the judiciary should not be an instrument
to erase the dividing line unless, of course, the circumstances of the day
require it to do so. (946-E-F-G-H(
B
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal and Ors., AIR. (1967)
SC 185; Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi
and Anr., ( 1975( 3 SCR 619 and Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian institute
of Chemical Biology and Ors., (2002] 5 SCC 111, followed.
Ba/co Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors., (20021 2
c sec 333, relied on.
4.3. When a private body exercises its public functions even if it is
not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the m:dinary
law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article
226. Therefore, merely because a non-governmental body exercises some
D public duty that by itself would not suffice to make such body a State for
the purpose of Article 12. In the instant case the activities of the Board
+
do not come under the guidelines laid down by this Court in the case of
Pradeep Kumar Biswas, hence this petition under Article 32 of the
.,
Constitution is not maintainable. (945-E-F(
E
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors.,
120021 5 sec 111, followed.
Per Minority (Sinha, J. for himself and S.N. Variava, J.) :
I.I. Constitution of India is an ongoing document and, thus, should
F be interpreted liberally. Interpretation of Article 12, having regard to the
exclusive control and management of sport of cricket by the Board and
enormous power exercised by it calls for a new approach. The
Constitution, it is trite, should be interpreted in the light of whole
experience after its commencement and not merely in that of what was
the state of law at the commencement of the Constitution. 1955-G I
G
Missouri v. Holland, (252 US 416 (433) and Kapila Hingorani •1. State
of Bihar, j200316 SCC I and John Vallamattom and Anr. v. Union of India,
JT (2003) 6 SC 37, relied on.
Liverpool & London S. P. & I Association ltd v. M.V. Sea Success I
H and Anr., 120041 9 sec 512, referred to.
ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
919
Human Rights and Article 18 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil A
and Political Rig/us. (/ 966) and 'Statu101y Interpretation', Fourth Edition by
Francis Bennion, referred to.
1.2. Flexibility is the hallmark of our Constitution. The growth of
the Constitution shall be organic, the rate of change glacial. 1966-GI
TM.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., 120021
8 SCC 481; Islamic Academy of Education and Anr. v. State of Karnataka
and Ors., 1200316 SCC 697 and Jiby P. Chacko v. Mediciti School of Nursing,
Ghanpur, Ranga Reddy District and Anr., (2002) 2 ALO 827, referred to.
B
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd. v. C
Donoghue, (2002) Q.B. 48 and R (on the application of Heather and Ors.) v.
Leonard Cheshire Foundation and Anr., (2002) 2 All ER 936, referred to.
R. Stevens: The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution
(Oxford 2002), p. (xiii) Q11oted by Lord Woe// in 'The Rule of Law and a
Change in the Constitution, 2004 Cambridge Law Journal 317, referred to. D
1.3. The State by reason of a legislative action cannot confer on it
extra territorial jurisdiction in relation to sports, entertainment etc.
Education, however, is in Concurrent List being Item No.25 of List III.
Sport is considered to be a part of Education (within its expanded E
meaning). Sports has been included in the Human Resource Development
as a larger part of education. 1958-EI
Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India
and Ors. etc. v. Cricket Association of Bengal and Ors. etc., 11995) 2 SCC
161, referred to.
F
2.1. The expression "A11thority" has a definite connotation. It has
different dimensions and, thus, must receive a liberal interpretation. To
arrive at a conclusion, as to which "other authorities" could come within
the purview of Article 12, one may notice the meaning of the word
"authority". The word "Other Authorities" contained in Article 12 is not G
to be treated as ejusdam generis. Broadly, there are three different concepts
which exist for determining the question which fall within the expression
"other authorities". There cannot be same standard or yardstick for
judging different bodies for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether it
fulfils the requirements of law therefor or not. 1960-B-G; E, HI
H
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] l S.C.R.
· A
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors.,
120021 5 sec 111, followed.
Black Diamond Beverages and Anr. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Central
Section, Assessment Wing, Calcutta and Ors., 11998) l SCC 458, relied on.
2.2. A 'State' has different meanings in different contexts. In a
B traditional sense, it can be a body politic but in modern international
practice, a State is an organization which receives the general recognition
accorded to it by the existing group of other States. Union of India
recognizes the Board as its representative. The expression "other
authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution of India is 'State' within the
C territory of India as contradistinguished from a State within the control
of the Government of India. The concept of State under Article 12 of the
Constitution is in relation to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part111 of the Constitution and Directive Principles of the State Policy as
contained in Part-IV thereof. The contents of these two parts manifest that
Article 12 is not confined to its ordinary or constitutional sense of an
D independent or sovereign meaning so as to include within its fold whatever
comes within the purview thereof so as to instil the public confidence in
it. (961-D-EJ
3.1. The feature that the Board has been allowed to exercise the
powers enabling it to trespass across the fundamental rights of a citizen
E is of great significance. In terms of the Memorandum of Association even
the States are required to approach the Board for its direction. If the
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh
and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh and development of law made
therefrom is to be given full effect, it is net only the functions of the
F Government alone which would enable a body to become a State but also
when a body performs governmental functions or quasi-governmental
functions as also when its business is of public importance and is
fundamental for the life of the people. This Court in expanding the
definition of State did not advisedly confine itself to the debates of
Constitutional Assembly. It considered each case on its own merit. "Other
G authorities", inter-alia, would be there which inter alia function within the
territory of India and the same need not necessarily be the Government
.~
' .
of India, the Parliament of India, the Government of each of the States
tor the legislation of the States. 1961-f'-G-H; 962-A-B-CI
Sukhdev Singh and urs. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, 1197511 SCC 421,
H followed.
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ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
921
3.2. The right of Indian players is comparable to their constitutional A
right contained in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India which would
include a right to work and a right to pursue one's occupation. The Board
while enjoying monopoly in cricket exercises enormous power. Its action
may disable a person from pursuing his vocation and in that process
subject a citizen to hostile discrimination or impose an embargo which B
would make or mar a player's career. 1981-E-FI
4.1. Article 12 must receive a purposive interpretation as by reason
of Part III of the Constitution a charter ofliberties against oppression and
arbitrariness of all kinds of repositories of power have been conferred -
the object being to limit and control power wherever it is found. A body c
exercising significant functions of public importance would be an authority
in respect of these functions. In those respects it would be same as is
Executive Government established under the Constitution and the
establishments of organizations funded or controlled by the Government.
1962-D-E-FI
4.2. It is not that every body or association which is regulated in its D
private functions becomes a 'State'. What matters is the quality and
character offunctions discharged by the body and the State control flowing
therefrom. 1962-Fl
Daniel Lee v. Vera Katz, 276 F.3d 550, referred to.
E
4.3. The concept that all public sector undertakings incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act or Societies Registration Act or any other
Act for answering the description of State must be financed by the Central
Government and be under its deep and pervasive control has undergone
a sea change. The thrust now is not upon the composition of the body but F
upon the duties and functions performed by it. 1963-C-DI
UP Stale Cooperative land Development Bank ltd. v. Chandra Bhan
Dubey and Ors .. AIR (1999) SC 753, relied on.
Federal Bank Ltd v. Sagar Thomas and Ors., 120031 to SCC 733; K.R.
Anitha and Ors. v. Regional Director, ES! Corporation and Anr., 120031 10 G
SCC 303 and G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute and
Am'., 120031 4 SCC 225, referred to.
4.4. The expansion in the definition of State is not to be kept confined
only to business activities of Union of India or other State Governments
in terms of Article 298 of the Constitution of India but must also take H
922
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
A within its fold any other activity which has a direct influence on 1he
citizens. 1966-EI
5. I. A body although self-regulating, if performs public duty by uay
of exercise of regulatory machinery, a judicial review wauld lie agai11st
it. The question has since been considered from a slightly different angle,
B viz., when such action affects the human right of the person concerned
holding that the same would be public function.
Greig and Ors. v. Insole and Ors., (1978( 3 All ER 449; R. v. Panel on
Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin pie and Anr., 1198711 All ER 564
C and Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd. v.
Donoghue, (2001 ( 4 All ER 604, referred to.
5.2. If the action of the Board impinges upon the fundamental or
other constitutional rights of a citizen or if the same is ultra vires or hy
reason thereof an injury or material prejudice is caused to its member ·or
D a person connected with cricket, judicial review would lie. Such functio~s
on the part of the Board being public function, any violation of or
departure or deviation from abiding by the rules and regulation framed
by it would be subject to judicial review. 1981-H; 982-AI
5.3. The concept of public law function is yet to be crystalised.
E However, the power of judicial review can be exercised by this Court und·er
Article 32 and by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India only in a case where the dispute involves a public law element as
contradistinguished from a private law dispute. General view is that
whenever a State or an instrumentality of a ~tate is involved, it will he
regarded as an issue within the meaning of public law but where
F individuals are at loggerheads, the remedy therefor has to be resorted m
private law field. Situation, however, changes with the advancement of tl1e
State function particularly when it enters in the fields of commerce,
industry and business as a result whereof either private bodies take up
public functions and duties or they are allowed to do so. The distinctiun
G has narrowed down but such a distinction still exists. Thus, it may be safely
inferred that when essential Governmental functions were placed or
allowed to be performed by the private body, they must be held to hne
undertaken public duty or public functions. 1982-D-E-F-GI
Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (DJ by LRs .. and Anr. v. B.D. Agarwal and Or~ ..
H 120031 6 sec 230, relied on.
·L
,,
....
....
ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
923
O'Reilly v. Mackman, (1982) 3 WLR 604, referred to.
A
.. American Constitutional law" by Laurence H. Tribe, referred to.
S.4. No legislation has been made either by any State or by the Union
or'lndia regulating and controlling the cricketing activities in the country.
The Board authorized itself to make law regulating cricket in India :Which B
it did and which it was allowed to do by the States either overtly or
covertly. The States left the decision making responsibility in the hands
of the Board, otherwise so-called private hands. They maintain silence
despite the Board's proclamation of its authority to make law of sports
for the entire country. (983-A(
S.S. Performance of a public function in the context of the
Constitution of India would be to allow an entity to perform the function
as an, authority within the meaning of Article 12 which makes it subject
to the constitutional discipline of fundamental rights. The duty to act fairly
c
is inherent in body which exercises such enormous power. Such a duty D
can be envisioned only under Article 14 of the Constitution and not under
the Administrative Law. (983-F-G(
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and
Ors., (1979] 3 SCC 489, relied on.
S.6. Even when public duties are conferred by statute, powers and
duties do not thereunder limit the ambit of'a statute as there are instanr.es
when the conferment of powers involves the imposition of duty to exercise
E
it, or to perform some other incidental act, such as obedience to the
principles of natural justice. Many public duties are implied by the Courts
rather than commanded by the legislature; some can even be said to be F
assumed voluntarily. Some statutory public duties are 'prescriptive
patterns of conduct' in the sense that they are treated as duties to act
reasonably so that the prescription in these cases is indeed provided by
the courts, not merely recognized by them. There are, however, public
duties which arise from sources other than a statute. These duties may be G
more important than they are often thought to be or perceived. The
functions of the Board, thus, having regard to its nature and character of
functions would be public functions. (984-8-D, H; 98S-A(
'Public Duties and Public Law' by A.J. Harding, pp. 6 to 14, referred
to.
H
924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.:~.
A
6.1. The traditional tests which had impelled this Court in the case
of Ajay Hasia to lay down the tests for determining the question as to
whether a body comes within the purview of"Other Authorities" are not
exhaustive. This case, moreover, is required to be proceed on the premise
that some other tests had also been propounded if the functions of the body
falls within the description of the public function, absence of State financial
B aid would not influence the conclusion to the contrary. (989-A-B; 990-lli:(
c
Ajay Hasia and Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors., (1981 ( I SCC
722, relied on.
Marsh v. Alabama 326 US 501, referred to.
6.2. Drawing the contrast between the governmental activities which
are private and private activities which are governmental, it was noticed
in the case of Sukhdev Singh that besides the so-called traditional functions,
the modern State operates a multitude of public enterprises. What is,
D therefore, relevant and material is the nature of the function could IJe
resolved keeping in view the following :
(i) When the body acts as a public authority and has a public duty
to perform;
E
(ii) When it is bound to protect human rights.
(iii) When it regulates a profession or vocation of a citizen which is
otherwise a fundamental right under a statute or its own rule.
(iv) When it regulates the right of a citizen contained in Artide
F 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India available to the general public and
viewers of the game of cricket in particular.
G
H
(v) When it exercises a de facto or a de jure monopoly;
(vi) When the State out-sources its legislative power in its favour;
(vii) When it has a positive obligation of public nature.
(990-B, C, D, E(
Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, ( 1975( I SCC 4:~1,
relied on.
..
' '
ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
925
6.3. The tests laid down in earlier cases may not be applicable in a A
case where the body like the Board was established as a private body long
time back. It was allowed by the State to represent the State or the country
in international fora. It became a representative body of the international
organizations as representing the country. When the nature of function
of such a body becomes such that having regard to the enormity thereof B
it acquires the status of monopoly for all practical purposes; regulates and
control the fundamental rights of a citizen as regard their right of speech
or right of occupation, becomes representative of the country either overtly
or covertly and has a final say in the matter of registration of players,
umpires and others connected with a very popular sport. The organizers
of competitive test cricket between one association and another or C
representing different States or different organizations having the status
of a State are allowed to make laws on the subject which is essentially a
State function in terms of Entry 33 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India. In such a case, different tests have to be applied.
(991-H; 992-A-B-CJ D
6.4. An entity or organization constituting a State for the purpose
of Part III of the Constitution would not necessarily continue to be so for
all times to come. Converse is also true. A body or an organization
although created for a private purpose by reason of extension of its
activities may not only start performing governmental functions but also E
may become a hybrid body and continue to act both in its private capacity
or public capacity. What is necessary to answer the question would be to
consider the host of factors and not just a single factor. The presence or
absence of a particular element would not be determinative of the issue,
if on an overall consideration it becomes apparent that functionally it is
an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. F
(992-F-GJ
6.5. It is true that regulatory measures applicable to all the persons
similarly situated, in terms of the provisions of a st11tute would by itself
not make an organization a State in all circumstances. Conversely, in a
case of this nature non-interference in the functioning of an autonomous G
body by the Government by itself may also not be a determinative factor
as the Government may not consider any need therefor despite the fact
that the body or organization had been discharging essentially a public
function. Such non-interference would not make the public body a private
body. (993-B-CI
II
926
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
A
6.6. The Board for all intent and purport was a recognized body.
Probably in that view of the matter, the Board did not think it necessarJ'
to apply for grant of such recognition of the Union of India asking it for
passing a formal order. However, the Board had all along been obtainin1:
the requisite permission for sending an Indian team abroad or for inviting
B a foreign team in India in the prescribed form. 11000-DI
c
6. 7. The conduct of both the Board and the Union of India clearly
go to show that sub silentio both the parties had been acting on the premise~
that the Board is recognized as the only recognized National Federation
for the purpose of regulating the game of cricket in India. 11001-G-HI
Rahul Mehra and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (Civil Writ Petition
No. !680 of2000) disposed of by Supreme Court on 4th October, (2004), reliecl
on.
6.8. A public authority would be an authority which not only can:
D regulate and control the entire sports activities in relation to cricket but:
also the decisive character it plays in formulatinl,l the game in all aspect~
Even the Federations controlled by the State and other public bodies a!:
la'3o the State themselves, in view of the Board's Memorandum ol'
Association and the Rules and Regulations framed by it, are under its
complete control. Thus, it would be subject to a judicial review.
E
11003-G, H; 1004-Al
6.9. Although, there are domestic events, indisputably only those whCI
are members of the Board and/or recognized by it can take part therein
and none else. This also goes to show that the Board regulates the domestk
competitive cricket to the fullest measure and exercises control over it!:
F members. 11006-Cf
6.10. In the constitutional scheme rule of law would, by all means.,
prevail over rule of cricket. A body regulating the game of cricket woul<ll
be compelled by the Court to abide by rule of law. It would not be correci:
to contend that a monopoly status upon a body must be conferred either
G by way of statute or by the State by issuing an appropriate order in that
behalf. 11006-G; 1007-Cf
6.11. Legal meaning attributed to the wordings of the Article 12.
would lead to the conclusion that the Board is a State. In sum, the controil
of the Board over the sport of competitive cricket is deep and pervasive.,
H nay complete. 11008-C-DI
·•"
.
;
I •
ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.O.L
927
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian l11stitule of Chemical Biology and Ors., A
1200215sec111, followed.
Bank of New South Wales v. Co111111011 Wealth, 76 CLR I by Dixon, J.,
referred to.
6.12. The Board, a body which makes law for the sports in India B
(which otherwise is the function of the State), conferring upon itself not
only enormous powers but also final say in the disciplinary matter and,
thus, being responsible for making or marring a citizen's sports career, it
would be an authority which answers the description of "other
authorities". 11012-A-BI
Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India
and Ors. etc. v. Cricket Association of Bengal and Ors. etc., 119951 2 SCC
161 and Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association, 531 US 288, referred to.
c
7.1. A decision, it is trite, should not be read as a statute. A decision D
is an authority for the questions of law determined by it. Such a question
is determined having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. While
applying the ratio, the court may not pick out a word or a sentence from
the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose
for consideration. A judgment, as is well-known, must be read in its E
entirety and the observations made therein should receive consideration
in the light of the questions raised before it. 11013-C-FI
Punjab National Bank v. R.l. Vaid and Ors., 120041 7 SCC 698; State
of Gujarat and Ors v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal and Ors., AIR
(2004) SC 3894 and A-One Granites v. State of U.P. and Ors., (200113 SCC F
537, referred to.
State of U.P. and Anr. v. Sy111hetics and Chemicals Ltd and Anr., (19911
4 SCC 139; Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, (20001 5 SCC 488 (Para 20);
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2003( 2 SCC
111; Ceme111 Corporation of India ltd. v. Purya and Ors., (20041 8 SCC 270; G
Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, JT (2005) I SC 303 and
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and Anr., (2005)
I SCALE 385, referred to.
7.2. It is noticed that in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas the only
question which arose for consideration was as to whether the decision of H
928
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 1 S.C.R.
A the Constitution Bench in the case of Subhajit Tewury was correctly
rendered. The ratio in that case must be understood to have been laid down
in respect of the questions raised therein. The questions raised in the
instant case were neither canvassed nor was there any necessity therefor.
Thus, Pradeep Kumar Biswas 's case cannot be treated to be a binding
B precedent within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India
as having been rendered in a completely different situation. 11014-E-FI
c
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors.,
1200215 SCC tl I and Sabha) it TewmJ' v. Union of India and Ors., 119751 l
sec 485, explained.
8.1. All public and statutory authorities are authorities. But an
authority in its etymological sense need not be a statutory or public
authority. Public authorities have public duties to perform. There,
however, exists a distinction between a statutory authority and a public
authority. A writ not only lies against a statutory authority, it will also be
D maintainable against any person and a body discharging public function
who is performing duties under a statute. A body discharging public
functions and exercising monopoly power would also be an authority and,
thus, writ would lie against it. 1985-B, E-FI
Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council
E v. Wallbank and Anr., (2004) l AC 546: (2003) 3 WLR 283, (1998);
Hampshire County Council v. Graham Beer tla Hammer Trout Farm, (2003)
EWCA Civ 1056 and Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston
Cantlow v. Wallbank, (2003) UKHL 37, referred to.
8.2. The Courts exercising the power of judicial review both under
F Articles 226, 32 and 136 of the Constitution of India act as a "sentinel on
G
the qui vive." Judicial Review casts a long shadow and even regulating
bodies that do not exercise statutory functions may be subject to it.
1985-H; 986-A; q
Padma v. Hirata! Motilul Desarda and Ors., 1200217 SCC 564, referred
to.
Co11stitu1io11al and Administralive La11• by A. W. Bradley and K. D. Ewing
(13th Edn) Page 303, referred to.
H
8.3. Having regard to the modern conditions when Government h
' .
,,.. -
\
). .
ZEE TELE FILMS LTD. v. U.0.1.
929
entering into business like private sector and also undertaking public utility A
services, many of its actions may be a State action even if some of them
may be non-governmental in the strict sense of the general rule. Although
rule is that a writ cannot be issued against a private body, but could be
issued subject to certain exceptions. (986-DI
Rahul Mehra and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (Civil Writ Petition B
No. 1680 of 2000) disposed of by Supreme Court on 4th October, (2004),
referred to.
8.4. The power of the High Court to issue a writ begins with a nonobstante clause. It has jurisdiction to issue such writs to any person or C
authority including in appropriate cases any Government within its
territorial jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs specified therein for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other
purpose. Article 226 confers an extensive jurisdiction to the High Court visa-vis this Court under Article 32 in the sense that writs issued by it may
run to any person and for purposes other than enforcement of any rights D
conferred by Part Ill but having regard to the term 'authority' which is
used both under Article 226 and Article 12, it is doubted as to whether any
distinction in relation thereto can be made. (986-H; 987-A, 8(
Rohtas Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union and
Ors., AIR (1976) SC 425; Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami E
Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V.R. Rudani and Ors.,
(19891 2 SCC 691; ABL International Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India Limited and Ors., JT (2003) 10 SC 300; Tata
Cellular v. Union of India, AIR (1996) SC I, Paras 101 and 102 and State
_of U.P. and Anr. v. Johri Mal, (2004( 4 sec 714, relied on.
F
Rahul Mehra and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Civil Writ Petition
No. 1680 of (2000) disposed of by Supreme Court on 4th October, (2004),
referred to.
E. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2004) 2 W.L.R. 1351 G
and Hatton and Ors. v. United Kingdom, 15 BHRC 259, referred to.
Assembrook Exports Ltd. and Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn.
of India ltd.