# MISS MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1992] 3 S.C.R. 658
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1992-07-30
- **Bench:** Kuldip Singh, R.M. Sahai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/miss-mohini-jain-v-state-of-karnataka-and-ors-11495
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 41, 45-Right to education-
::>---
Whether a constitutional right-Capitation fee-Whether unconstitutional.
C
Kamataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984-Preamble--Object of.
Kamataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984-Sections 3, 5(1)-Notification under-M.B.B.S: Course-Admission-Tuition fee-Different rates for the three categories of students-Legality
D of-Excess Tuition fee other than Rs.2,000 per annum-Whether Capitation
fee-Whether permissible in /aw-Held, Notification ultra vires.
The respondent ~o.1 - State Government issued a notification dated
June 5, 1989 under section 5(1) of the Kamataka Educational Institutions
E
(Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 fixing the tuition fee, other fees
and deposits to be charged from the students by the Private Medical
Colleges in the State. The tuition fee per year for the candidates admitted
against "Government seats" was Rs.2,000, whereas for the Kamataka
students (o~er than those admitted against "Government seats") the
tution fee was not exceeding Rs.25,000 and for the students belonging to
F
the category of "Indian students from outside Kamataka" were to pay the
tuition fee not exceeding Rs.60,000 per annum.
The petitioner, who came under the category of "Indian students
from outside Kamataka", was informed by the respondent No.3 - Private
Medical College, that she could be admitted to the MBBS Course in the
G session commencing February/March 1991, provided she would deposit
Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first year and furnish a bank guarantee
in respect of the fees for the remaining years of the MBBS Course. When
the father of the petitioner informed the respondent No.3 that he could not ·
pay the exorbitant annual tution fee of Rs.60,000, the petitioner was denied
H admission.
658
. ....-
--
MOillNI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
659
The petitioner has, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, · 'A
challenged the notification dated S.6.1989 issued by the respondent No.1,
'. permitting the Private Medical Colleges to charge exorbitant tuition fees
1
from the students other than those admitted to the "Government seats".
Respondent No.3 contended that the students from whom higher
tuition fee was charged belong to a different class; that those who were B
admitted to the "Government seats" were meritorious and the remaining
non-meritorious; that classification of candidates into those who possessed merit and those who did not possess merit was a valid classification
and as such the college-management was 'Nithin its right to charge more
fee from those who did not possess merit; that the object sought to be t
achieved by the said classification was to collect money to meet the expenses incurred by the college in providing medical education to the students.
The intervener-Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association argued that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka did not
receive any financial aid from either the Central or the State Government; D
that the Private Medical Colleges would incur about Rs.S lakhs per student
as expenditure for S year MBBS course; that 40% of the seats in the
colleges were set apart as "Government seats" to be filled by the Government; that the students selected and admitted against Government seats
would pay only Rs.2,000 per annum as such the rest of the burden was on E
those who were admitted against management quota; that the tuition fee
was not excessive and as such there was no question of making any profit
by the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka.
Respondent No.3 and the intervener submitted that in order to run
the medical colleges the managements were justified in charging the F
capitation fee; that apart from the Act, there was not provision under the
Constitution or under any other law which would forbid the charging of
capitation fee.
On the questions: (1) Was there a 'right to education' gua

## Text

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A
MISS MOHINI JAIN
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
JULY 30, 1992
B
[KULDIP SINGH AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 41, 45-Right to education-
::>---
Whether a constitutional right-Capitation fee-Whether unconstitutional.
C
Kamataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984-Preamble--Object of.
Kamataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984-Sections 3, 5(1)-Notification under-M.B.B.S: Course-Admission-Tuition fee-Different rates for the three categories of students-Legality
D of-Excess Tuition fee other than Rs.2,000 per annum-Whether Capitation
fee-Whether permissible in /aw-Held, Notification ultra vires.
The respondent ~o.1 - State Government issued a notification dated
June 5, 1989 under section 5(1) of the Kamataka Educational Institutions
E
(Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 fixing the tuition fee, other fees
and deposits to be charged from the students by the Private Medical
Colleges in the State. The tuition fee per year for the candidates admitted
against "Government seats" was Rs.2,000, whereas for the Kamataka
students (o~er than those admitted against "Government seats") the
tution fee was not exceeding Rs.25,000 and for the students belonging to
F
the category of "Indian students from outside Kamataka" were to pay the
tuition fee not exceeding Rs.60,000 per annum.
The petitioner, who came under the category of "Indian students
from outside Kamataka", was informed by the respondent No.3 - Private
Medical College, that she could be admitted to the MBBS Course in the
G session commencing February/March 1991, provided she would deposit
Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first year and furnish a bank guarantee
in respect of the fees for the remaining years of the MBBS Course. When
the father of the petitioner informed the respondent No.3 that he could not ·
pay the exorbitant annual tution fee of Rs.60,000, the petitioner was denied
H admission.
658
. ....-
--
MOillNI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
659
The petitioner has, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, · 'A
challenged the notification dated S.6.1989 issued by the respondent No.1,
'. permitting the Private Medical Colleges to charge exorbitant tuition fees
1
from the students other than those admitted to the "Government seats".
Respondent No.3 contended that the students from whom higher
tuition fee was charged belong to a different class; that those who were B
admitted to the "Government seats" were meritorious and the remaining
non-meritorious; that classification of candidates into those who possessed merit and those who did not possess merit was a valid classification
and as such the college-management was 'Nithin its right to charge more
fee from those who did not possess merit; that the object sought to be t
achieved by the said classification was to collect money to meet the expenses incurred by the college in providing medical education to the students.
The intervener-Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association argued that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka did not
receive any financial aid from either the Central or the State Government; D
that the Private Medical Colleges would incur about Rs.S lakhs per student
as expenditure for S year MBBS course; that 40% of the seats in the
colleges were set apart as "Government seats" to be filled by the Government; that the students selected and admitted against Government seats
would pay only Rs.2,000 per annum as such the rest of the burden was on E
those who were admitted against management quota; that the tuition fee
was not excessive and as such there was no question of making any profit
by the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka.
Respondent No.3 and the intervener submitted that in order to run
the medical colleges the managements were justified in charging the F
capitation fee; that apart from the Act, there was not provision under the
Constitution or under any other law which would forbid the charging of
capitation fee.
On the questions: (1) Was there a 'right to education' guaranteed to
the people of India under the Constitution? If so, did the concept of 0
'capitation fee' infracts the same?; (2) Whether the charging of capitation
fee in consideration of admissions to educational institutions was arbitrary, unfair, unjust and as such violated Article 14 of the Constitution?;
(3) Whether the impugned notification permitted the Private Medical
Colleges to charge capitation fee in the pise of regulating fees under the H
'
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 3 S.C.R.
A Act? and ( 4) Whether the notification was violative of the provisions of the
the Act?, allowing the writ petition to the extent of striking down the
capitation fee, this Court
B
·HELD: 1.01. The dignity of man is inviolable. It is the duty of the State
to respect and protect the same. It is primarily the education which bringsforth the dignity of a man. The framers of the Constitutions were aware that
more than seventy per cent of the people, whom they were giving the Constitution of India, were ill!trate. They were also hopeful that within a period
of ten years illiteracy would be wiped out from the country. It was with that
hope that Articles 41 and 45 were brought in Chapter IV of the Constitution.
C An individual cannot be assured of human dignity unless his personality is
developed and the only way to do that is to educate him. [667F]
1.02. Article 41 in Chapter IV of the Constitution recognises an
individual's right "to education". It says that "the State shall, within the
limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision
D for the securing the right .•••• to education ••. ." Although a citizen cannot
enforce the directive principles contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution but these were not intended to be mere pious declarations. [667H]
E
F
1.03. Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the
Constitution a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter Ill shaH
remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate. [668E]
1.04. lbe "right to education", therefore, is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part Ill of the Constitution. The State is
under a constitutional mandate to provide educational institutions at all
levels for the benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must
function to the best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire
education cannot be confined to the richer section of the society. [670A]
1.05. Every citizen bas a 'right to education' under the Constitution.
G The State is under an obligatJ~n to establish educational institutions to
enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its
obligation through state-owned or state-recognised educational institu·
tions. When the State Government grants recognition to the private educational institutions it creates an agency to fulfil its obligation under the
Constitution. The students are given admission to the educational instituH lions • whether state-owned or state-recognised in recognition of their
-
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
661
'right to education' under the Constitution. Charging capitation fee in A
consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent denial
of a citizen's right to education under the Constitution. [672C-E]
1.06. Capitation fee is nothing but a price for selling education. The
concept of "teaching shops" is contrary to the constitutional scheme and
is wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. [670C]
B
1.07. "Right to life" is the compendious expi:ession for all those rights
-~
which the Courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified
enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the in-.
dividual is free to pursue. The right to education flows directly from right, C
to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual,
cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The,
State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide,
educational facilities at all levels to its citizens. [669 F-G]
~
I
:--{
1.08. Capitation fee makes the availability of education beyond the ·
reach of the poor. The State action in permitting capitation fee to be '
charged by S~te-recognised educational institutions is wholly arbitrary '
and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [672G]
1.09 The capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class bias. It enable
the rich to take admission whereas the poor has to withdraw due to
financial inability. A poor student with better merit cannot get admission
because he has no money whereas the rich can purchase the admission.
Such a treatment is patendy unreasonably, unfair and unjust. There is,
therefore, no escape from the conclusion that charging of capitation ~ee in
consideration of admissions to educational institutions is wholly arbitrary
and as such infracts Article 14 of the Constitution. (673 F-G]
D
E
F
Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
[1981] 2 SCR 516; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors.,
[1984) 2 SCR 67; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (1974] 2 G
SCR 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors.,
(1979) 3SCR1014;Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc.,
[1981) 2 SCR 79 and Dr. Pradeep Jain etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc.,
(1984) 3 SCR 942, referred to.
fl
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
A
D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat and another, (1955] SCR
UIS, distinguished.
Dr. Ambedkar - C.A.D. Vol. VIII P.476; IMA Resolutions of India
Medical Conference held at Cuttak on December 28-30, 1980; Presidential
Address of Dr. K.S. Chugh, Chainnan, Department of Medicine and Head
B Department of Nephrology Postgraduate Institute of Medical _Education and
Research, Chandigarh delivered on 17.1.1992 at the 47th Annual Conference
of the Association of Physicians in India, held at Patna, referred to.
2. The Kamataka Educational_ Institutions (Prohibition of CapitaC tion Fee) Act, 1984 has been brought into existence by the Karnataka State
Legislature with the object of effectively curbing the evil practice of collec·
iog capitation fee for admitting students into the educational institutions
in the State of r~rnataka. The preamble to the Act which makes the object
clear. [679F]
D
3.01. The -State Government in fulfilling its obligation under the
Constitution to provide medical education to the citizens has fixed
Rs.2,000 per annum as tuition fee for the students selected on merit for
admission to the medical colleges and also against "Government seats" in ·
private medical colleges. Therefore, the tuition fee by a student admitted
E
to the private medical college is only Rs.2,000 per annum. The seats other
than the "Government seats" which are to be filled from outside Kamataka
the management has been given free hand where the criteria of merit· is ·
not applicable and those who can afford to pay Rs.60,000 per annum are
considered at the discretion of the management. [680 F-H]
F
3.02. If the State Government fixes Rs.2,000 per annum as the tuition
fee in government colleges and for "Government seats" in private medical
colleges then it is the State-responsibility to see that any private college
which has been set up with Government permission and is being run with
Government recognition is prohibited from charging more than Rs.2,000
G from any student who may be resident of any part of India. When the State
Government pennits a private medical college to be set-up and recognises its
curriculum and degrees, then the said college is performing a function which
under the Constitution has been assigned to the State Government. [681A]
3.03. Capitation fee in any form cannot be sustained in the eyes or
H law. The only m__ethod of admission to the medical colleges in consonance
-
---
--
.. _,....____
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.)
~3
with fair play and equity is by ways of merit and merit alone. Charging of A
capitation fee by the private educational institutions as a consideration for
admission is wholly illegal and cannot be permitted. (674 B-C]
3.04. Rs.60,000 per annum permitted to be charged from Indian
students from outside Kamataka in Para 1 ( d) of the notification is not
tuition fee but in fact a capitation fee and as such cannot be sustained and, B
is liable to be struck down. [681C]
3.05. What is provided is paras l(d) and l(c) of the impugned,
notification dated June S, 1989 is capitation fee and not a tuition fee. It ·.
has to be held that the notification is beyond the scope of the Act rather ' C
goes contrary to Section 3 of the Act and as such has to be set aside. It is
not permissible in law for any educational institution to charge capitation '
fee as a consideration for admission to the said institution. [681E]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.456of1991 .
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Vijay Pandia and R. Satish for the Petitioner.
. D
Santosh Hegde, R. Jagannatha Gouley, M.K. Dua, K.H. Nobin Singh,
Manoj Sarup, C.S. Vaidyanathan, K.V. Mohan, Ms. Anita Lalit and M. ,E
Veerappa for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KULDIP SINGH, J. The Karnataka State Legislature, with the object
of eliminating the practice of collecting capitation fee for admitting stuf
dents into educational institutions, enacted the Karnataka Educational
Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 (the Act). The Act
which replaces the Karnataka Ordinance No.14 of 1983 came into force
with effect from July 11, 1983. Purporting to regulate the tuition fee to be
charged by the Private Medical Colleges in the State, the Karnataka
Government issued a notification dated June 5, 1989 under Section 5(1) of G
the Act thereby fixing the tuition fee, other fees and deposits to be charged
from the students by the Private Medical Colleges in the State. U~der the
notification the candidates admitted against "Government seats" are to pay
Rs.2,000 per year as tuition fee. The Karnataka students (other than those
admitted against "Government seats") are to be charged tuition fee not tt'
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
A
exceeding Rs.25,000 per annum. The third category is of "Indian students
from outside Karnataka", from whom tuition fee not exceeding Rs.60,000
per annum is permitted to be charged.
B
Miss Mohini Jain a resident of Meerut was informed by the Management of Sri Siddharatha Medical College, Agalokote, Tumkur in the State
of Karnataka that she could be admitted to the MBBS course in the session
commencing February/March 1991. According to the management she was
asked to deposit Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first year and furnish
a bank guarantee in respect of the fee for the remaining years of the MBBS
course. The petitioner's father informed the management that it was
C beyond his means to pay the exorbitant annual fee of Rs.60,000 and as a
consequence she was denied admission to the medical college. Mohini Jain
has alleged that the management demanded a further capitation fee of
rupees four and a half lakhs but the management bas vehemently denied
the same.
D
E
In this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Miss
Mohini Jain has challenged the notification of the Karnataka Government
permitting the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka to charge
exorbitant tuition fees from the students other than those admitted to the
"Government seats".
Mr. San(osh Hedge learned counsel appearing for the medical college respondent No.3 has contended that the students from whom higher
tuition fee is charged belong to a different class. According to him those
who are admitted to the "Government seats" are meritorious and the
F
remaining non-meritorious. He states that classification of candidates into
those who possess merit and those who do not possess merit is a valid
classification and as such the college-management is within its right to
charge more fee from those who do not possess merit. He further states
that the object sought to be achieved by the said classification is to collect
money to meet the expenses incurred by the college in providing medical
G education to the students. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the intervener Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association has
argued that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka do not
receive any financial aid from either the Central or the State Government.
According to him the Private Medical Colleges incur about Rs.5 lakhs per
H student as expenditure for a 5 year MBBS course .. 40% of the seats in these
)-
-
)I.--
~·
(
-
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.]
665
colleges are set part as "Government seats" to be filled by the Government. A
The students selected and admitted against Government seats pay only
Rs.2,000 per annum as such the rest of the burden falls on those who are
admitted against management quota. He, therefore, contended that the
tuition fee is not excessive and as such there is no question of making any
profit by the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka. Mr. B
Hegde and Mr. Vaidyanathan have vehemently contended that in order to ,
run the medical colleges the managements are justified in charging the
capitation fee. According to them, apart from the act, there is no provision '
-~~
under the Constitution or under any other law which forbids the charging
of capitation fee. Finally they have relied upon the judgment of this Court
in D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat, and another, (1955] SCR 1215.
1 C
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and also perusing the '
written arguments submitted by them the following points arise for our
consideration in this writ petition:
'D
(1) Is there a 'right to education' guaranteed to the people of India
under the Constitution? If so, does the concept of 'capitation fee' infracts '
the same?
(2) Whether the charging of capitation fee in consideration of admissions to educational institutions is arbitrary, unfair, unjust and as such E
violates the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution?
(3) Whether the impugned notification permits the Private Medical
!
Colleges to charge capitation fee in the guise of regulating fees under the ,
Act?
( 4) Whether the notification is violative of the provisions of the Act
which in specific terms prohibit the charging of capitation fee by any
educational institution in the State of Karnataka?
In order to appreciate the first point posed by us it is necessary to
ref er to various provisions of the Constitution of India. The preamble G
promises to secure to all citizens of India "justice, social, economic and
political" "liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship". It further provides "equality of status and of opportunity" and assures dignity of
the individual. Articles 21, 38, 39(a) and (f), 41 and 45 of the Constitution
are reproduced hereunder:
H
666
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 3 S.C.R.
"21. Protection of life and personal liherty.-No person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law."
"38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare
of the people.-(1) The State shall strive to promote the Welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as
it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and
political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in
status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals
but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas
or engaged in different vocations."
"39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. -
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to
an adquate means to livelihood;
(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and
dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against
exploitation and against moral and material abandonment."
"41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in
certain cases. - The State shall, within the limits of its economic
capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in
cases of unemployment, old a:ge, sickness and disablement, and
in other cases of undeserved want."
"45. Provision for free and compulsory education for
children. - The State shall endeavour to provide, within a
period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until
they complete the age of fourteen years."
-
-
~
I
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.)
667
It is no doubt correct that "right to education" as such has not been A
guaranteed as fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution but
reading the above quoted provisions comulatively it becomes clear that the
framers of the Constitution made it obligatory for the State to provide
education for its citizens.
The preamble promises to secure justice "social, economic and political" for the citizens. A peculiar feature of the Indian Constitution is that it
combines social and economic rights along with political and justiciable
legal rights. The preamble embodies the goal which the State has to achieve
B
in order to establish social justice and to make the masses free in the
positive sense. The securing of social justice has been specifically enjoined C
an object of the State under Article 38 of the Constitution. Can the
objective which has been so prominently pronounced in the preamble and
Article 38 of the Constitution be achieved without providing education to
the large majority of citizens who are illiterate. The objectives flowing from
the preamble cannot be achieved and shall remain on paper unless the D
people in this country are educated. The three pronged justice promised
by the preamble is only an illusion to the teaming-million who are illiterate.
It is only the education which equips a citizen to participate in achieving
the objectives enshrined in the preamble. The preamble further assures the
dignity of the individual. The Constitution seeks to achieve this object by
guaranteeing fundamental rights to each individual which he can enforce E
through court of law if necessary. The directive principles in Part IV of the
I
Constitution are also with the same objective. The dignity of man is
inviolable. It is the duty of the State to respect and protect the same. It is
primarily the education which brings-forth the dignity of a man. The
framers of the Constitution were aware that more than seventy per cent of F
· the people, to whom they were giving the Constitution of India, were
illiterate. They were also hopeful that within a period of ten years illiteracy
would be wiped out from the country. It was with that hope that Articles
41 and 45 were brought in Chapter IV of the Constitution. An individual
cannot be assured of human dignity unless his personality is developed and
the only way to do that is to educate him. This is why the Universal G
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 empksises "Education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality .... " Article 41 in
Chapter IV of the Constitution recognises an individual's right "to education". It says that "the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity
and development, make effective provision for securing the right. ..... to H
I
.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
A
educationw. Although a citizen cannot enforce the directive principles
contained iri. Chapter IV of"the Constitution but these were not intended
to be mere pious declarations. We may quote the words of Dr. Ambedkar
in that respect:
B
c
"In enacting this Part of the Constitution, the Assembly is giving
certain directions to the future legislature and the future executive to show in what manner they are to exercise the legislature and the executive power they will have. Surely it is not
the intention to introduce in this Part these principles as mere
pious declarations. It is the intention of the Assembly that in
future both the legislature and the executive should not merely
pay lipservice to these principles but that they should be made
the basis of all legislative and executive action that they may be
taking hereafter in the matter of the governance of the country"
(C.A.D. Vol.VII p.476.)
D
The directive principles which are fundamental in the governance of
the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Part III. These principles have to be read into the fundamental
rights. Both are supplementary to each other. The State is under a constitutional mandate to ~reate conditions in which the fundamental rights
E guaranteed to the individuals under Part III could be enjoyed by all.
F
G
H
Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the Constitution
a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond the
reach of large majority which is illiterate.
This Court has interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution of India to
include the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it.
In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
(1981) 2 SCR 516, this Court elaborating the right guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of the India held as under:
"But the question which arises is whether the right to life is
limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further
and embrace something more. We think that the right to life
includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes
along with it, namely the bare necessaries of life such as
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expression oneself in diverse forms, freely
-
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>---
.. --'.
-
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MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.]
669
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human A
beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the
economic development of the country, but it must, in any view
of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life
and also the right to l..my on such functions and activi~ies as B ·
constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self."
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., [1984] 2 SCR
67, this Court held as under:-
"This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 C
derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State
Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and
Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include
protection of the health and strength of workers men and
women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opD
portunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational
facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity
relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist
in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no
State - neither the Central Government nor any State GovernE
ment - has the right to take any action which will deprive a
person of the enjoyment of these basic essential."
"Right to life" is the cor.ipendious expression for all those rights
which the Courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified F
enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue. The right to education tlows directly from right
to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual
cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The
State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide
educational facilities at all levels to its citizens.
G
,
The fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution
of India including the right to freedom of speech and expression and other
rights under Article 19 cannot be appreciated and fully enjoyed unless a
citizen is educated and is conscious of his individualistic dignity.
H 1
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670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
The "right to education", therefore, is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The State is under
a constitutional-mandate to provide educational institutions at all levels for
the benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must function to the
best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire education cannot be
confined to the richer section of the society. Increasing demand for medical
education has led to the opening of large number of medical colleges by
private persons, grvups and trusts with the permission and recognition of
State Governments. The Karnataka State has permitted the opening of
several new medical colleges under various private bodies and organisations. These institutions are charging capitation fee as a consideration for
admission. Capitation fee is nothing but a price for selling education. The
concept of "teaching shops" is contrary to the constitutional scheme and is
wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. As back as December
1980 the Indian Medical Association in its 56th All India Medical Conference held at Cuttack on December 28-30, 1980 passed the following
D resolutions:
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"The 56th All India Medical Conference views with great
concern the attitude of State Governments particularly the
State Government of Karnataka in permitting the opening of
new Medical Colleges under various bodies and organisations
in utter disregard to the re<".ommendations of Medical Council
of India and urges upon the authorities and the Government
of Karnataka not to permit the opening of any new medical
college, by private bodies.
It further condemns the policy of admission on the basis of
capitation fees. This commercialisation of medical education
endangers the lowering of standards of medical education and
encourages bad practice."
Dr. K.S. Chugh, Chairman, Department of Medicine and Head
G Department of Nephrology Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education
and Research Chandigarh, recipient of Dr. B.C. Rai National Award as
'eminent medical man for 1991', in his Presidential Address delivered on
-
January 17, 1992 at the 47th Annual Conference of the Association of
)--
Physicians in India held at Patna observed as under:
H
"In the recent p~t, there has been a mushroom growth of
..
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.]
671
~
medical colleges in our country. At the time of independence A
we had 25 medical colleges which turned out less than 2000
graduates every year. At the present time, there are 172 (150
already functioning and 22 are being established) medical colleges with an annual turn over of over 20,000 graduates. The
Mudaliar Commission had recommended a doctor-population B
ratio of 1 : 3500. We have already achieved a ratio of 1 : 2500.
If we take into account. the practitioners of other systems of
~-I
medicine who enjoy pay scales and privileges comparable to
those of allopathic doctors, India will soon have a doctorpopulation ratio of 1 : 500. Such over production of technical
man-power from our medical colleges is bound to lead to c
-
unemployment and frustration. Indeed the unabated exodus of
our professional collegues to other countries is a direct consequence of these lop-sided policies .
. ~-
According to some estimates., India has exported human D
capital worth over 51 billion d~llars to USA alone during
I
1966-88. Currently about 8000 skilled young men and women
are leaving the country every year. It is high time a blanket ban
is imposed on any further expansion of medical colleges in our
country and a well thought out plan to reduce the intake into
_,_\'
existing institutions is prepared. This will help to improve the E
standard of medical education and health care in our country.
It is common knowledge that many of the newly started
medical colleges charge huge capitation fees. Besides, most of
these are poorly equipped and provide scanty facilities for F
~-
training of students. At best such institutions can be termed as
"Teaching Shops". Experience has shown that these colleges
admit students who have been unable to gain admission in
recognised medical colleges. The result is a back door entry
into medical training obtained solely by the ability to pay one's G
way through. Even the advice of the Medical Council of India
'~
is sidelined in many such cases. The Government must resist
all pressures to allow· this practice to continue. Admission to
medical colleges bought by paying. capitation fees must be
stopped forthwith and all such existing institutions required to
....
strictly adhere to the Medical Council of India rules.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992) 3 S.C.R.
In the words of my predecessor Dr. V. Parameshvara, "The
need of the hour is better doctors than more doctors, better
health education than more education, better health care than
more health care delivery."
The Indian Medical Association, the Association of Physicians of
India and various other bodies and organisations representing the medical
profession in this country have unanimously condemned the practice of
charging capitation fee as a consideration for admission to the medical
college.
We hold that every citizen has a 'right to education' under the
Constitution. The State is under an obligation to established educational
institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may
dis6harge its obligation through state-owned or state-recognised educational institutions. When the State Government grants recognition to the
D private educational institut!ons it creates an agency to fulfil its obligation
under the Constitution. The students are given admission to the educational institutions - whether state-owned or state- recongnised - in recognition
of their 'right to education' under the Constitution. Charging capitation fee
in consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent denial
E
of a citizen's right to education under the Constitution.
Indian civilisation recognises education as one of the pious obligations of the human society. To establish and administer educational institutions -is considered a religious and charitable object. Education in India has
never been a commodity for sale. Looking at the economic-front, even forty
F
five years after achieving independence, thirty per cent of the population
is living below poverty-line and the bulk of the remaining population is
struggling for existence under povert}r-conditions. The preamble promises
and the directive principles are a mandate to the state to eradicate poverty
so that the poor of this country can enjoy the right to life guaranteed under
the Constitution. The state action or inaction which defeats the constituG tional-mandate is per se arbitrary and cannot be sustained. Capitation fee
makes the availability of education beyond the reach of the poor. The state
action in permitting capitati5>n fee to be charged by state-recognised educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. -During the last two decades the horizon of
H equality clause has been widened as a result of this Court's judgments.
) ...
---
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MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.]
673
Earlier the violation of Article 14 was judged on the twin tests of classificaA
tion and nexus. This Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Anr.,[1974] 2 SCR 348 gave new dimension to Article 14 in the following
words:
"Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within B
traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of
view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law
in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an
absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it C
that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14."
This Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621,
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. 71ie lnt!!mational Airport Authority of India and
Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 1014 and Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and D
Ors. etc., [1981] 2 SCR 79 following E.P. Royappa authoritatbely held that
equality is directly opposed to arbitrariness. In Ajay Basis this Court
observed as under :
"Unfortunately, in the early stages of the evolution of our
constitutional law, Article 14 came to be identified with the
doctrine of classification ... In Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu
this Court laid bare a new dimension of Article 14 and pointed
out that that Article has highly activist magnitude and it embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness ..... "
The capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class bias. It enable the
rich to take admission whereas the poor has to withdraw due to financial
inability. A poor student with better merit cannot get admission because
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he bas no money whereas the rich can purchase the admission. Such a
treatment is patently unreasonable, unfair and unjust. There is, therefore, G
no escape from the conclusion that charging of capitation fee in consideration of admissions to educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such
infracts Article 14 of the Constitution.
We do not agree with Mr. Hegde that the management has a right
to admit non-meritorious candidates by charging capitation fee as a con- H
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 3 S.C.R.
A
sideration. This practice strikes at the very root of the constitutional
scheme and our educational system. Restricting admission to nonmeritorious candidates belonging to the richer section of society and
denying the same to poor meritorious is wholly arbitrary against the constitutional scheme and as such cannot be legally permitted. Capitation fee
B in atty form cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The only method of
admission to the medical colleges in consonance with the fair play and
,equity is by ways of merit and merit alone.
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We, therefore, hold and declare that charging of capitation fee by
the private educational institutions as a consideration for admission is
wholly illegal and cannot be permitted.
Mr. Santosh Hegde and Mr. Vaidyanathan learned counsel for
respondent 3 and the intervener have relied upon D.P. Joshi v. The State
of Madhya Bharat and Anr., (supra) for the proposition that classification
of candidates for admission to medical colleges on the basis of residence
is permissible. In D.P. Joshi's case a resident of Delhi was admitted as a
student of Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore which was
run by the State of Madhya Bharat. His complaint was that the rules in
force in the said institution discriminated in the matter of fees between
students who were residents of Madhya Bharat and those who were not,
and that the latter had to pay in addition to the tuition fee and charges
payable by all the students a sum of Rs.1500 per annum as capitation fee
and that the charging of such a fee from the students coming out of Madhya
Bharat was in contravention of Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of
India. In D.P.