# MITHAN LAL v. T.FJE STATE OF DELHI & ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1959] 1 S.C.R. 445
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Bench:** S. R. Das C. J, Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. A. K. Sarkar, VIVIAN BosE
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mithan-lal-v-t-fje-state-of-delhi-another-1661
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

445
DAS,
Sales Tax-Building contracts-Tax on supply of materials in
construction
worlls-Compe,ence
of
Parliament-Delegation of
authority to extend taxation law-Notification by GovernmentV alidity-Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, I94I (Ben.VI of I94I_),
ss. 2, 4-Part C States (Laws) Act, r950 (XXX of I950),· s. 2~
Constitution of India, Arts. 246(4), 248(2).
, 1
The petitioners were building contractors carrying. on business in Delhi, which under. the Constitution of India became a
Part C State.· In exercise of the power conferred by Art. 246(4)
of the 1:onstitution, Parliament enacted the Part C States (Laws)
Act, 1950, by virtue of which the Chief Conimissioner of Delhi
issued a notification extending the ' operation of the Bengal
Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 194r, to Delhi. Acting under the provisions of this Act, the sales tax officer imposed tax on the petitioners in respect of materials supplied in execution of the building contracts. After paying it for some years the petitioners
challenged the validity of the assessment on the grounds, inter
alia, that (r). as there was no sale of materials used in execution of.
a building contract, a tax thereon was not authorised, and ·.(2) 'in
any event, the provisions of the Act under which the sales
tax officer sought to levy the tax were unc.onstitutional and
invalid :
Held, (1) It is within the competence of Parliament to impose
a tax on the supply of materials in building contracts and to
impose it under the name of sales tax, and as Parliament has the
power to legislate for Part C States the imposition of the tax on
the petit\oners is valid.
. , $late of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd.,
[r959] S.C.R. 379, held inapplicable.
.
.
(2) Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act is not repugnant to Art. 248(2) on the ground that it conferred on the Government authority'to extend a taxation law,to Part~ States. Wh(m
·a notification is issued under s. 2 of the Act by the appropriate
Government extending the law of a Part A State to a Part CState,
the provisions of the law which is extended become incorporated
by reference, i1! the Act itself, .an,d therefqre ;t. tax .imposed thereunder rs a tax 1mpost::d by Parliament.
:
(3) Sectio~ 2,of. the Act i; not b~d as an upconstitutiona.l
delegation of legislative power$.
,
~1
·.
•
•
•
April 7.
•
•
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
Jn r< The Delhi Laws Act, I9I2, [r95r] S.C.R. 747, followed.
~ltithan Lal
(4) The expression "enactment which is in force in a Part A
State" in s. 2 of the Act must be construed as meaning "statute
Th
,1 1v. i D 11 . which is in operation in a part A State" as distinct from a statute
e .:::i a e 0
e u which had been repealed, and cannot be interpreted as having
reference to individual sections or provisions of a statute.
(5) The notification in question whether it is viewed as one
extending a subsisting statute to Delhi or as extending it \~ith
modifications so far as the impugned provisions are concerned, is
intra vires s. 2.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 15 & 16 of
1955.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Radhey Lal Aggarwal, for the petitioners.
G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India and• R. H.
Dhebar, for the respondents.
T. M. Sen, for the States of Madras and Mysore
..
(Interveners).
'
G. G. Mathur and G. P. Lal, for the State of U. P.
(Intervener) .
• Sardar Bahadur, for the State of Kerala (Intervener).
Ratnaparkhi, A. G., for M/s. Raipur Provincial
Engineering Co. (Intervener).
1958.
April 7.
The ,Judgment of the Court. was
delivered by
Venkatarama
• VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-The
petitioners
are
Aiyar J.
building contractors carrying on business in Delhi, and
they have filed the present applications under Art. 32
of the Constitution challenging the validity of certain
provisio1is of the Bengal :Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
(Ben. VI oi 1941), which had been extended to
the State of Delhi by a notification dated April 28,
1951.
Th

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
MITHAN LAL
v.
T.FJE STATE OF DELHI & ANOTHER
(with connected petition)
(S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, S. K.
A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)
445
DAS,
Sales Tax-Building contracts-Tax on supply of materials in
construction
worlls-Compe,ence
of
Parliament-Delegation of
authority to extend taxation law-Notification by GovernmentV alidity-Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, I94I (Ben.VI of I94I_),
ss. 2, 4-Part C States (Laws) Act, r950 (XXX of I950),· s. 2~
Constitution of India, Arts. 246(4), 248(2).
, 1
The petitioners were building contractors carrying. on business in Delhi, which under. the Constitution of India became a
Part C State.· In exercise of the power conferred by Art. 246(4)
of the 1:onstitution, Parliament enacted the Part C States (Laws)
Act, 1950, by virtue of which the Chief Conimissioner of Delhi
issued a notification extending the ' operation of the Bengal
Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 194r, to Delhi. Acting under the provisions of this Act, the sales tax officer imposed tax on the petitioners in respect of materials supplied in execution of the building contracts. After paying it for some years the petitioners
challenged the validity of the assessment on the grounds, inter
alia, that (r). as there was no sale of materials used in execution of.
a building contract, a tax thereon was not authorised, and ·.(2) 'in
any event, the provisions of the Act under which the sales
tax officer sought to levy the tax were unc.onstitutional and
invalid :
Held, (1) It is within the competence of Parliament to impose
a tax on the supply of materials in building contracts and to
impose it under the name of sales tax, and as Parliament has the
power to legislate for Part C States the imposition of the tax on
the petit\oners is valid.
. , $late of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd.,
[r959] S.C.R. 379, held inapplicable.
.
.
(2) Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act is not repugnant to Art. 248(2) on the ground that it conferred on the Government authority'to extend a taxation law,to Part~ States. Wh(m
·a notification is issued under s. 2 of the Act by the appropriate
Government extending the law of a Part A State to a Part CState,
the provisions of the law which is extended become incorporated
by reference, i1! the Act itself, .an,d therefqre ;t. tax .imposed thereunder rs a tax 1mpost::d by Parliament.
:
(3) Sectio~ 2,of. the Act i; not b~d as an upconstitutiona.l
delegation of legislative power$.
,
~1
·.
•
•
•
April 7.
•
•
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
Jn r< The Delhi Laws Act, I9I2, [r95r] S.C.R. 747, followed.
~ltithan Lal
(4) The expression "enactment which is in force in a Part A
State" in s. 2 of the Act must be construed as meaning "statute
Th
,1 1v. i D 11 . which is in operation in a part A State" as distinct from a statute
e .:::i a e 0
e u which had been repealed, and cannot be interpreted as having
reference to individual sections or provisions of a statute.
(5) The notification in question whether it is viewed as one
extending a subsisting statute to Delhi or as extending it \~ith
modifications so far as the impugned provisions are concerned, is
intra vires s. 2.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 15 & 16 of
1955.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Radhey Lal Aggarwal, for the petitioners.
G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India and• R. H.
Dhebar, for the respondents.
T. M. Sen, for the States of Madras and Mysore
..
(Interveners).
'
G. G. Mathur and G. P. Lal, for the State of U. P.
(Intervener) .
• Sardar Bahadur, for the State of Kerala (Intervener).
Ratnaparkhi, A. G., for M/s. Raipur Provincial
Engineering Co. (Intervener).
1958.
April 7.
The ,Judgment of the Court. was
delivered by
Venkatarama
• VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-The
petitioners
are
Aiyar J.
building contractors carrying on business in Delhi, and
they have filed the present applications under Art. 32
of the Constitution challenging the validity of certain
provisio1is of the Bengal :Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941
(Ben. VI oi 1941), which had been extended to
the State of Delhi by a notification dated April 28,
1951.
The impugned provisions of the Act may now be
referred to. Section 2(d) of the Act defines "goods" as
including "all materials, articles and commodities,
whether or not to be used in the construction, fitting
•
•
•
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
out, improvement or repair of immovable property".
z958
" Sale" is defined in s. 2 (g) as including " any transfer
Mithan Lal
of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or
v.
other valuable consideration, including a transfer of The state of Delhi
property in goods involved in the execution of a
contract ........................... " . Section 2(b) defines
Venkatarama
"contract"
as meaning, omitting what is not
Aiyar f.
relevant,
"any agreement for carrying out for cash or
deferred payment or othtir valuable consideration-the
construction, fitting out, improvement or repair of any
building, road, bridge or other immovable property."
" Sale price" is defined in s. 2(h)(ii) as meaning
valuable consideration for "the carrying out of any
contract, less such portion as may be prescribed of such
amount, representing the usual proportion of the cost
of labour to the cost of materials used in carrying out
such contract". " Turnover" is defined in s. 2(i), and
is as follows :
" " Turnover "used in relation to any period means
the aggregate of the sale-prices or parts of sale prices
receivable, or if a dealer so elects, actually received by
the dealer during such period after deducting the
amounts, if any, refunded by the dealer in respect @f
any goods returned by the purchaser within such
period."
Section 4, which is the charging section, provides,
that " .................. every dealer whose gross turnover
during the year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act exceeded the taxable quantum shall
be liable to pay tax under this Act on all sales effecteri
after the date so notified."
The Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, was a law
passed by the Legislature of the Province of Bengal
and applied only to sales effected within t~at Province,
and after the partition of the Country, to sales effected
within the State of West Bengal. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, Delhi was a Chief Commissioner~'> Province administered by the
GovernorGeneral, and under the Constitution, it became a Part
C State, and Art. 239 vested its administration in ·the
President
actirig
through a Chief Commissioner
.
.
•
•
•
448
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
r958
or a Lieutenant-Governor as he might think fit.
Mithan Lal
Article 246(4) 'vhich is material for the present purpose
is as follows:
·
v.
Th• State of Delhi
"Parliament has power to make laws with respect
-
to any matter for any part of the territory of India not
Venkatamma
included in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule notAiya• J.
withstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated
in the State List.''
In exercise of the power conferred by this Article,
Parliament enacted the Part• C 8tates (Laws) Act
No. XXX of 1950, ands. 2 thereof is as follows:
"The Central Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, extend to any Part C State (other
than Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or
to any part of such State, with such restrictions and
modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which
is in force in a Part A State at the date M the
Notification ............ "
On April 28, 1951, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi
issued a notification under this section extending the
operation of the Bengal 'Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941,
to Delhi as from November 1, 1951.
Acting under the
provisions of this Act, the Sales Tax Officer, Karolbagh,
l)elhi issued on June 12, 1952, notices to the petitioners
calling upon them to submit returns of their receipts
from building contracts and to deposit the taxes due
thereon. In compliance with these notices, the petitioners were sending quarterly returns of their taxable
turnover and assessment orders were also made in
respect of their annual turnover for the years 19511952 and 1952-1953, and the amounts due thereunder
natl also been paid. For the year 1953-1954,
the quarterly returns had been submitted and the tax
due thereon deposited, and procedings were pending
for assessment of tax for that year. This was the
position whEl''~ the Madras High Court pronounced its
decision in Gannon Dunkerley &
Co. v. State of
Jl,fadras ('),that the provisions of the Madras General
Sales Tax Act, 1939, imposing tax on the supply of
materials in construction works were ultra vi1es the
powers of the Provincial Legislature under Entry 48
(1) (1954] 5 S.T.C. 216 .
•
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•
,
' f
..
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
in List II, Sch. VII to the Government of India Act,
I958
1935.
'
Mithan Lal
Basing 'themselves on this judgment, the petitioners
v.
who had been acting so far on· the view that thene state of Delhi
provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941,
imposing tax· on construction contracts were valid
Ve>tkatarama
and had been paying tax in 'that belief, filed Civil
Aiyar f.
Writs Nos. 244-D and 247 ·of 1954 in the Punjab
High Court
challenging the
validity
of those
p1'ovisions on the gtound that there was no sale of
materials used in execution of a building contract,
and that a tax thereon was not authorised by
Entry 48.
They accordingly prayed (a) for a writ of
certiorari quashing the assessments for the years 19511952 and 1952-1953, (b) for a writ of prohibition
restraining proceedings for assessment of sales tax
for the year 1953-1954 or realisation of any tax for
that year, and (c) for a writ of mandamus directing
the. respondents to forbear in future from assessing
the petitioners to sales tax under the impugned
provisions. Both these petitions were summarily
dismissed by the High Court on October 18, 1954, and
the orders of dismissal, not having been challenged in
appropriate proceedings have become final.
Now, the present attempt of the petitioners is to
reopen the question which had been answered agains.t
them by the High Court of Punjab by resort to
proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is
therefore not surprising that the learned SolicitorGeneral appearing for the respondents should have
taken preliminary objections of a serious charactei; to
1:;.he maintainability of these petitions. He contended
that the petitioners having filed petitions under
Art. 226 claiming the very reliefs which they have
now ·prayed for and on the very grQllnds now put
forward, and those petitions having been dismissed
and no appeals having been filed against the orders
of dismissal, they had no right'to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 for · obtaining the
samr:i reliefs.
He further contended that the claim of
the petitioners that the assessments in question, being
.
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•
450
SUPREME COUi:tT REPORTS
[1959]
i95B
unauthorised, constituted an interference with their
Mithan Lal
fundamental right to carry on business under Art. 19
v.
(l)(g) could not he maintained inasmuch as assessn, Stat, of Ddhi ment proceedings had been completed and the tax
realised.
He also argued that even if the petitioners
y,,.katamma
were right in their contention that the assessments
Aiya' J.
were unauthorised, their remedy was to sue for refund
of the taxes paid, and that the applications for writ of
certiomri to quash the orders of assessment were
misconcefrcd. It was further ·contended that the
payments having been
made by the petitioners
voluntarily-it might be under a misconception of
their rights-they had no right to claim refund of the
amounts even by action. These contentions raise
questions of considerable importance; but it is unnecessary to express our opinion thereon, as the petitiov-ers
also pray for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from imposing sales tax in future,
and it will be more satisfactory to decide the case on
the merits.
The contention of the petitioners based on the
decision of the Madras High Court in Gannon Dunkerley
& Co. v. State of ~Madras (1) is that the State Legislatures acting under Entry 48 have no competence to
enact laws imposing tax on the supply of materials
in execution of works contract, as there is no sale of
those materials by the contractor.
The decision in
Gannon Dunkerley
cf1 Co. v. State of Madras (1) was
taken on appeal to this Court in Civil Appeal No. 210
of 1956, and by our judgment, The State of Madras
v . • Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd.(') pronounced on April 1, 1958, we have affirmed it, and if
the present case iq governed by that judgment, the
petitioners would clearly be entitled to succeed. But
it is contended. by the learned Solicitor-General that
that decision has no application to the present
petitions, because the impugned law was enacted not by
a State Legislature in exercise of the power conferred
by Entry 54 in List II but by Parliament by virtue of
the authority granted by Art. 246( 4) of the Constitution,
(1) [1954] 5 S.T.C. 210 .
(z) [1959] S.C.R. 3i9·
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•
S.C.R;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
451
and that it was within the competence of Parliament acting m.1der that Article to impose a tax on the
Mithan Lal
supply of materials in building contracts, even though
v.
there was no sale of those materials within Entry 54. The State of Delhi
. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded.
·
Art. 246, Cls. (2) and (3), of the Constitution confer
Venkataram,a
on the Legislatures of the States mentioned in Parts
Aiyar J.
A and B the power to make laws with respect to the
matters enumerated in Lists II and III of Sch. VII,
and one of those m"atters is " Tax on the sale of
goods ", Entry 54 .in List II. It is with reference to
the corresponding, Entry in the Government of India
Act, 1935, Entry 48 in List II, that we have held in
The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley &
Co.,
Madras Ltd. (1) that the power to tax sale of goods
conferred by that Entry has reference only to sales as
defined in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930. But
here, we are concerned not with a law of a State
mentioned in Part A or Part B but with that of a
State in Part C. Under Art. 246(4) it is Parliament
that has the power to legislate for Part C States, and
that power
is untrammelled by the
limitations
prescribed by Art. 246, Cls. (2) and (3), and Entry 54
of List II, ;:i,nd is plenary and absolute, subject only to
such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution,
and there is none such which is material to the
present question. It would therefore be competent to
Parliament to impose tax on the supply of materials
in building contracts and to impose it under the name
of sales tax, as has been done by the Parliament of
the Commonwealth of Australia or by the Legislatures
of the American States. The decision in The State
of Madras v. GannonDunkerley & Co., Madras Ltd. (1 )
which was given on a statute.passed by the Provincial
Legislature under the Government of I1'dia Act, 1935,
has therefore no application to the present case.
It is argued that though Parliament has the power
under Art. 246(4) to make a law imposing tax on
construction contracts, that power is subject to the
limita.tion contained in Art. 248, that under that
Article it is Parliament that has the exclusive power
(1) (1959J s.c.~: 379.
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452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
r958
to enact laws in respect of matters not enumerated in
the Lists, including taxation, and that such a power
Milhan Lal
ld
1 b
. d
1 b
p
l'
t "t lf
v
cou
proper y e exercise on y
y
ar 1amen 1 se
The sia1<. of Delhi imposing a tax and not by its extending the operation
of a taxation law passed by the Legislature of a
V enkatamma
State ; and that s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act
Aiyar J.
must be held to be bad as being repugnant to
Art. 248(2) in so far as it conferred on the Government
authority to extend a taxation law to Part C States.
This argument proceeds on a m"isapprehension of the
true scope of Art. 248. That Article has reference to
the distribution of legislative powers between
~he
Centre and the States mentioned in Parts A and B
under the three Lists in Sch. VII, and it provides that
in respect of matters not enumerated in the Lists
including taxation, it is Parliament that has powJ)r to
enact laws. It has no application to Part C States,
for which the governing provision is Art. 246( 4 ).
Moreover, when a notification is issued by the appropriate Government extending the law of a Part A
State to a Part C State, the law so extended derives
its force in the State to which it is extended from
s. 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act enacted by
Parliament. The result of a notification issued under
that section is that the provisions of the law which is
extended become incorporated by reference, in the
Act itself, and therefore a tax imposed thereunder is a
tax imposed by Parliament. There is thus no substance in this contention.
It is next contended for the petitioners that even
a~suming that Parliament was competent to impose
a tax on the supply of materials in a building contract
and that could be done by a notification extending the
law of a Part A State, the notification dated April 28,
1951, is, in oio far as it relates to the impugned
provisions, in excess of the authority conferred by
s. 2, because that section limits the authority of the
Central Government to extend laws of Part A States
to Part C States; to "any enactment which is in force"
at the date of the notification, and, as the impugned
provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941,
w1ire ultra virea Entry 48 under which' the Legislature
.
.
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....
..
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
of the Province of Bengal derived its power to
z958
impose sales tax, they were not "in force " in the
M. h
L 1
State of West Bengal at the date of the notification,
· " ~~ a
and could not therefore be extended to the State of Ths state of Delhi
Delhi.
According to the petitioners, "enactment in
force" in s. 2 must be construed as meaning proVenkattlrama
visions of a statute which are valid and enforceable.
Aiyar.J.
We are unable to agree with this contention. Though
the language of s. 2 might, in the abstract, be
susceptible of the con•struction which the petitioners
seek to put upon it, in the context that is not, in our
opinion, its true meaning. What is intended by that
section is that with reference to different topics of
legislation on which the several States in Part A had
enacted different statutes, the authority acting under
s. 2 ~hould have the discretion to extend that statute
in any of the Part A States which is best suited to
the conditions in the particular Part C State to which
it is to be extended, and that, further, the authority
should have the power to extend it with suitable
"restrictions and modifications". It could not have
been intended by this section that the authority
concerned should take upon itself to examine the
vires of each and every one of the provisions in the
statute, and then extend only such of them as it
considers to be valid. In our view, the expression
"enactment which is in force in a Part A State"
must be construed as meaning " statute which is in
operation in a Part A State" as distinct from a
statute which had been repealed and it cannot be
interpreted as having reference to individual sections
or provisions of a statute.
But even if we accept the narrow construction
contended for by the petitioners, that would not.
make any difference in the result, as the authority
conferred by s. 2 on the Government to extend the
enactments in force in Part A State includes a power
to do so with restrictions and modifications, and
it was within the competence of the Government acting
on thi~ provision to incorporate on its own authority
the impugned provisions by way of modification of the
Bengal FiI).ance ~Sales Tax) Act, 1941. It is said th~t.
58
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454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959]
r958
the notification does not, as a fact, purport to modify
. 1
the Bengal Act, but merely extends the whole of it on
M•t ·~.n Lal
a mistaken notion that it is all valid. But that does
The State of Ddhi not affect the position. The notification intends that
all the provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax)
Vsnkatarama
Act, 1941, should operate in the State of Delhi, and if
Aiyar J.
that could be effectuated by recourse being had to any
of the pmvers of the Legislature, that should be dofJ.e
and the legislation upheld as referable to that power.
U t res magis valeat quarn per eat~
It is lastly urged thats. 2 of the Part C States (Laws)
Act is bad for the reason that it confers on the Government a power to modify laws passed by State Legislatures, and that it is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative powers to authorise an outside authority to
modify a law enacted by a Legislature on wh~t are
essentially matters of policy. Now, it should be noted
that in In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc. (1) one of
the questions referred. for the opinion of this Court
related to the vires of this very provision, and the
answer of the majority of this Court was that the first
portion of the section, which is what is material for the
present discussion, was valid.
Counsel for the petiti6ners, however, relies on the decision of this Court in
Rajnarain Singh v. The Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna and another ('), wherein it was
held than an executive authority could be authorised
by a statute to modify either existing or future laws but
not in any essential feature, and that a modification
,
which involved a change of policy of the Act would be
bad. It is argued that it is a question of policy whether
taxes should be imposed on the supply of materials
in building contracts; and that, therefore, the power
conferred bys. 2 on the Government to extend a law
with modificii.tions cannot be exercised so as to modify
a/.ifroyision of the Beng:,t~ , Finance (Sales Tax) Act,
1941, rel.ating to that mat~e.r.,. ,The answer to this
contentior{ "is . that the' niodifi,cation made by the
Central GovetHment, assuming that tlia.t. is its true
character, does not.involve any chmige Of poricy iinderlying the Bengal Fi'nAnce '(Sales Tax) Act, 1941,." Incieed,
t}i.e .modification gi-i?es;'~,ff·~ct to the. policy of ~~a:t
. (1) [;951) S.C,R. j47.
(2) [1955) I S.C.R. 290"
.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
enactment .which was to bring· cbnstruction contracts
x958
within the ambit of the tax;a.tion powers of the State,
Mitha11 Lal
and which failed only for want ·of legislative authority.
v.
Whether we view the notification as one extending aTJwState of Delhi
subsisting statute to Delhi or as extending it with
modifications so far as the impugned provisions are
Venkatar!lma
concerned, it is intra vires s. 2.
·
Aiyar J.
• All the contentions urged by the petitioners having
failed, the petitions are dismissed with costs .
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Petitions dismissed~
J. K. CHAUDHURI
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v.
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H,, K. DATTA GUPT:k & OTlIERS'
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(BIIAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and A. K, SARKAR JJ.)
University of Gauhati, powers of-:-Principal dismissed by
Governing Body of College~If University can interfere-'---Gauhati
University Act (Ass. XV I of I947), ss. 2, 9, I2 and ZI, Statutes of
the University, els. I, 2 and 3.
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R was appointed Professor of Math'ematics in a College affiliated to the Gauhati University. He was later appointed Principal of the College.
On complaints being made against R the
Governing Body of the College held an enquiry artd or:dered his
dismissal as Principal and Professor of Mathematics. R made
representations to the Vice-Chancellor of the Gauhati University
and the Executive Council of the University appointed a committee to report on the propriety of the action taken. Upon the
report of the committee that there was no reasonable gro1V1d
justifying. the dismissal of R, the Executive Council passed ·a
resolution directing the Governing Body to reinstate R :
Held, that the Executive Council acted without jurisdiction
in so far as it interfered with the action taken against R as the
Principal of the College .. The Gauhati Universify Act, 1947, and
the Statutes framed under s. 21(g) thereof made a qistinction
between a Principal and a teacher. Clause 3(g)(v) ofthe Statutes
empowered the Executive Couqcil to interfere only with the action
taken by the Governing Body of an affiliated College against a
teach~ a·nd not with action taken against a Principal.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeal No.
321 of 1957. . .
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.April 7.