# MOHAMMAD KHAN & ORS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1972] 2 S.C.R. 152
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-10-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals ,Nos. 238 and 249 of 1965
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, I. D. DUA ANDS. C. Roy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mohammad-khan-ors-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-5507
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

/11c/ian Penal Cude, ss. 96 tu 106---Scopc-RiRht of Private de/c11ceExercisl' of the right n·/u:n justified.
B
The inhabitants of village S who were all Muslims were divided into
two groups.
The relations between them were very. muc.h strain~ : so
much so that one group ·felt compelled to leave that village and shift to a
new site for residence where they formed a new village called NS. The
C
old village S was thereafter called JS. Differences between the two groups,
however, remained unresolved and the bitterness did not abate.
On the
day of Id in February, 1965 residents of both the above villages went to
Sanwar Mosque for offering prayers.
The people from the old village
(JS) had to pass through the new village (NS) for going to the Mosque.
After the prayers when the inhabitants of JS were returning to their village
they were confronted by armed inhabitants of NS at the outskirts of their
village.
There were attacks and counter-attacks between the rival groups
D
belonging to the two villages resulting in casualties and a1so injuries to
several persons on both sides. This occurrence gave rise to two crdss-cases
and both groups were separately tried by the same Judge. The prosecution
succeeded in securing conviction of some accused persons in both the
cases. The plea of the right of private defence raised by both sides was
rejected.
On appeal in the High Court both sides repeated their plea df selfE
defence which was negatived.
On appeal by special leave.
HELD: (i) the people of village JS had a right to for prayers to
Sanwar Mosque on the day of Id and merely because the only route to the
Mosque passed through village NS the inhabitants of which were inimical
towards them, they could not be deprived of the right to use that route.
F
When in the lawful and bonafide exercise of their right to go back from
the Mosque to their village by that route the inhabitants of village JS were
confronted by the inhabitants of village NS who, armed with dangerous
weapons, were waiting for them,. they were fu1ly justified in using force in
defending themselves against unlawful aggression.
When enacting ss. 96 to l 06. l.P.C. the legislature clearly intendod to
arouse and encourage manly spirit Of self-defence amongst the citizens,
G
when faced with grave danger.
The right of private defence is designed
to serve a social purpose and deserves to be fostered within the prescribed
Jimits. On the facts and circumstances of the case the people from villages
.JS are held to have justifiably exercised the right of self defence and the
appeal is allowed and the appellaots (Cr. A. No. 204 of 1967) acquitted.
[ 160 B]
(ii). As regards the other appeal (Cr. A. No. ~3/68) since the people
H
from village NS were agl?l"essors, they had no right of p·rivate defence
against the people from village JS and accordingly Cr. A. No. 83/68 fails
and is dismis.sed.
A
MOHD. KHAN v. M.P. STATE (Dua, /.)
153
G. V. S. Subramanyam v. State of A.P., A.LR. 1970 S.C. 1079, rdferr·
eel tn.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal Appeals
N9s. 204 of 1967 and 83 of 1968.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
B February 27, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore
Bench m Criminal Appeals ,Nos. 238 and 249 of 1965.
R. L. Kohli, for the appel!ants (in Cr. A. No. 204 of 1967).
Ganpat E.ai and S. K. Sabharwal, for the appellants in Cr. A.
C
No. 83 of 1968).
M. N. Shroff and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (in both
the appeals).

## Text

152
MOHAMMAD KHAN & ORS.
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
October 21, 1971
(J. M. SHELAT, I. D. DUA ANDS. C. Roy, JJ.]
/11c/ian Penal Cude, ss. 96 tu 106---Scopc-RiRht of Private de/c11ceExercisl' of the right n·/u:n justified.
B
The inhabitants of village S who were all Muslims were divided into
two groups.
The relations between them were very. muc.h strain~ : so
much so that one group ·felt compelled to leave that village and shift to a
new site for residence where they formed a new village called NS. The
C
old village S was thereafter called JS. Differences between the two groups,
however, remained unresolved and the bitterness did not abate.
On the
day of Id in February, 1965 residents of both the above villages went to
Sanwar Mosque for offering prayers.
The people from the old village
(JS) had to pass through the new village (NS) for going to the Mosque.
After the prayers when the inhabitants of JS were returning to their village
they were confronted by armed inhabitants of NS at the outskirts of their
village.
There were attacks and counter-attacks between the rival groups
D
belonging to the two villages resulting in casualties and a1so injuries to
several persons on both sides. This occurrence gave rise to two crdss-cases
and both groups were separately tried by the same Judge. The prosecution
succeeded in securing conviction of some accused persons in both the
cases. The plea of the right of private defence raised by both sides was
rejected.
On appeal in the High Court both sides repeated their plea df selfE
defence which was negatived.
On appeal by special leave.
HELD: (i) the people of village JS had a right to for prayers to
Sanwar Mosque on the day of Id and merely because the only route to the
Mosque passed through village NS the inhabitants of which were inimical
towards them, they could not be deprived of the right to use that route.
F
When in the lawful and bonafide exercise of their right to go back from
the Mosque to their village by that route the inhabitants of village JS were
confronted by the inhabitants of village NS who, armed with dangerous
weapons, were waiting for them,. they were fu1ly justified in using force in
defending themselves against unlawful aggression.
When enacting ss. 96 to l 06. l.P.C. the legislature clearly intendod to
arouse and encourage manly spirit Of self-defence amongst the citizens,
G
when faced with grave danger.
The right of private defence is designed
to serve a social purpose and deserves to be fostered within the prescribed
Jimits. On the facts and circumstances of the case the people from villages
.JS are held to have justifiably exercised the right of self defence and the
appeal is allowed and the appellaots (Cr. A. No. 204 of 1967) acquitted.
[ 160 B]
(ii). As regards the other appeal (Cr. A. No. ~3/68) since the people
H
from village NS were agl?l"essors, they had no right of p·rivate defence
against the people from village JS and accordingly Cr. A. No. 83/68 fails
and is dismis.sed.
A
MOHD. KHAN v. M.P. STATE (Dua, /.)
153
G. V. S. Subramanyam v. State of A.P., A.LR. 1970 S.C. 1079, rdferr·
eel tn.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal Appeals
N9s. 204 of 1967 and 83 of 1968.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
B February 27, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore
Bench m Criminal Appeals ,Nos. 238 and 249 of 1965.
R. L. Kohli, for the appel!ants (in Cr. A. No. 204 of 1967).
Ganpat E.ai and S. K. Sabharwal, for the appellants in Cr. A.
C
No. 83 of 1968).
M. N. Shroff and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (in both
the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J.
These
two appeals by special leave arise out of
D
common judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which
disposed of two criminal appeals by two rival factions belong·
ing to two different villages situated at a small distance from
each other which were involved in the occurrence in question
dated February 4, 1965.
E
Village Siloda in Tehsil Sanwer, district Indore was inhabited by Muslims but it was divided into two gtoups, the rela·
lions between whom were strained and differences rose to such
a pitch that one group felt compelled to leave the village and
shift to a ne\Y site for their residence. The new village formed
by this group was called Naya Siloda.
The original
village
F
Siloda was thereafter given ~he name of Juna Siloda. It appears
that in spite of the departure of one group for Naya Siloda the
differences between the tw.o groups
remained unresolved and
the bitterness did not abate.
The two villages virtually became
inimical to each other. The animosity between the two villages
was not confined to any specified
individuals but the entire
G population of each village considered itseJf as the enemy of the
entire population of the other.
The incident giving rise to the two cross-cases which are
the subject matter of the two appeals before us took place on
February 4, 1965 which was the day of Id.
Many people had
11 collected at Sanwer mosque to offer their prayers and the residents of the two Silodas had also gone there in the morning.
They met at the prayer time but they apparently remained peaceful at that auspicious moment.
Some evidence' does seem to
11-L256SuJ).Cll72
15 4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
hav.e been led suggesting that some threats were given
by the
A
inhabitatants of J una Siloda to the inhabitants of Naya Siloda.
According to the High Court it was not possibUe to base a firm
conclusion in support of this allegation.
After the prayer was
over the inhabitants of Juna Siloda on their way back to their
village had· to pass through Naya Siloda. In the opinion of the
High Court the residents of Juna Siloda had gone to Sanwer in
B
a cart with children and weapons.
The inhabitants of Naya
Siloda also went there but it was a matter of controversy whether
they too had weapons with them.
After the conclusion of the
prayer the Naya Siloda people with weapons in their hands were
found waiting on the route at a small distance from their village.
The inhabitants of Juna Siloda, after sending their children in advance, back to the village, came by the same route and
were confronted by the Naya Siloda people on the outskirts of
their village. At that spot two old men out of the inhabitants
c
of Juna Siloda, namely, Rasul Khan and Nazim Khan, got down
from the carts and proceeded to pacify the inhabitants of Naya
Siloda and to plead with them to !iv~ peacefully.
Without giv0
ing any definite finding as to whether these two persons were
challenged by the inhabitants of Naya Siloda, according to the
High Court, there was an attack and a counter-attack in which
fire arms .were used by the inhabitants of Naya Siloda.
The
inhabitants of Juna Siloda also got down from the carts and
killed Latif Khan of the opposite faction and seriously injured
several other members of the Naya Siloda group.
The inhabiE
tants of Naya Siloda also killed Majid and Yasin of the Juna
Siloda group and injured several others, the number of the injured on both sides being almost equal.
Amongst the injured
on the Naya Siloda side were Abdul Karim, Amir Khan, Chhote
Khan son of Ramzan, Garu Khan, Chhote Khan son of Latif,
Kallu Khan and Munshi Khan.
Amongst the rival faction the
F
persons seriously injured were Roshan Khan, Manjoor Hussain,
Abdul Kadar,
Mohammad Khan,
Najini Khan,
Kallu Khan
and Faqru.
These injured persons were on both sides in addition to those who had lost their lives.
The persons out of the
group from J una Siloda who were arrested after investigation
were charged, under· s. 302, 1.P.C. for the muder of Latif Khan,
and under s. 148, I.P.C. for being members of the
unlawful
assembly which had the common object of committing the murder of Latif Khan and of causing injuries to the inhabitants of
Naya Siloda.
They were further charged under s. 307, I.P.C.
G
for attelmpting to commit murder of the
persons mentioned
earlier tQ have been seriously injured.
Charges under ss. 302
and 307, I.P.C. read with s. 149, I.P.C. were also framed
in
H
the alternative for the offences for which charges under ss. 302
and 307, I.P.C. were framed.
8
c
D
E
F
MOHD. KHAN ii. M.P. STATE (Dua, J.)
155
The inhabitants of Naya Siloda who were arrested and pttt
up for trial were charged for the murder of Yasin Khan and
Majid Khan under s. 302, I.P .C.
and also charged under
s. 148, l.P.C. with the common object of murdering and causing hurt to the people of Juna Siloda. They were also in addition charged under s. 307, l.P.C. for committing the murder of
the people mentioned earlier to have received serious injuries.
In their case too charge on identical lines under ss. 302 and 307,
l.P.C. read with s. 149, l.P.C. was framed in the
alternative
for the offences which were the subject of charge under ss. 302
·and 307, I.P.C.
The two trials were held by the same Judge.
In the trial
of the accused from Juna Siloda, Mohammad Khan, Roshan
Khan, Rasul Khan, Munshi Khan, Mohd. Hussain, Chhote Khan,
Kallu Khan, Shakoor, Nazim, Faqru Khan and Manjoor Hussain
were convicted under s. 302 read with s. 149, I.P.C .. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life.
The charge under s.
148, I.P.C. was also proved and on this count they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years.
Chhote Khan
was convicted under s. 325, l.P.C.
and sentenced to
three
years'
rigorous
imprisonment.
Mohammad Hussain,
Chitu
Khan, Mahrat and Mohammad Khan were also convicted under
s. 323, I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six
months each.
Kallu was convicted under s. 324, I.P .C. and
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. - All the sentences were to run concurrently.
All the accused were acquitted of the substantive offences under ss. 302 and 307 and also
under s. 307 read with s. 149, I.P.C.
In the case against the accused from N aya Siloda all of them
were convicted under s. 302 read with s. 149, I.P.C. for the murder of Yasin Khan and Majid and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life.
They were further held guilty of the offence
under s. 148, I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
two years each.
Kallu Khan and Abdul Karim were also convicted under s. 326, I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
Amir Khan was convicted of an offence
G
under s. 324, l.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
one year. Chhote Khan son of Ramjan and Gammu Khan were
in addition sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months
each under s. 323, I.P.C. All the sentence' in their case were
also to run concurrently.
H
The High Court first considered the case against the accuse~
from Juna Siloda.
The only point raised on their behalf was that
they had a right of private defence and whatever injuries were
inflicted by them were in the exercise of that right.
According
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
to their case they carried the weapons because they were always
A
in ain apprehension of assault from the inhabitants of Naya
Siloda.
It may be pointed out that the trial court
had not
accepted the right of private defence pleaded by either side and
according to that court this was a case of free. fight there being
no occasion for the exercise of the right of private defence on
the part of either faction. It was on this basis that both parties
B
were convicted as already stated.
After considering the arguments addressed .before it the High Court considered one basic
fact to be clear that none of the witnesses had seen how the
assault had started and all that could be said was that somehow
the quarrel did start between the two factions.
The fight had
taken place on the cart track and both groups which were inimi- c
cal to each other met there when they had arms with them and
they both were seen assaulting their opponents. The High Court,
after considering the evidence on the record and the circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that the object of
Juna Siloda people was to chastise the Naya Siloda people and
this appeared. to ·be evident from the circumstance that they had
sent back their children earlier and they took the path through
D
Naya Siloda. Since they were aware of the inimical attitude of
the people of N aya Si!oda through which village they had to pass
and there was no question of J una Siloda people being taken
unawares while passing through Naya Siloda, according to the
High Court, there was no question of any right of private defence being available to the people of Juna Siloda.
The High
E
Court further observed that the right of private defence, if at
all available, must be claimable by all members of the group
and there was no question of considering the case of each individual accused for the purpose of determining this right apart
from the entire assembly.
After so holding the High Court
considered the case of. each member of the group from J una
F
Silo1:Ia for determining whether he was present at the spot as a
member of the assembly. Holding them all to be present their
appeal was dismissed.
The High Court similarly dealt with the appeal presented
by Naya Siloda group.
In that Court's view the mere failure
of .the accused from Juna Siloda to satisfactorily prove their
G
right of self-defence could not serve to clothe the accused from
Naya Siloda with such a right.
The two cases having been
tried separately each case, according to the High Court, had to
be decided on the facts established on its record with the result
that in the appeal of the Naya Siloda group they had independently to prove that ·Juna Siloda people were the aggressors and
the Naya Siloda group were, therefore, entitled to claim the right
of private defence.
After considering the evidence in the case
H
the High Court came to the conclusion that the Naya Siloda
A
B
MOHD. KHAN v. M.P. STATE (Dua, J.)
157
people had gathered under the Kabit tree on the road by which
the J una Siloda people were
returning from Sanwer to their
village after the prayers. The Naya Siloda people had not gone
to Sanwer with arms but had returned to their village after Id
prayers a little earlier and after collecting the arms had gathered
under the Kabit tree waiting for the Juna Siloda people to come.
In these circumstances the Naya Siloda people were also held
disentitled to claim any right of private defence. According to
the High Court if Naya Siloda people had merely assembled
inside their village for self-defence appreb,endipg aggression on
the part of Juna Siloda people then they might have been able
to put forward the plea of self-defence. But having gone out of
c their village fully armed and gathered on the road under the
K abit tree which was the only route for the carts of JU)la Siloda
people when returning to their village from the Mosque the plea
of self-defence could by no means be open to them. The Naya
Siloda people, according to the High Court, on the cireumstances
of the case could also have approached the police with a comD plaint that they were apprehending assault from the J una Siloda
people who were armed with dangerous weapons and were to
pass through their village on the return journey from the Mosque.
Negativing, the claim to the right of private defence on the part
of the Naya Siloda people their appeal was also dismissed by
the High Court. In the concluding portion of its judgment the
E
High Court observed that the trial court had erroneously acquitted some members of the unlawful assemblies for offences under
s. 302, I.P.C. because by virtue of s. 149, I.e.c. they weie- all
liable to be committed pursuant to the common object of the
assembly. But there being no appeal against acquittal the High
Court was content merely with this observation.
In this Court Shri R. L. Kohli addressed elaborate . arguF ments on behalf of the appellants from Ju,na Siloda
(Cr!.
A.
No. 204 of 1967). According to the counsel right of private
defence had been fully established on the record so far as his
clients are concerned and the courts below have misread the
evidence while considering the plea of private defence.
Great
emphasis was laid on the fact that Majid and. Yasin out of the
G appellants' group had been killed and it was thereafter that the
appellants used their weapons in exercise of their right of private
defence.
The counsel drew our &ttention to the following
passage from the judgment of the High Court in which the right
of private defence on the part of the Naya Siloda people was
negatived:
H
"There is also the story of Rasulkhan and Najimkhan going to pacify them. . Whether this is true or
not is not very material for this case. They got down,
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 2 S.C.R.
'
they got injured in the fight that took place.
Therefore there cannot be any question of self-defence for
the Naya Siloda people in general when we .find that
they had gathered under the Kabit tree on the road by
which the carts w.ere going. These people did not go
to Sanwer with arms.
They came to
Naya Siloda
earlier, collected the arms and waited for Juna Siloda
people to come.
Under these
circumstances
Naya
Siloda peoplt: cannot claim any right of private defence
though the J una Siloda people may or · may not be
having a right of self-defence."
B.
The counsel laid emphasis on the fact that, according to the
C
High Court, the J una Siloda people had not gone to Sanwer
with arnis whereas the Naya Siloda people had returned earlier
to their own village, and after collecting the arms lay in wait for
the J una Siloda people to come: thereafter when the two unarmed men from
th~ group of Juna Siloda people got down
from their cart they were injured.
On this premise, according
to the counsel, the J una Siloda people were clearly entitled to
D·
protect themselves against the aggressive assault by the Naya
Siloda people. Shri Kohli drew our attention to the evidence of
Kallu Khan (P.W. 16) of Naya Siloda who was himself injured
during the occurrence.
According to him Latif Khan was armed with a gun and had fired three or four shots and it was thereafter that he was surrounded by the people from Juna Siloda
&
and beaten with dharia and farsi.
According to counsel Latif
Khan was clearly assaulted after he had used his gun against
the inhabitants of Juna Siloda and therefore they were entitled
to plead the right of private defence. Reference was also made
to the evidence of Munshi Khan of Naya Siloda (P .W. 18).
AccordiQg to him a woman handed over a gun to Latif Khan
which he used against the people of Juna Siloda.
Latif Khan,
according to this witness, was surrounded when he had exhausted his ammunition.
This according to the counsel, also supports the .,Plea of private defence on the part of the inhabitants
of Juna Siloda.
The coul)sel, however,
seems to us to have
ignored that part of the statement of this witness where he says
y
that the people of Juna Siloda were already assaulting the party
G
of the witness with lathis.
Shri Kohli then submitted that there is no evidence on the record justifying the observation of the High Court that the people
of Juna Siloda had sent back their children earlier.
He added
that the evidence of some other prosecution witnesses, according
to whom the Juna Siloda people had passed .through Naya Siloda
H
on. their way to the Mosque in the morning with various danger0us weapons, is wholly incredible and untrustworthy.
A
MOIID, KHAN v. M.P. STATE (Dua, I.)
159
The Iearned counsel for the State conceded that in this case
there was no evidence
that the children had been sent away
earlier by the people of Juna Siloda, In fact evidence to this
effect was only led in the counter-case which admittedly could
not be used in the present case. He referred us to the judgment
of the High Court where it is stated that the Juna Siloda p•wple
B knew that the only route was through Naya Siloda and they
should have, therefore, avoided the cart track. The High Court,
after so observing, proceeded:
c
D
E
"It was not incumbent for them to come by carts
only. It is not that Sanwer was at a long distance so
that they could not go without a cart.
We are not
considering the case of a person ignorant of the situation.
We are considering the facts with the background of mutual hostile relationship. It was
such
that the parties could not live in the village and the
authorities were forced to find out a different place to
live. It is true that there is evidence that there was a
tree over the Nala on the other route so that carts
might not go, but if one did not want to fight which
was inevitable in that route one would have avoided
going through N aya Siloda.
We are not saying that
the law teaches us cowardice but law does not encourage bravado.
The right of self-defence only arises if
the apprehension is unexpected and one is taken unawares.
If one enters into an inevitable danger with
the fullest intimation before hand and· goes there armed to fight out, the right cannot be claimed.
Under
these circumstances we do not think that Juna Siloda
people had any right of private defence."
F We find it difficult to agree with this approach of the High Court.
The peo11le of J una Siloda had a right to go for
prayer to
Sanwer on the day of Id and merely because the only route passed through Naya Siloda the
people of which were
inimical
towards them, it cannot deprive them of their right to use that
route for going to Sanwer. If while exercising that right they
G were attached without justification, the right of private defence
cannot be denied to them.
And then the Juna Siloda people
having gone to Sanwer for Id prayers in their carts, they had to
come back with their carts, which they could not be expected
to leave behind, merely because there was an apprehension ia
their mind that on their way back the Naya Siloda people were
H
likely to confront them.
The only cart-route being the one that
passed through Naya Siloda they had no alternative except to
use that route.
When in the lawful and bona fide exercise of
the right to go back to their village in their carts by that route
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972J 2 S.C.R.
they were confronted by the Naya Siloda people who were armed
A
with dangerous weapons and were waiting for them, they were
fully justiped in using force to defend themselves against unlawful aggression.
When enacting ss. 96 to 106 of Indian Penal
Code, excepting from its penal provisions, certain classes of acts,
done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful aggression, the legislature clearly intended to r.rouse and encourage
B
the manly spirit of self-defence amongst the citizens, when faced
with grave danger.
The law does not require a law-abiding
citizen to behave like a coward when confronted with an imminent unlawful aggression.
As repeatedly observed by this Court
there is nothing more degrading to the human spirit than to run
away in face of danger:
G. V. S.
Subramanyam v.
State of c
Andhra Pradesh( 1). The right of private defence is thus designed to serve a social purpose and deserves to be fostered within
the prescribed limits.
Not only is the approach of the High
Court erroneous in law but the High Court also wrongly held
without any evidence that the J una Siloda people had earlier
sent back their children by another route for the purpose of having a confrontation with the Naya Siloda people. We, however,
must not be understood to endorse the view of the High Court
D
that the Jact of Juna Siloda people having actually sent back
their children would, if true, have deprived them of the right of
private defence while lawfully going back to their home by the.
route through Naya Siloda. However, once the above approach of
the High Court is held to be erroneous and it is also part of the
E
Juna Siloda people to arm themselves for confrontation, the only
permissible conclusion open· on the
record is that the
J una
Siloda people had used force only in justifiably exercising their
right of private defence. It may be recalled that the Naya
Siloda people had returned from the prayers early and gone out
of their village after equipping themselves with arms in order to
F
wait for confrontating the Juna Siloda people on their way back
home from their Id prayers. It was nobody's case before us that
if there was the right of private defence, it was exceeded by the
Juna Siloda 11eople.
We have, therefore, no hesitation in allowing this appeal and acquitting the appellants which we hereby
do.
G
On the view taken by us in Cr!. A. No. 204 of 1967, the
other appeal (Cr!. A. 83 of 1968) presents no difficulty. Having known the origin of the conflict about which there is no
contrary finding in Cr!. A. No. 83 of 1968 it cannot but be held
that the people of N aya Siloda were the aggressors and they had
no right of private defence against the people of Juna Siloda.
H
Indeed, the learned counsel for the appellant in Cr!. A. No. 83
(I) A.LR. 1970 S.C. 1079 at 1087.
t
MOHD. KHAN v. M.P. STATE (Dua, !.)
161
A
of 1968, Shri Ganpat Rai, did not put forward any serious or
sustained argument that the appellants from N aya Siloda were
compelled to use force to defend themselves against unlawful
aggression.
Naturally there was no argument in regard to the
guilt of any individual appellant nor was any argument addressed
on the question of sentence.
Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1968
rl
must, therefore, fail and the same is hereby dismissed.
Cr. A. No, 204 of 1967 allowed.
S.N.
Cr. A. No. 83 of 1968 dismissed.