# MOHD. DHANA ALI KHAN v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

- **Citation:** [1975] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 124
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-08-23
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 17 of 1975
- **Bench:** N. L. Untwal!A, s. MURTAZA FAzAL Au
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mohd-dhana-ali-khan-v-state-of-west-bengal-6446
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971-Whether a single incident of
their in a running train at night had nexus with disturbance of public orders. 14-:..-Jflhether confers a disc1-'etionary power on the ·Central (;overnn1ent to
revoke or n?odify an order-Detaid;ng authority had other tnaterial before hini
at the tilne Of passing the order-Whether vitiates the order of detention.
The petitioner was detained under the provisions of the Maintenance o{ Internal Security Act, 1971. In a petition under Att. 32 of the Constitution the
petitioner contended that a single incid.~nt of theft committed in a train had no
nexus with the disturbance of public order, (2) that under S. 14 of the Act it
was open to the Central Government to revoke or modify the order of detcution and, therefore, there must be some material to shov.• that the Government
of India applied its mind under S. 14 of the Act and (3) that the District
l\.fagistrate was not only influenced by the grounds served on the petitioner but
also by other materials on the record and as: such the order of detention \Vas
vitiated.
Allowing the petition,
HELD ; ( 1) The ground mentioned in the order of detention did ha Ye a
nexus with the disturbance of public order. It is true that the ground contained a
single incident of theft of valuable property from some passengers travelling
in a running train and may amount to robbery. But that did not by itself take
the· case out of the purview of the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act. The allegation was tliat the petitioner had snatched away a wTist
watch and a gold chain after putting the passengers of the compartn1ent to fear
of death. Secondly, the theft had taken place at night in a running train in a
third class compartment. The effect of it would be to deter peaceful citizens
from travelling in trains at night.
This would undoubtedly disturb th'! even
tempo of the life of the community.
[126D to F]
(2) There is no material on record to show that the Central Government
did not apply its mind at all under S. 14 of the Act. Section 14 nlercly confers
a discretion on the Central Gove'fnment to revoke or modify an order of detention made by the State Government. It does not confer any right or privilege
on the detenu. It is for the Central Government to revoke' or modify after the
report was submitted to it. The mere fact that the Central Government did not
choose to revoke or modify the order of detention without anything more cannot necessarily lead to the irresistible inference that the Central Governn1ent
failed to apply its nlind. It cannot, therefore, b'! said that as the Central Government did not apply its mind under S. 14 of the Act, lhis \vould invalidate the
order of detention.
[126G-H & 127A]
(3) The order of detention suffers from. a veTy serious infirmity \vhich goes
to the root of the matter. The District Magistra!e was influenced not only by the
ground which was served on the petitioner but alsO by other materials on the
record. The history sheet of the detenu which was placed before the District
Magistrate had been produced and it could be seen from it that there were four
incidents, many -of which related to thefts in running 1rains. It is true that in
another place in his affidavit the District Magistrate had stated that he was
satisfied only on the_ basis of the incident mentioned in the gro!Jnd served .on
the petitioner. But this was contradictory to what he had stated tn the op_en1ng
paragrfiph of the counter-affidavit.
The District Magistrate, before passing the
order of.detention, had other materials also before him. It cannot, therefore, be
- '
•
D. A. KHAN v. WEST BENGAL (Fazal Ali, J.)
125
said to \\-'hat extent the District Magistrate \Vas infh.i.enced by the other mateA
rials and not by the material which is mentioned in the ground of detention.
[127E-.GJ
K!wdiram Das v. State of West Bengal, AJ.R. 1975 S. C. 550, referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 17 of 1975.
Peti

## Text

t
124
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MOHD. DHANA ALI KHAN
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
April, 11, 1975
[N. L. UNTWAL!A AND s. MURTAZA FAzAL Au, JJ.]
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971-Whether a single incident of
their in a running train at night had nexus with disturbance of public orders. 14-:..-Jflhether confers a disc1-'etionary power on the ·Central (;overnn1ent to
revoke or n?odify an order-Detaid;ng authority had other tnaterial before hini
at the tilne Of passing the order-Whether vitiates the order of detention.
The petitioner was detained under the provisions of the Maintenance o{ Internal Security Act, 1971. In a petition under Att. 32 of the Constitution the
petitioner contended that a single incid.~nt of theft committed in a train had no
nexus with the disturbance of public order, (2) that under S. 14 of the Act it
was open to the Central Government to revoke or modify the order of detcution and, therefore, there must be some material to shov.• that the Government
of India applied its mind under S. 14 of the Act and (3) that the District
l\.fagistrate was not only influenced by the grounds served on the petitioner but
also by other materials on the record and as: such the order of detention \Vas
vitiated.
Allowing the petition,
HELD ; ( 1) The ground mentioned in the order of detention did ha Ye a
nexus with the disturbance of public order. It is true that the ground contained a
single incident of theft of valuable property from some passengers travelling
in a running train and may amount to robbery. But that did not by itself take
the· case out of the purview of the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act. The allegation was tliat the petitioner had snatched away a wTist
watch and a gold chain after putting the passengers of the compartn1ent to fear
of death. Secondly, the theft had taken place at night in a running train in a
third class compartment. The effect of it would be to deter peaceful citizens
from travelling in trains at night.
This would undoubtedly disturb th'! even
tempo of the life of the community.
[126D to F]
(2) There is no material on record to show that the Central Government
did not apply its mind at all under S. 14 of the Act. Section 14 nlercly confers
a discretion on the Central Gove'fnment to revoke or modify an order of detention made by the State Government. It does not confer any right or privilege
on the detenu. It is for the Central Government to revoke' or modify after the
report was submitted to it. The mere fact that the Central Government did not
choose to revoke or modify the order of detention without anything more cannot necessarily lead to the irresistible inference that the Central Governn1ent
failed to apply its nlind. It cannot, therefore, b'! said that as the Central Government did not apply its mind under S. 14 of the Act, lhis \vould invalidate the
order of detention.
[126G-H & 127A]
(3) The order of detention suffers from. a veTy serious infirmity \vhich goes
to the root of the matter. The District Magistra!e was influenced not only by the
ground which was served on the petitioner but alsO by other materials on the
record. The history sheet of the detenu which was placed before the District
Magistrate had been produced and it could be seen from it that there were four
incidents, many -of which related to thefts in running 1rains. It is true that in
another place in his affidavit the District Magistrate had stated that he was
satisfied only on the_ basis of the incident mentioned in the gro!Jnd served .on
the petitioner. But this was contradictory to what he had stated tn the op_en1ng
paragrfiph of the counter-affidavit.
The District Magistrate, before passing the
order of.detention, had other materials also before him. It cannot, therefore, be
- '
•
D. A. KHAN v. WEST BENGAL (Fazal Ali, J.)
125
said to \\-'hat extent the District Magistrate \Vas infh.i.enced by the other mateA
rials and not by the material which is mentioned in the ground of detention.
[127E-.GJ
K!wdiram Das v. State of West Bengal, AJ.R. 1975 S. C. 550, referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 17 of 1975.
Petition' Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
R. K. Jain-for the petitioner.
Sukumar Ghosh and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondcni.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byFAZAL ALI, J .-The petitioner assails
the order
of detention
.passed against him on August 23, 1973 by the Distmt Magistrate,
24 Parganas. A report was sent ily the District Magistrate to the Government on August 27, 1973 a.id the detention was approved by the
Government on 30th Angust, 1973. On
September 10, 1973 the
detenu made a representation to the Government which was rejected
on September 12, 1973. 'Thereafter the matter was referred to the Advisory Board and after obtaining its opinion the order of detention was
confirmed by the Government on November 14, 1973. We might a!So
state that a report to the Cen:ral Government was al5o made immediately after the order of detention was passed.
Mr. R. K. Jain appearing for the petitioner as amicus curiae has
been of much assistance to us and has advanced five contentions before
us. In the first place he submitted that there was sufficient defav on
the part of the District Magistrate in submitting his report to the Government and the explanation. given by him is not convincing. In the
counter affidavit, however, the District Magistrate has explained that
he had to pass almost eight orders of detention on the 23rd August
and all of them had to be typed out and as 26th August which was a
Sunday had intervened, it was not possible for him to send the report
to the Government earlier. In the circumstances, we arc· satisfied that
the explanation given by the District Magistrate in his affidavit is convincing and satisfactory. In Writ Petition
No. 23 of 1975 (Gopal
Manda! v. State of West Bengal decided on 9th April, 1975) an identical explanation was given by tfie District Magistrate which was upheld by this, Court. For· this reason, the first contention raised by
learned counsel is over-ruled.
It was next argued that the order of the Government rejecting the
representation of the petitioner is not a speaking order and therefore
· the detention is illegal. This matter appears to be concluded by a decision of this Court in John Martin v. State of West Bengal(') following Hardan Shah's case where a a similar argument put forward by
this Court was rejected outright. This .contention of the learned counsel
does not therefore survive.
'
It was next contended that the ground of detention, served on him
amounted to a single incident ,a,nd had no causal connection with the
(l) Judgement in W.P. No, 467/74 dt. 21-i-1975
B
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SUPRE¥E COURT REPORTS
[1975] SUPP •. S.C.R.
A
disturbance of the public order. The ,ground served on the petition
was as follows :
B
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"That on 3-8-1973 between 21-10 and
21-20 hrs. you and
your associates being armed with daggers boarded a 3rd
class compartment ot SL 257 Up train of E. Rly. Sealdah
Division at Gocharan R. S. and putting the passengers of
the compartment to fear of death snatched away a wrist
watch and a gold necklace from one Nirmal Chatterjee
and his wife in between Gocharan and Surajpur R. Ss.
you then decamped with booty from the running train at
Suryapur R. S.
Your action caused confusion, panic and
disturbed
public
order there then.
You have thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the mainte-
'·
nance of public order."
' I
D From a perusal of this we are unable to accept the contention of the
petitioner that this ground has no nexus with the disturbance of public
order. It is true that the ground contains a single incident of theft of
valuable property from some passengers travelling in a running train
and may amount to robbery. But that does not by itself take the case
, E
out of the purview of the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act. There are two pertinent facts which emerge from the
grounds which must be noted. In the first place the allegation is that
the petitioner had snatched away a wrist watch and a gold chain after
putting the passengers of the compartment to fear of death. Secondly,
the theft had taken place at night in a running train in a third class
•F
compartment and the effect of it would be to deter peaceful citizens
from travelling in trains at night and this would undoubtedly disturb
the even tempo of the life of the community. For tbese reasons we
are satisfied that the ground mentioned in the order did have a nexm
with the disturbance of public order.
G
The fourth contention put forward was · that under s.14 of me
Maintenance of Internal Security Act it was open to the Central Government to revoke or modify the order of detention after receiving a
repon from the State Govermnent and therefore there must be some
material to show that the Government of India applied its mind under
'section 14. In the first place s.14 merely confers a discretion on the
H Central Government to revoke or modify an order of detention made
by the State· Govermnent. It does not confer any right or privilege on
the detenu. It is for the Central Govermnent to revoke or modify after
tbe report is submitted to it. The mere fact that the Central Government does not choose to revoke or mooify the order of detention without anything more cannot necessarily lead to the irresistible inference
that the Central Government failed to apply its mind. So far as the
State Govermnent is concerned. its duty comes to an end after' it has
sent a repon regarding the detention order to the Central Government.
In these circumstances, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination
that as Central Government did not apply its mind under section 14
of the Act, this would invalidate the order ~f-detention. There is no
!
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,D. A. KHAN v. WEST BENGAL (Fazal Ali, J.)
1 27
material before us to show that the Central Government did not apply
A
its mind at all under section 14 of the Act. The argument on this score
't
is, therefore, n;jected.
Lastly, it was contended that it would appear from the affidavit ·
filed by the District Magistrate that while detaining the petitioner the
B
District Magistrate was not only influenced by the ground served on
the petitioner but also by other materials on the record. In paragraph
5 of the counter affidavit the District Magistrate stated as follows:-
·1 >Uy that l matle the detention orde7
after being bou~ ·
fide satisfied from the materials on record (relating to the c
detention of the detenu) that with a view to preventing
the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order it is ne~essary to detain him
under the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. I further say that the ground furnished to
the detenu is the only ground on which I based my satisD
faction for making the detention order."
It would, thus appear that the District Magistrate has taken a contradictory stand. A close perusal of .his counter affidavit would disclose
that he was influenced not only by the ground which was served on the
petitioner but' also by other materials on the record. The history sheet
E
of the detenu which was placed before the District Magistrate has been
produced before us and we find that there were as many as four incidents many of whi,ch relate to thefts in running trains. It is true that
in another place in his affidavit, the District Magistrate has stated that
he was satisfied only on the basis of the incident mentioned in the
F
ground served on the petitioner. But this is contradictory to what he
has stated in the opening paragraph 5 of the counter atlidavit. In these
circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the District Magistrate
before passing the order of detention had other material also before
him. It cannot be said to what extent the District Magistrate was influenced
by
the
other materials
and
not by the
material, G
which is mentioned in the ground of detention. Thus the order of detention suffers from a very serious infirmity which goes to the root of
the matter. The libe11y of the subject being an extremely precious right,
where .any infraction of such a right is involved the court must act· as
a watch-dog and a sentinel on the qui vive to see that every benefit
of the lacunae goes to the detenu. We are fortified in our view by reaH
son of the decision of this Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West
Benga/(1) where their Lordships observed as follows!-
"It is, therefore, not orily the right of the court, but also its
duty as well to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detainincr
authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The jud~
cial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of
the detaining authority that it has taken
into account
only certain basic facts and materials and though other
-~--------'
(I) A.I.R.1975 S.C. 550
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128
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] SUPP. S.C.R,
basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to
influence its
satisfaction.
The Court is
entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and
determine for itself whether there were any other basic
facts of materials apart from those admitted by it, which
could. have reasonably
influenced the
decision of the
detaining authority and for that purpose, the Conrt can
,certainly require the detaining authority to produce and
make available to the Court the entire record of the case
which was before it. That is the least the Court can do
to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority."
·
Learned counsel appearing for the State
justified the order of
detention on the ground that there is an express statement made by
the District Magistrate that he was satisfied only on the incident mentioned in the ground of detention. This argument however is not tenD ·able because it is not supported by a perusal of the affidavit filed by
the District Magistrate as a whole. We are therefore of the opinion
that the order of detention must be set aside and the petitioner be set
at liberty forthwith. The application is accordingly allowed and the
rule is made absolute.
P.B.R.
Appeal allowed .
..
..