# MOHD. SHAFI v. SEVENTH ADDITIONAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE ALLAHABAD & ORS

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 464
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-12-16
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mohd-shafi-v-seventh-additional-district-sessions-judge-allahabad-ors-7059
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

U.P. Urban Buildi11gs (Regulation of Le/ling, Rent and Eviction) Actfin2Sec. 2! (I) expla11ation (iv )-Interpretation of a benevolent legislarion-When
two views possible-Whether to be construed strictly against the landlordMeaning of "building" in explanation (iv)-Whether Unit of accommodationConstitu:ion-Articles 226-227-Whether High Court can interfere with mixed
questions of law a11d facts.
Respondent No. 3 owned a double storey house. There were two tenements
on the ground floor and two on the first floor.
Each of the two tenements in
the first floor was in possession of a tenant.
One of the tenements on
the
ground floor was in possession of respondent No. 3 while the other tenement
on the ground floor was in possession of the appellant as a tenant since the last
over 35 years.
Respondent No. 3 after terminating the tenancy of the appellant made an application before the prescribed authority under s. 21 (1) of U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No.
13 of 1972) claiming release of the rented premises in her favour on
the
ground that she bona fide required them for occupation by herself and the
members of her family for residential purposes. The prescribed authority held
that the explanation (iv) to s. 21(1) of the Act was attracted in the present
case since tb.e ground floor constituted a building and a part of it was under
the tenancy of the appellant and the remaining part was in occupation of respondent No. 3. Under s. 21 (1) the prescribed authority has power to evict. a
tenant if it is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord
·for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The proviso, however,
requires that ·except in the case mentioned in the explanation the
prescribed
authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from
the
grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the
refusal of the application. Explanation (iv) provides that the tact that
the
building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in
the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to
prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlard. The prescribed
authority also went into the question of comparative hardship and held that
greater hardship would be caused to respondent No. 3 by refusal of her application than what would be caused to the appellant by granting it.
In an appeal filed by the appellant, the District Court agreed with
the·
prescribed authority that explanation (iv) to section 21 (!) was applicable to
the facts of the case and that it conclusively proved that the building
was
bona fide required by respondent No. 3. But on the question of greater hardship the District Court disagreed with the conclusion reached by the pres~rihed
authority and held that the app~llant was ltkely to .suffer greater hardship by
granting the application !ban what respondent No. 3 would. suf)'er by its refu.sal.
The District Court accordingly allowed the appeal and drsmrssed the app!tci.-
tion of respondent No. 3 for release of the rented premises.
In a writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 the High Court held that the
prescribed authority had recorde~ a definite fi!1d~ng of fact that the accommodation o0 the ground floor constituted one bmldmg and that the app.ellant was
in possession of a part of the buildi!1g. and resporiden! No. 3 wa~ m occupation of the remaining part of the bmldmg for resrdentral purposes.
The Hrgh
Court held that once it wa~ held that explanation (iv) to ~. 21 (I) wa1: attracted
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MOHD. SHAFI v. VII ADDL. DSTT. S.J •. (Bhagwati, /.)
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there could be no question· of examining comparative hardship. The
High
'A,
Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the District Court and allowed the application of respondent No. 3 for release of the
rented premises.
Allowing· the appeal by Speciai Leave, ·
HEL

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464
MOHD. SHAFI
v.
SEVENTH ADDITIONAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE ..
ALLAHABAD & ORS.
December 16, 1976
[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA
FAZAL ALI, JJ.]
U.P. Urban Buildi11gs (Regulation of Le/ling, Rent and Eviction) Actfin2Sec. 2! (I) expla11ation (iv )-Interpretation of a benevolent legislarion-When
two views possible-Whether to be construed strictly against the landlordMeaning of "building" in explanation (iv)-Whether Unit of accommodationConstitu:ion-Articles 226-227-Whether High Court can interfere with mixed
questions of law a11d facts.
Respondent No. 3 owned a double storey house. There were two tenements
on the ground floor and two on the first floor.
Each of the two tenements in
the first floor was in possession of a tenant.
One of the tenements on
the
ground floor was in possession of respondent No. 3 while the other tenement
on the ground floor was in possession of the appellant as a tenant since the last
over 35 years.
Respondent No. 3 after terminating the tenancy of the appellant made an application before the prescribed authority under s. 21 (1) of U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No.
13 of 1972) claiming release of the rented premises in her favour on
the
ground that she bona fide required them for occupation by herself and the
members of her family for residential purposes. The prescribed authority held
that the explanation (iv) to s. 21(1) of the Act was attracted in the present
case since tb.e ground floor constituted a building and a part of it was under
the tenancy of the appellant and the remaining part was in occupation of respondent No. 3. Under s. 21 (1) the prescribed authority has power to evict. a
tenant if it is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord
·for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The proviso, however,
requires that ·except in the case mentioned in the explanation the
prescribed
authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from
the
grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the
refusal of the application. Explanation (iv) provides that the tact that
the
building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in
the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to
prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlard. The prescribed
authority also went into the question of comparative hardship and held that
greater hardship would be caused to respondent No. 3 by refusal of her application than what would be caused to the appellant by granting it.
In an appeal filed by the appellant, the District Court agreed with
the·
prescribed authority that explanation (iv) to section 21 (!) was applicable to
the facts of the case and that it conclusively proved that the building
was
bona fide required by respondent No. 3. But on the question of greater hardship the District Court disagreed with the conclusion reached by the pres~rihed
authority and held that the app~llant was ltkely to .suffer greater hardship by
granting the application !ban what respondent No. 3 would. suf)'er by its refu.sal.
The District Court accordingly allowed the appeal and drsmrssed the app!tci.-
tion of respondent No. 3 for release of the rented premises.
In a writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 the High Court held that the
prescribed authority had recorde~ a definite fi!1d~ng of fact that the accommodation o0 the ground floor constituted one bmldmg and that the app.ellant was
in possession of a part of the buildi!1g. and resporiden! No. 3 wa~ m occupation of the remaining part of the bmldmg for resrdentral purposes.
The Hrgh
Court held that once it wa~ held that explanation (iv) to ~. 21 (I) wa1: attracted
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MOHD. SHAFI v. VII ADDL. DSTT. S.J •. (Bhagwati, /.)
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there could be no question· of examining comparative hardship. The
High
'A,
Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the District Court and allowed the application of respondent No. 3 for release of the
rented premises.
Allowing· the appeal by Speciai Leave, ·
HELD: i. If explanation (iv) to s. 21(1) is applicable in the present case,
the question of comparative hardship of appellant and respondent No. 3 would
not ar\se.
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Z. The High Court erred in holding that the finding that explanation (iv)
was applicable is a finding of fact and it was not competent for the High Court
to interfere with it.
Whether explanation (iv) is attracted in. the present case
would depend upon the applicability to the facts of the correct interpretation of
the explanation and it would, therefore, clearly be a mixed question of law
and fact and if the High Court found that in reaching its conclusion on this
question the District Court proceeded on a wrong interpretation of the explanation, the High Court can certainly correct the error and set aside the conclusion reached by the District Court.
[ 469 A-G]
3. 1The language used by the Legislature in. explanation (iv) is extremely
clumsy.
The legislation should be couched in simple and plain language.
Since
the explanation raises a conclusive presumption in favour of the landlord in a
legislation which is inbended to protect the ·tenant against unreasonable. eviction,
11 must be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible
into the protection afforded to the tenant. If the language of the explanation
is susceptible· of two interpretations we should prefer that which enlarges the
protection of the tenant rather than that which restricts it. The. word building
is used thrice in explanation (iv) and it is clear from the context in which it
occurs that it is not intended to be used in its popular sense so M to mean the
entire superstructure raised on the ground. The "building" jn the explanation
is used to denote a unit of which accommodation under tenancy constitutes
a part and the remaining part is in the. occupation of the landlord for residential purposes.
Where a superstructure consists of two or more tenements' and
each tenement is an independent unit distinct and separate from the other the
explanation would be of no application because . each tenement would be
a
unit and not a part of a unit. It is only where there is a unit of accommodation out of which
a part is under the tenancy and the remaining part is
in
occupation of the landlord that the explanation would be attracted.
To determine the applicability of the explanation, the question to be asked would be
whether the accommodation under tenancy and the accommodation in occupation of the landlord together constitute one unit of accommodation. This
construction would be more consistent with the policy and intendment of the
legislation which is to protect. the possession of the tenant unless the landlord
establishes his bona fide requirement of the accommodation under tenancy.
.
[469 A-F, 470 A-G]
Chunnoo Lal v. Addi. District Judge, Allahabad [1975] 1 A.LR. 362,
approved.
The Court remanded the matter back to the District Court to determine the
question in the light of the interpretation of the explanation given in 'the judgD
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1.976.
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(Appeal by Special Lea~e from· the Judgment and Order dated
14-5-1976 of the Allahabad High Court in C. M. W. No. 7441 of
1975).
K. P. Gupta and B. B. Tawak/ey, for the app\\\lant.,
S ... P, ·Gupta,· Pramod Swarup and Ma'noj .Swarup; for" tespori'dent
No.3.-.-',.
·.·..
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, .... .,,.,.,.
.,.,.,,.
ii
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 s.c.R.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-There is a house bearing No. 10-A situate at
Khuldabagh in the city of Allahabad belonging to respondent No. 3.
· This house consists of a ground floor and a first floor. There are two
tenements on the ground floor and two tenements on the first floor.
Ea~h of the two tenements in the first floor is in the possession of a
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tenant. The tenement on the northern side of the ground floor is in
the possession of respondent NO: 3, while the tenement on the' southern side is in the possession of the appellant as a tenant since the last
over 35 years. The appellant pays rent of Rs. 4/- per month in respect of the tenement in his occupation.
Respondent No .. 3,
after
determining the tenancy of the appellant, made an application before
the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad under section 3 of
C · the U.P. Rent Control & Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a
suit to eject the appellant on the ground that she bona fide required
the rented premises in the possession of the appellant for her use and
occupation. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer, on a consideration
of the evidence led before him, came to the conclusion that the need
of respondent No. 3 for the rented premises was not bona fide and
genuine and on this view, he rejected the application of respondent
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No. 3 by an order dated 23rd February, 1972.
Respondent No. 3
preferred a revision application against the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the Commissioner and, on the coming into
force of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent &
Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), this revision application came to be transferred to the District Court under section 43
(m) of that Act and it was numbered as Civil Appea-i No. 245 of
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1972.
The District Judge by an order dated 12th January, 1973
agreed with the view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer
and dismissed the appeal.
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However, within a short time thereafter, respondent No. 3, undaunted by her failure, filed an application before the Prescribed Authority
on l&th January, 1974 under section 21 ( 1) of U.P. Act No. 13 of
1972 claiming release of the rented premises in her favour on the
ground that she bona fide required them for occupation by herself and
,
the members of her family for residential purposes.
The Prescribed ,~
Authority held that Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) of U.P. Act
No. 13 of 1972 was attracted in the present case, since the ground
floor of house No. 10-A constitute a building, a part of which was
under tenancy of the appellant and the remaining part was in the
occupation of respondent No. 3 for residential purposes, and hence
it must be held to be conclusively established that the rented premises
were bona fide required by
respondent
No. 3.
The
Prescribed
Authority also went into the question of comparative hardship of the
appellant and respondent No. 3 and observed that greater h~rds?ip
would be caused to respondent No. 3 by ·refusal of her appl1cat1on
than what would be caused to the appellant by granting it On this
view the Prescribed Authority aHowed the application of respondent
No. '3 and released the rented premises in her favour.
The appellant being agl!rleved by the order passed bv the Prescribed
Authority prefered an appeal to the District Court, Allahabad.
The
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MOHD. SHAFI v. VII ADDL,, DSTT. S.J. (Bhagwati, J.)
"67
District Court agreed with the view taken by the Prescribed Authority
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that Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972
was applicable to the facts of the present case and "that fact conclusively proved that the building was bona fide required" b>: re.spondcnt
No. 3.
But on the question of greater hardship, the. D1str1ct Col!rt
disagreed with the conclusion reached by the Prescnbed Authonty
and held that the appellant was likely to suffer greater hardship by
granting the application than what respondent No. 3 would suffer by
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its refusal.
The District Court accordingly allowed the appeal and
rejected the application of respondent No. 3 for rnlease of
rented
premises.
~-
This led to the filing of a writ petition by respondent No. 3 in the
High Court of Allahabad challenging the legality of the order rejecting
her application.
Respondent No. 3 contended .that since her bona
fide requirement of the rented premises was established by reason of
applicability of Explanation (iv) to section 21 (1) of U.P. Act No. 13
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of 1972, the question of comparative hardship was immaterial and
the District Court was in error in throwing out her application on the
ground that greater hardship would be caused to the appellant by
granting. her application than what would be caused to her by refusing .
it. The High Court while dealing with this contention observed that the
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Prescribed Authority had recorded a finding of fact that "the accommodation on the ground floor constituted one building" and
"the
respondent was in possession of a part of the building and the landlady was in occupation of the remaining part of the building for residential purposes" and this finding of fact reached by the Prescribed
Authority was- confirmed by the District Court and in view of this
tinding which the High Court apparently thought it could not disturb,
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the High Court proceeded on the basis that Explanation (iv) to section 21 (1) of U .P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ·was applicable in the present
case. But the High Court went on to point out that once it was held
that Explanation (iv) to section 21(1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of
1972 was a'ttracted, there could be no question of examining compa_.)
rative hardship, for in such a case greater hardship of the
tenant
would be an irrelevant consideration.
The High Court on this view
allowed the writ petition, set aside the order of the District Court and
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premises but gave two months' time to the appellant to vacate the
same. The ap_pellant being dissatisfied with this order passed by the
High Court preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained
from this Court.
Now, it may be pointed out straightaway that if Ex:planation (iv)
to section 21(1) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable in the
present case, the question of comparing the relative hardship of the
appellant and respondent No. 3 would not arise and respondent No.
3 would straightaway be entitled to an order of eviction as 8oon as
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she shows that the conditions specified in the Explanation are satisfied.
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Section 21 ( 1), as it stood at the material time with the retrospective
amendment introduced by the U.P. Urban Buildin!!s (Regulation of
Letting, Rent & Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 being U.P. Act
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468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· [1977] 2 S.C.R.
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No. 28 of 1976, was _in the followin~ terms-we are setting out here
only the relevant portt9n of that section :-
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· "21. Proceedini:s for release of building under occupation
of tenant.-
·
(1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of
the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of
a
tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any
of
the
following grounds exists, namely,
(a) that the building is bona fide required
either
in .its existing form or after demolition and new
construction by the landlord for occupation by
himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either or
residential purposes or for purposes of apy pro•
fession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is
the trustee of a public charitable trust, for
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objects of the trust :
Provided also that the prescribed
authority
~hall,
except in cases provided for in tho Explanation, take
into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the
grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have tegard to such
factors as may be prescribed.
Explanation : In the case of a re~idential building-
(iv) tho fact that the building under tenancy is a part of
building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of
the landlord for residential purposes, shll be conclusive to
prove thaf. the building is bona fide required by the landlord."
The language of the proviso is clear and explicit and it requires the
Prescribed Authority to take into account the relative hardship of the
landlord and the tenant only in those cases which are not covered by
the Explan<!t!Qn.
If a case falls within the Explanation, the proviso
would have no application and it would not be necessary to consider
the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant in deciding
whether or not to make an order of eviction.
The principal question
which, therefore, arises for determination in this appeal is
whether
Explanation (iv) is 'attracted on the facts of the present case.
The
High Court seemed to take th_e view that the fin,ding of the Prescribed
Authority that fX.J?J.a,riation (iv) w,as applicable in the . present case
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MOHD. SWAl'I V. VII ADDL. DSTT. S.J. (Bhagwati, J.)
469
was a finding of fact and iinco this finding of fact was affirmed by the
District Court in appeal, it was not competent to the High Court to
interfere with it in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Art. 226 of the Constitution and that was presumably the reason why
the High Court accepted the hypothesis that the case was covered by
Explaniition (iv). But this view of the High Court is plainly erroneous because the question whether Explanation (iv) is attracted in
. the present case would depend on the applicability to the facts, of the
correct interpretation of the Explanation and it would,· therefore, clearly
b.e a mixed question of law and fact, and if the High Court found that
in reaching its conclusion on this question the Distri~t Court proceed-
·ed on a wrong interpretation of the Explanation, the High Court could
certainly correct the error and set aside the conclusion reached by the
· District Court.
We must, therefore, first consider what is the proper
construction of the language employed in Explanation (iv).
· It is apparent even on a cursory r~ading of Explanation (iv) that
the language employed by the Legislature in expressing its intent is
extremely clumsy.
This is a glaring example of how the Legislature
can by inapt and ill-considered drafting create uncertainty and promote
litigation. It appears that sometimes the legislature forgets that laws
:are intended for human beings and they should be so framed that an
ordinary man can understand their true import and · meaning.
The
language in which the legislation is couched must be simple and plain
so that even 'a man in the Clapam bus', or if we may indigenise this·
·expression 'a man in the DTC bus' should be able to follow its man-
<late and injunction without the possibility of doubt or error.
Here,
unfortunately the language of Explanation (iv) is such that we have
to grope our way in a chaos of verbal darkness and try to arrive at
the correct legislative meaning with great diffidence and hesitation.
But there is one principle of interpretation which offers some guidance
in the interpretation of the rather obscure language of this Explanation and it is that since the Explanation raises a conclusive presumption
in favour of the landlord in a legislatiori which is intended to protect
the tenant against unreasonable eviction, it. must be construed strictly
against the landlord so as to cut as litt<!e as possible into the protection
afforded to the tenant. If the language of the Explanation is susceptible
of two interpretations, we should prefer that which enlarges the pro-
-~ . tection of the tenant rather than that which · res_tricts it.
Bearing in
'
/ , mind his principle of interpretation, we may now approach the langu-
)
age of Explanation (iv) and try to arrive at its proper construction.
The word 'building' is used thrice in Explanation (iv) and it is
-clear from the context in which it occurs that it is not intended to be
used in its popular sense so as to mean the entire
super-structure
raised on the ground.
The first time that the word 'building' is used
is in the exoression 'the building under tenancy' and it is obvious that
it is 'the building unc;Jer tenancy' which is intended to be referred when
the word 'buHding' is used towards the end of the Explanation. It is
in respect of 'the building under tenancy' that a conclusive presumption is raised that it is bona fide required by the landlord. Now, 'the
building under tenancy' cannot be the entire super-structure because
what i's contemplated by the Explanation is that "the building under
tenancv" must be "a part of a building" and, therefore, it cannot be
the whole super-structure. Here, the word 'building' obviously meaml
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470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 2 S.C.R.
acco~odation. which is th~ subject-matter of tenancy.
The question
~hus 1s : what 1s the sense m which the word 'building' is used when
~t ~ccurs for the second ~im~ i~ t?~ Explanation. The context clearly
md1cates that the word bmldmg 1s there used to denote a unit of
whic~ _the acco~m.odation under . tenancy constitutes a part and' the
remammg part 1s m the occupation of the landlord for
residential
~urp~ses. The acc?mmodation under tenancy and the accommodation m the occupat10n of the landlord together go ·to make up the
'building'. The use of the word 'part' is a clear pointer that the 'building'., o~ which the ac~ommodation under tenancy and the accommodat10n m the occupat10n of the landlord are parts, must be a unit.
Where a super-structure consists of two or more tenements and each·
tenement is an independent unit distinct and separate from the other,
the Explanation would be of no application, because each tenement
would be a unit and not part of a unit. It is only where there is a ·
unit of accommodation out of which a part is under tenancy and the
remaining part is in the occupation of the landlord, that the Explanation, would be attracted.
To determine the applicability of the
Explanation, the question to be asked would be whether the accommodation under tenancy and the accommodation in the occupation of the
landlord together constitute one unit of accommodation? The object
of the Legislature clearly was that where there is a single unit of
accommodation, of which a part has been let out to a tenant, the landlord who is in occupation of the remaining part should be entitled to
recover possession of the part let out to the tenant. It could never have
been intended by the Legislature that where a super-structure consists
of two independent and separate units of accommodation one of which
is let out to a tenant and the other is in the occupation of the landlord,
the landlord should, without any proof of bona fide requirement, be
entitled to recover possession of the tenement let out to the tenant.
It is difficult to see what social object or purpose the legislation could
have had in view in conferring such a right on the landlord. Such a
provision would be plainly contrary to the aim and objeciive of the
legislation.
On the other hand, if we read the Explanation to be
applicable only to those cases where a single unit of accommodation is
•
divided by letting out a part to a tenant so that the landlord, who is
in occupation of the remaining part, is given the right to evict the
tenant and secure for himself possession of the whole unit, it would not
unduly restrict or narrow down the protection against eviction afforded _,.....,.
to the tenant.
This construction would be more consistent with the
policy and intendment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant, unless the landlord establishes his bona fide requirement of the accommodation under tenancy. We may point out that
Mr. Justice Bari Swamp has also taken the. same view in a wellconsidered judgment in Chunnoo Lal v. Addi. District Judge, Allahabad(') and that decision has our approval.
Since the question as to the applicability of Explanation (iv) on
the facts of the present case has not been considered by the High
Court as well as the lower courts on the basis of the aforesaid conH
struction of the Explanation, we must set aside the judgment of the
High Court as also the order of the. District Court and remand the
case to the District Court with a direction to dispose it of in the light
(1) (1975) 1 A.L.R. 362.
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MOHD. SHAFI v. VII ADDL. DSTT. S.J. (Bhagwati, J.)
471
of the interpretation placed by us on the. Explanation. It was contended before us on behaJ.f of the appellant that since Explanation
(iv) has been omitted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, respondent No. 3
was no longer entitled to take advantage of it and her claim for
possession must fail.
But the answer given by respondent No. 3 to
this contention was that the omission of Explanation (iv) was pros-
;
pective and not retrospective and since Explanation (iv) was in force
at the date when respondent No. 3 filed her application for release, she
had a vested right to obtain release of the rented premises in her favour
"
by virtue Explanation (iv) and that vested right was not taken away
by the prospective omission of Explanation (iv) and hence she was
entitled to rely on it despite its omission by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976.
We have not pronounced on these rival contentions since we think it
would be better to leave it to the District Court to decide which contention is correct. If the District Court finds that by reason of the
omission of Explanation (iv) by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 re·spondent
No. 3 is no longer entitled to rely on it to sustain her claim for release
of the rented premises in her favour, it will be unnecessary for the
District Court to examine the further question .as to whether Explanation (iv) is attracted on the facts of the present case. If, on the
other hand, District Court finds that the omission of Explanation (iv)
by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 being prospective and not retrospective,
respondent No. 3 is entitled to avail of that Explanation, the District
Court will proceed to decide whether the two tenements or the ground
floor constituted one single unit of accommodation so as to attract the
applicability of Explanation (iv) and for this purpose, the District
Court may, if it so thinks necessary, either take further evidence itself
or require further evidence to be taken by the Prescribed Authority.
If the District Court finds that the case is covered by Explanation
(iv) , there would be
no
question
of
examining
comparative
hardship of the appellant and respondent No. 3, and respondent
No. 3 would straightaway be entitled to an order of release of the
rented premises in her favour.
On the other hand, if the
District
Court comes to the conclusion that by reason of the omission of
Explanation (iv) of the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 respondent No. 3
is not entitl!!d to rely on it or that Explanation (iv) is not applicable
on the facts of the present case, the application of respondent No. 3
would fall, since it has already been found by the District Court-
'
~.- and we do not propose t~ disturb this finding-that the appellant
would suffer greater hardship by !!fanting of the application than what
would be suffered by respondent No. 3 if the application were to be
refused. We accordingly remand the matter to the District Court with no
order as to costs.
-
P.H.P.
Appeal allowed.
}
14-1546 SCI/76
A
B
c
D
E
F
G